yevamos 90 הוראת שעה

the gemara tries to prove that the sages have power to go against the torah from the story of אליהו בהר הכרמל. Tosfos asks (here and in tosfos yeshanim and in sanhedrin), how can we bring a proof from אליהו if he did it ע"פ הדיבור, one track of tosfos is to say that if not that חכמים have a power to go against the torah then נבואה wouldn't help since אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר.
Another track of tosfos holds that no, and there is in fact a concept of הוראת שעה ע"פ הדיבור. This also seems to be the opinion of the rambam.

Interesting that we find this concept of הוראת שעה mentioned all over shas (my search brought up 18 places, but some sugyas mentioned it more then once in the same context). so according to the opinion that holds there no such power as to against the torah ע"פ נבואה all these places will have to be למיגדר מילתא.

To end with a note of Machsava, Rav Hutner has a piece (i think its in rosh hashansa) that shows that all the beginnings were הוראת שעה. The kurbanos of the מילואים and the same by the 1st bais hamikdash were all diferent then the norm. in the 2nd bais hamikdash, it was the miracle of chanuka that fulfiled this concept. with this he explains the psukim in יחזקאל regarding the 3rd bais hamikdash. a fascinating must see piece.

the depth here is what the rambam really says in the מורה and that is that the rule for sustaining the thing is the opposite of its point of creation. for example, he says there that if a child was born in an island stranded there with only men, the men can teach the child to read etc so that one day when they reach civilization he will be able to fit in. But one thing the child cannot comprehend- the birth of a child. if you were to tell this child that a man is created in an enviorment where he is immersed in water and his lungs are collapsed and no food enters his mouth etc. he will think you are mad! Hashem created nature this way to teach us that although this world follows the rules of nature and exists within a framework of time and place, but the point of origin is exactly the opposite.

and it MUST be that way, because to be created has to come from outside the system. too long for a blog...

Yevamos 90b - Tzitzis: shev v'al ta'aseh

R' Yossi - thanks for keeping it up while i am gone (1 more week!).

Tosafos is bothered why the gemara considers tzitzis to be a shev v'al ta'aseh. Tosafos understands that the mitzvah of tzitzis is only applicable after the garment is already being worn, so the act of putting it on is not a violation and the continued wearing of it is a shev v'al ta'aseh. However, Tosafos in the end points out that the bracha does not seem to conform with this approach. The Sha'agas Aryeh has a more simple approach. The mitzvah of tzitzis is like any other mitzvas a'seh, where the bitul of it by definition is shev v'al ta'aseh. Even if one were to put themselves into a situation where they are actively causing a bitul to the mitzvah i.e. putting on a four cornered garment without tzitzis, the actual bitul of the mitzvah is by not tying tzitzis onto the garment which is being violated b'shev v'al ta'seh. If i remember correctly we find a parallel to this in Tosafos at the beginning of shavuos, if one makes a vow to eat a loaf of bread and then throws it into the ocean, although he is actively causing the bitul of his vow, the actual violation of the vow is by not eating the bread which is b'shev v'al ta'aseh. I think the steipler discusses this in shavuos (but i don't have many seforim with me now).

ibid does she become a zona

the mishna says she cannot marry a kohen, is she a zona? it would seem to be an argument in gemara 56b, why didn't the gemara bring a proof from here??

yevamos 87b not being able to eat truma, d'robonon??

the mishna says that if a woman remarries and then her husband shows up then she is pasul for trumah and rashi explains that its m'drobonon.
my question is that in 35a in the case of 2 brothers and 2 sisters that exchanged their wife’s by mistake, there the gemara says that they are pasul to kohanim, rashi and tosfos debate the source for that, according to rashi its from the pasuk of having relations with a "zar" like amoni and the like (68a), problem is then she should be pasul also to eat truma forever m'doraysa. bottom line according to rashi 35a it would seem that in our mishna also it should make her not be able to eat truma m'doraysa???

יבמות 86 מה תרומה טובלת

עיין ברש"י ותוספות שחולקים מדוע חייב מיתה על טבל שמעורב בו תרומה, דשיטת רש"י כיון שמעורב בו תרומה שחייב עליה מיתה ושיטת התוספות דיש פה שם טבל ועל זה חייב ונלמד חילול חילול מתרומה

וכעין זה מצינו מ"ח ראשונים בנדרים יב ע"א. דשם בסוגיא איתא שהמתפיס בכחלת אהרון ותרומתו הוי מתפיס בדבר האסור ולא הנדור, ומקשים הראשונים מדוע לא הוי דבר הנדור הרי קדושתם באה מקריאת שם דומי דקרבנות, עיין שם בר"ן מה שתירץ, אך הרא"ש שם בפירושו מתרץ וז"ל ואע"ג דמתסר ע"י פיולא הוי דבר הנדור דהא מעיקרא נמי הוא אסור משום טבל ופיו לא אסר אלא התיר שהוציא השירים מידי טבל עכ"ל ולהדיא מבואר שהרא"ש ס"ל כרש"י שאין ממש קריאת שם על תרומה אלא התרומה כבר מעורבת בטבל עוד לפני הקריאת שם ולכן הוי דבר האסור ולכן רש"י מבאר בסוגיא שלכן גם חייב מיתה האוכל טבל שמעורב בו תרומה

אלא שקשה על רש"י קושית התוספות דא"כ נימא גם בטבל טבול למעשר ראשון שתרומת מעשר מעורבת בה, ולכאורה צ"ל שרש"י ילמוד דמעשר שאני שאין הוא מעורב בטבל אלא צריך לקרוא שם על המעשר כדי שיהיה שם מעשר הכא, ואה"נ אולי לאחר שקורא שם מעשר ג"כ שייך לומר שהפרשת תרומת המעשר היא כעין קריאת שם דתרומה ולא כקריאת שם דמעשר
ואסיים בדרך צחות שכך אולי מדוייק בפסוקים סוף פרשת קרח, ואצטט הפסוקים והמבין יבין

מעשר: כד כִּי אֶת מַעְשַֹר בְּנֵי יִשְֹרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר יָרִימוּ לַיי' תְּרוּמָה נָתַתִּי לַלְוִיִּם לְנַחֲלָה עַל כֵּן אָמַרְתִּי לָהֶם בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְֹרָאֵל לֹא יִנְחֲלוּ נַחֲלָה:

תרומה: כט מִכֹּל מַתְּנֹתֵיכֶם תָּרִימוּ אֵת כָּל תְּרוּמַת יי' מִכָּל חֶלְבּוֹ אֶת מִקְדְּשׁוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ

תרומת מעשר: כו וְאֶל הַלְוִיִּם תְּדַבֵּר וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם כִּי תִקְחוּ מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְֹרָאֵל אֶת הַמַּעֲשֵֹר אֲשֶׁר נָתַתִּי לָכֶם מֵאִתָּם בְּנַחֲלַתְכֶם וַהֲרֵמֹתֶם מִמֶּנּוּ תְּרוּמַת יי' מַעֲשֵֹר מִן הַמַּעֲשֵֹר

current events

it is almost allowed to learn today's daf ans tosofos as it discusses the sanctity of yerushalayim in the time of destruction.
it is well know that the opinion of the rambam is that although קדושה ראשונה בטלה but the sanctity of ירושלים והעזרות stays on. on a מחשבה level, the parallel to that is the שברי לוחות which remain קדוש even after they broke. more so, hashem didn't tell moshe not to give the לוחות even after לך רד כי שחת עמך and the reason is that the breaking of the לוחות is also a form of קבלת התורה. the depth here is that when we have a בהמ"ק we see the revelation of Hashem, but when we don't have it we see a deeper revelation that it isn't possible to exist without it. This realization in itself is a revelation and it is that revelation that causes the גאולה. Machiach is born on Tisha Beov and ט' באב has a דין מועד. (adopted from...)
may we merit redemption.

I will be taking a vacation until August 8th and I don't think I will have internet access - Yossi PLEASE keep up the blog!

Yevamos 83b - Removing Someone else's Pot From The Fire

Tosafos 83b says that the rule of "ein adam mekadesh davar sheino shelo" applies only to issurim where the machshava - thought, plays a role in creating the issur such as kelaim and avoda zarah, but issurim that are purely based on ma'aseh are not bound by this rule. R' Akiva Eiger (O.C 253) points out that the Ra'sh (kelayim perek 7) argues on Tosafos since we find that if one does melacha with para aduma of someone else, it passuls even though it is dependent on machshava (as we see from the case of bringing it into barn and threshing...). The Ra'sh maintains that really one can assur even davar sheino shelo, except by kelayim where there is a gezeiras hakasuv that it must be yours, and avodah zara where the issur is completely bound by the intent of the owner (since that is the definition of avoda zara - intent). R' Akiva Eiger explains the point of argument: Tosafos holds that whenever machshava plays a role we implement the rule that one cannot assur something which doesn't belong to him. But the Ra'sh holds that any situation where the issur is dependent on an action, just that a thought can prevent the issur, such as kelayim and parah aduma where the machashava can prevent the issur, so long as the one doing it is interested in doing the melacha or planting the kelayim, it becomes assur even though the owner was not interested.
Now R' Akiva Eiger explains, the issur of chazarah - returning a pot to the "blech" on shabbos requires 2 conditions: 1. it is still in your hand. 2. his intent was to return it when he took it off. If someone else removed my pot and was still holding it in his hand but did not have intent to put it back, according to tosafos since the machshava plays a role one cannot assur the pot of someone else, but according to Ra'sh since the primary problem is the act of removing and the machshava merely prevents the act from assuring the return of the pot, we regard the thought of someone else to consider it an act of removing so the pot cannot be returned to the fire.

question

the gemara assumes that if after the zika he becomes a sris, then the zika should not require chalitza.
question: in mishna 41a it is clear that if she becomes a wife's sister after the zika, she needs chalitza, and tosfos yom tov and tiferes yisroel explain since the zika cam first. would love an answer for this.

Yevamos 81b - Chatas Tahor is Batul

The Braisa of chaticha makes a distinction that if a chatas tamei gets mixed into chatas tahor it is batul, but if chatas tahor get mixed into chulin it is not batul. Rashi explains that really in both cases it should be batul (acc. to R' Yochanan who says that something which is sometimes sold by quantity is batul, unless it is always sold by quantity). The rationale for the seifa case of chatas tahor mixed into chulin not being batul is that: 1. it is sometimes sold b'minyan so it has some chashivus (to the exclusion if it would be dissolved). 2. it is deoraysa (to the exclusion of the figs which are only derabonon). 3. it is only a small loss even if it is not batul since kohanim can still eat it (to the exclusion of tamei getting mixed which is a major loss). The combination of all 3 factors forces us to be machmir.

Tosafos disagrees with rashi and explains that the rationale for chatas tahor not being batul in chulin is that if it would be batul, you can use it to be honor someone. The issur would be a chaticha that is re'uya l'hischabeid and is not batul. But in the reisha, where even if it is batul it would remain kodesh, it is not re'uya l'hischabeid so it is batul. It seems that this Tosafos is based on Tosafos 82a (d.h. R' yehuda) that a davar yaveish that is batul is not bec. it is not recognizable where the issur is, but the issur piece retains its status (If it would be like liquid which does not retain its status rather gets dispersed, then at the point it would become re'uya l'hischabeid it is no longer a piece of issur). Therefore, since the issur piece after being batul will retain its issur status and can be used to be mechabeid someone, it has chashivus and can't be batul. The moment you try to make it batul it is able to be used to be mechabeid and would no longer be batul.

Yevamos 79a - Gezeira on Nissinim

Explanation of 2 mehalchim in tosafos about the gezeira on Nissinim:

1. Moshe and Yehoshua were gozer to make them slaves, but since the slavery was only for a set period of time, they are not included in the la'av of kadeish. Since people perceive them as slaves, they also forbade marrying them. After the destruction of the mikdash, there was no longer an issur, but Dovid was gozer against marrying them since they did not have midos of Yisroel. In order to uphold the issur to marry them, Dovid was gozer that they should be slaves (opposite of moshe and yehoshua, who upheld the slavery by assuring marriage). In the time of Rebbi, they wanted to be matir the issur marriage imposed by Dovid, by being mafkir the right of slavery. But, since Dovid gave ownership rights to klal yisroel and to mizbeiach, they could not be matir the rights of the mizbeiach and therefore it would be inappropriate to be matir marriage since they still look like slaves (similar to moshe and yehoshua's gezeira).

2. Moshe and Yehoshua and Dovid were all gozer regular slavery. Although Moshe and Yehoshua were temporary gezeiros, it still gave them the status of slaves who are assur m'diorayasa from marrying kehal hashem. In the times of Rebbi they realized that they could not be matir the issur of marriage, since they realized that they could not release the ownership of the mizbeiach, and they would remain slaves. Nevertheless, they wanted to free them from work, but then they realized that people would soon forget that they were slaves who were still owned by mizbeiach and would come to marry them, so we could not free our ownership of them.

Yevamos 78a - Milah After Tevillah

The gemara explains that even if an unborn child is not part of the mother, and the conversion of the mother does not work for the child, the tevillah of the mother works as if the child himself had tevillah and therefore undergoes his own conversion. The Nimukei Yosef (bottom 16a) cites Ramban who proves from here that tevillah can be done (bidieved) before milah, and he would not need a 2nd tevillah. However, the Re'ah argues and says:

דכשהוא במעי אמו אינו בן מילה, והרי הוא כנקבה דסגיא לה בטבילה, וכשנולד ומלין אותו אינו אלא כמו שמלין ישראל שהוא ערל...

Milah is only required when it is physically possible to do it, but so long as the child is in the mother's womb he is not an o'rel and can be converted with tevillah alone.

Tosafos (47b on top) can either be explained to be saying like the Re'ah, or can be explained to mean that when milah cannot be done at the time of tevilla, we would allow the tevillah to be done before the milah, but both are required for the geirus. The nafka minah is whether the milah has to be done l'sheim geirus.

Yevamos 78a - Moavi V'lo Moavis

In the story with Ruth, the Go'el was concerned "pen achish nachalasi" - he was afraid that his children will be pesulei kahal, as rashi explains in Ruth 4:6 that the go'el made mistake by not realizing "moavi and not moavis". The Maharsha asks, based on his mistake of not making this drasha i.e. holding like Do'eg, he should have been concerned for doing an issur of marrying an Amonis. Why was his concern only about his children being pasul to kehal and not about himself doing an issur? Maharsha answers that he had a heter for yibum bec. the aseh of yibum would push off the issur moavi, but his children would still be pesulei k'hal. This approach if very difficult bec. even though based on Ramban by Tamar we find the concept of Yibum in regard to all relatives, it certainly would not have the power to push off an issur (especially in the time of Ruth which was after matan torah)?

The Brisker Rav on Ruth answers this question, that the beis din of Boaz was matir Ruth based on a drasha of "moavi and not moavis". Really this drasha was a halacha l'moshe misinai and could not be changed, but the go'el didn't accept that it was a halacha l'moshe m'sinai, rather assumed that it was a drasha of 13 midos which can be accepted in one generation and then overturned in the next generation. So, for himself he had a heter to marry Ruth since that was the p'sak of the beis din in his generation, but he was concerned that it will be overturned in future generations and retroactively render his children p'sulei k'hal.

Regarding Tosafos question, just like we make the drasha of "moavi and not moavis" we should make the drasha of "mitzri and not mitzris", both maharsha and brisker rav agree based on Rambam (Isurei Biah 12:18) that it is not a drasha, rather a halacha l'moshe misinai.

Yevamos 77a - Converting a Moavi

It seems from the Mishnah and Gemara, and is explicit in the Rambam and Chinuch that there is no problem to convert a moavi man, just that if converted he is assur b'khal Hashem. This is muchrach by Mitzri, since the only way to have a mitzri sheini and shlishi, is that after conversion of a mitzri rishon, the child will be a sheini and their child a shlishi [As a side point, the Tosafos Yeshanim seems to understand that the issur of mitzri/edomi amoni/moavi, apply only after conversion. Based on this he explains the gemara's question on shlomo hamelech, how can he marry bas pharoh since she was a mitzri rishon. Meaning, if she was a goy, there is no question bec. the issur doesn't apply, but if she converted then there is an issur].

Now, the maharsha explains that the reason why do'eg was threatened that if he doesn't accept the halacha of "moavi and not moavis", he would be killed by sword was mida k'neged midah, since he was trying to kill with the sword. Do'eg claimed that an amonis conversion is invalid, in which case the marriage of Bo'az to Ruth was kanaim pog'im bo since she was a non-jew and they deserve to be killed like by pinchas. I really don't understand the maharsha, there is no question that Ruth was a Jew, the only question is whether she was mutar b'khal hashem?

Yevamos 76a - Clogged Vas Deferens

According to my understanding, sperm is produced in the testicles and is expelled through the vas deferens (chutei beitzim) and then through the urethra to exit the body. Along the way it picks up some extra fluids from the prostate (if i am wrong, please correct me).

R' Moshe (Igros E.H. 4:30) has a fascinating teshuvah about someone who had a clogged vas deferens and wants to repair it through surgery which would entail cutting and removing the bad section, and then sewing together the two sides so that sperm can flow through it. The questions are:

1. Is there an issur of sirus (sterilizing) by cutting the tube, since sirus is an issur d'oraysa even after one is already not capable of reproducing?

2. Is the person considered a patuzah dakka in his present state with a clogged vas deferens?

3. If the surgery is successful, is the pasul of patuzah dakkah removed so that he can marry kehal hashem?

4. If the surgery is not successful, does he become a patzuah dakka from the surgery?

R' Moshe assumes from our gemara where they expand the whole in his eiver in order to repair it, that sirus which is done with the intent to repair, does not violate an issur sirus. We also see from there and from the gemara earlies where krus shafcha was repaired, that these problems can be fixed. This answers question 1 and 3. Now, R' Moshe proves from the statement of R' papi in the gemara on the bottom of 75b-76a that a blockage is considered patzuah dakka. This answers question 2. Therefore, one who had the blockage from illness is considered patzuah dakka bidei shamayim, and is mutar l'kahal. If the surgery is not successful he maintains his state of being mutar l'kahal. But, one who has a vasectomy (cut the vas deferens) which is a patzuah dakka bidei adam, can only be fixed if the surgery is successful, but otherwise maintains his issur l'kahal status.

Yevamos 75b - Patzuah Dakka

1. Rabbeinu Tam is mechadesh based on the yerushalmi that if one beitzah is removed, he is still kasher. There are 2 versions in the yerushalmi based on the girsah: 1. if the beitzah left behind and the one removed were both healthy (b'shleimin) he is kasher. 2. if the beitzah left behind was the right one (b'shel yemin) he is kasher. The Rema 5:7 writes that some are matir if the beitzah that was removed was healthy and the one left behind (which is also healthy) is the right one. The Rama is machmir for both interpretations of the yerushalmi, and still paskens not to rely on it at all, so if either one of the beitztim were removed, he is passul.

2. There is an important machlokes in classifying "bidei shamaim". The Rosh understands from Rashi that only if one is born missing beitzim or they get damaged by hail (or some natural phenomenon) is it considered bidei shamayim and kasher. But if it occurs bec. of illness he is passul. But the Rambam and most others disagree and maintain that illness qualifies as bidei shamayim. The poskim write (see pischei teshuva 5:7 in the name of chasam sofer) that if they must be surgically removed due to illness, that also qualifies as bidei shamayim and he is kasher.

Yevamos 74a - Annointing is like Drinking

The Gemara says that ma'aser that is tamei can be used for anointing. Why speak about ma'aser tamei, since ma'aser tahor can also be used for anointing? Rashi says that one would of thought that ma'aser tamei can't be used for anointing since anointing is like drinking, and it would be like drinking ma'aser tamei, therefore we are taught that even ma'aser tamei may be used for anointing. Rashi understands that bec. of sicha k'shtiya, the default position would have been to assur anointing with ma'aser tamei, so we need a gezeiras hakasuv to be matir. However, Tosafos says that the chiddush of ma'aser tamei is that since there is a prohibition to benefit from the burning of ma'aser tamei (not like terumah - 73b), it should also be assur to anoint since it is like burning (consuming not through eating), so we need a gezeiras hakasuv to be matir anointing.
Tosafos does not explain like rashi since Tosafos holds (nidah 32a) that the concept of sicha k'shtiya - anointing is like drinking, is only derabonon, so we don't need a pasuk to exclude that premise. But, Rashi seems to understand that sicha k'shtiya is d'oraysa so the default would be to assur anointing m'doraysa since it is tantamount to drinking ma'aser tamei, and the pasuk comes to be mechadesh that anointing with ma'aser tamei is mutar.

See Maharatz Chiyus who raises this issue but does not turn it into a machlokes rashi and tosafos.

Yevamos 71b - Millah When Parents are in Jail

The gemara is searching for a case where milah of a child holds one back from eating the korban pesach even though the mitzvah of milah didn't exist at the time of slaughtering the korban pesach. Rava says that if the parents of an 8 day old child were in jail at the time of slaughtering the korban pesach, they are not mechuyav in the mitzvah of milah since they are unable to perform it. Therefore, if they would remain in jail even for the time of eating, they can eat the korban pesach (that an agent brought for them), but if they get out at the time of eating, their child being an orel prevents them from eating the korban pesach. Maharsha points out that the gemara (and rashi) imply that although a woman is not metzuvah in milah to her child, the fact that her child is an orel still prevents her from being able to eat korban pesach. Therefore, the gemara must make the case where she is also in jail. What would be the din if only the father were in jail (for both the slaughtering and the eating) but the mother was not in jail; certainly the mother cannot eat since from her perspective the child is an "orel", but can the father eat? It seems to me that since according to maharsha there is a joint chiyuv on the father and mother, if the mother would not be in jail, then even the father could not eat from the korban pesach.

Do you think that is correct?

Also, Rashi implies that if the parents were unable to do the bris on 8th day due to some o'nes, the beis din would not be responsible to step in since the parents plan on doing the mitzvah after the o'nes passes. Ya'avetz makes ukimtah where there is no beis din and there is no one else to do it - very dochek. Simply speaking rashi implies that the father fulfilling his mitzvah to do milah himself takes precedence over anyone else, even at the expense of milah b'zmana. But, based on what I wrote above from maharsha, if the mother is not in jail she should do milah to allow herself to eat korban pesach, even though she is not really metzuveh in milah to her son. So, the mother's mitzvah of korban pesach would over ride the father's mitzvah to do the milah himself.

Yevamos 70a - Patzuah Dakka Not Zar Meikara

The Mishna says that a woman would become passul to Terumah for having bi'ah with their husband who is a patzuah dakka. The question is that there are only 2 ways to make a woman passul to Terumah, either through a pessul kehuna such as gerusha to kohen, or a standard issur so long as it qualifies as "zar meikara" meaning that the issur was present since birth (to the exclusion of the issur of remarrying a divorcee when she married someone else in between). So, why does a petzuah dakka passul his wife from terumah?

Rashash offers 2 possible answers: 1. "zar meikara" means it is an issur that could potentially be applicable even at birth, but even if it does not occur at birth it would passul. Therefore patzuah dakka qualifies since it is potentially applicable at birth. 2. "zar meikara" means from the time that there was a change to the persons body i.e. became patzuah dakka, the issur was present. The Tosafos Yeshanim explicitly writes like the second answer of the Rashash. Rashbah answer a third answer that by pesulei kahal we passul even if it is not "zar meikara", it is only by lower level issur lavin such as machzir gerushaso that we exclude bec. it is not "zar meikara".

Yevamos 69a - Passul Kehuna and Teruma - IN A NUTSHELL

The gemara concludes that we learn from 2 pesukim that any bi'ah with a passul, passuls her from teruma. Once we know that she is passul from terumah, she is also passul to marry a kohen bec. the kal v'chomer of gerusha is a giluy milsa that anyone pasul from teruma is automatically pasul from kehuna since Terumah and Kehuna go hand in hand. Rashi 68b d.h. giluy milsa, does not mean to equate terumah and kehuna, bec. a gerusha is pasul to marry a kohen and mutar to terumah so they are not the same. Rashi is very meduyak in that her status regarding terumah is an indication whether she has kedushas kehuna, so if she is passul for terumah she is definitely passul to marry a kohen, but the issur to marry a kohen is not an indication about kedushas kehuna, so it is possible for someone to be assur to a kohen yet maintain kedushas kehuna to eat teruma i.e. a gerusha.

It is not clear from our gemara how this fits with the issur "zonah". We discussed once before that it is a 3 way machlokes: 1. Rambam holds that anyone who is considered passul, even if there is no issur violated i.e. a chalal to a bas yisroel, would render her a zonah. 2. Rashi holds that chayvei lavin would render her a zonah but not chayvei aseh. 3. Tosafos holds that only chayvei krisus make her a zonah. The Rambam holds that this gemara is magdir a "zonah", whereas rashi and tosafos hold that this gemara has nothing to do with zonah.

Now, is every "zonah" passul to terumah?

Tosafos 69a holds that acc. to r' elazar even a panui with penuya is a zonah, but mutar to terumah. Basically a "zonah" is a status of issur, but does not reflect on her kedushas kehunah exactly like a gerusha. However, tosafos 44b argues and holds that every zonah is passul to terumah, since the guy her turned her into a zonah is always considered a "zar" and therefore is a reflection on her kedushas kehuna.

Yevamos 68a - Safek 9 year old pasuls with bi'ah

Tosafos asks why a safek 9 year old should pasul from terumah (if he is pasul and has bi'ah with a bas yisroel or kohenes). We have a chazaka that he is less than 9 and a chazaka that she is kasher, so m'safek his bi'ah should not passul. Tosafos answers that we are speaking in a case where now he is 9 years old, so the chazaka d'hashta destroys the chazaka d'meikara (both on him and her) and creates a safek d'oraysa.

2 points:

1. Where do we find that the chazaka d'hashta overpowers chazaka d'meikara? We always assume that a mikvah with a chazaka d'meikara of kashrus, would pasken that one who was tovel yesterday is tahor even though today it is found to be less than 40 se'ah! I have written down to see sha'ar hayosher (2:4) - something along the lines that when we pasken on him, it is true that chazaka d'meikara is stronger, but when we pasken on her, his chazaka d'meikara doesn't help her, and his chazaka d'hashta ruins her (i don't have the sefer here).

2. Rashash points out that acc. to tosafos if the safek 9 year old would come to beis din before his ninth birthday, we would go with chazaka d'meikara to be machshir her to terumah. It would come out that until he is definitely 9 we will be machshir her temporarily, but after he is definitely 9 when we have a chazaka d'hashta we would passul her! It must be that we go after the time he came to beis din and pasken that if now he is still a safek, we would be machshir her forever.

קנין הגופ של עבד

בריש הפרק איתא בתוספות שעבדי מלוג לא אכלי כשהאשה חללה אפילו למ"ד קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, "כיון שאין הגוף שלו כמו שאין יוצאין בשן ועין לאיש" . ובמהשך התוספות מביא ראיה שאזלינן בתר קנין הגוף מהאי שמעוכב גט שחרוו אוכל בתרומה "אע"פ שאין לרב פירות אלא הגוף". ובפשטות התוספות תמוה, דהרי במעוכב גט שחרור הגוף שייך לעבד ואין לאדון אלא דין איסור כדי לתת גט שחרור (קרן אורה) ובפשטות צ"ל דכונת התוספות לקנין איסור ורק מוכיח שדין האכלת תרומה תלוי בקנין איסור ולא בדין קנין ממון ולכן סביר להניח שהשאה היא היא בעלת הקנין איסור בעבדי מילוג, וכך לכאורה הבין האבנ"מ בשו"ת סימן י"ח

אך יש לעיין, דלעיל בסוגיא דגירות עבדים בדף מו ע"א למדנו: "א"ל רב פפא לרבא חזי מר הני דבי פפא בר אבא דיהבי זוזי לאינשי לכרגייהו ומשעבדי בהו כי נפקי צריכי גיטא דחירותא או לא א"ל איכו שכיבי לא אמרי לכו הא מילתא הכי א"ר ששת מוהרקייהו דהני בטפסא דמלכא מנח ומלכא אמר מאן דלא יהיב כרגא משתעבד למאן דיהיב כרגא" ושם בתוספות מבואר דהעבדים האלו היו גויים והשאלה היתה אם יש להם קנין הגוף ונפ"מ בבאים להתגייר אי יכולים בלי גט שחרור וע"ש ברש"י ובתוספות הרא"ש. ובפשטות משמע שאלו העבדים אפילו שלא טבלו נקנו לרבם בגופם והיה משמע כמו פשטות התוספות הכא שמפקיר עבדו עדיין קנוי לו קנין הגוף כפשוטו אפילו בלי דיני איסור כההיא דהתם. וצ"ע ועיין בשו"ת פני משה על הסוגיא שם ומובא במחנה אפרים הלכות עבדים

Yevamos 67a - Slaves Eating Terumah Bec. of Fetus

The gemara assumes that if the fetus has a portion in the inheritance, the slaves would not be able to eat terumah since the fetus either has a din of a zar, or a gezeiras hakasuv that until he is born he can't feed terumah to the slaves. It is not so clear why the slaves can't eat: Is it bec. the fetus owns a portion in the estate, and therefore pasuls each and every slave from eating Terumah, or is it because the fetus owns a portion of the slaves and we are not sure which one so out of doubt we can't feed any of them terumah? Rashi (d.h. chelko shel ubar) seems to explain the second way, which implies that we say breirah even midoraysa, so which ever slave ends up by the fetus after the split, is the only slave that can't eat. But, until the split we are concerned that each slave is the portion of the fetus and therefore none of them can eat terumah.

Now, if we would know the fetus is male (sonogram), then even acc. to r' shimon b' yochai who is not concerned for the mi'ut, the fetus would definitely have a portion so the slaves could not eat teruma. But, based on rashi we should say that since most of the slaves belong to the live brothers, and only a mi'ut belong to the ubar i.e. 4 live brothers, 1 ubar, 5 slaves; we should be able to feed terumah to 4 out of the 5 slaves since on each of them there is a rov saying that he will belong to the live brother?

is chazaka a certainty

גמ: ת"ר ניסת לראשון ולא היו לה בנים לשני ולא היו לה בנים לשלישי לא תנשא אלא למי שיש לו בנים נישאת למי שאין לו בנים תצא בלא כתובה ע"כ
וביאר התוספות שהשלישי לא יתן כתובה אפילו לפני ששהה עמה עשר שנים כיון שהוי מקח טעות. והרמב"ן מבאר וז"ל "אבל מ"מ צריכה גט שאין כאן טעות ודאי אלא חששא היא וגבי ממון עליה להביא ראיה ולענין איסורא לחומרא וצריכה גט" ע"כ. ומבואר שהחזקה לא עושה אותה לוודאי עקרה ולכן צריכה גט

ולפ"ז מיושב קושית ר"א שהקשה על מה שאיתא בגמרא
איבעיא להו נישאת לשלישי ולא היו לה בנים מהו דליתבעוה הנך קמאי ... מסתברא מצית אמרה להו השתא הוא דכחשי ע"כ והקשה שבכל חזקה לא אומרים כן אלא אומרים שאיגלאי מילתא למפרע שמסיבה זו לא הולידה לכל הג' אנשים כעין בווסתות שלמפרע אמרינן שכיון שהוקבע ווסתה לא מטמאת טהרות מעת לעת למפרע, ע"ש בהוספות, אך לרמב"ן ניחא דאין זו חזקה רגילה אלא עדיין בגר ספק
ויש להוסיף שהסיבה שזה רק חששא כיוון שנוגד לטבע שאשה בטבע כן מולידה אך חזקה שמססיעת לטבע (רוב) כן תהיה בגדר וודאי. כ"ך נראה ועיקר הדברים מצאתי באחרונים שונים

Yevamos 64b - Why are women not commanded in P'ru U'rvu?

I thought that I remembered the Meshech Chochma writing that women are not commanded in p'ru u'rvu bec. they have a natural desire to have children and don't need the mitzvah for the push. There is a clear contradiction to that approach from the gemara which says that not having children would only be a punishment for him, not for her, since she doesn't care that much (like rashi explains). If her desire to have kids replaces the mitzvah, it should be just as much of a punishment for her as for him.

Actually the Meshech Chochma (Noach 9:7) works perfectly with this gemara. He offers 2 approaches why the Torah didn't command women in this mitzvah:

1. Diracheha Darchei Noam - since pregnancy and childbirth are dangerous for her, it would not be darkei noam for the Torah to obligate her in this mitzvah. But to compensate for this, Hashem built in to her nature a greater desire to have kids. This does not contradict our gemara bec. he is not suggesting that the desire given to woman is parallel to the mitzvah on men, rather just that Hashem partially compensated by giving her more of a nature to want to have kids.

2. Tav L'maisav Tan du - The desire of a woman to be married compensates for this mitzvah. Men would not get married without this mitzvah, but women who desire marriage more, don't need a mitzvah to encourage them to get married. But, he continues that once Hashem instilled in a women the nature of desiring marriage, the torah could not obligate women in this mitzvah. The reason is, if she would be obligated in this mitzvah, it would require her to ask for a divorce from her husband if she didn't have kids after 10 years (since she can't marry 2 husbands), which goes against her nature of her desire to stay married. The Torah never obligates her in something which would be totally against the nature of a person (pretty brilliant if you think about it!).

תוכחה

כשם שמצוה על אדם לומר דבר הנשמע כך מצוה על אדם שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע רבי אבא אומר חובה שנאמר אל תוכח לץ פן ישנאך הוכח לחכם ויאהבך
ופירש"י שקאי על מצות הוכח תוכיח, והריטב"א מקשה והרי איתא בערכין שיש מצוות תוכחה עד הכאה, וראיתי שהאריך מאד הרב יאהפ'ן בהערותיו וי"א שאה"נ שיעור עד הכאה שייך רק כשלבסוף יקבל תוכחתו. לעומת זאת הריטב"א מתרץ שביחיד יש מצוה עד הכאה והגמרא כאן עוסקת בתוכחת רבים ששם רק אם ישמעו, ומוסיף הריטב"א שגם ברבים צריך להוכיח פעם אחת מההיא מעשה דריש גלותא ע"ש. ולהלכה נפסק כריטב"א. ופרטי הדינים רבים ומאד נוגע להלכה ואולי חד מהרבנים יאמרו ראשי הפרקים.

Yevamos 63b - Ben Azai: No Marriage or Kids

Ben Azai comments that one who does not have children is guilty of murder and reducing the d'mus of Hashem. He justified his own actions by saying "What can I do, my soul yearns for Torah, the world can be sustained by others". There is a lot of discussion in the achronim to explain the position of Ben Azai, especially since it is paskened l'halacha in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch E.H 1:4.

R' Elchonon explains that although Ben Azai was obligated in this mitzvah since it is a mitzvah that cannot be fulfilled by others and even if preoccupied with torah study, one is not exempt from a mitzvah that can't be done by others. Nevertheless, he was an o'nes. Similar to the gemara Kiddushin 33a about one who thinks in Torah in the bathroom, is not guilty if the reason is that they are o'nes and cannot distract their mind from learning.

Maharam Shik (thanks to my brother, r' aryeh, for the ma'areh makom) focuses on the second part of Ben Azai's statement, "the world can be sustained by others". Since the world can be sustained by others, pru u'rvu is considered a mitzvah that can be done by others, and one is not obligated to stop learning to fulfill this mitzvah. Obviously this approach is very difficult, since p'ru u'rvu is still an obligation on every individual. Although its purpose may be to sustain the world, the mitzvah an obligation on each person and cannot be done by others.

Perhaps both approaches are true. Ben Azai justifies his personal obligation by saying "what can i do, my sould yearns for torah", meaning he is o'nes as R' Elchonon explains. But then must justify his communal obligation of "l'sheves yitzara" to participate in the sustaining of the world, and to that he says "the world can be sustained by others".

Yevamos 62b - Celibate Children

To fulfill the mitzvah of pru u'rvu we pasken like r' yochanan that one has to leave the world with children, but if G-d forbid his children die during his lifetime, he does not fulfill the mitzvah. It is also clear from the braisa and paskened in shulchan aruch 1:5 that if one has a child who cannot have children i.e. s'ris or eiylonis, he did not fulfill the mitzvah since they are not capable of having offspring. However, the Beis Shmuel 1:8 writes that if one would have a boy and girl who are capable of having children, but decide not to have children (the example in the beis shmuel is where his daughter marries a sris, or son marries an eiylonis, but the chelkas michokeke says that the same is true if they decide not to marry at all), one would fulfill the mitzvah. Clearly, the poskim hold that if the father did all he can do, the fact that the children decide not to have children, would not take the mitzvah away from the father. The Pischei Teshuva quotes the sefer Bnei Ahuva (R' Yonasan Eibshitz) who considers a case where his daughter marries a s'ris to be tantamount to the daughter passing away, since it is impossible for her to leave the marriage and fulfill the mitzvah. Nevertheless, so long as the children still have the ability to have children, the father fulfills his mitzvah. R' Yakov Benzaquen (in our kollel) pointed out that based on this, if someone has a son and a daughter, and the daughter chooses not to get married, the father is still mekayem his mitzvah (as the chelkas michokek writes), but as the daughter gets older and due to her age no longer has the ability to have children, maybe the father should loose the mitzvah similar to a case where the daughter dies?

Yevamos 61b - Bitul Pirya V'rivya

Tosafos seems to understand that according to the first version of the gemara, the only difference between one who has children or not, is regarding the mitzvah of p'ru ur'vu; but regarding the mitzvah to get married, he must marry someone who is capable of having children even though he already has children (it is only in the second version where we say that if he has children he can marry one who is not bas banim). This seems very strange. Since we do not require him to have children (he can be batul from pru u'rvu), whey would we demand that he marry a women who is capable of having children? The same question can be asked on the R"I in Tosafos, even on the second version of the gemara. Is there an advantage in marrying a woman who can have children even when we do not require him to have more children? How can we say in the same sentence "you may be batul from pru u'rvu", BUT "you must marry a woman who can have children"?

zonah - rashi

rashi keeps on saying that a גיורת is not allowed to marry a כהן because we assume she was נבעלה to a גוי , does that mean that if you have witnesses that she never had relations that she would be permissible to a kohen?
תוספות clearly holds that any גיורת even one that is less the 3 years old has a דין זונה no matter what.

Another related point, Tosfos opinion's is that זונה happens from any חייבי כריתות, the rambam holds that it comes from חייבי לאוין ועשה ששוין בכל, again my question is what does rashi hold? in 61b he gives the example of עריות and ממזר ונתין, if he holds like the rambam he should say a bigger chidush of חייבי עשה, is rashi a third opinion?

a final point regarding a גיורת פחותה מג' there is an argument rambam and raavad if she is a זונה or if she is אסור from a הל"מ, see אגר"מ אה"ע א' י"א