Brachos 30b - 31a - Simcha in this world

The gemara says on 31a - אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולם הזה. Rabbeinu Yona interprets it very literally. He writes that some say this has to do with the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, but if that were the case it would say so explicitly. Rather it is because simcha leads one to get drawn after physical indulgences and forget about doing mitzvos. Based on this he doesn't interpret the gemara which says וגילו ברעדה, במקום גילה שם תהא רעדה, to just mean that simcha should be balanced and controlled. Rabbeinu Yona writes that in the physical world fear and joy are opposites. However, in the service of Hashem, when a person ponders G-d's greatness and develops a fear for  G-d, he develops a joy for appreciating the fear he has for Hashem since that fear will ultimately be an inspiration to fulfill mitzvos. This is the type of simcha referred to in the pasuk of עבדו את השם בשמחה, it really means to serve Hashem out of fear, but to develop an appreciation for that fear that brings him simcha. He also considers this to be the peshat in the pasuk of תחת אשר לא עבדת את השם אלקיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב, but direct simcha is not considered positive. However, when the gemara speaks about davening out of simcha, Rabbeinu Yona (22a close to bottom) writes that if one finds himself unable to concentrate due to worries or anxiety, he is allowed to feel simcha for the purpose of inspiring himself to serving Hashem. In short, Rabbeinu Yona considers simcha to be a dangerous emotion, unless it is a result of the service of Hashem, or used as an inspiration to serve Hashem. On the flip side he warns that עצב, sadness or depression is also a dangerous emotion because it leads to physical illness that prevents proper service of Hashem.

Based on Rabbeinu Yona's approach, he explains the response of the amoraim אנא תפילין מנחנא, to mean that when they were challenged for feeling a simcha that is not associated with a mitzvah, they immediately explained that it was associated with a mitzvah and their joy was merely a result of appreciating the mitzvah that they were performing.

Rashi on the other hand doesn't seem to view simcha as something which is inherently bad. The challenge to the amoraim for expressing simcha was that it gave the impression that they were being פורק עול and throwing off the yoke of heaven. To that they respond that the tefillin that they are wearing is a clear sign that they still maintain the yoke of heaven and are not פורק עול. The difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Yona is that Rashi seems to be concerned with the public display of joy, but the inner emotion is not negative, whereas Rabbeinu Yona is concerned even with the inner feeling of joy.

According to Rabbeinu Yona, nothing changes pre and post destruction of the beis hamikdash. However, the Meiri writes that pre the destruction of the beis hamikdash, simcha shel mitzvah was allowed. Whereas post destruction of the Beis HaMikdash things are intensified so that אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולה הזה even if it for the sake of a mitzvah.

Brachos 30a - Davening While Seated

The gemara discusses a situation where one has to take a trip early in the morning before the z'man krias shema. Their choice is to either stand while davening but forfeit being סומך גאולה לתפלה or to daven while travelling. The Shulchan Aruch (99:8) rules that it is better to daven before leaving one's home while standing, rather than davening on the road walking, even though it will be at the expense of being סומך גאולה לתפלה. M.B. cites Magen Avrohom who seems to hold that it is better to daven on the road when one can be סומך גאולה לתפלה.

The beginning of the sugya seems to refer to the virtue of "standing" to the exclusion of walking, not to the exclusion of sitting. This is actually very meduyak in Rashi. Rashi throughout the sugya comments that the advantage of davening while standing is for the purpose of intent. This makes a lot of sense a tthe beginning of the sugya when we are contrasting "standing" to walking.

ד"ה תפלה מעומד - שיכול לכוין את לבו לפיכך היו מקדימין להתפלל מעומד בביתם שלא יצטרכו להתפלל בדרך במהלך

However, as the sugya progresses we are told that R. Ashi would daven during his shiur from his seat, implying that the issue due to the fact that he is sitting rather than standing. Yet, Rashi continues his approach to explain the advantage of "standing" to be one of intent.

ד"ה בהדי צבורא - כמו שהיה יושב בתוך הצבור, כלומר, שאינו יוצא, וכי הוה אתי לביתיה חוזר ומתפלל מעומד לכוין את לבו

ד"ה לא חזינן - לפיכך מתפלל מיושב במקומו ולפי שאין דעתו מיושבת עליו כ"כ צריך לחזור ולהתפלל בביתו

It seems that Rashi understands that this sugya does not address the virtue of standing over sitting, rather it discusses the issue of davening in a situation where one won't be as focused. Both when one is travelling and when Rav Ashi was delivering his lecture, they were unable to properly focus on the tefillah. Rashi understands that the reason Rav Ashi davened again at home was not because the first time he sat through his davening (actually Rashi interprets רב אשי מצלי בהדי צבורא מיושב doesn't necessarily mean he was sitting, rather it means he davened in his place without walking out of the shiur where he could concentrate better). According to Rashi's approach in the sugya, we have no source for the advantage of davening while standing vs. sitting.

Tosafos in the name of Rabbeinu Meir learns from Rav Ashi that if one did not daven while standing, they must repeat the shemoneh esrei when they get home while standing. However, from Tosafos as well we don't see that the issue was the fact that one sat instead of standing, rather the issue is that if one davened in a situation where they couldn't concentrate, they are required to repeat when they can concentrate. Furthermore, see Rabbeinu Yona who explains the sugya also to be one of concentration and therefore writes that the issue is for one to be walking or riding, but sitting on an animal would be no worse than standing.

Yet, the Shulchan Aruch 94 speaks about the importance of davening while standing, not leaning or sitting. In si'if 9 he writes that if one is forced to sit for shemone esrei, they must repeat the shemoneh esrei later while standing. The Beis Yosef points to Tosafos as the source of this halacha. However, a careful reading of Tosafos doesn't compel any advantage to standing over sitting, and certainly doesn't require repeating shemone esrei. The Shulchan Aruch seems to be taking the Rambam's approach that the issue being discussed in our sugya is standing vs. sitting, and rules like Tosafos that if one didn't do what they were supposed to, they must daven again (but tosafos themselves will say that the issue is about concentration, not sitting).

The Mishna Berura (94:27) writes that the prevalent minhag is that if one had to daven while seated they don't daven again later, against the ruling of Shulchan Aruch. In light of what we explained that most Rishonim understand the issue in the sugya to be a lack of concentration rather than physical position, and in light of the Rambam who explicitly says that if one davened while sitting they would not need to repeat, the minhag is to rely on the tefillah one davened while seated. Therefore, if one davened on an airplane while seated, they don't need to daven again when they get off the plane. 

Brachos 28b - We Run And They Run

The Rambam in the Pirush HaMishna writes that the tefillah of Rav Nechunia Ben Hakana upon entering and exiting the beis midrash is an obligation, not just a story about what he used to do. The proof is that the gemara doesn't ask בכניסתו מה היה אומר, rather מהו אומר, implying that it should be said by all. The tefilla when exiting contains the line:

אני עמל והם עמלים, אני עמל ומקבל שכר והם עמלים ואינם מקבלים שכר, אני רץ והם רצים, אני רץ לחיי העוה"ב והם רצים לבאר שחת

The statement of אני עמל ומקבל שכר והם עמלים ואינם מקבלים שכר means that when studying torah one receives reward not just for what they accomplished, but for their effort and work invested in it. The statement of אני רץ לחיי עוה"ב, Rabbeinu Yona explains that he views himself as if he is always running and the time is passing quickly, he therefore is constantly preparing his way for olam ha'ba. Whereas they don't realize that the end is approaching until it actually arrives, therefore they make no preparations and end up in a be'er shachas.

Brachos 27 - Kabbalas Shabbos Early

The gemara says that Rav davened ma'ariv for shabbos on erev shabbos. However, the gemara justifies this by using the opinion of R. Yehuda that after plag hamincha it is already considered to be night. We only find that R. Yehuda says this in regard to tefillah, not for anything else. Tosafos and the Rosh cite Rabbeinu Tam (beginning of masechta) use this to justify saying shema early as well. However, the Rosh takes issue with this Rabbeinu Tam that for krias shema, plag hamincha won't help. In short, it is only clear that one can rely on this leniency of davening early on erev shabbos for tefillah, not for anything else. It is clear from the gemara that there would also be an issur melacha (unless the kabala was by mistake), but it isn't clear if the issur melacha would be d'oraysa. Rabbeinu Yona seems to be mesu'pak whether the issur melacha during the time of tosefes would be d'oraysa.

But, the gemara then goes on to day that Rav even made kiddush early on Friday night. Kiddush is a mitzvah d'oraysa that must be done on shabbos. How is it possible to make kiddush early? The fact that even kiddush can be made early (shulchan aruch 267:2) implies that one can actually transform the day into shabbos by being me'kabel shabbos early. Although the M.B. (5) cites two opinions as to whether one should make sure to eat some of the seuda when it is actually shabbos, that is because the pasuk that is used as the source for the 3 seudos uses the term "yom" - day. But for kiddush it seems that one can certainly be yotzei during the z'man of tosefes. It would seem that even if we assume that Tosefes shabbos is only d'rabonon regarding the issur melacha, as Rabbeinu Yona suggests, the z'man would still have kedushas shabbos on a Torah level to enable you to fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush.

Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe O.C. 3:38 - end of teshuva) raises a very interesting point. There is a well known halacha (O.C. 263:12) that when there is only one shul in town that is mekabel shabbos early, the entire community must begin shabbos with the tzibbur and one cannot continue doing melacha after that time. Rav Moshe says that he isn't sure if this din applies nowadays when the shul is mekabel shabbos early only for convenience. He suggests that perhaps the din of the tzibbur being pulled after the shul being mekabel shabbos is only when they are intending to fulfill a mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, not when it is purely for convenience. Therefore, when it is only done in the summer and not the winter, it is a clear indication that the intent is not for the mitzvah and may not bind the entire community to an early shabbos.

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It has been troubling me where Rav Moshe gets this notion from. Why would he think to make a distinction based on the intent of the shul being mekabel shabbos? I found that Rabbeinu Yona in explaining Rav davening early assumes that he would say shemoneh esrei early, but say shema with it's brachos after tzeis hakochavim. He asks, what about סמיכת גאולה לתפלה? To which he answers that since Rav was intending to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, he was willing to forfeit the advantage of being סומך גאולה לתפלה. Now the question is, how did Rabbeinu Yona know that Rav was intending to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, perhaps he too was doing it only out of convenience? The gemara says that Rav had a practice of davening early from which we see he held like Rav Yehuda, but Rav Huna didn't have this practice so we see he doesn't hold like Rav Yehuda. The Tzlach asks that we don't see anything from Rav Huna. Perhaps Rav Huna also agrees that one can be mekabel shabbos and daven after plag hamincha but didn't do this because he didn't want to! The Tzlach answers that since there is a mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, the assumption of the gemara is that if Rav Huna held it can be done, he would have done so. We see based on the approach of the tzlach that the gemara itself assumes that the compelling reason to be מצלי של שבת בערב שבת was to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos. This is perhaps why Rabbeinu Yona assumes that Rav "intended" to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos.

Based on this we can explain Rav Moshe's suggestion. The source of everyone in the community being drawn after the shul is found in the Mordechai (Shabbos perek 2, 297). Since the only precedent we find in the gemara for accepting shabbos early is when one is intending for the mitzvah, it is fair to assume that only in that case the Mordechai citing the Riva"m would consider the individuals in the community to be drawn after the tzibbur.

Another interesting point is that the Mordechai is assuming that the majority of the community were in shul, just that there were some individuals not in shul. Perhaps in a situation where there were more observant Jews who weren't yet mekabel shabbos, not in shul, they would not be bound to the kabalas shabbos of the shul.

Brachos 23a - Going to the Bathroom During Tefillah

One who needs to use the facilities to a point where he is unable to hold himself in for an extended period of time, is not allowed to daven. If one davened when they had to go to the bathroom and couldn't contain themselves for a significant amount of time, the halacha is that they must daven again (siman 92).

The gemara cites a machlokes about one who urinated during their tefillah and concludes that if they delayed כדי לגמור את כולה, they must start from the beginning, but if the time delay was minor, we pasken like the more lenient opinion that one can simply continue from where they left off.

What is the halacha if one took a break in middle of shemone esrei to use the bathroom? If they couldn't contain themselves it is clear that the tefillah would be a toeiva anyway, so they would have to daven again. But what if they can contain themselves when they began but in the middle got a sudden urge to use the bathroom and did so, can they continue from where they left off or must they start again from the beginning?

Surprisingly, the Shulchan Aruch doesn't deal directly with this question. The Biur Halacha (92:2, yoser tov) suggests that this would be dependent on the way the rishonim learn our gemara. The gemara considers one who urinates during his shemone esrei to be גברא חזיא ותפלתו תפלה - the person is fit and therefore the tefillah is valid. This is the opinion that we follow l'halacha. However, depending on how we understand the term גברא חזי it may or may not apply to one who defecates. The Rosh says that when one urinates they are technically fit to daven even while they are urinating (on a torah level), therefore it isn't considered a hefsek. Since defecating is definitely not allowed m'doraysa while one is davening, and would turn the tefillah into a to'eiva, it would constitute a hefsek even without a significant time lapse. However, the Biur Halacha points out that Rashi interprets the phrase גברא חזי not to refer to the ability to daven while urinating, rather to refer to the state of being of the individual prior to urinating. Meaning, until he began urinating he was fit to daven so all the tefillah that was recited prior to urinating should be acceptable therefore we allow him to continue from where he left off. This applies equally to one who defecates during davening. Since until that point he was fit to daven (assuming that at the start of the davening he didn't have to go that badly), he can continue from where he left off.

Brachos 22b - 23a - Davening in Front of Tzoah

The gemara says that if one davens and then finds excrement in the place he davened, it would invalidate his tefilla. However, the gemara considers this to be a violation of זבח רשעים תועבה, indicating that he did something wrong. Therefore, Tosafos explains that the halacha of תפלתו תועבה only applies if he was negligent because it was a place that he should have expected there to be tzoah, but if it was a complete accident - אונס, this halacha would not apply. It comes out that we only consider his tefillah to be a תועבה if 2 conditions are met. 1. He actually found tzoah afterward (this is clear from the gemara which says ומצא צואה במקומו). The M.B. discusses whether it would include a place that there is almost always tzoah there, but would certainly not include a place that may or may not of had tzoah. The implication is that even if he were negligent, chazal don't render his tefillah to be a to'eiva, unless there was actual tzoah present. 2. He had to have been negligent by davening or saying shema (shulchan aruch brings this halacha in hilchos krias shema (end of siman 76). If he wasn't negligent, even though he found tzoah afterward, his tefillah wouldn't be considered a to'eiva. It comes out that the status of תועבה is a combination of factors, his negligence AND the metzius of davening in the presence of tzoah.

What does it mean to be תפלתו תועבה? Tosafos cites two approaches. Both approaches agree that the tefillah is invalid. The first approach is that he hasn't been yotzei tefillah and there is nothing he can do about it. The second approach is that he must daven again. The first approach of Tosafos is very difficult to understand. Since he wasn't yotzei tefillah, he should certainly daven again. What rationale is there to say that he doesn't daven again? It seems to me that what forces Tosafos to say this is that Tosafos understands that davening in the presence of tzoah invalidates the tefillah. Therefore, even if one were not negligent, but later found that they davened in front of tzoah, they must daven again. If so, what does the aspect of being negligent contribute to creating the status of תפלתו תועבה? Tosafos understands that regardless of him being negligent, he wasn't yotzei tefillah since the fact is that he davened in the presence of tzoah. However, if he were negligent we penalize him by no allowing him to make it up, whereas if he was a complete אנוס, we would allow him to make it up by davening again.

The second approach of Tosafos (which is the one brought l'halacha in shulchan aruch) that even when we say תפלתו תועבה we allow him to daven again to make it up, would have to hold that when he was not negligent we don't regard the tefillah to be a to'eiva, and he is actually yotzei with that tefillah. According to this approach, davening in the presence of tzoah may be an issur d'oraysa, but it is not an automatic invalidation of the tefillah (Biur Halacha 76 d.h. tzarich takes this approach that m'doraysa it is forbidden to daven, but the invalidation of the tefilla is only d'rabonon). Therefore, when he is negligent and actually davened in the presence of tzoah we penalize him by invalidating his tefillah, but if he is not negligent, we don't invalidate the tefillah.

Brachos 22a - Making Brachos Like Hilchos Derech Eretz

The gemara cites a braisa with many different opinions regarding the type of learning a ba'al keri is allowed to do. The concept seems to be that if the learning is too involved or based on pesukim, it is not allowed. Whereas superficial type learning is allowed, but they argue where exactly to draw the line. The opinion of R. Yehuda is that a ba'al keri can study hilchos derech eretz which is halachos about appropriate conduct for a Talmid Chacham. The simple reading of the gemara is that the reason R. Yehuda allows the ba'al keri to read shema with brachos, is because he considers it like hilchos derech eretz.

However, the Tzlach is meda'yek from Rashi עשאן רבי יהודה - לברכת המזון, that this concept of being like hilchos derech eretz doesn't apply to krias shema and birchas krias shema, and doesn't even apply to the birchas hamazon after the meal. What does it mean that R. Yehuda considers the saying of these things to be like hilchos derech eretz? The Tzlach explains that this can only apply to the bracha rishona that one makes on food which is learned from a sevara that one cannot benefit without thanking Hashem. When Rashi says Birchas HaMazon, he means bracha rishona. A bracha before eating is exactly like hilchos derech eretz. Therefore it comes out that for d'oraysa things such as shema and birchas hamazon after eating, R. Yehuda will say that one can even say them since he holds that hirhur is not like speaking. When it comes to bracha rishona, one is allowed to actually say it since it is like hilchos derech eretz. And for birchas krias shema one is only allowed to be meharher.

Brachos 21b - Shomeia K'oneh

The gemara discusses when a person can start davening when they come late to shul and says that since we hold that one cannot say kedusha alone, one cannot start shemoneh esrei unless they assess that they will be done by the time the shliach tzibbur reaches kedusha. There is a machlokes between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam cited by Tosafos here (and in Succah 38b) how to regard the concept of shomeiah k'oneh. Rashi understands that if one were to remain silent during their shemone esrei and listen to the kedusha with intent as if they were saying it, they could be yotzei, and it would not constitute a hefsek in the shemone esrei. Rabbeinu Tam and R"I both hold that it would constitute a hefsek. Clearly, according to Rabbeinu Tam and the R"i, the concept of shomeiah k'oneh is literal, that by hearing it is tantamount to saying. However, Rashi holds that it creates some level of tziruf that allows the listener to combine with the the mitzvah being performed by the reader, but isn't as if the listener is actually saying the words and therefore doesn't constitute a hefsek. The Tzlach explains that according to the R"I and Rabbeinu Tam that shomeia is literally like being o'neh and saying the words oneself, if one were to use shomeiah k'oneh to make a bracha that they were not obligated in, it would be a violation of a bracha l'vatala (whereas the concept of hirhur k'dibur even according to Ravina wouldn't constitute a bracha l'vatala).

Tosafos asks that according to Rashi that one can be yotzei by listening even during their own private shemoneh esrei, why would the gemara require one to wait until after kedusha before starting shemone esrei? Why not start shemoneh esrei and be yotzei kedusha through shomeiah k'oneh? Tosafos answers that according to Rashi although one can be yotzei through shomeiah k'oneh, it is not ideal. It is more of a hiddur mitzvah to actually say it and not be yotzei through listening.

It doesn't seem from Tosafos that we regard the listening as a type of hefsek lichatchila, rather the mitzvah of saying kedusha is not being performed ideally unless one actually says the words. Why is this different from kiddush on shabbos when we use shomeiah k'oneh lichatchila to be motzi others? If the concept of shomeia k'oneh doesn't work lichatchila, we shouldn't use it for kiddush either?

I was at a chasuna last night and posed this question to Rav Asher Weiss. He thought that although shomeiah k'oneh is only a "bidieved", there are other considerations that can override it and that is why we sometimes use it even lichtachila. I asked what is the consideration by kiddush that overrides shomeiah k'oneh, to which he said that since we have kiddush b'makom seduah, the group element is important. In my opinion this is not correct. Although the kiddush may require a makom s'eudah (be it d'oraysa or d'rabonon - see Rosh Pesachim), it does not require a group (or perhaps, as r. warren cinamon suggested to me it is just the regular din of b'rov am hadras melech that would override the lichatchila of saying it oneself). Perhaps by Megillah there is a concept of being yotzei b'tzibbur such as we find shelo b'zmano must be with a minyan, but by kiddush we don't find such a concept.

It seems to me that Tosafos is not saying a rule for all shomeiah k'oneh that it is only bidieved, to which kiddush is an exception. Rather, Tosafos is saying something very specific to the replying to kaddish and kedusha. Tosafos holds that since the goal of answering kaddish and kedusha is to actively participate and show that one agrees and confirms the greatness and holiness of Hashem, it is ideal to do this actively. Generally, the din shomeiah k'oneh is as ideal as doing it oneself, but when it comes to things that are meant to proclaim the holiness and greatness of Hashem, it is a hiddur mitzvah to do it actively by actually saying the words as a declaration.

Brachos 19b - Kavod HaBriyos

According to our girsa in the gemara on is obligated to remove shatnez from themselves even if it will cause them public embarrassment. The Rambam had a girsa that when one finds shatnez on their friends garment they are obligated to rip it off them even in the street. From the Rosh who has our girsa, it seems that one would only need to do this to themselves but not to someone else. The Rosh actually goes lishitaso (Nida, Kilei begadim 6) where he writes that if one sees their friend wearing shatnzes and the friend is unaware, don't tell him until he reaches a place that is possible to remove the garment without suffering embarrassment.

The Rambam and Rosh seem to argue whether the שוגג, accidental violation would allow someone else to not tell him immediately to protect his kavod habriyos. The Nodeh B'Yehuda (O.C. 35) explains based on a chakira whether on why we would push off an issur בשב ואל תעשה for the sake of kavod habriyos as we find in the end of the gemara. If שב ואל תעשה  is just a lower level aveira, but when the aveira is being violated בקום ועשה such as when someone is wearing kelayim, there is a requirement on the one who knows to tell him. Or if the point of שב ואל תעשה is that one has the right to be passive, so too the one who knows has the right to be passive for כבוד הבריות and not inform the one wearing the shatnez. The Rambam would hold that since the prohibition is being violated by the active wearing of shatnez, it is not considered passive and you must tell him. However, the Rosh holds that since the one who knows is just being passive by not telling, he has the right to do so for the sake of kavod habriyos even though the prohibition is being violated actively. See Sha'agas Aryeh (58) who makes this issue dependent on two answers of Tosafos in Shavuos 30b.

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The gemara asks from the statement of גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה את ל"ת שבתורה, that one can violate a prohibition to protect kavod habriyos. The gemara responds that they can only violate לא תסור. and then explains that all Rabbonon's are supported by לא תסור, but where it interferes with kavod habriyos, they were lenient.

There is a well known argument between the Rambam and Ramban whether all Rabbinic prohibitions are automatically upgraded to be like a d'oraysa based on לא תסור. The Rambam holds it is like the violation of a d'oraysa, whereas the Ramban says that it is only the violation of a d'rabonon. The Ramban would learn the gemara here to say that לא תסור is not more than an אסמכת to find so hint to the concept of listening to the Rabbonon from within the Torah, but in truth the pasuk is not a real source for anything. However, the Rashi seems to imply like the Rambam. Really every derabonon is supported by לא תסור, just that the Rabbonon had the foresight to lower the bar and be "mochel" on their restrictions in pressing circumstances such as kavod habriyos. Therefore. although לא תסור is a source to support d'rabonon violations, and kavod habriyos is not powerful enough to push it off, the Rabbonon never implemented their decrees in a situation where there would be a conflict with kavod habriyos. According to the Ramban we don't need to say that רבנן אחלוה ליקרייהו לעבור על דבריהם היכא דאיכא כבוד הבריות, which essentially means that the issur d'rabonon doesn't apply to such a situations, rather simply that kavod habriyos is more powerful and trumps the issur d'rabonon.

Brachos 19a - Nichum Aveilim

The mishna said that after the burial, if there is enough time to read shema before the shura is formed, the attendees must read, but if not they are exempt. The reason that they are exempt is because they are still considered to be involved with a mitzvah. Although the mitzvah of burial is over, the shura is a part of the mitzvah of nichum aveilim. Rabbeinu Yona explains that נחום אבלים is also considered a d'roaysa mitzvah because it is included in gemilas chasadim and supported by the pasuk of והודעת להם את הדרך, therefore we can apply the principal of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה to even exempt from a mitzvah d'oraysa such as krias shema.

Rabbeinu Yona clearly assumes that involvement in a mitzvah d'rabonon wouldn't exempt from a mitzvah d'oraysa, but we consider nichum aveilim to be d'oraysa. Rav Elchonon Wasserman (Koveitz Shiurim 2:32) raises a question as to whether one involved in a mitzvah d'rabonon would be exempt from a Torah mitzvah, but doesn't cite Rabbeinu Yona.

However, the Mishna says that if there would be enough time before the shura is formed to say shema, they must do that. The gemara explains that even if there isn't enough time to say the entire shema, just one perek or even just one pasuk, they must do that. Now, if we assume that when the gemara says 13b that Rebbi would say שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד in middle of his shiur, it means only that one pasuk because only one pasuk is d'oraysa, it would make sense that we require the menachamim to say even one pasuk. However, according to Rabbeinu Yona who holds that the entire perek is necessary m'doraysa, and certainly according to those who hold that both parshiyos are d'oraysa, why would we make the menachamim say just the pasuk of shema?

It seems that the mitzvah of shema may not be fulfilled unless both parshiyos are said, but it is not all or nothing. Although there is no independent mitzvah to be מקבל עול מלכות שמים, rather it is part of the mitzvah of shema, if one fulfills that aspect, they have fulfilled a mitzvah d'oraysa - just that they are missing the other component of the mitzvah. To properly fulfill the mitzvah of shema one would need say both parshiyos to even be mekabel עול מצות, if not they should at least say the entire section of shema to be מקבל עול מלכות שמים properly, but if not there is still a kiyum of kabalas עול מלכות שמים that is achieved by saying the first pasuk.

Brachos 17b - Exempting an O'nen From Mitzvos

There is a fundamental machlokes between Rashi and Tosafos as to the source of the exemption of mitzvos for an o'nen. Rashi says that it is similar to a chosson who is mentally focused on doing the mitzvah of p'ru u'rvu, therefore we don't impose on him any other positive obligations. Similarly, the focus on burying one's dead forces chazal to waive the imposing of any other mitzvos. Based on this the exemption is essentially based on עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה. Tosafos cites the Yerushalmi that says that the rationale is either for kavod of the deceased, or to ensure that there is someone tending to the burial needs. The Yerushalmi says explicitly that the kavod ha'meis concern would apply even if there are other to tend to the needs of burial.

Rashi and Tosafos seem to also argue whether the exemption of an o'nen from the making of brachos is an exemption, or even a prohibition for the o'nen to make brachos. Tosafos who holds that the rationale is to show kavod for the meis would certainly hold that it would be prohibited to make blessings since that would display a lack of undivided attention to the meis. whereas Rashi who holds that it is an exemption from doing other mitzvos, it would still be permitted to choose to do them.

The gemara asks why does the mishna stipulate מי שמתו מוטל לפניו which implies that the exemption from mitzvos is only when one in in the present of their deceased relative, but the Braisa exempts one from mitzvos even if not in the presence of their deceased relative. The gemara has two possible answers. The first is that the exemption from mitzvos only applies within the presence of the deceased. That approach certainly seems to assume that the rationale to exempt is kavod ha'meis and therefore only applies in the presence of the deceased. But the second approach which is that whenever it is your obligation to bury this relative, it is as if he is lying in your presence, wouldn't compel this rationale.

The gemara also equates the exemption of an o'nen to one who is watching a dead body and is exempt from mitzvos. That would certainly imply like Rashi that the rationale to exempt is osek b'mitzvah patur min hamitzvah, because the two rationales of the yerushalmi would seemingly not apply. Yet in the next gemara it compares an o'nen to one who is walking through a cemetery and cannot perform mitzvos because of לועג לרש - it is degrading to he deceased by teasing them that they no longer have the ability to perform mitzvos. This would indicate that the p'tur of an o'nen is also connected with kavod ha'meis as Tosafos cites from the Yerushalmi.

Brachos 16b - 17a - Tefilos after Davening

Someone in my shiur asked me today why it was necessary for all these amoraim to add on tefilos after their davening. Anshei k'neses ha'gdola instituted the nusach of davening. Why did these amoraim feel that it was insufficient and necessary to add to it?

I found that the Tzlach actually asks this question. The gemara on 28b says that tefillah cannot be "kevah" rather it must be רחמים ותחנונים. The Anshei K'neses Ha'gedola instituted a nusach of tefillah but this nusach is generic and not personal. It has a tendency to lead one to daven out of habit rather than heartfelt requests of Hashem. Therefore, the gemara teaches us that everyone must personalize his tefillah to ask Hashem for what he needs and not just leave it as the generic tefillah of the anshei k'neses ha'gedola.

Brachos 16a - Shema D'oraysa

The gemara discusses whether workers continue working while they say shema, and concludes that for the first perek they stop their work to say shema, but the second chapter they say while working. The gemara is assuming that the first perek requires kavana, but the second does not. The issue of kavana was already dealt with at the beginning of the perek regarding the part that one has to stop walking for. Rava holds only the first pasuk requires intent, whereas R. Yochanan says the entire first parsha. The Ri"f explains that even Rava who only requires kavana for the first pasuk and would allow one to continue walking after the first pasuk, would say that one cannot do work for the entire first parsha דלא לשוי לה עראי  - not to degrade the first parsha of shema. However, Tosafos says that the gemara's answer is to allow for a distinction even in the opinion of R. Yochana, but since we pasken like Rava it would be sufficient to stop working for just the first pasuk.

Rabbeinu Yona points out that according to the Ri"f the d'oraysa part of shema is only the first pasuk, yet we force workers to stop their work for the first parsha דלא לישוי עראי, but after that we are not concerned. Why are we not concerned after the first parsha? From here the Rabbeinu Yona derives that only the first parsha of shema is d'oraysa, the parsha of והיה אם שמוע is only d'rabonon. Rabbeinu Yona elaborates to prove this point. One of his sources is the gemara 13b that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi would only say shema yisroel within the time of Krias Shema. Rabbeinu Yona understands this to mean that he would read the entire first perek, not just the first pasuk. If the second perek were d'oraysa Rebbi would have had to say that as well, the fact that he didn't proves that after the first perek it is only d'rabonon. 

In the gemara on 13b about Rav Nachman who would dose off during shema and only required his servant to keep him awake for the FIRST PASUK, not the first parsha. If the first parsha is d'oraysa why didn't he require his servant to keep him awake for the entire parsha? Rabbeinu Yona (beginning of perek) explains that he actually read the entire shema, just that he was dosing off so he didn't have kavana. He insisted that his servant keep him alert to have kavana for the first pasuk, like Rava paskens, but not beyond that.

This distintion between the first parsha being d'oraysa and second being d'rabonon, would help explain the opinion of Rashi on 2a who says that the mitzvah of krias shema is fulfilled by the saying of the first perek before one goes to sleep. Tosafos disagrees and says that if one were to be yotzei with krias shema al ha'mita, they should read all three parshiyos (the third is definitely not d'orasya for shema, just for yetzias mitzrayim). The Sha'agas Aryeh (3) also justifies the position of Rashi based on the Ri"f that only the first parsha is d'oraysa, but for the d'rabonon parsha we rely on the saying of shema early. The proof of Rabbeinu Yona has that the second parsha isn't d'oraysa is based on his learning of our gemara that the distinction between the first perek and second is true even according to Rava who requires kavana only for the first PASUK, so the distinction between the first PARSHA and second must be whether it is d'oraysa. However, according to Tosafos that the workers only need to pause for the first PASUK, that is because of kavana, but the d'oraysa requirement to read could be both the first and second PARSHA, which is li'shitasam on 2a.

Rabbeinu Yona asks that since we require people learning to stop for all mitzvos, even Rabbinic mitzvos, why wouldn't we require Rebbi to stop for והיה אם שמוע? Rabbeinu Yona cites a Yerushalmi that we stop a reading mitzvah i.e. limud ha'torah, for an action mitzvah, but not for another reading mitzvah i.e. krias shema.

Brachos 15b - Learning Out Loud

The gemara develops a 3 way machlokes as to whether one is required to hear what they are saying for mitzvos that are dependent on amira such as kriash shema and brachos. We pasken like R. Yehuda that lichatchila one must hear what they are saying but they can be yotzei bidieved even if they don't hear what they are saying. In the discussion the gemara compares this to one who says ברכת המזון בלבו, which would seem to imply that a person can be yotzei even without articulating the words with their mouth. However, Rashi 15a implies that when the braisa speaks about saying birchas hamazon in one's heart, it doesn't literally mean in one's heart, it means that they don't hear the words that they are saying. Rabbeinu Yona writes this explicitly, we pasken הרהור לאו כדבור דמי, so the entire discussion here is when there is actual dibur, just not audible. The gemara at the very end asks, how can one be yotei brachos that aren't audible, the pasuk says הסכת ושמע ישראל, which implies that hearing what you are saying is essential. The gemara responds that the pasuk of הסכת ושמע ישראל is not speaking about other mitzvos and brachos, rather about talmud torah. Rashi explains that this does not mean that when one learns there is a requirement to hear what one is reading. Rather, the gemara 63b darshens from this הסכת that one should form groups and not study alone. Rashi is clearly bothered by interpreting the gemara to say that one must read out loud when learning, because the mitzvah of limud ha'torah is a mitzvah in the mind, not in the mouth. A similar idea is expressed by the Gr"a cited in the biur halacha in hilchos birchas hatorah. The Shulchan Aruch seems to make the halacha of whether הרהור in Torah requires a birchas hatorah to be dependent on הרהור כדבור דמי, to which the Gr"a responds that even if הרהור is not like speech, it would still require a birchas hatorah because the mitzvah of talmud torah is והגית בו יומם ולילה. Meaning the mitzvah of Talmud Torah is not a speech related mitzvah, it is a mitzvah for one to be mentally involved in Torah study.

However, the Shulchan Aruch HaGraz in Hilchos Talmud Torah (2:12) writes:

וכל אדם צריך ליזהר להוציא בשפתיו ולהשמיע לאזניו כל מה שלומד בין במקרא משנה ותלמוד, אלא אם כן בשעת עיון להבין דבר מתוך דבר. וכל מה שלומד בהרהור לבד ואפשר לו להוציא בשפתיו ואינו מוציא, אינו יוצא בלימוד זה ידי חובת מצות ולמדתם אותו וכו' וכמו בכל המצות התלויות בדבור שאינו יוצא בהן ידי חובתו בהרהור אא"כ שומע מפי המדבר שהשומע כעונה בפיו.

The Ba'al Hatanya seems to learn our gemara כפשוטו, that the mitzvah of Talmud Torah is essentially a mitzvah of dibur and can only be fulfilled if it is read in an audible way. According to this approach, Talmud Torah is actually stricter than other brachos and krias shema where one can be yotzei bidieved even if they don't hear what they are saying. The gemara considers the pasuk of הסכת ושמע ישראל to be me'akeiv, so that one is not yotzei talmud torah even bidieved unless they actually hear what they are saying.

Brachos 12b - Mitzvah to Mention Yetzias Mitzrayim

The Mishna has a discussion whether there is a mitzvah to mention yetzias mitzrayim only by day or even by night. Aside from the fact that we pasken like ben zoma that there is a mitzvah to mention yetzias mitzrayim both by day and by night, all agree that at least by day there is a mitzvah. Yet, the Rambam in his minyan ha'mitzvos 157 counts the mitzvah of sippur yetzias mitzrayim on the night of pesach, but doesn't count the mitzvah of zechiras yetzias mitzrayim, which is a mitzvah every day, twice a day. Furthermore, the Rambam in Hilchos Krias Shema in the heading writes that in the section below there is only one mitzvah - 

מצות עשה אחת והיא לקרות קריאת שמע פעמים ביום

The hagahos of the mishneh l'melech wonders why the Rambam counts it only as one mitzvah since it must be said twice a day, but a bigger question is raised by the tzlach - what about the mitzvah of mentioning yetziah mitzrayim. The Rambam himself (1:3) writes that even though tzitzis doesn't apply at night, we still say the parsha of tzitzis because it has in it yetzias mitzrayim, "and there is a mitzvah to mention yetzias mitzrayim by day and by night". Being that the rambam considers this a mitzvah, why does he not count it as a mitzvah?

The Tzlach answers that the Rambam understands like rashi in chumash that the pasuk of למען תזכור את יום צאתך מארץ מצרים כל ימי חייך, is not written in the language of a command rather in the language of a rationale. Rashi (devorim 16:3) says that it is a justification for the mitzvos that we do on the night of pesach such as eating korban pesach and matzah, in order to remember yetzias mitzrayim, and is not an independent command. According to Rashi, this pasuk cannot be considered a mitzvah at all. The Rambam understands like rashi that the pasuk of למען תזכור is not a command, but it is an indication that Hashem wants us to remember yetzias mitzrayim. That is why the Rambam says that there is a mitzvah - a mitzvah in the sense that it is the will of the Torah, but not an absolute command. This would probably be considered a kiyum mitzvah since it is the ratzon ha'torah but not a chiyuv. However, Rashi himself in parshas Bo (13:3) learns that the pasuk of זכור את היום הזה אשר יצאתם ממצרים is an absolute mitzvah and command to mention yetzias mitzrayim everyday.
The Ohr Sameiach (beginning of Hil. Krias Shema) has the same basic approach as the tzlach. Chazal understood from other mitzvos in the Torah that the will of Hashem was that we remember yetzias mitzrayim. Therefore, it is not a real mitzva d'oraysa, but also not a d'rabonon since it is the ratzon of Hashem. Based on the Meshech Chochma (shoftim) it would make sense why we would be machmir about a safeik by this type of mitzvah as well. Furthermore, the Ohr Sameiach says that even if mentioning yetzias mitzrayim isn't considered time bound since it is both by day and night (unlike sha'agas aryeh who says that it is time bound since the day mitzvah doesn't apply at night and the night mitzvah doesn't apply by day), women may still be exempt. The actual obligation for this mitzvah is only on pesach night to tell the story of yetzias mitzrayim and through that chazal indidcate that they want it mentioned daily. Since women are exempt from the mitzvah of sippur on pesach night, they are also exempt from the mitzvah of zechiras yetzias mitzrayim (this of course assumes that women are exempt from sippur but many hold that woman are actually obligated in the mitzvah of sippur on pesach night as well).

It seems to me from that language of the Rambam that his approach is slightly different. The Rambam after writing that there is a mitzvah to mention yetzias mitzrayim both by day and night, concludes - וקריאת שלש פרשיות אלו על סדר זה היא הנקראת קריאת שמע. What does the Rambam mean by this line that the reading of all 3 parshiyos is called krias shema? The gemara suggests the insertion of parshas balak in the krias shema, would that also be called krias shema? It seems that the Rambam is trying to say that the mitzvah of mentioning yetzias mitzrayim is not an independent mitzvah, rather part of the broader mitzvah of krias shema. A support to this is from the gemara that says that they established saying ויאמר because it has in it 5 different points - one of them being yetzias mitzrayim. It seems from the gemara that it wasn't simply tagged onto krias shema to accomplish a second mitzvah of mentioning yetzias mitzrayim which also happens to be twice a day, rather it is part and parcel of the actual shema. 

Furthermore, the Tzlach writes at the very end of the perek that if the mitzvah of mentioning yetzias mitzrayim is derived from the pasuk of למען תזכור, then it must include mentioning the plague of killing the first born as it says in the yerushalmi (since it mention the חפזון which the gemara tells us on 9a refers to חפזון of mitzrayim during makas bechoros). Therefore, the parsha of ויאמר would be a mentioning of yetzias mitzrayim but would not be sufficient to technically fulfill the mitzvah. It is only the bracha of that follows the shema of אמת ויציב by day and אמת ואמונה at night, which mention makas bechoros explicitly, that one can fulfill this mitzvah. This is supported by the gemara 21a that considers אמת ויציב to be d'oraysa since with it one fulfills the mentioning of yetzias mitzrayim - what about ויאמר? The gemara seems to understand that with ויאמר one cannot fulfill this mitzvah. According to this approach, the parsha of ויאמר  is not a technical fulfillment of this mitzvah, but was added to the krias shema because it has 5 essential principles, one being to mention yetzias mitzrayim.
Perhaps the Rambam's source that the parsha of tzitzis became part of the mitzvah of krias shema is from the gemara 13b. The gemara says that Rebbi would say the first pasuk of shema in middle of his shiur and would also try to discuss a topic that contained something about yetzias mitzrayim. The gemara questions whether after the shiur Rebbi would say all the remaining parts of shema. The gemara responds that he would seemingly not say the other sections of shema later on, because if he did why would he have to mention yetzias mitzrayim during the shiur, he could fulfill his mitzvah with the saying of it later. To that the gemara responds that even if Rebbi was going to say all 3 parshiyos of shema later on, he would still mention yetzias mitzrayim in his discourse - כדי להזכיר יציאת מצרים בזמנה, so that he can mention yetzias mitzrayim in it's time. Rashi explains - בזמן קריאת שמע. The Sha'agas Aryeh 10 points out that Rashi is teaching us that the mitzvah of mentioning yetzias mitzrayim is not limited to a certain time of day, rather Rebbi wanted it to be said in the time of krias shema. This implies that the institution of the parsha of tzitzis wasn't merely to fulfill a mitzvah of mentioning yetzias mitzrayim, rather the mentioning of yetzias mitzrayim itself became part of the krias shema.

Brachos 12a - Mitzvos Require Intent

The gemara discusses a situation where one begins a bracha with the wrong intent, but then finishes off the bracha properly, whether it is a valid bracha. Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona assume that this is dependent on the issue of whether mitzvos need intent. Since the person said all the words correctly, just that he had the wrong intent when he started the bracha, if we assume mitzvos don't require kavan he would still be yotzei. Based on this assumption, Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona asks why the gemara doesn't explicitly answer the question based on other sources that we have regarding mitzvos needing intent, such as the gemara in rosh hashana 28a. TRY (talmidei rabbeinu yona) write that according to the Ri"f who holds that mitzvos require intent, the gemara's question is legitimate. It seems that they understand that even if mitzvos would normally require intent, a bracha may not require intent at the beginning of the bracha since it was finished properly. However, according to those who pasken that mitzvos don't need intent, surely here the bracha would be valid even with the wrong intent at the beginning. What then is the gemara's quetion? TRY answers that when one does an act of a mitzvah such as blowing shofar or shaking lulav, we can pasken that mitzvos don't need intent because the act is significant enough to make up for the lack of intent. However, mitzvos that are dependent on speech, such as a bracha, would surely require intent. The rationale is:

שהאמירא היא בלב, וכשאינו מכוין באמירה ואינו עושה מעשה נמצא כמי שלא עשה שום דבר מהמצות

Since speech is ultimately dependent on one's heart, speech without intent is worthless. That is why the gemara suggests that one could not be yotzei their bracha when they had invalid intent at the beginning.

The Bach (hagahos on TRY) points out that the gemara at the very beginning of the next perek discusses mitzvos tzrichos kavana in the context of saying Shema. That is clearly a mitzvah done with speech, without action, yet the gemara seems to raise the standard issue of whether מצות צריכות כוונה? The answer of the Bach that TRY just mean that the gemara doesn't answer the question here, but does answer it at the beginning of the next perek by showing that this distinction isn't true, is a difficult answer.

To answer this question we need to understand what TRY says. What do they mean that speech is dependent on the heart and therefore intent is integral? There are two types of mitzvos that involve speech. One type of mitzvah is a mitzvah that is really dependent on the saying of something, it is a mitzvah that is fulfilled through אמירה such as shema and kiddush. Another type of mitzvah is where the focus is really on what is in one's heart but needs to be formally articulated to substantiate what is in one's heart. Brachos on food would seem to be the latter category. The purpose of the bracha is to feel appreciation for what Hashem has given, just that the feeling of appreciation needs to be articulated. When it comes to mitzvos that are truly dependent on speech, TRY would categorize them as all other mitzvos that are dependent on action. The speech in shema is tantamount to the action of shaking lulav, where even without intent one can be yotzei. But when it comes to brachos where the focus is really on what is in one's heart, they need to feel the appreciation prior to articulating it. That is what TRY means that it is dependent on one's heart, and that is why intent is more essential for brachos than it is for krias shema.

Brachos 11b - Birchas HaTorah for Women

Tosafos discusses why Birchas HaTorah can work once in the morning and one is not required to make the bracha again for the duration of the day. Tosafos makes this point by contrasting Birchas HaTorah to Leishev BaSuccah which is required every time one returns to eat in the succah. Tosafos explains that eating in the succah has set times therefore the bracha that is being made only goes on the specific meal and whatever sitting in the succah follows it. However, by Torah there is a mitzvah to learn constantly - והגית בו יומם ולילה, therefore even if one has breaks throughout the course of the day, they would not be required to say birchas hatorah when they return to their learning. The point that Tosafos is trying to make is more clearly brought out by Rabbeinu Yona. Rabbeinu Yona suggests that there should be a distinction between different types of people. Those who learn regularly throughout the day would only need to make birchas hatorah once since their intent when making the bracha goes on the entire day since they will spend the majority of it learning. However, those who aren't spending most of their day learning is only making a bracha on what he is about to learn, therefore when the opportunity arises that he is unexpectedly able to learn, he should need to make a new birchas hatorah. To that Rabbeinu Yona responds that the minhag is that even those who fall in the second category do not make a new birchas hatorah. The rationale is:

דכיון דמצות הקריאה כל היום היא, אותה הברכה שבבקר פוטרת כל מה שיקרא ביום

Rabbeinu Yona (citing the R"I) originally thought that the birchas hatorah is dependent on whether a person is actually spending his day learning and only one who does, would be able to make the bracha only on the morning. However, he justifies the minhag based on the fact that the obligation to learn all day applies to everyone. In short, the reason we don't consider the time one is not learning to be a hefsek is because the obligation is to learn even during those times. This is the intent of Tosafos as well to differentiate between birchas hatorah and the bracha on succah. It isn't dependent on what one does, rather on the inherent obligation.

The Tzlach writes what even he considers to be a tremendous chiddush and wonders why this isn't pointed out by rishonim and other acharonim. Although we hold that woman are entitled to make birchas hatorah as the shulchan aruch paskens in the last si'if of 47, the rationale of Tosafos that we don't regard the break time to be a hefsek because they are obligated to learn even during those times, doesn't apply to women. Women are not obligated at all to learn. Therefore, if a woman makes birchas hatorah in the morning and then returns to learn later in the evening, she would need to make a new birchas hatorah.

It seems to me that this chiddush may be dependent on how exactly we justify a woman's right to make birchas hatorah. The Biur Halacha quotes two approaches. The Beis Yosef and Magen Avrohom write that a woman can make birchas hatorah since they are required to learn laws that are pertinent to them and also obligated to say the parshiyos of korbanos. This is what the birchas hatorah goes on. The Gr"a disagrees and says that it is like every time bound positive mitzvah that they have a right to make a bracha on. The Biur Halacha suggests that according to the first approach, they can technically be motzi a man in birchas hatorah, whereas according to the approach of the Gr"a, they cannot. Perhaps another distinction is that although the rishonim discuss whether one needs to learn immediately after making birchas hatorah (even the yerushalmi may only require this by ahava rabba), our custom is to say pesukim and a mishna right after birchas hatorah. It would seem logical that one would need to learn something that they are obligated to learn, so that the birchas hatorah can go on that learning. Based on the approach of the gr"a women can learn anything after birchas hatorah, including the saying of the pesukim and mishna that we say. But according to the first approach, they would need to learn halachos that apply to them. 

Perhaps another distinction between these two approaches is the suggestion of the tzlach. Do we consider the time in between the learning to constitute a hefsek. If they are making birchas hatorah due to their requirement to learn halachos that are pertinent, just as we don't consider the time in between a hefsek for men, we shouldnt consider it a hefsek for women either. But if they are only able to make a birchas hatorah as they make a bracha on every time bound mitzvah, the time in between the learning should be a hefsek for them and require them to make a new birchas hatorah when they come back to learn, as the tzlach suggests.

Brachos 9b - Starting Before the End of the Zman

The Mishna says that the zman of krias shema extends for the first 3 hours of the day. To add to yesterdays post, Rabbeinu Yona explains that there is a lichatchila start and finish time for shema, and a bidieved start and finish time. The lichatchila start time of Shema is misheyakir, and the lichatchila finish time is sunrise. From Rabbeinu Yona was see that the importance of davening k'vasikin is not just an advantage of doing tefilla with sunrise, but also getting in shema prior to sunrise which is the lichatchila end time. On a bidieved level, the start time of shema is alos hashachar, and the end time is 3 hours into the day. As I pointed out yesterday, Tosafos seems to contradict themselves (8b - 9b) whether the start time is misheyakir or alos.

It isn't clear when we are given zemanim for shema and tefillah, whether they must be completed by the end time, or is it sufficient to just begin them by the end time. The Magen Avrohom (beginning of Hilchos Tefillah) cited by the M.B. (89:5) who says that the davening must be completed within the first third of the day (z'man tefillah extends 1 halachic hour past z'man krias shema). The Aruch HaShulchan (110:5) infers this from a Magen Avrohom who says that if one sees that the time of tefillah is passing, they should say havineinu. Why not just start the regular shemoneh esrei before the time passes? The M.A. must hold that one has to be finished with the shemoneh esrei before the end of z'man tefillah, so that if he can't he should daven havineinu. The Aruch HaShulchan disagrees and says that it is sufficient to begin tefillah by z'man tefillah, even if one will not be finished until after the time passes. He derives this from Tosafos Brachos 7a that says that Bilam was able to start his curse of the jewish people at the moment of Hashem's anger. Although he couldn't complete his curse in that moment, it was sufficient to just start it. We see from here that once one begins in the "zman", they can finish afterward. The logic of the Aruch HaShulchan would presumably apply to Shema as well. So long as one starts in the right time, they can finish afterward.

It seems to me that from Rabbeinu Yona on our gemara we have a very strong proof to the Magen Avrohom, against the Aruch HaShulchan. Rabbeinu Yona posits that sunrise is the end time for the lichatchila reading of Shema. He explains that the pasuk of ייראוך עם שמש requires that Tefillah be done sometime as the sun is rising and is not a specific momemnt (unlike Rashi who says that the pasuk is referring to shema). If Krias Shema could be done lichatchila after the sun begins to rise, why were the vasikin so meticulous to finish shema exactly upon the sun rising, they could have been less precise and managed to finish shema sometime within the 10 - 15 minutes that it takes the sun to rise and then davened shemone esrei. From this Rabbeinu Yona concludes that their precision was not due to hilchos tefilla, rather to hilchos krias shema. Had they not been so precise, their krias shema would extend beyond the start of sunrise, and they would not fulfill the lichatchila mitzvah of reading shema before sunrise. Rabbeinu Yona then adds, that the vasikin themselves would agree that bidieved one could be yotzei shema for the first 3 hours of the day, even after sunrise, because if they held that sunrise was the absolute end time, they wouldn't have risked losing the entire mitzvah of shema by finishing so close to sunrise. The language of Rabbeinu Yona is:

אם איתא דאינו יוצא בדיעבד אחר הנץ, היאך היו מצמצמין כל כך שיגמרו אותה עם הנץ החמה ממש, היה להם לחוש שמא יעבור זמן ק"ש ולא היו מכניסין ק"ש בספק כזה. Now, if the Aruch HaShulchan was correct, the logic of Rabbeinu Yona wouldn't have made sense. There would be no risk to saying Shema right before sunrise since all we would require is that it begin before sunrise, even if it isn't completed by sunrise. Clearly we see from Rabbeinu Yona that shema would need to be completed prior to the end of the z'man.

Perhaps one could dispute this proof by distinguishing between the z'man of shema and the z'man of tefillah. It is only for tefillah that starting within the time would be okay as suggested by the Aruch HaShulchan whereas shema would need to be completed within its time. However, if for the d'oraysa of shema it would need to be completed within the time, it is more logical that chazal would have modeled the z'man tefillah after the z'man krias shema and wouldn't have been lenient to allow one to just start before the end of the z'man. Therefore it seems that the Magen Avrohom is correct, and the proof of the Aruch Hashulchan from bilam's curse is not the model for chazal's institution of z'man tefillah.

Brachos 8 - 9 - Time for Shema

The gemara says that one can read shema before and after amud ha'shachar and fulfill both the shema of the evening and shema of the morning. The gemara then has a second lashon that says one can read shema both prior to sunrise and after sunrise and fulfill both the shema of the evening and the shema of the morning. Rabbeinu Yona (2a) says that the Rif holds that these leshonos don't disagree. The first lashon which says that evening shema can be read before amud ha'shachar (at least m'doraysa), and the morning after amud ha'shachar is even in a normal circumstance. The second lashon which talks about before sunrise and after sunrise is speaking about a sha'as ha'dechak where a person could not read shema earlier, so they can read the night time shema before sunrise even after alos ha'shachar, and then again after sunrise. Actually, Rabbeinu Yona says that when the gemara says that the morning shema could be read after sunrise, it is to the exclusion of the evening shema which cannot be read after sunrise, but the ideal time to read the morning shema is just before sunrise as the gemara says on 9b. Tosafos 9a in the second answer also says that one can read the even shema before misheyakir and the morning shema after misheyakir and be yotzei. Even in the lashon that allows the morning shema to be read after alos, Tosafos 8b holds that it cannot be read until misheyakir, and when the gemara says after also ha'shachar, it is לאו דוקא. However, Tosafos 9b implies that even lichatchila one can say shema in the morning after alos. In Shulchan Aruch (o.c. 58) we pasken that ideally one should say the morning shema just before sunrise and daven with sunrise as the vasikin do. If one is unable to do the מצוה מן המובחר, they can say shema as early as misheyakir, and from that point it should be done as soon as possible and must be done before 3 hours of the day. In a sha'as ha'dechak one can say it as early as alos hashachar, provided that they have said the evening shema before alos hashachar (m.b. cites gr"a who doesn't consider it to be a contradiction to say both evening and morning shema after alos, since it is both a time when people are sleeping and a time when people get up.

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Rav Moshe has a teshuva where he explains the Mishna in Megilla that says all day mitzvos can be done from alos, but lichatchila should be done after sunrise. Rashi says that m'doraysa the z'man is alos, but m'drabonon they wanted us to wait until sunrise to be sure that it is day. Rav Moshe understands from the Rambam that both the lichatchila and the bidieved are on a Torah level. The Torah considers alos ha'shachar to be day on a bidieved level, and sunrise to be day on a lichtachila level. It seems to me that the language of Rabbeinu Yona 2a strongly supports Rav Moshe's chiddush:

אע"פ שאחר שעלה עמוד השחר יוצא ידי חובה מק"ש של יום, קורא אותו לילה מפני שעיקר היום אינו אלא אחר הנץ החמה ואילך, וכל דבר שמצותו ביום לכתחלה צריך לעשותו מהנץ החמה ואילך, וכיון דלכתחלה אינו יום אע"פ שבדיעבד יוצא מק"ש של יום, קורא אותו לילה

Brachos 5a - Hashem "Sold" Torah to Klal Yisroel

The gemara darshens the pasuk of כי לקח טוב נתתי לכם תורתי אל תעזובו, that the giving of the Torah is comparable to a man selling his most precious item. The gemara points out the contrast that when a man "sells"  at item because he needs the money, he is saddened by the sale, whereas Hashem "gave" the Torah to the Jews and was happy about it. The Tzlach points out that the gemara is comparing apples and oranges. How does it compare the sale of a man to the giving of Hashem? The Tzlach explains that is exactly the point of the gemara. The pasuk says in Iyov (35:6) אם חטאת מה תפעל בו...אם צדקת מה תתן לו. Hashem has not benefit from our mitzvos and not loss from our aveiros. Even when we say that our aveiros causes Hashem to be weakened, that is only in His relationship to us, but it doesn't truly impact Hashem at all. The gemara is coming to illustrate that when a seller sells an object he receives payment for the object, and is nevertheless saddened by it's loss. Whereas Hashem gave us the Torah, while receiving nothing in return, yet is happy about giving it up.

Another important point in understanding this gemara is something that my wife's grandfather, Rabbi Yitzchok Gefen, develops in his sefer dalyas ha'kerem, which I also found in the Nesivos' sefer on aggadah called Emes L'ya'akov. The gemara is seemingly trying to illustrate the contrast between the reaction of a seller and the reaction of Hashem by giving up the Torah. The question is that it is not at all comparable. When a seller sells an object, that object is now in the hands of the buyer, and lost from the seller. When it comes to a חכמה such as Torah, it can be taught to the Jewish people without being lost from the giver. It is more similar to the transfer of fire where the "seller" has no reason to be upset since he didn't lose anything? The answer is that when Hashem gave the Torah to klal yisroel, he literally gave it up. As the gemara says in Baba Metzia, the ability to pasken and be machriah in Torah was handed over to the chachmei ha'torah so that even when Hashem disagrees, the halacha follows the chachmei hatorah. Hashem literally handed over the ba'alus - ownership of the Torah to the Jewish people. He had every reason to be saddened by giving up the Torah, yet His reaction was one of joy.

Brachos 4b - Geula Next to Tefilla

The gemara cites a machlokes between R. Yochanan and R. Yehoshua Ben Levi whether the concept of לסמוך גאולה לתפלה, applies only by day or even by night. R. Yehoshua Ben Levi holds that it doesn't apply at night since the primary redemption was during the day, not at night. What is the purpose in being מסמיך גאולה לתפלה and why is one who does it deserving of the title בן עולם הבא? Rabbeinu Yonah says that Hashem took us out of mitzrayim to be His servants. We recognize this in the bracha of ga'al yisroel. By davening immediately afterward we show that we recognize that we were acquired from Mitzrayim by Hashem to be His servants and are bound to his mitzvos. Alternatively, Rabbeinu Yona writes that it is Hashem earned out full trust by taking us out of mitzrayim and we are completely confident that he will always provide for us. Therefore, we say that just as we had this confidence when we left mitzrayim, we maintain this confidence when we turn to Him to ask for our needs.

Both approaches of Rabeinu Yona seem to attribute the advantage of being סומך גאולה לתפלה to be something new. It is not that the bracha of geu'la compliments the tefila, or the tefila compliments the bracha, rather the connection implies either a recognition of being his servants, or confidence that He will provide for us. Rashi seems to offer another explanation by citing the Yerushalmi which says that by making the bracha of geu'la and then walking away, we are tantamount to servants who knock on the door of the king and run away when he answers. After we appease Hashem and speak great praise about how we were redeemed, we run away without asking for our needs. Rabbeinu Yonah seems to say that both the bracha and the tefilla serve a significant function on their own, but when we put them together we show a special allegiance to Hashem. Rashi on the other hand says that the reason we need to daven after making the bracha of ga'al yisroel is because otherwise the bracha doesn't fulfill it's purpose. Rashi seems to say that the entire purpose of ga'al yisroel is to set up a situation where we can ask Hashem for what we need.

The gemara asks that according to R. Yochanan who requires geu'la to immediately precede tefillah, how can we say the Bracha of השכיבנו at night which separates between the bracha of ga'al yisroel and tefilah? The gemara answers that השכיבנו  is like a "long geu'la" - meaning that it is an extension of the bracha of ga'al yisroel, and therefore not a separation.

Tosafos explains the concept of כגאולה אריכתא דמי to mean that since it was instituted by chazal, it is not considered to be a hefsek. It seems that Tosafos holds that only personal interruptions are viewed as a hefsek. Based on this, Tosafos holds that the insertion of יראו עינינו and other pesukim are also not considered a hefsek since they were instituted by the chachamim.

Rabbeinu Yonah seems to disagree with Tosafos. Rabbeinu Yonah explains that השכיבנו is considered an extension of the geu'la because it is a reference to the night before we left mitzrayim and Hashem protected us during the makas bechoros. Rabbeinu Yonah seems to hold that simply being instituted by the chachamim doesn't give it the status of גאולה אריכתא. Perhaps it is for this reason that Rabbeinu Yona cites the Ramban disagreeing with Tosafos, that יראו עינינו shouldn't be said because it does interrupt between the geu'la and the tefillah. Even Rabbeinu Yonah himself who justifies the saying of it, is only because ma'ariv originally started as a re'shus where it wasn't so important to be מסמיך גאולה לתפלה, but otherwise would hold that it couldn't be said.

Perhaps the machlokes between Tosafos and Rabbeinu Yona regarding יראו עינינו being a hefsek, is actually dependent on the function of being מסמיך גאולה לתפלה. Rabbeinu Yona who holds that it is a special statement that is implied from the immediate juxtaposition that we show allegiance to Hashem or confidence in Hashem, it is only implied by an immediate juxtaposition without any other interruption. Therefore, Rabbeinu Yona is litshi'taso that even a hefsek instituted by chazal would dilute the connection between geu'la and tefilla so that the concept would no longer be recognized. However, Tosafos holds like Rashi that the purpose of being מסמיך גאולה לתפלה is that we can't walk away from גאולה without asking for our needs since that is the entire purpose of why we mention the geu'la. There isn't anything that we are trying to imply by the connection, but by breaking the connection we are undermining the purpose for the bracha of geu'la in the first place. Therefore, anything that chazal institute to be there wouldn't be considered knocking on the door and walking away. The immediate juxtaposition is only necessary for Rabbeinu Yona who holds that the effort for one to follow the other has a special implication, which wouldn't be obvious if there were some other passage in between. But Rashi and Tosafos hold that the concern is that we shouldn't knock and run, and any passage instituted by chazal would not qualify as running away after knocking.