Shabbos 122a - Benefiting From Melacha Done By A Goy

The Mishna says that if a goy does melacha for himself, a Jew can benefit from it, but if done for the Jew, it depends. If it is a melacha d'oraysa then no Jew can benefit from it, but if it is only a melacha d'rabonon then the one who it was done for cannot benefit from it (Tosafos says this to answer the question of techum which is only assur for the one it was done for. The Ran says that perhaps techum is a special leniency since it is different for each person, but a standard issur d'rabonon done for a Jew would be assur for everyone).

The gemara develops the details of the rules as to when a Jew could benefit from the melacha of a goy. Anytime a goy does a melacha for a Jew it is assur because we are afraid that if we allow the Jew to benefit, he will come to tell the goy to do it (Tosafos). If he does it for himself, then it depends. A type of melacha that you would increase the quantity based on the number of people that need to benefit is assur because we are afraid he is going to do extra for the Jew. But if it is like a candle or ramp to exit a boat where it is the same melacha no matter how many it is done for, even if he knows the Jew, since he is doing it also for himself, it is permitted. It is also clear from the gemara that when a goy is lighting a candle for himself, even if there are many Jews who would be benefiting, it is permitted since we consider the primary melacha to be for himself. But if he is doing it for others, we follow the majority and assume he is doing it for whoever the majority is (mostly jews would be assur, and half jews would be a safeik issur).

There is a stark contrast between the previous Mishna 121a and this Mishna 122a. In the earlier Mishna it permits the Jew to allow the goy to extinguish a fire for the Jew, yet in this Mishna it forbids allowing the goy to light a fire for the Jew. Tosafos asks what is the rationale behind this distinction? Furthermore, why does the Mishna change from the melacha of extinguishing to the melacha of ligthing?

Tosafos (d.h. v'im) explains that when the Jew is going to be benefiting from the melacha of a goy, we don't consider the goy to be doing it for himself unless the goy is actually doing it for himself (or another goy). Therefore, the latter Mishna doesn't permit benefiting from the candle unless the goy lit it for himself (or for himself and others). But when the Jew is not actually deriving benefit from the melacha done by the goy, even if the goy is doing the melacha for the Jew, we consider him to be doing it for himself since he knows that he will ultimately benefit from the good will created. In short, a Jew can allow a goy to do a melacha for the Jew when there is no direct benefit that the Jew derives from the melacha. The extinguishing of a fire or candle is not considered a direct benefit that the Jew derives from the melacha (the fact that his house didn't burn down, or that it is now dark so he can sleep is considered an indirect benefit). This is a very important distinction to explain why it would be permitted to allow a non-jew to shut off the lights in a room so that you can sleep, but if he would turn on the lights it would be forbidden to read (or do any activity that couldn't be done in the dark) in that room.
Another interesting question is raised by Tosafos (d.h. mishtameish). Tosafos points out that at the beginning of maseches beitzah we find that chazal made a gezeira on fruits that fall of trees or liquid that flow out of fruits that it is forbidden to eat them because we are afraid that if we permit it, one will come to pick the fruits and squeeze fruits on shabbos and yom tov. Why here aren't we concerned that if we permit a Jew to benefit from the light of a candle when the goy lit it for himself, one will come to light candles on shabbos? Tosafos answers that chazal were only gozer on melachos that are easy to do and one is is drawn to do them such as food related things, but things that are either not so easy to do or one is not so motivated to do, there is no gezeira. The Ran in the name of the Ramban answers this question differently. He says that things that occur by themselves are somewhat common and therefore a problem, but since Jews usually live in sectioned off areas and not among goyim, it isn't common to have a goy do melacha for a jew so we don't impose a gezeira. Based on this distinction of the Ramban, it is very possible that nowadays since we live among non-jews, it would be forbidden to use a light that a non-jew lit for himself because it is common so that we are concerned the Jew will come to light the candle himself.

Shabbos 121a - A Child Doing Melacha For His Father

There is a pasuk in this weeks parsha that is very difficult to figure out how exactly chazal interpret it and is crucial halacha l'ma'aseh.

ויום השביעי שבת לה' אלקיך, לא תעשה כל מלאכה אתה ובנך ובתך עבדך ואמתך ובהמתך וגרך אשר בשעריך

What is the prohibition of בנך ובתך, not having children do work on Shabbos? Does it mean that when children do a melacha of violating Shabbos, the parent(s) are in violation of this issur d'oraysa?

Rashi on the Torah writes -אלו קטנים וכו' אלא לא בא אלא להזהיר גדולים על שביתת הקטנים, וזהו ששנינו קטן שבא לכבות אין שומעין לו מפני ששביתתו עליך. It seems from Rashi that any time a child would do melacha on Shabbos, the parents are in violation of this prohibition by allowing them to do melacha. According to this, it would be similar to shevisas b'hemto where an animal doing melacha would constitute a Torah violation on the owner.

According to Rashi, the sugya of the gemara is very difficult to read. The gemara suggests that the issur in telling a child to extinguish a fire, which the Mishna explains is prohibited because שביתתו עליהן, is predicated on the concept that קטן האוכל נבילות, בית דין מצווין להפרישו. However, the gemara isn't content explaining the Mishna based on that opinion since it contradicts R. Yochanan's opinion in Yevamos (who we pasken like) that אין ב"ד מצווין להפרישו. Therefore the gemara concludes that we are speaking when he is עושה לדעת אביו. Rashi explains that if a child does a melacha because he knows his father wants it done and will be happy about it, the father must stop him from doing it. If Rashi (על התורה) is correct that a father is prohibited from even allowing his child to do a melacha on shabbos, why doesn't the gemara say that the issur is an issur of שביתת בנו ובתו which is an issur d'oraysa? The Mizrachi (on rashi in chumash) and the Netziv (Meishiv Davar siman 20) ask this question and conclude that this must be what the gemara means. When the gemara says that we are speaking about a child who is doing it FOR his father, the gemara is being מגדיר the issur of שביתת בנו ובתו and telling us that the issur in the Torah applies only when the child is doing it for the father. According to this approach, certainly if a father would tell a child to do a melacha on Shabbos the father would be violating a Torah prohibition because the child will be doing it for the father. The S'forno and Ramban both seem to follow this approach as well. The S'forno explains that the pasuk is referring to קטנים העושים לדעת אביהם, and the Ramban explains  - הזהירנו בשבת שלא יעשו הבנים הקטנים מלאכה לדעתנו וברצוננו.

This is also me'duyak in Rashi in the Mishna - Rashi contrasts a goy with a child and says that a Jew is not obligated on the שביתה of a goy, "who is not his slave". The implication of Rashi is that the same issur that we have on a child would apply to a slave, which is the continuation of the pasuk, but not to a regular goy. This is also explicit in the Ramban (hasagos to shoresh 14 of sefer hamitzvos of Rambam - cited by sefer hachinuch) where he explains the la'av of mechamer and writes paranthetically -

אבל על מלאכת בהמתו לא מיחייב אלא שמוזהר עליה בלאו כמו במלאכת בנו הקטן ועבדו הכנעני. The Ramban considers the melacha done by a child similar to a slave or animal, on which the father is in violation (but doesn't explicitly stipulate that it is only if he does it FOR the father).

The difficulty with this approach is the continuation of the gemara -

 דכוותה גבי נכרי דקא עביד לדעתיה דישראל מי שרי, נכרי לדעתיה דנפשיה עביד. The gemara asks that if we are speaking about a child who is extinguishing for the father, would a similar situation be permitted for a goy to do a melacha for a Jew? To which the gemara says that we would always consider a goy doing it for himself. But, what is the question of the gemara to begin with. A child doing melacha for a father would be a violation of שביתת בנו ובתו but a goy doing melacha for a Jew is not included in any pasuk. It must be that the gemara is asking that if the mishna is speaking about a child doing melacha for a father which would be an issur d'oraysa, the contrast to a goy would not make sense because when a goy does a melacha for a Jew it should at least be an issur d'rabonon.

The Minchas Chinuch (end of mo'seich ha'shabbos) says he doesn't understand the Ramban. If a father would feed issur to a child such as put a nap sack on his back and bring the child carrying the nap sack from reshus hayachid to reshus ha'rabim, the father would be in violation of לא תאכילם which is the general prohibition of not feeding issur to children. But a father is not in violation of this Torah prohibition when his child decides to do a melacha. The Minchas Chinuch ends by writing:

ולא מצאתי בשום מקום דיהיה מצווה על שביתת אלו בניו הקטנים. It is very unclear how he would interpret the pasuk in chumash that says לא תעשה מלאכה וגו' ובנך ובתך! It is also very strange that he missed Rashi in Chumash who also considers any melacha done by children to be a violation of their father (which we qualified based on the gemara to refer to ONLY when done FOR the father).
Rashi in Yevamos 114a explains that a child doing a melacha על דעת אביו is prohibited becasue it is as if the father commanded him to do it. It is not clear if Rashi means that it would therefore be the prohibition of לא תאכילום that we learn from dam, sheratzim and tu'mah, or if Rashi means that it would then be a violation of שביתת בנו ובתו. If Rashi means the latter, then he is essentially being magdir the issur of שביתת בנו ובתו to only when the father tells his child to do a melacha or when the child does it for him since that is as if he told the child to do it.

On a slightly different note, the Netziv in his teshuvos (Meishiv Davar #20) discusses whether it is permitted for a father to tell a child to violate an issur d'rabonon on shabbos. He points out that based on the Ran and Rashba in our sugya who consider the melacha of extiguishing a fire to be a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה which is only assur d'rabonon, yet the gemara says that a child doing it לדעת אביו would be assur, and according to Rashi in chumash even a Torah prohibition (on something which is d'oraysa), we see clearly that it's assur. However, the Netziv is medayek from the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch a tremendous chiddush. The Shulchan Aruch O.C. 343 writes:

קטן אוכל נבילות אין ב"ד מצווין להפרישו וכו' ולהאכילו בידים אסור אפילו דברים שאסורים מדברי סופרים, וכן אסור להרגילו בחילול שבת ומועד ואפילו בדברים שהם משום שבות. The language of the Shulchan Aruch implies that non-kosher food, even if only assur m'drabonon cannot be fed to a child. But, when it comes to chilul shabbos, it is only assur to get him accustomed to violating shabbos regularly. The rationale is that non-kosher food is metamtem the heart and therefore a worse violation than shabbos. Although an melacha d'oraysa would be assur to "feed" a child even as a one time thing, an issur d'rabonon of shabbos is only assur to "feed" him on a regular basis. However, to fit this with a braisa in Yevamos he backs off a little and says that anytime it is being done for a non-mitzvah purpose, we are afraid that you will do it more regularly and therefore forbidden, but if being done for a mitzvah purpose such as asking a child to carry a siddur to shul through a karmelis, it is permitted.

Shabbos 120b - Pesik Reisha D'lo Nicha Lei On An Issur D'rabonon

There is a well known machlokes between the Terumas HaDeshen and Magen Avrohom (314:1) regarding a peski reisha d'lo nicha lei, on an issur d'rabonon. Although the Aruch cited in Tosafos Shabbos 103a and Kesubos 6a holds that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה is permitted even on a d'oraysa, Tosafos elaborates to prove that it is an issur d'rabonon, as does the Ran at the end of perek shemoneh sheratzim. However, when the entire melacha is only an issur d'rabonon, perhaps even Tosafos would agree that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה on an issur d'rabonon is completely permitted. The source of this discussion is when there is a knife stuck into a barrel from before shabbos and the removal of it would expand the hole and be a Rabbinic violation of making an opening, is it mutar to pull it out? It is essentially a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה because he is not interested in making a pe'sach, on something which is only an issur d'rabonon. The Shulchan Aruch holds that it is permitted, and the Terumas HaDeshen explains that it is because when one does an action that as a pesik reisha results in an issur d'rabonon, but they are not at all intending for that (לא איכפת ליה), it is permitted. The Rama says that it is only permitted if it were removed before shabbos so that now it is not a pesik reisha that it will expand the hole, implying that had it been a pesik reisha, even though it is only a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה on an issur d'rabonon, it is prohibited. The M.B. (11) explains that there are other factors in the case of the knife in the barrel that could affect whether it is mutar or assur, but regarding the primary question as to whether a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה on an issur d'rabonon is permitted, the Magen Avrohom, Eliyahu Rabba, Gr"a and R. Akiva Eiger all hold that it is assur.

The source of this issur in the gemara is the case where one opens a door in front of a candle that causes the candle to extinguish (Rashi explains that the case is where the wind will blow it out, and Tosafos explains that the moving of the oil closer or further is a violation of burning or extinguishing). The gemara explains that even according to R. Shimon who holds that a דבר שאינו מתכוין is permitted, it would be forbidden to open the door since it is a פסיק רישא that the candle will be extinguished. The extinguishing of the candle in this situation is a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה which according to R. Shimon is only assur m'drabonon, yet the gemara says that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה would be assur. The Gr"a cites this proof that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה on an issur d'rabonon is assur, but suggests a distinction between a melacha that is inherently d'oraysa and only reduced to a d'rabonon due to מלאכה שא"צ לגופה (there is already a precedent to equate a melacha d'oraysa that is a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה with an actual d'oraysa - see Ran 94b), and a melacha which is inherently only d'rabonon. Perhaps when the melacha is inherently only d'rabonon, we would permit a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה. Nevertheless, the Gr"a rejects this distinction and agrees with the Magen Avrohom that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה is assur even on an issur d'rabonon.

On the other hand, Tosafos 103a asks how the gemara in Succah can permit the removing of the berries on a hadas since it is "fixing" the hadas to be kasher and therefore should be assur as a pesik reisha. Although the gemara says that we are speaking where he has another hadas, that works well for the Aruch who permits a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה, but for those who reject the Aruch, how will that gemara be explained? Tosafos answers that the fixing the hadas is only a minor tikun and therefore only a Rabbinic violation, therefore it is permitted. Tosafos implies that on an issur d'rabonon we accept the position of the Aruch that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה is permitted. This Tosafos is a strong support for the Terumas HaDeshen, however, Tosafos in other places (Kesubos, Succha) as well as other Rishonim answer the question of Tosafos differently. They say that for the sake of a mitzvah we can rely on the Aruch. The machlokes between the Terumas HaDeshen and Magen Avrohom may be a machlokes between two answers of Tosafos.

The Shulchan Aruch (336:8) writes that one shouldn't pick up a flower pot from the ground and put it on a peg, or put it from a peg back on the ground. Since the flower pot doesn't have a hole on the bottom, it is only a d'rabonon violation of planting or uprooting. The Sha'ar Hatziyun 39 says that this supports the opinion of the Magen Avrohom that a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה on an issur d'rabonon is still assur.

The M.B. 321:57 cites the Magen Avrohom that one is not allowed to urinate onto dirt because of the issur gibul. Even though it is only an issur d'rabonon of gibul, it would still be forbidden. He then cites the Beis Meir who in a situation of need permits urinating directly on mud (when it is not your property so there is no interest in the gibul). The Sha'ar Hatziyun 68 explains that the heter is based on פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה on an issur d'rabonon. Here we see that the poskim are willing to rely on the Magen Avrohom in a makom tzorech. The Chazon Ish (58:8) writes that the heter is based on kavod habriyos and cannot be applied elsewhere.

Even according to those who are machmir like the Magen Avrohom not to permit a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה even when the issur is only d'rabonon, the Sha'ar Hatziyun (316:21) cites the pri megadim that when it is a double d'rabonon, meaning two reasons why it is not d'oraysa, we can permit a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה.

Shabbos 119b - Melave Malka

The gemara says that one should be careful to be מסדר שולחנו and eat a meal on motzei shabbos, even if he is only going to eat a small amount. Rashi explains that just as it is a kavod shabbos to honor the shabbos as it enters, it is also a kavod to accompany the shabbos as it leaves, as one would escort a king leaving a city. Based on this, the M.B. (300:2) says that the seudah of melave malka should be as soon as shabbos is over since that is when the king is leaving.

However, in comparison to the other seudos that one is required to eat on Shabbos, the M.B. says that it is not as much of an obligation as the 3 seudos of Shabbos. The 3 seudos of shabbos are learned from a pasuk that repeats the word היום three times, as the gemara says 117b, whereas the seuda of melave malka doesn't have a source in the Torah. For the same reason the Sha'ar HaTziyun writes that if one has a choice on making an elaborate shalosh seudos or an elaborate melave malka, it is preferable to make an elaborate shalosh seudos. Although the M.B. quotes this from the Shulchan Aruch of the Ba'al HaTanya, it is found in Rashi 118a d.h. achlei. The gemara in discussing the number of meals distributed to a poor person only accounts for the 3 meals of Shabbos, and suggests eating the Motzei Shabbos meal early as shalosh seudos. Rashi comments that even though there is a mitzvah to eat shalosh seudos as well, הני מילי למאן דאפשר ליה. Rashi clearly writes that shalosh seudos takes precedence over melave malka.

Shabbos 115a - Cutting The Vegies For The Break Fast and Touching Food on Yom Kippur

The gemara says that although generally it is prohibited to prepare on a Shabbos or Yom Tov for afterwards, even if not melacha is being violated, as the mishna 113a implies, there was an exemption made for קניבת הירק in the late afternoon of Yom Kippur. There is a machlokes what exactly קניבת ירק means. Rashi says it refers to the removal of the leaves to prepare the vegetables to be cut and sliced after the fast. Rashi seems to hold that the heter was only to begin the preparation but not finish the process. The Ran doesn't agree with Rashi because the removal of the leaves is considered borer, and therefore explains that it refers to the washing of the vegetables which would normally be a problem of mesakein, but is permitted on Y.K. (this approach actually fits better with rashi 113a regarding the folding of keilim where rashi seems to hold the nature of the issur is fixing, not doing a tircha on shabbos and y.t. for afterward). Tosafos implies that we are referring to the actual slicing and cutting of the vegetables and is therefore compelled to distinguish this case from the cases earlier in shabbos where there is a melacha involved in the cutting of vegetables. According to Tosafos we should permit any preparation for after the fast, and not limit it to just starting an act of preparation. The Shulchan Aruch 611:2 writes that technically kenivas hayerek is permitted but nowadays the minhag is to forbid it as we see from the end of the gemara that people started to be lax and being the preparations prior to mincha.

Even at the time when it was permitted, it was only permitted after the time of mincha ketana. The gemara says that the rationale to permit it was עגמת נפש. Rashi explains that since the entire nature of Y.K. is to be a day of inuy, they permitted קניבת ירק since being involved with food when you are very hungry compliments the inuy and is conducive to the nature of the day. It is for this reason that it was only permitted late in the day when people are hungry and enticed by the food that they are working on. However, the Ba'al Hameor (printed in the inner margin of the gemara) explains that the agmas nefesh that the gemara is referring to does not take place on Y.K. itself, rather, if they would not permit preparations on Y.K. there will be too great of an agmas nefesh after the fast ends during the time it takes to prepare all the food. They permitted preparations on Y.K. to avoid עגמת נפש. Based on the ba'al hameor, the agmas nefesh is only a justification for the heter, but doesn't explain why it was only permitted starting from mincha and onward. To deal with this the Ba'al Hameor creates a new prohibition, a concern that one may come to eat from the food that they are working with. This would be a concern all Y.K. long until the very end of the day where the fast is imminently over so that the person has פת בסלו and won't come to eat from the food.

The Ba'al Hameor seems to create a new prohibition that we don't have a source for in the gemara. It would be prohibited to busy oneself with food preparation out of fear that they may come to eat from the food they are woking on. We find a similar prohibition regarding chometz in Pesachim 10b regarding whether one should do a bedika on Pesach (if they didn't do one before). The gemara suggests that it may be best not to do a bedika because one may come to eat from the food. Similarly, Tosafos 2a explains that it is for this reason that chazal imposed bedika on top of bitul, because with bitul alone we are afraid that you will come to eat from the food. The gemara 11a explains that by other issurim we don't find such a prohibition because one naturally stays away from it, whereas chometz which is permitted the entire year, one will not be as careful to stay away from. A similar reasoning would apply to Y.K. that one has a tendency to not keep their guard up so we are afraid of him coming to eat from it.

Based on this, it should prohibited on Y.K. to prepare meals for children until late in the day. Yet, the Rama 612:10 quotes from the Terumas HaDeshen that it is permitted to touch food and drink on Y.K. to feed to children and we are not afraid that he will come to eat or drink it. The M.B. explains that on Pesach where he is eating other foods, we are afraid that if he is involved with chometz he will eat that too, but on Y.K. where one is abstaining from all foods, we are not afraid that by working on preparing food he will come to eat it. Although the Sha'arei Teshuva 3 cites the har karmel (21) who says it is still better not to be busy with food prep, it sounds like just a chumra, whereas according to the ba'al hameor it should actually be an issur.

Shabbos 114a - Preparing From Yom Tov For Shabbos

R. Akiva Eiger in his comments on the Shulchan Aruch (302:Magen Avrohom 6) writes that one may prepare things on Yom Tov for Shabbos (provided that no melacha is being done) even without an eiruv tavshilin. Although Tosafos 113a writes that one may not fold their talis on shabbos for after shabbos, one may fold their tallis on yom tov which is erev shabbos for use on shabbos. R. Akiva Eiger explains where he derives this from. In the Mishna 113a there is a Machlokes between R. Yishmael and R. Akiva whether the left over korbanos of Y.T. can be burned on Shabbos. R. Yishmael holds that left over korbanos of Y.K. can be burned on Shabbos, but left over korbanos of Shabbos cannot be burned on Y.K. because shabbos has a higher kedusha than Y.K. The Mishna implies that it is for the same reason that R. Yishmael permits setting the beds on Y.K. for Shabbos, since Shabbos has more kedusha, but not the reverse. The rationale is that the prohibition to be טורח on Shabbos or Y.K. for afterward, doesn't apply when one is preparing on a day that has less kedusha for a day that has more kedusha. Whereas, R. Akiva holds that the kedusha of Shabbos is not greater than Y.K. so he forbids the left over korbanos from one to be burned on the other. Based on R. Akiva it would also be forbidden to do activities on Y.K. to prepare for Shabbos. Although we follow R. Akiva and forbid and preparation from Shabbos to Y.K., the Braisa 114a says that even R. Akiva admits that left over korbanos of Shabbos can be burned on Yom Tov, because there is no question that the kedusha of Shabbos is greater than Yom Tov. Therefore it should follow that one may make preparations on Yom Tov which falls on Friday to prepare for Shabbos. R. Akiva Eiger points out that the Eliyahu Rabba disagrees and holds that when Y.T. falls on a Friday, one can only do things from Y.T. to Shabbos if they have an eiruv tavshilin.

The M.B. 302:17 quotes this fundamental argument as to whether an eiruv tavshilin is necessary for preparations that don't involve melacha. R. Akiva Eiger would permit one to fold his talis on Y.T. for Shabbos, whereas the Eliyahu Rabba would only permit it if one had made an eiruv tavshilin. The Aruch Hashulchan 302:10-12 justifies the minhag to fold talisos even on Shabbos for after Shabbos based on Rashi and the Rambam who forbid מקפלין את הכלים ומציעין את המטות only because of a מתקן כלי issue since they were very meticulous about the creases, which doesn't apply to our talisos. He implies that acc. to Ra'avad 23:7 and Tosafos who imply that it is an issue of doing a טרחא for after shabbos, it would be assur. It seems to me that nowadays the folding is necessary to properly fit it into the bag so that the shul doesn't look messy and no one takes the talis, it isn't considered preparation for after shabbos and therefore permitted even according to Ra'avad and Tosafos.

Rashi 114a implies that according to R. Akiva we consider Shabbos and Y.K. to have equal levels of kedusha, which is why the left over korbanos of shabbos cannot be burned on Y.K. and visa versa. Also, that is why one cannot prepare from Y.K. to Shabbos, as the Mishna implies. However, in the braisa in Megilla 23a there is a machlokes R. Yishmael and R. Akiva regarding the number of aliyos on Shabbos and Yom Kippur. R. Yishmael holds 6 for Y.K. and 7 for Shabbos which is very in line with his approach here that the kedusha of Shabbos is greater. But R. Akiva holds 6 for Shabbos and 7 for Y.K. which implies that the kedusha of Y.K. is greater than Shabbos. Why then does R. Akiva hold that the left over korbanos of Y.K. cannot be burned on Shabbos, he should hold the exact opposite of R. Yishmael, that leftovers of Shabbos cannot be burned on Y.K. but leftovers of Y.K. can be burned on Shabbos? Also, why does Rashi write that according to R. Akiva the kedusha of Y.K. is like shabbos - רבי עקיבא היא דחשיב ליה יוה"כ כשבת, when in truth it is a higher level kedusha than Shabbos? The Turei Even in Megillah wonders what advantage Y.K. has over Shabbos practically that would justify and extra aliya, and he suggests that it is due to the extra tefillah of ne'ilah. However, all the rationales offered by the gemara seem to be simanim that indicate a higher level of kedusha, so the extra aliya for Y.K. should also indicate an extra level of kedusha over Shabbos - וחזרא קושיין לדוכתיה וצ"ע.

Shabbos 113a - Making a Double Knot

The Shulchan Aruch 317:8 writes that it is permitted to make a bow on shabbos, to which the Rama adds that even if one will make a single knot below the bow, which is typical in the way we tie shoes, it is permitted. However, the M.B. (29) qualifies this by explaining that it is only permitted if the intention is to untie it that same day. According to Rashi/Rosh (see yesterday's page) it is permitted since it is not typically made to be a קשר של קיימא and the person tying it is intending to keep it very temporarily. Even according to the Rambam/Rif who consider every knot that may be a מעשה אומן to be an issur d'rabonon, the M.B. explains that it would not qualify as a מעשה אומן. However, if it is made to last for a significant amount of time such as the egged of a lulav that is made to last for the duration of Succos, the M.B. says that it is only permitted to do a bow without any form of knot underneath. The rationale is that a bow without any knot underneath doesn't even qualify as a knot, it is just considered wrapping. But when there is a single knot underneath as we do when we tie shoes, it is considered a knot, therefore if it is done for a significant length of time, it is assur d'rabonon according to Rashi/Rosh since it qualifies as being semi-permanent.

The M.B. then ends by writing that one can make two bows, one on top of the other, and concludes - וכן יש לנהוג. In my opinion this statement of the M.B. is somewhat misleading. It sounds as if he is saying that the making of what we call a "double knot" when we tie shoes, which includes a single knot, then a bow, then another single knot using the bow, is permitted. But in truth, I don't think that this is permitted.

The gemara explains that whether we regard a bow as a knot is a machlokes tana'aim. We pasken like the opinion of the Rabbonon who disagree with R. Yehdua and don't consider a bow to be a knot. What is the rationale for a bow not being considered a knot? It seems that the rationale is NOT that it is temporary, because a bow can actually stay for a significant amount of time. The machlokes would seem to hinge on the two rationales offered by the gemara 111b, in discussing whether according to R. Meir it would be permitted to make a bow. The rationale to permit it is that it can be undone with one hand, therefore it isn't considered a knot (although the Rabbonon would forbid a real knot even when it's loose and can be undone with one hand, the fact that for a bow pulling on one of the strings disassembles the entire bow, would be a rationale to permit it). The rationale to forbid is that it is still very tight, and able to last. The rationale of the Rabbonon who permit a bow by not considering it to be a knot is that it can be undone by simply pulling the string. Therefore, when one would make a double knot by using the bow to make a single knot, they are ruining the possibility of untying it by simply pulling the string, rendering it a real knot. This should then qualify as a knot on top of a knot which the Rama says we are concerned qualifies as a מעשה אומן and forbidden.

Based on this, after making a single knot and then a bow on one's shoes, one cannot make a second knot with the bow, even if there intent is to untie it within a day. The reason it is forbidden is that we are concerned for the Rambam that any מעשה אומן is assur, and since this resembles a standard double-knot which cannot be undone with one hand, it would be assur m'drabonon.

The M.B. who says that one can make a double bow would be speaking of a situation where one makes a bow on top of a bow, rather than using the first bow to form a single knot on top of it.

Shabbos 112a - Making Knots

The Mishna teaches that there are 3 types of knots, some are assur m'doraysa, some m'drabonon, and some are permitted. Rashi and the Rosh explain that any knot which is permanent and meant to be there for an unlimited amount of time is considered a permanent know for which one is chayev m'doraysa. Knots that are semi-permanent and meant to stay for a short but significant amount of time are assur m'drabonon, and knots that are non-permanent are permited. The Rama bring two opinions as to the exact criteria for differentiating the second and third category. Some hold that if it is meant to be untied daily it is mutar, but otherwise it is in category 2 and assur m'drabonon, and some hold that if it is meant to last for less than 7 days it is mutar, but longer than 7 days is category 2 and assur m'drabonon. These two opinions develop from contradictory diyukim from Rashi in our sugya. 

The Taz cited by the Biur halacha 317:1 assumes that the permanence is dependent on the persons intent when he ties the knot. So long as the intent is to be temporary, even if it is the type of knot tied normally for permanence, and even if itis tied by an expert, it is not a Torah violation. But the Biur Halacha disagrees and cites from the Beis Meir that the type of knot which is normally tied as a permanent knot, one is chayev for even if the person tying it doesn't intend to keep it permanently. It seems from the Biur Halacha that intent has the ability to consider a knot which is generally tied as a temporary knot, to be a permanent knot and be chayev, but will not remove the Torah prohibition from tying a knot that is normally tied to be permanent. With this he explains why it is impossible to tie tzitzis on shabbos without violating shabbos, since even if the person tying intends to take out the knots after shabbos, it will still be a Torah violation.

The Rif and Rambam have an entirely different approach. They hold that there are 2 criteria for knots, permanence and an expert knot. When both criteria are met, meaning the knot is permanent and the type made by an אומן, it is an issur d'oraysa. If it is either a permanent know OR a ma'aseh uman it's assur m'drabonon, and only if it is neither is it permitted. However, within this approach there is no room to distinguish between various levels of permanence. Therefore, even if one intents the knot to be there for a few weeks or months, but not permanently, so long as it is not a מעשה אומן, it is permitted (M.B. 317:5). Based on the opinion of the Rambam and our lack of knowledge what is considered to be a מעשה אומן, the Rama says that it is forbidden to tie any double knot since there is concern that it qualifies as a מעשה אומן which is assur m'drabonon even if not done as a permanent knot.

All opinions agree that there is not distinction how tight the knot is. Only R. Meir in the Mishna has a clause that if it is so loose that one can untie it with one hand, it isn't considered a knot, but the Rabbonon don't consider that to be an important factor (so long as it is tight enough that it won't untie by itself).

Shabbos 107a - Capturing Things That Aren't Generally Captured

The Mishna says that one is chayev for capturing the 8 sheratzim on shabbos, but for others, it depends on whether it is being captured לצורך or שלא לצורך. Rashi understands that the distinction between לצורך ושלא לצורך, when it is needed or not, is exactly the distinction made by the braisa 106b between מינו ניצוד and אין במינו ניצוד. Rashi understands that לצורך means that it is מינו ניצוד and therefore a מלאכה הצריכה לגופה for which one is chayev, but if it is שלא לצורך then it is אין במינו ניצוד and therefore a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה and therefore patur. Tosafos asks that this approach is very difficult because the opinion who exempts when it is אין במינו ניצוד is seemingly speaking even when one is capturing in order to use it and it is a מלאכה הצריכה לגופה. In other words, the concept of מלאכה שצריכה לגופה should be completely subjective and not dependent on the species that is being captured. So long as the person needs this species, even if no one else captures it, it should qualify as a מלאכה הצריכה לגופה.

Tosafos explains that there are to separate halachos. The first is that one is never chayev on אין במינו ניצוד. This has nothing at all to do with מלאכה שא"צ לגופה, rather, as the Ran explains that even R. Yehuda who is mechayev for a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה would exempt when it is אין במינו ניצוד. But when it is מינו ניצוד, the type of species that is generally captured, then according to our mishna that follow R. Shimon, we would require a מלאכה הצריכה לגופה, which is what the mishna means הצדן לצורך חייב, שלא לצורך פטור. The difference between the 8 sheratzim and all others is as Tosafos explains, the 8 sheratzim are always assumed to be צורך and a מלאכה הצריכה לגופה because they have skins that are usable, but other sheratzim are assumed to be אינה צריכה לגופה unless the person has specific intent to use it for something.

According to Tosafos it isn't clear what exactly the nature of the distinction between מינו ניצוד and אין במינו ניצוד is. It seems that it is not a general distinction that permeates all 39 melachos of shabbos (such as מלאכה שא"צ לגופה or מקלקל), rather it is a very localized distinction made within the melacha of צידה. The distinction would therefore be that the melacha of tzeida is defined by trapping species that are generally captured, but capturing species that are not generally captured is beyond the parameters of this melacha.

Based on this approach, it would have been possible that אין במינו ניצוד which is completely beyond the parameters of tzeida, is not even going to be assur m'drabonon, unlike a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה which we know is still assur m'drabonon (and only permitted in a case of tza'ar or nezek). However, Tosafos 107b deduces from the language of R. Yehoshua that even on a פרעוש which the gemara identifies a אין במינו ניצוד, there would be an issur d'rabonon to trap it - פטור אבל אסור. Although Tosafos holds that the nature of the heter for אין במינו ניצוד is not מלאכה שא"צ לגופה, rather that it is simply not included in the melacha of tzeida, it still follows the same principles that it is assur m'drabonon.

Tosafos writes that if the פרעוש is biting then one would have a right to grab it and remove it because just as we are matir מלאכה שא"צ לגופה in a situation of tza'ar, as we find on 107a by מפיס מורסא, we are also matir אין במינו ניצוד in a case of tza'ar. The Ran and Rosh justify the right to grab it and remove it differently. They say that the heter is based on the concept of מתעסק. Since the person is just trying to remove the פרעוש, not trap it, he is allowed to remove it by grabbing it since the tzeida will only be a מתעסק. Based on this heter, it should be permitted to remove even if it is not biting.

Shabbos 106b - Intending to Protect Your House and Trapping a Deer

The mishna and gemara indicate that the melacha of tzeida is not violated by maintaining a situation of being trapped, and is only violated by doing an act that actually traps an animal or bird that was previously not trapped. Therefore, if an animal has already been trapped or tied down in a house, one would be allowed to close the door, and even if they later untie the animal, they would not have to open the door (Ran explains that this is the intent of the mishna למה זה דומה לנועל ביתו לשמרו ונמצא צבי שמור בתוכו).

The Ran quotes a Rashba who understands from a Yerushalmi that if a deer ran into a persons home, one would be allowed to close the door of his home with the intent of protecting his home, even if he also intends to capture the deer that is inside. Although it would be forbidden to close the door if the sole intent would be to catch the deer, they can close the door for the purpose of protecting their home, even if their intent is also to capture the deer. The Ran is amazed how the Rashba can permit this. This seems to be a classic situation of a פסיק רישא which is forbidden even is his intent was not at all to capture the deer since it is inevitable that the deer will be trapped. How can the Rashba permit closing the door with the intent to trap the deer in addition to protecting the house? Therefore, the Ran explains that the Yerushalmi is simply saying that if one closed the door to their house with the intent of protecting their home, and later realized that the deer was inside, they can maintain the status quo and don't need to open the door to release the deer. 

The M.B. 316:25 paskens like the Ran and writes that it is forbidden for one to close the door to their home with the intent of protecting their home if they know that there is a deer that will be trapped inside, even if they are not intending to trap the deer. The M.B. explains that closing the door when one knows that the deer is inside would be an issur d'oraysa (it is a pesik reisha that they want, even thought they aren't intending for it). Certainly if their intent would be to capture the deer it would be forbidden m'doraysa.

The Sha'ar Hatziyun (32) suggests that perhaps even the Rashba would only permit closing the door if the primary intent would be to protect the house, not when he is equally intending to trap the deer and protect the house because that would contradict a gemara in Pesachim which implies a double intent (one being mutar and the other asur) is forbidden.

The Poskim do not follow the controversial and difficult position of the Rashba. R. Akiva Eiger cites the Shulchan Aruch (3) who forbids closing a box for the purpose of protecting its contents, if one knows that there is an insect inside that will inevitably be trapped. This is an identical case to the deer in the house about which the Rashba and Ran argue, and indicates that the halacha is like the Ran against the Rashba. The Pri Megadim (Eishel Avrohom 11) isn't convinced by the proof from Shulchan Aruch because in that case his primary purpose in closing the box is because of the bug, unlike the case of the Rashba where the need to close the door to protect the house is at least as important to him as trapping the deer.

In short, the opinion of the Rashba is very difficult to comprehend because it contradicts the standard rule that even by a דבר שאינו מתכוין a p'sik reisha is forbidden, and the Rashba even permits a דבר המתכוין such as intending to trap in addition to protecting one's home.

The Shiltei Giborim tries to justify the opinion of the Rashba and writes:

והשתא לדברי הרשב"א נמצינו למדין דאע"ג דקיי"ל דפסיק רישיה אסור, היינו דוקא שבאותו מעשה דעביד הפסיק רישיה אינו מתכוין ואינו עושה דבר היתר עמו, אבל אם באותו הפסיק רישיה שעושה, עושה ג"כ דבר היתר עמו ויתכוין גם לדבר היתר אז אפילו עביד פסיק רישיה ומכוין גם לו שרי

The Shiltei Giborim seems to understand that in the classic pesik reisha such as dragging a bench, the inevitable reaction of the dragging which the making of the hole, has no element of heter to it. Therefore, even if he isn't intending to make a hole, it is an inevitable result that is forbidden. But when the result of the action has both a heter and issur component, it is permitted. The difficulty with this approach is that we should simply view the action to be protecting the home, and the result to be an inevitable trapping of the deer which is a classic pesik reisha. וצריך עיון בדברי השלטי גבורים.

Shabbos 105b - Destruction Therapy

The gemara is trying to find a case where there is a תיקון in the process of tearing and destroying keilim. Even according to R. Yehuda who says that one is chayev for a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, it must be a tikun and not a kilkul. The gemara suggests that we are speaking about a case where one tears something to allow his anger to subside. Since there is a tikun for him, it qualifies as a tikun despite that it is a kilkul to the item (this only works in r. yehuda who expands the chiyuv to even מלאכה שא"צ לגופה, therefore we can also expand the scope of what we consider a tikun, just as we do when one causes an injury because they need the blood - 106a). The gemara then asks, is this permitted? One is not allowed to let out their anger for the purpose of letting off steam because he is training his yetzer hora to behave in this very aggressive manner. Rashi explains that we don't consider letting off steam to be a tikun since it encourages this type of behavior to continue. According to Rashi, the Torah demands that we control our aggression, and only through suppressing it will one overcome it. Therefore, the only tikun in tearing clothing is when one needs to fake anger to instill fear on his children.

The Rambam in 3 different places, seems to say that it is considered a tikun to let off steam by breaking and damaging things. The Rambam writes (Shabbos 8,8) that one who damages someone to let off steam and calm himself down is considered a tikun and is chayev. Similarly (10,10) when tearing clothing out of anger, the Rambam considers it a tikun. And finally (12,1) torching someone's home out of anger he also considers a tikun. The Rambam seems to be inconsistent with the gemara because the gemara implies that we don't regard this kind of behavior as a tikun. The Magid Mishna (8,8) explains that the gemara never meant to challenge whether this is considered a tikun. Although it is considered a tikun, the gemara asks whether it is permitted to act in this way even during the week and proves that it is forbidden. From the fact that the Mishna never discussed the prohibition during the week, we are compelled to find another situation so that the prohibition is only applicable to shabbos and not during the week. Nevertheless, the rule of the gemara that when one damages something to let out their anger, it qualifies as a tikun, remains true. This approach fits with the language of the gemara וכי האי גוונא מי שרי וגו, because the gemara is asking whether this behavior is permitted even during the week. But, according to Rabbeinu Chananel's girsa וכי האי גוונה מי מיחייב, we are forced to interpret like Rashi (not like the Rambam) that the gemara is proving that this is destructive behavior, not a tikun, and therefore one wouldn't be chayev on shabbos for doing this.

Shabbos 104b - Chok Tochos

The gemara elaborates about the melacha of writing on shabbos. Although the Shulchan Aruch 340:4 is very concise in this melacha, the Mishna Berura elaborates and provides many details based on what is found in our gemara.

The gemara says that if one erases the middle of the ches turning it into two zayin, or erases the back of the dales turning it into a reish (and completes a sefer by doing this so that it is like writing two letters), they are chayev. The Ran struggles with a fundamental question. Why is this not a problem of chok tochos? In the context of STAM and gittin we require the writing to be performed by writing, not by erasing, because when a letter is formed through erasing it is called חק תוכות which doesn't qualif as כתיבה? The Ran cites the Rashba who says that erasing the roof of the ches or the back of the dales would not be considered חק תוכות  because it is similar to merely separating between two attached letters which would not be a problem of חק תוכות, here too it is like erasing ink that fell on the back of the letter. Perhaps the Rashba understands that we are speaking about a case where his intention was to write a reish, just that some extra ink came out forming a dales, therefore he equates this with ink falling on a letter. However, the Ran takes a radically different approach. The Ran says that to be in violation for writing on shabbos we don't make a distinction between actual writing and חק תוכות. One can even be chayev for writing חק תוכות. His rationale is:

דכל היכא דהוי מלאכת מחשבת מיחייב שהרי אפילו מוחק ע"מ לכתוב חייב

The approach of the Ran seems to be that on shabbos our focus is not on the technical act of writing, rather on מלאכת מחשבת. That means that our focus is on the result of the melacha, not the act of doing the melacha. Therefore, so long as a person accomplishes a כתיבה, even if he does so by erasing which wouldn't qualify as writing in other areas of Torah, it is considered writing on shabbos so he is chayev.

Shabbos 94a - Live People Carry Themselves

There is a machlokes between the Rabbonon and R. Nosson regarding חי נושא את עצמו. They both agree to the concept when carrying a person, but argue when carrying an animal. If the person or animal is tied down (כפות), the gemara says that even R. Nosson agrees that we don't say חי נושא את עצמו. Rashi (d.h. d'bei) implies that the same logic that the Rabbonon use for why an animal is not included in חי נושא את עצמו which is that it throws itself down rather than assists in being held, R. Nosson applies to something or someone that is tied. Tosafos discusses whether a young child is also considered חי נושא את עצמו and concludes that by a very young child we may not say חי נושא את עצמו (Tosafos implies that R. Nosson who allows for חי נושא את עצמו by an animal, will also say it by a young child, but according to the Rabbonon we won't say חי נושא את עצמו by a very young child). However, Tosafos at the beginning of perek r. eliezer d'mila seems to hold that even on a very young child we say חי נושא את עצמו.

It isn't clear from the gemara what exactly the rationale is to reject the notion of חי נושא את עצמו by a young child. Tosafos raises this question by pointing out that even if we consider a live weight to be lighter, we don't find that there is an exemption for carrying a light weight object on shabbos! Tosafos also rejects the approach that חי נושא את עצמו makes it as if two people are doing the carrying together so that it is considered שנים שעשאוה, because in this case the carrier is יכול whereas the one being carried is אינו יכול so we should consider the יכול to be chayev anyway. Therefore, Tosafos concludes by simply saying it doesn't resemble the carrying that was done in the mishkan. When carrying was done in the mishkan it was on dead animals, not live ones, so carrying is only a violation on dead, not alive. The Korban Nesanel points out that this is a good rationale for R. Nosson who holds of חי נושא את עצמו by animals, but wouldn't be a good rationale for the Rabbonon who make the distinction by people and not by animals? He suggests that the limud from the mishkan is that we don't find that carrying was done on objects that contribute to the carrying by lightening the load, therefore we say חי נושא את עצמו on any situation where the thing being carried lightens its load such as a live person.

There is a famous Radvaz cited by Pischei Teshuva in Yoreh Deiah (195) who permits a Nida and her husband to pass a child to one another based on the sevara of חי נושא את עצמו. In light of Tosafos that this is not a logical distinction, just that it doesn't match the form of carrying that was done in the mishkan, it is very difficult to apply this heter to the harchaka of a Nida passing something to her husband.

Shabbos 93a - Misa'yei'ah Ein Bo Mamash

In a situation where two people together do a melacha on shabbos, but one is capable of doing the entire thing on his own and the other is not, the gemara says that the one who can do it on his own is chayev and the other is exempt because מסייע אין בו ממש. If the אינו יכול who could not do it on his own would be considered significan (מסייע יש בו ממש) it is not clear from the gemara what would happen. Tosafos writes that they would both be chayev because it would be like אינו יכול ואינו יכול where they are both chayev (at least according to r. meir and r. yehuda but the rashba understands that even r. shimon would agree that they would both be chayev). However, Rashi (d.h. ein bo) implies that if the אינו יכול is considered significant, it would make it like זה יכול וזה יכול and they would both be patur (acc. to R. Yehuda who we pasken like). Nevertheless, the gemara concludes and proves from various places that we pasken מסייע אין בו ממש therefore the יכול is chayev and the אינו יכול is patur.

Tosafos (d.h. Amar) raises a question from the gemara in Beitza 22a in the context of a goy putting eye ointment in for a jew on yom tov and the jew assists by opening and closing his eye which is a Rabbinic prohibition of refuah. In that context both R. Zevid and Rav Ashi say מסייע יש בו ממש so that even though there is no prohibition on the goy, there is an issur on the jew to assist as it is being done for him. Why in that context do they assume מסייע יש בו ממש and in our context we assume מסייע אין בו ממש?

The first answer of Tosafos is that the gemara here is working off the maskana of the gemara in Beitzah where everyone came around to hold מסייע אין בו ממש. The second answer of Tosafos is that for a melacha d'oraysa we hold מסייע אין בו ממש, but in the gemara Beitza it is speaking about the gezeira d'rabonon of שחיקת סממנים, and in that context rav ashi and rav zevid consider מסייע יש בו ממש. What is the rationale to be more machmir for מסייע by the gezeira of שחיקת סממנים? When it comes to an issur d'oraysa we focus on the ma'aseh issur, therefore when one is merely a מסייע we don't consider his action significant enough to make him chayev. However, when it comes to the issur of refuah which is a rabbinic concern that it will lead to שחיקת סממנים, we don't need to focus on the specific action, rather any involvement that may lead someone to grind the medicine would be included. A מסייע may also be led to grind the medicines, that is why in this context we consider him יש בו ממש.

The Ritva suggests another answer. In a situation where the מסייע ultimately doesn't contribute that much because the result is the same with or without their help, such as in our case where the other person can carry out the item without the מסייע, we say מסייע אין בו ממש. But in the sugya in Beitza, if not for the מסייע opening and shutting his eye, the ointment would not be as effective, therefore we say מסייע יש בו ממש.

Shabbos 91 - Swelling and Shrinking of Shiurim

The gemara discusses situations where one carries a grogeres which shrinks and less than a grogeres that swells whether one will be chayev for carrying it on shabbos. The assumption is that one would not be chayev if it is less than the shiur and only because the shiur for carrying is dependent on the person machshava, would we say that if the shiur changes together with his machshava he will still be chayev.

The Minchas Chinuch (Moseich Shabbos, Tochein) raises a very interesting question. What is the halacha with issur that began with less than a kezayis and then swelled up, or started as more than a kezayis and the shrunk? He cites a gemara in Menachos 54a that is pasekend in the Rambam (ma'achalos assuros 4,4) that a kezayis must be naturally the size of kezayis and must be maintained. A kezayis of forbidden food that shrinks to less than a kezayis, or less than a kezayis that swells to more than a kezyais, one would not be chayev malkus for eating it. The only case where one would be chayev is where it began as a kezayis and ended as a kezayis but shrunk and then swelled in between, that would still qualify as a kezayis. Based on this, we do not take into consideration any artificial swelling, rather we insist that it is a kezayis naturally, otherwise one would not be chayev.

The Rashba in our sugya (cited by minchas chinuch) asks on the gemara that the gemara implies that swelling makes a difference. Meaning, if one carried out less than a kezayis for planting and changed his mind to eat it but it had already swelled to more than a kezayis, he is chayev (the only rationale to exempt is that he changed his purpose). This implies that artificial swelling helps to consider it the size of a kezayis, which is against the gemara in Menachos? The Rashba answers that there is a difference between all issurim and shabbos. Regarding other issurim we require that there be a full shiur of the issur in its natural state and swelling doesn't help to create a shiur, but regarding the issur of carrying on shabbos (and other issurim of shabbos), it is all dependent on chashivus and swelling helps to give it chashivus.

The answer of the Rashba is really predicated on the gemara 77a where the gemara says that carrying out a small amount of wine concentrate that can be mixed will water qualifies as a shiur because for shabbos - מידי דחשיב בעינן והא נמי הא חשיב. The shiurim for shabbos are dependent on chashivus. This is clear from the fact that a מצניע is chayev even on the smallest amount as we find in the Mishna. Rashi 90b explains that when one carries out a small amount for a specific purpose - גלי דעתיה דטרח ואחשביה, he reveals that this amount is considered choshuv for him and his is therefore chayev for it. For the same reason that a subjective machshava helps to make one chayev on less than a shiur, the artificial swelling is also going to be chayev. But by other issurim where the subjective chashivus is irrelevant, the swelling is also irrelevant, and one is not chayev until it has a natural shiur of kezayis.