Eiruvin 85b -86a - Having a Tefisas Yad in the House

The Mishna says that if a ba'al habayis has a tefisas yad in the homes that he lends or rents out, they don't need an eiruv to join them together. The gemara tells a story of a wealthy person who lent out many homes in his chatzer but retained a place for keilim in each one thereby circumventing the need for an eiruv.

Regarding the types of items that qualify as a tefisas yad, the gemara says a rule that anything which isn't muktzah and may be moved on shabbos doesn't qualify as tefisas yad, but things that are muktzah do qualify. Rashi explains why non-muktah items aren't considered a tefisas yad - דאי בעי שקיל ושדי ליה לבראי.

It isn't clear from Rashi whether he means that we are concerned that the owner will remove the items, or whether the renter will throw out the items. In other words, are we speaking about a case where the owner has legal rights to leave the items in the renters property, just that we are still afraid that he may need his items and remove them, so we insist that they be muktzah; or does the muktzah item allow us to consider the owner to have a tefisas yad even if he has no rights to actually leave his item in the renters home? 

The Mishna Berura (370:11) says that the owner must legally retain rights to leave items at least in some small corner or section of the renters home. The Sha'ar Hatziyun (8) cites the Mordechai and Ritva as the source. The Bach understood from Rashi that even if the renter has the right to throw out the item, it qualifies as tefisas yad since the item cannot practically be moved on shabbos due to its muktzah status. The Sha'ar Hatziyun disagrees with the Bach and says that Rashi means that the item must be muktzah to prevent the owner from removing the item, but in addition the owner must have legal rights to actually store the item there.

Based on this halacha we generally assume that in an apartment building or complex in which the apartments are rented out, there is no need for an eiruv since the owner has a tefisas yad by the refrigerator or oven that he has in the apartment. In light of the halacha above, it must be a situation in which the renter doesn't have the right to discard the refrigerator and oven, and instead purchase one of his own. If the owner for example tells the renter that the oven is there for his convenience, but it is an old oven so if you want you can throw it out and purchase your own, it would not qualify as a tefisas yad.

Eiruvin 83b - Why Shiur Challah Matches The Shiur of Mann?

The gemara says that the amount of bread that one needs to knead in order to be chayev in challa is 1/10 of an Eifa which is the shiur of an Omer. The way the Torah articulates this is by saying עריסותיכם, meaning the amount of עיסה that they were accustomed to eating in the midbar. Why is the Shiur to be Chayev in Challa dependent on the amount of Mann that they were eating in the midbar?

It seems to me that the entire concept of separating challa is to remind us that our primary sustenance comes from Hashem. By connecting the mitzvah of Challa to the Manna we are reminded that the same G-d who made the miracle of bread falling from the sky in the midbar, continues to make the miracle of wheat sprouting from the ground after they enter Israel. After yerusha v'yeshiva when they start to live non-miraculous lives, eating from the toil of their labor, they need to be reminded to separate Challa for Hashem specifically when they eat the amount that was eaten in the midbar. By connecting the dots between bread from the ground and the Mann from the heaven they are able to continuously be reminded of the miracle in the midbar, and recognize that a natural miracle of bread coming from the ground is no less a miracle. The concept is similar to the Ramban's explanation at the end of Parshas Bo where he writes that Hashem doesn't perform obvious miracles in every generation, therefore we are required to remember and invoke the miracles that were performed long ago to remind us that Hashem is the כל יכול.

Eiruvin 69 - Mechalel Shabbos On A Drabonon

The gemara makes a distinction between one who violates shabbos privately vs. one who violates publicly for the purpose of being able to be mevatel reshus. At first the gemara thinks that shabbos is no different than any other violation where according to R. Meir one who is chashud for one is chashud for all, and according to the Rabbonon one is only chashud for what they are known to violate. However, Rav Ashi concludes that a mumar to violate shabbos publicly is considered a mumar for the entire Torah just as a mumar for avoda zara is. We also see clearly from Rav Yehuda Nesia in our sugya that if one is embarrassed to be mechalel shabbos in the presence of an adam gadol, even though they are mechalel shabbos publicly, they don't have a status of a בפרהסיא מחלל שבת. Rashi explains the sugya on the top of 69a regarding the person who carried into the chatzer on shabbos to be an issue of mumar (unlike tosafos who says that the issue is whether after carrying to the chatzer on that shabbos one can be mevatel reshus). Tosafos d.h. ka'an, points out that according to rashi even a mumar to violate shabbos on a drabonon is considered a mumar. R. Akiva Eiger (Y.D. Shulchan Aruch 2,5) has a long discussion about this issue. Regarding why we consider a mumar to be mechalel shabbos publicly to be a mumar for everything, Rashi explains in Chulin 5a that a mechalel shabbos publicly is kofer in ma'aseh breishis - ה במעשה בראשית"הקב והמחלל שבת כופר במעשיו ומעיד שקר שלא שבת. Based on this we can understand why Rashi would hold that even a d'rabonon violation of shabbos can consider a person a full fledged mumar. It is not the severity that Shabbos has over other issurim that makes it worse, rather it is what Shabbos represents. Therefore, even a d'rabonon violation of Shabbos, when done publicly is essentially making a statement that one is kofer in ma'aseh b'reishis. On the other hand, it would seem that according to Rashi, the concept of shabbos is what makes it different, not the severity. Therefore, one who would me mechalel yom tov or even yom kippur publicly would not assume a status of mumar since their is no association with being kofer in ma'aseh breishis. Had the issue been just one of severity, it would be possible to argue that Yom Kippur and maybe even yom tov are severe enough for this purpose to be like shabbos. But, since the issue is not one of severity, it should only apply to shabbos. There is a teshuva of the Maharam Mi'Rottenberg who says that even yom tov and yom kippur are considered like shabbos for this purpose that one who violates publicly would be considered a mumar for everything. Another point that evolves from Rashi is that Tosafos asks why should a tzidoki and kusi be better than a mumar, they also violate at least the d'rabonons of shabbos even publicly. To which Tosafos answers that although they have a theology of rejecting d'rabonons, practically speaking they keep the d'rabonon so as not to upset the prushim. This implies that the underlying difference between the tzedokim and the prushim was not in their actions, rather in their theology. Therefore, one who doesn't believe in Torah min Hashamayim as the Rambam describes, even if they keep mitzvos meticulously, they would at least be no better than the tzedokim.

Eiruvin 82a - Making an Eiruv Only For a Mitzvah

Rav Yosef makes a statement that is somewhat meduyak in the mishna, that one can only make an eiruv techumin for a d'var mitzvah. Both the Rambam and Rashba (avodas hakodesh) pasken like Rav Yosef that one can only make an eiruv for a d'var hareshus. However, the Rambam (6:6) holds that although one is only allowed to make an eiruv for a d'var mitzvah, if they were to be me'areiv for a d'var ha'rshus it would be binding. The Rashba disagrees and holds that even bidieved, if done for a dvar harshus, it is not binding. The Rashba then qualifies and says that this is only if he were to be me'areiv with bread, but one who is me'areiv b'raglav by being at the edge of the techum when shabbos begins, that can be done even for a d'var ha'rshus. The Gaon Yaacov rejects the approach of the Rashba (and Rabbeinu Yehonasan) who say that one can be me'areiv b'raglav for a d'var ha'rshus even lichatchila. The rationale to be more lenient by being me'areiv b'raglav is because they consider that to be the "ikar eiruv". Therefore, it should follow that according to R. Meir 49b who says that ikar eiruv is with bread, one can be me'areiv with bread even for d'var harshus, which is against our mishnah. Therefore, the Gaon Yaakov concludes that there is not distinction between being me'areiv b'raglav and using bread, it can only be done for a d'var mitzvah.

There is another major machlokes Rishonim. Rashi comments on the statement of only being me'areiv for d'var ha'rshus that it is not merely a din in what one is making the eiruv for. Rather, Rashi writes that one cannot use an eiruv for anything other than a d'var mitzvah. Rashi implies that even if one made an eiruv for a d'var mitzvah, they cannot use the eiruv once it is made for a d'var harshus. The Tur (415) disagrees and writes that once the eiruv is made for a d'var mitzvah, it can be used for a d'var ha'rshus. The machlokes between Rashi and the Tur is whether the din of אין מערבין אלא לדבר מצוה is a din in the making of an eiruv (Tur) or the use of an eiruv (Rashi). The Gaon Yaacov explains that Rashi must hold like the Rashba that if one would make an eiruv for a d'var harshus it wouldn't be binding even bidieved, because if making an eiruv for d'var ha'rshus works bidieved, when it is done for a dvar mitzvah it should certainly be usable for a d'var ha'rshus since it is already bidieved. In other words, if we are going to say like the Rambam that bidieved it works if done l'dvar ha'rshus, we would surely permit one to use the eiruv l'dvar ha'rshus when it was done for a d'var mitzvah.

Tosafos (d.h. kattan) asks that since we only allow an eiruv l'dvar ha'rshus, how can we talk about using the eiruv for a young child, what mitzvah can be possibly do? Tosafos answers: 1. the child is so connected to the mother that she can't go without him, therefore bringing the child with her is part of the d'var mitzvah. 2. since there is a mitzvah of chinuch to train a child to do mitzvos, it qualifies as a d'var mitzvah when the child is being taken to do nichum aveilim or another mitzvah.

Had Tosafos held like the Tur that the din of an eiruv l'dvar mitzvah was only in the making of an eiruv, Tosafos should have no question. Once the mother makes an eiruv l'dvar mitzvah, it is usable even for a d'var ha'rshus, therefore there is no need to associate a mitzvah with the child going. The fact that Tosafos needs to associate a mitzvah with the child, or make the mothers ability to do the mitzvah dependent on the child being able to go, implies that they hold like rashi; even after an eiruv is made l'dvar mitzvah, it cannot be used for a d'var ha'rshus, only for a d'var mitzvah.

The Rama (415) paskens like the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch (in line with the Rama) paskens like the Rambam. Therefore, they hold that if one made an eiruv l'dvar mitzvah, they can travel for a d'var ha'rshus, AND that if one made an eiruv for a d'var ha'rshus, it is binding bidieved. The Sha'ar Hatziyun (11) explains that by the Shulchan Aruch paskening like the Rambam that even when done for a d'var r'shus it works bidieved, he is automatically incorporating the opinion of the Tur that certainly when done for a d'var mitzvah it can be used for a d'var ha'rshus. It would seem based on this that the opinion of the Tur that when done l'dvar mitzvah it can be used for d'var ha'rshus would disagree with the Rambam and hold that if done originally for d'var ha'rshus, it would not work (otherwise the Tur should say a bigger chiddush). Therefore, it should follow that by the Rama citing the Tur, he is rejecting the Rambam and would hold that if one made an eiruv for a d'var ha'rshus it wouldn't even be binding bidieved. However, it is possible that the Tur and Rama really agree with the Rambam, and they are coming to say that one may lichatchila make an eiruv when they know that they will need it both for a d'var mitzvah and a d'var ha'rshus. v'dok!

Eiruvin 81 - Fixing the Bread with a Toothpick

The gemara talks about using a broken loaf for an eiruv. The gemara says that if it is missing the shiur challah which is 1/24 for a ba'al habayis and 1/48 for a baker it is still considered whole. The Gaon Yaakov explains that the gemara is not allowing the loaf to be missing up to 1/24, rather the gemara is saying that if it was taken for the mitzvah of hafroshas challah, then it is allowed to be missing up to 1/24 for a ba'al habayis and up to 1/48 for a baker. Another halacha that the gemara mentions is that one can reattach the missing piece using a toothpick provided that he does a good job and it isn't obvious that it has been broken.

Do these halachos also apply to lechem mishna on shabbos?

The Sha'arei Teshuva 274:1 cites the chacham tzvi 62 who says that if the lechem mishna is missing a piece it is dependent on a machlokes R"I and Rosh. The R"I cited in Tosafos holds that even missing the smallest amount doesn't qualify as a shaleim for eiruv unless the missing piece was taken for the mitzvah of challah, and the chacham tzvi assumes that the same applies to lechem mishna. Whereas the Rosh holds that so long as it is missing less than the shiur challah, even if not taken for the mitzvah of challah, it still qualifies as a shaleim for eiruv (so long as it is missing less than challas nachtom which is 1/48) and the chacham tzvi assumes that the same would apply to lechem mishnah.

According to the approach of the Chacham Tzvi that we can learn halachos of shaleim by lechem mishna from eiruv, it would seem that fixing with a toothpick can also be learned from the halacha of eiruv. However, the Maharatz Chiyus writes that by eiruv the reason why it is repairable is that the problem with using a perusah is that it causes eivah, therefore so long as it isn't recognizable that it has been broken because the toothpick repair makes it look like a shaleim, there won't be any eiva. Based on this approach, lechem mishnah which requires shaleim because of chashivus, not just because of eivah, we can't learn from eiruv that fixing with a toothpick is adequate. In truth, even the chacham tzvi ends his teshuva by pointing out that by eiruv the issue is eivah and says that he is being medayek from the mishna that refers to it as a shaleim. Since it qualifies as a shaleim, it should still be a shaleim for lechem mishna also. However, regarding  din of fixing with a toothpick, we don't see that the mishna refers to that as a shaleim, therefore perhaps even the chacham tzvi would agree with the maharatz chiyus that we can't learn that din from eiruv.

Eiruvin 63a - Giving All One's Tzedaka to One Poor Person

The gemara says that one who gives all his gifts to one kohein will bring famine into the world. The implication clearly is that one must distribute the matnos kehuna among multiple people. The Maharsha asks that throughout shas we find a concept of מכירי כהונה which means a kohein who is accustomed to always receiving the gifts from a particular person, clearly implying that this was an accepted system. The Maharsha suggests that perhaps the prohibition of giving all gifts to one kohein is only for a king like Dovid who presumably had enough to distribute to many kohanim. But for a regular person who generally has enough for only one kohein, he can always give everything to that kohein. However, the Maharsha points out that our gemara certainly doesn't seem to hold that because it makes a rule for everyone and not just for kings.

The Rashash points out that this halacha is not codified in the Rambam and suggests that perhaps it is because the concept of מכירי כהונה that we see throughout shas contradicts this gemara and overrides it. Based on the Rashash it would seem that lma'aseh it is fine to give all one's matnos kehuna to one kohein.

Would we apply this concept to tzedaka as well? Is there an issue with one who wants to give all his tzedaka to one particular poor person?

The Nodeh Beyehuda (kama, y.d. 81) uses this gemara as a source to not give sandakaos to the same person twice because there is a concept to distribute wealth and zechuyos to multiple people. If we would stretch this concept to sandakaos, it should certainly apply to tzedaka. The Nodeh Beyehuda seems to understand that we would pasken like this gemara and therefore we should say the same thing by tzedaka. Whereas, the Rashash seems to hold that we don't pasken like this gemara and therefore one can choose a poor person to whom he gives all his tzedaka.

The Magen Avrohom (Hil. Purim 695:12) writes that the reason that one must give matanos la'evyonim to two people as opposed to mishloach manos which is only to one person is because by aniyim there is a mitzvah to distribute to multiple aniyim rather than giving all the tzedaka to one individual. Presumably, the Magen Avrohom would draw his principal from our gemara, understanding that we do pasken like this, not like the Rashash. To elaborate on this point, the machatzis hashekel cites that Bach who says that if one has 100 gold coins, it's better to give 1 to 100 aniyim, rather than giving 100 to one because by giving to 100 aniyim you give life to 100 souls. The rationale that is offered by the Bach only makes sense if one would be giving a significant amount to each ani and enough to tend to their needs. However, if one has $100 which may be a significant give for 1 ani but not for 100, it would seem that even the bach and magen avrohom may agree that it is better to give it all to one person rather than distribute it to 100 poor people. The Pri Megadim seems to disagree with the magen avrohom and says that it is merely a technical diyuk from the pasuk which says matanos la'evyonim, implying multiple aniyim, but would not be a rule for tzedaka in general.
However, in Hilchos Tzedaka 257:9 the shulchan aruch writes that one should not give all his tzedaka to one poor person and the Be'er HaGola cites our gemara as the source. Clearly, the Shulchan Aruch holds that we do pasken like our gemara and doesn't consider the din of makirei kehuna to contradict it. Perhaps it is because makirei kehuna is assuming that one barely has enough matanos for one kohen, but if the has enough to provide many with a significant amount, he should be distributing his matanos and his tzedaka.

Eiruvin 59a - Levels of Trust

The Mishna says that a shifcha is believed to testify about the border of the techum shabbos since it is only d'rabonon. Tosafos d.h. afilu, explains based on a gemara in kesubos 28a that a child is believed only after he becomes a gadol to testify about what he witnessed as a child regarding the edge of the techum (Tosafos has two opinions whether he is believed alone or only with another adult). It is clear from Tosafos that although a woman is believed, and even a shifcha, a child is not.

Tosafos d.h. u'techumin, asks why the mishna allows us to believe a woman only because the entire prohibition is d'rabonon, implying that on a d'oraysa a woman isn't believed. Why is this any different that trusting a woman for shechita, nikur and teruma? Tosafos answers that on a d'oraysa a woman is only believed when it is בידה, meaning she is in control of doing a proper shechita, but she is not believed to testify about facts that are out of her control (such as techum, had it been d'oraysa). The rationale seems to be that a woman is not believed to testify about facts because we are concerned that she may not have been meticulous to notice all the details, but when she actually does something and has control of a situation, she is believed to say it was done properly. However, Tosafos points out that the gemara in Pesachim 4b implies that women are only trusted to do bedikas chometz because it is d'rabonon, implying that even though it is בידה she would not be believed if it were d'oraysa (such as a case where there will be bedika without bitul). Tosafos explains that an act like searching for chometz which demands extra diligence and attention, and is a great tircha, a woman is not believed because she will be moreh heter to make assumptions (such as if there is no chometz in one place, there is probably no chometz in another without properly checking). Yet, since it is only d'rabonon, she is believed. In short, on a d'oraysa a woman is believed if its בידה, not if it is out of her control. Even if it is בידה she is only believed if it doesn't demand meticulous attention and isn't a great tircha. However, on a drabonon, if it is בידו even a child is believed (such as bedikas chometz, even though it requires attention), but if it's not בידו such as techum, a woman is believed but not a child.