Pesachim 70a - Eating the Korban Pesach While Full

The Mishna 69b explains that a korban chagiga would accompany the korban pesach when there were too many people counted on the the korban pesach. The gemara explains that the korban chagiga was not an obligation and the function of it was only to make sure that the korban pesach was eaten על השובע. Why is it necessary to eat the korban pesach על השובע? Tosafos cites from the Yerushalmi that it is a din D'rabonon because when one is too hungry they would come to break the bones. If people are too hungry, then when they are hastily eating the meat around the bones they will be too rough and break the bones. By implementing a korban chagiga to ensure that everyone would not be so hungry when they came to eat the korban pesach, there would not be a concern that they will accidentally break the bones. Tosafos later on 120a adds an additional peshat - שלא יצא משולחן רבו רעב. It is degrading to walk away from eating a korban and still be hungry. Therefore, we want to make sure that he eats enough before the korban pesach so that he can walk away from the korban pesach satiated. The difference between these two approaches is that according to the first approach we want to make sure that he begins eating the korban pesach על השובע so he won't break the bones, whereas according to the second approach we want him to be full when he finishes the korban pesach. According to the first approach it is difficult to understand why we would only bring a korban chagiga when there are many people counted on the korban pesach, but if there would be only a few, one would not need a korban chagiga. Shouldn't we always encourage one to have many people on the korban pesach so that we can force bringing a korban chagiga to ensure that when they begin eating the korban pesach they won't be hungry? It seems that ideally one should have a large number on the korban pesach so that they are forced to bring a korban chagiga, so that when they begin the korban pesach they are already somewhat satiated and won't come to break the bones.

Rashi seems to have a third approach in understanding על השובע. When one eats something when they are starving, they don't enjoy the taste of it. Only after the severe hunger subsides does one begin to enjoy what he is eating. We insist on a korban chagiga so that one will not be so hungry when they begin eating the korban pesach. By doing this they will enjoy the korban pesach more which is a kavod and chashivus for the korban pesach. According to this approach also it would seem that it is ideal to have more people counted on the korban pesach and force the bringing of a korban chagiga so that when they begin the korban pesach they are already full.

Pesachim 64a - Reading Hallel

The mishna says that they would read Hallel by each of the three groups as they brought their korban pesach. Tosafos cites the Tosefta that it was the Levi'im who would read the Hallel, not everyone. Tosafos asks that if it was the Levi'im who would be reading the Hallel, it should have a status of שירה and would be a violation of the rule אין אומרים שירה אלא על היין. Tosafos answers that the halacha of אין אומרים שירה אלא על היין is a halacha in being "makriv" the korban. The shira which complimented the burning of the korban on the mizbeiach was done specifically at the time of the nisuch ha'yayin. Here the Hallel is not being said at the time of the hakrava, rather we are talking about Hallel at the time of shechita. On this type of shira there is no requirement of אין אומרים שירה אלא על היין.

The Brisker Rav (Hil. Chanuka) cites the Rambam who says that Hallel is a תקנה מדברי סופרים, whereas the Magid Mishna writes that it was a תקנת נביאים which is the language of the gemara as well. The Brisker Rav explains that there are 2 dinim in Hallel. There is a Hallel of שירה such as the Hallel said at the time of the eating of the korban pesach - כליל התקדש חג, as we see in the gemara 95b. There is also the Hallel which is a קריאה such as the Hallel done on every Yom Tov in shul. Hallel as a שירה is a  תקנת נביאים but Hallel as a קריאה is מדברי סופרים. Regarding the Bracha on Hallel, we only make a bracha (מעיקר הדין) on the "full" Hallel because only the full Hallel has status of Hallel. But when Hallel is being said as a shira, there is no specific amount that must be said, therefore they could make a bracha on it even if it wasn't completed. The Brisker Rav explains that the Hallel at the time of shechting the korban pesach is a din in shira, therefore it wasn't necessary for the 3rd group to complete it as the Mishna explains. The Brisker Rav concludes by citing a Tosafos HaRosh that there are 3 times where we say Hallel without wine, which are exceptions to the rule of אין אומרים שירה אלא על היין. The 3 times are: 1. Hallel of shechitas HaPesach. 2. Hallel by eating the Pesach. 3. Hallel by war. Why don't they also count every Hallel of Yom Tov which are also exceptions? The Brisker Rav explains that only when the Hallel is being said as a shira do we regard it as an exception when it is done without wine. When the Hallel is being said as a קריאה, of course it is said without wine.

Based on this, Tosafos would also categorize Hallel of shechitas HaPesach as a שירה not a קריאה, yet since it is not done at the time of hakrava, we don't require it to be done on wine.

Pesachim 63a - Shechting Korban Pesach With Chometz

The Rambam (Hil. Korban Pesach 1:5) writes that if one shechts, sprinkles the blood or burns the eimurin of a korban pesach while one of them has chometz or one of the chabura has chometz, all those playing an active role in the korban (שוחט, זורק ומקטיר) are in violation. The implication of the Rambam is that the members of the chabura, even the one who has chometz is not in violation since they are not doing any active part of being מקריב the korban. Tosafos writes that the one who has chometz is not in violation. However, Tosafos gives two explanations why the member of the chabura that has the chometz is not in violation: 1. The Torah says לא תשחט implying one who does an avodah. 2. It is a לאו שאין בו מעשה so there can't be malkus. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 89) points out that according to the first answer of Tosafos it seems that the בעל החמץ is not in violation of anything, whereas the second answer of Tosafos implies that he is in violation, just that he doesn't receive malkus for a la'av sh'ein bo ma'aseh. Rashi seems to disagree with both the Rambam and Tosafos. Rashi on the mishna writes that if one of them has chometz, they are ALL in violation, implying that not only is the בעל החמץ in violation, but all the passive members of the chabura are also in violation.

Another issue is whether the violation of this לאו invalidates the Korban Pesach. Tosafos writes that the Pesach is kasher since there is no repetition to indicate that the violation of this would cause passul the korban. The Rambam also writes that the korban is kasher [In the pirush hamishna he also writes - ולא יפסיד הזבח]. The kesef mishna points out that this is the implication of the mishna since it only says that you would violate a לא תעשה and doesn't mention the korban.

There is a Mishna L'melech that discusses whether the זורק or מקטיר would be in violation of a korban pesach that has already become passul. Is the violation of לא תשחט על חמץ only on a kasher korban pesach, or even on a passul one? The Mishna L'melech proves from a Yerushalmi that it would not apply to a passul korban pesach. In the Yerushalmi, R. Shmuel says that from the fact that the issur even applies to the zoreik, it must be that the pesach is kasher. Meaning, if the korban pesach that is shechted while one has chometz is passul, the korban would have already become passul by the shechita so that the zoreik would not be in violation. The fact that the zoreik can also be in violation implies that the korban is not invalidated by being shechted with someone having chometz. The entire approach of R. Shmuel in the Yerushalmi assumes that on a passul korban pesach one cannot be in violation of this prohibition.

The Tzlach suggests a similar lomdus to the mishna l'melech in his understanding of Rashi, from which he tries to prove that the korban would be invalidated by being shechted while someone has chometz. Rav Papa says that the מקטיר will also be in violation of this issur. Rashi explains that we are speaking about a circumstance where none of the בני חבורה had chometz so that there was no violation until now, the one who burns the korban on the mizbeiach will be in violation if he has chometz. Why does Rashi need to say that we are speaking where the בני חבורה don't have chometz? It must be that Rashi assumes that if the בני חבורה had chometz so that the issur was already violated by the shechita, the korban would be פסול, therefore the מקטיר would not be in violation. Rashi assumes like the conclusion of the mishna l'melech that on a passul korban, one cannot be in violation and therefore needs to make the case where the korban was not invalidated. The Tzlach later rejects this diyuk, but according to this diyuk, Rashi would hold that the korban becomes invalidate if any of the avoda is done while someone in the chabura or one of the makrivim have chometz.

Pesachim 58b - Korbanos In Between Morning and Afternoon Tamid

The gemara cites Rava who learns from the pasuk of העולה that the korban Tamid has to be the first one brought in the day, and learns from והקטיר עליה חלבי השלמים that nothing can come after the evening korban Tamid, rather עליה השלם כל הקרבנות כולן. Tosafos asks that there is another source in perek ha'tadir that the gemara learns from מלבד עולת הבוקר אשר לעולת התמיד, implying that the Tamid is first. Why do we need both pesukim? Tosafos rejects the possibility that repeating it is to tell you it is me'akeiv, meaning that a korban would be invalid if brought afterward, because the gemara says explicitly that it is not l'ikuva. In Tosafos second answer they say that the pasuk in our gemara focuses on the burning of אימורין on the mizbeiach prior to the Tamid, whereas the pasuk in hatadir is to tell you that the shechita of the Tamid is first. Tosafos also points out that the gemara in Eiruvin says that a korban shelamim brought prior to the opening of the doors of the heichal is invalid, proves that shechting before the tamid won't invalidate, because if it were then we wouldn't need a pasuk to invalidate prior to the opening of the doors.

Tosafos cites the gemara that says that a korban brought prior to the morning tamid wouldn't become passul, but isn't clear about whether a korban that is brought after the korban tamid would become passul. Tosafos in menachos writes that it wouldn't become passul if brought after the evening tamid. Tosafos on thid daf implies that as well because the Tosefta says that a korban brought prior to the morning tamid or after the evening one would become passul, to which Tosafos writes that it is only m'drabonon, implying that they are the same and that m'doraysa neither would be passul. Rashi d.h. kach, writes that nedarim and nedavos brought after the evening Tamid would become passul. See Mishneh L'melech (1:3 of Hil. Temidin U'musafin who is ma'arich very much on these issues).

The Mishna L'melech points out that the Rambam seems to hold like Tosafos because the Rambam (1:3) writes it in the form of an issur, but makes not mention of korbanos being invalid if brought before the morning tamid or after the evening one.

The Rambam writes - לפי שאסור להקריב קרבן כלל קודם תמיד של שחר, ולא שוחטין קרבן אחר תמיד של בין הערבים חוץ מקרבן פסח לבדו שאי אפשר שיקריבו כל ישראל פסחיהן בשתי שעות

The Rambam writes that the only korban brought after the evening Tamid was the korban pesach and the rationale he offers is that if you were to bring the korban pesach prior to the tamid, it would need to be brought between 12:30pm and 2:30pm and two hours isn't sufficient time for the korban pesach. Therefore, it is brought after the Tamid. The Lechem Mishna points out that this rationale is difficult because if the problem were merely the limitation of 2 hours they should have allowed it to be brought either before or after the Tamid. Furthermore, the gemara gives another rationale, since it says by Pesach both בערב and בין הערבים, it implies that it is pushed to later.

Another difficulty with the Rambam is pointed out by the Mishna l'melech at the end of his esssay. Why does the Rambam say that no korban is "brought" prior to the morning Tamid and no korban is "shechted" after the evening one. Tosafos holds that by the morning Tamid where there are two pesukim, one indicates the issur to be makriv (הקטרת אימורין) and the other indicates the issur to shecht, implying that the pasuk cited in our gemara for not sacrificing after the Tamid would be consistent with the context and forbid הקטרה after the evening Tamid. This seems to be the opposite of the Rambam! The Mishna L'melech explains that technically there is no issur to shecht before or after the Tamid, the entire issur is only on being makriv. The reason is that shechita is not regarded as an Avoda and therefore there are no rules limiting it. In the morning one could shecht prior to the morning korban tamid. But, in the evening since if one were to schecht they would be unable to be burn the korban properly or sprinkle the blood, it is assur to even shecht because the are causing the korban to be wasted. Therefore, the Rambam is very meduyak that before the morning Tamid it is only forbidden to be makriv, whereas after the even Tamid it is even forbidden to shecht.

Pesachim 57a - Pei'ah on Vegetables

In the Mishna we find that the people of Yerichos left Peiah on vegetables, and the chachamim protested. The gemara explains that there was a legitimate halachic argument between them. The issue was whether the leaves of turnips qualify as מכניסו לקיום which is one of the conditions to be chayev in peiah. The people of Yericho held that since it is able to be stored together with the turnip bulbs, it qualifies as מכניסו לקיום and is obligated in Peiah, whereas the Chachamim held that this does not qualify as מכניסו לקיום and is exempt from Peiah. Therefore, according to the Chachamim, the people of Yericho who were treating the turnips like Peiah and not separating Teruma and Maaser were causing the poor people to violate the prohibition of eating tevel, that is why they protested.

Rashi on the Mishna explains that the problem with what the people of Yericho were doing is that they were considering it Peiah when it reality it wasn't and causing the poor to eat tevel, as we explained. According to this approach, there is room for Tosafos question - Even if Peiah is not technically binding, it should be considered hefker which is also exempt from ma'aser, so it shouldn't be a problem of eating tevel (Tosafos answers that since they only allowed the poor to eat and not the rich, it didn't qualify as hefker). However, in explaining the story of בן בוהיין, Rashi explains it very differently. Rashi implies that the leaving of Peiah on vegetables was effective in exempting it from ma'aser because it assumes a status of hefker and hefker is exempt from ma'aser. The problem is not that they poor would be eating tevel, rather the problem was that by doing a ha'arama to make it hefker and exempt from ma'aser is not proper. The Maharsha points out that Rashi in the Mishna is not the same peshat as he offer in the story of בן בוהיין, whereas Tosafos understood the case of בן בוהיין to be exactly the way Rashi explained in the Mishna.

Why does Rashi explain the case of בן בוהיין to be such a minor problem and not as he explained by the אנשי יריחו that the problem is a more severe problem of eating tevel? It seems that Rashi understands that the case wasn't limited to turnip leaves where there was mistaken halachic justification, rather בן בוהיין knew that vegetables were exempt from Peiah, but was machmir on himself to make it hefer as if it were Peiach, as a chumra. His intent was to make it hefker so that it would truly be exempt from ma'aser, therefore the concern in the mishna of feeding tevel to the poor doesn't apply. Tosafos question also doesn't apply because the fact that it is effective in exempting from ma'aser by assuming a status of hefker is exactly the problem.

Pesachim 56a - Saying Baruch Sheim... Out Loud

The gemara says that we compromise in saying ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו between what Yaakov Avinu did of saying it loud and what Moshe Rabbeinu did (not saying it at all in the parsha of shema in parshas vaeschanan). Therefore, we say it, but we say it silently. Our custom on Yom Kippur is to say Baruch Sheim... out loud because of a special status we have. The Maharsha and Tzlach both point out that the issue with saying Baruch Sheim out loud is only a problem when being used as a break between the pasuk of Shema and V'Ahavta. Therefore, if one is not saying Shema, or is only saying the first pasuk of Shema Yisroel, they can say Baruch Sheim out loud.

This approach fits well with Rashi who explains that R. Meir in the Braisa considers כורכין את שמע to mean, without pausing between the pasuk of Shema and V'ahavta. Therefore, R. Yehuda argues and says that even if you are mafsik with a pause, it is not sufficient, because you need to be mafsik with the phrase of Baruch Sheim. Based on this approach, there is no question that the function of Baruch Sheim and the discussion of saying it loud or quietly is due to the hefsek between Shema and V'ahavta. However, Tosafos explains the problem with being כורכין את שמע and not being מפסיקין, doesn't refer to a hefsek between shema and v'ahavta, rather a hefsek between שמע ישראל and the word Hashem. According to this approach, there is no discussion at all regarding hefsek between שמע and ואהבת, therefore when R. Yehuda comes to argue on R. Meir and insists on the saying of ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד, it would seem that after saying shema there is an inherent reason to say the pasuk of baruch sheim, not merely for the purpose of serving as a hefsek. Therefore, when the gemara concludes that we compromise to say it quietly, it may apply even in a situation where one is just saying the pasuk of shema and not the entire parsha, they should still say baruch sheim quietly and not out loud.

Pesachim 53b - Giving One's Life for Kiddush Hashem

The gemara cites a braisa in which Tudos darshens a kal v'chomer to explain why chananya misha'el v'azarya risked their lives by being throne into a fire, rather than bow to the idol of Nevuchadnetzar. They learned from the frogs of מכת צפרדע who jumped into the preheated ovens. Rashi explains that if not for the kal v'chomer the default should be וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, therefore they had to learn from the frogs that they should forfeit their lives.

Tosafos asks that this was considered בפרהסיא, since it was a public spectacle. Therefore even if it weren't the more severe prohibition of avoda zarah, there is no concept of וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, and the default is that you must give your life. Why was it necessary for them to derive this concept from the frogs since it is the halachic default? Tosafos answers that it wasn't a real Avoda Zara, rather it was an idol for the purpose of kavod, therefore it wasn't an actual aveira at all. Since technically they were not required to forfeit their lives, it was an extra level of Kiddush Hashem beyond what was required and therefore necessary to learn from the frogs. Tosafos would seem to be against the opinion of the Rambam (Yesodei HaTorah 5:4) who says that one is not allowed to be "machmir" on יהרג ואל יעבור, and is not allowed to give up their life unless the halacha demands it. However, the Kesef Mishna cites the Nimukei Yosef who says that an אדם חסיד who deems it necessary to be mechazeik an area of Torah that people are no adhering to, may make a decision to give up his life even in a time that is not necessary. This would justify the approach of חנניה מישאל ועזריה. The difficulty with this approach is that the gemara in Megillah 12a says that the Jews in the time of Achashveirosh were threatened because of the aveira they violated of bowing to "the idol". Rashi interprets that it refers to the idol of Nevuchadnetzar. According to Rabbeinu Tam who says that the tzelem of Nevuchadnetzer wasn't real Avoda Zara, it would be forbidden for the Jews to sacrifice their lives, so how could they be liable for not doing so? Perhaps Rabbeinu Tam would say that the tzelem being referred to is that of Haman (see Maharsha there) and holds like Rashi in the Megillah who says that the tzelem of Haman was actual Avoda Zara (against Tosafos in Shabbos and Sanhedrin in the sugya of worshiping out of ahava and yi'rah).

The Maharsha justifies Rashi's position by saying that even if it were bonified avoda zarah, it could be that Tudos held like the opinion in Sanhedrin 74a that even for Avoda Zara one does not need to sacrifice their life. Regarding the point of it being בפרהסיא, the Maharsha says that since it wasn't in the presence of 10 Jews, it doesn't qualify as פרהסיא even if it were in public (perhaps Tosafos assumed that since 10 Jews knew about it, it qualifies as פרהסיא even if it is not in their presence, as we find by Ester that the gemara Sanhedrin 74b considers פרהסיא since 10 Jews were aware that she was living with Achashveirosh - see Shach in Y.D.).

However, the Maharsha points out that due to the concept of וחי בהם - ולא שימות בהם, the entire kal vchomer learned from the frogs is ruined. How can they learn from the frogs who are not commanded in the mitzvah of וחי בהם, to themselves who are commanded in וחי בהם?

Both the Tzlach and the author of the Nesivos (R. Yaakov M'Lisa in sefer Emes L'yakov on parshas Va'eira) explain that when the gemara says מה ראו חנניה מישאל ועזריה שמסרו נפשן על קדושת השם, does NOT mean that they should have bowed down due to the mitzvah of וחי בהם. Rather, the question of the gemara is predicated on the fact that the kiddush hashem would only result if חנניה מישאל ועזריה would make it out alive, otherwise it would be a Chilul Hashem. The Emel L'yakov (here the he deviates from the approach of the tzlach) Kal V'chomer from the frogs was not whether they must or can allow themselves to be thrown into the fire, rather they learned from the frogs what would happen if they were to allow themselves to be thrown in. The kal v'chomer was that if the frogs who were not commanded on kiddush hashem, a miracle was performed so that they exited alive to enable a kiddush hashem, certainly for them who were commanded on kiddush hashem, Hashem would make a miracle to enable the kiddush hashem. Based on this approach, it wasn't an issue of sacrificing their lives because the kal v'chomer taught them that they would make it out alive.

Pesachim 50b - Lo Lishma

The gemara says that a person should always involve himself in Torah and Mitzvos even she'lo li'shma because it will lead to lishma. In my sefer, Nasiach B'chukecha (pg. 178) I cited the Dibros Moshe (Shabbos He'ara 92) who says that it would seem that something only qualifies she'lo lishma when it is being done for the purpose of a mitzvah, just that there is an ulterior motive it why it is being done. For example if one studies Torah for the purpose of receiving honor that it shelo lishma because their intent is to do the mitzvah of Torah study just that it is for a non-ideal objective. However, when one is so to speak mis'aseik in the doing of a mitzvah, and doesn't intend to even do the mitzvah, it should not even qualify as she'lo lishma and there should be no reward. However, Rav Moshe proves from this gemara of שפל ונשכר being as Tosafos describes a lazy person who abstains from doing work and happens to also not do work on erev shabbos, receives reward of shelo lishma. In this case his abstention from work is not for the intent of even doing a mitzvah, yet it still qualifies as shelo lishma for which he receives a reward.

There is an interesting question regarding שלא לשמה whether it has inherent value, or whether in and of itself is not significant but one receives reward since it will put them on the path of doing it lishma. We can derive from the gemara that even one who abstains from doing melacha out of laziness qualifies as shelo lishma, that the advantage of lo lishma is not inherent, rather just because the routine will eventually lead to lishma. ויש לדחות.

Pesachim 49a - Returning from a Mitzvah to destroy Chometz

The Mishna says that one who is on his way to shecht the korban pesach or do a bris milah and remembers having chometz at home, if there is time to return, destroy and still be able to do the mitzvah, that is what he should do. However, if there is a conflict so that by returning to destroy the chometz he will be unable to perform the mitzvah, he should just be mevatel the chometz and continue with doing the mitzvah. The rationale is as Rashi explains, since bitul is sufficient m'doraysa, chazal did not impose the requirement to destroy chometz if it will interfere with a mitzvah. The implication certainly is that in a situation where one cannot be mevatel their chometz because it is after the z'man issur, they will need to go back and destroy their chometz even at the expense of the mitzvah. Nonetheless, this point is a machlokes between the Magen Avrohom and Even Ha'Ozer. The Magen Avrohom says he would go back to destroy the chometz but the Even Ha'ozer says he would continue with the mitzvah and leave the chometz at home.

The Tzlach asks on the Even Ha'ozer, since the mitzvah we are speaking about is korban pesach, how can we allow him to shecht the korban pesach while he still has chometz since that will be a violation of a la'av of shechting the korban pesach while he has chometz? The Tzlach points out that in this situation it is not possible to suggest that the aseh of korban pesach would push off the lo ta'aseh of shechting the korban pesach while he has chometz because the concept of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh applies only when they happen to conflict, but a lo ta'aseh that specifically refers to the issur of having chometz in one's possesion while shechting the korban peach, cannot possibly be pushed off by the mitzvah of shechting the korban pesach.