Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Nidah 32a - B'nos Kusim are Nida From Birth

The Mishna says that chazal made a gezeira to consider all kusim to be nidas from the moment they are born.  The gemara explains that the Mishna follows the opinion of Rav Meir who is concerned for the minority against the majority, which requires us to be concerned that they are all part of the mi'ut who menstruate at a very young age. Tosafos assumes that R. Meir's opinion of being concerned for the mi'ut is a d'oraysa concern, therefore questions why this is listed in the among the 18 ge'zeiros in maseches shabbos, which are all d'rabonon. In truth, it isn't so obvious that R. Meir's concern for mi'ut is d'oraysa, Tosafos in Chulin 12a writes that R. Meir's entire concern for the mi'ut to ignore the rov and consider it a safeik is only d'rabonon - דנראה דמדאורייתא לא חייש רבי מאיר למיעוטא אלא מדרבנן. But in truth, even if we assume it is only d'rabonon, it doesn't belong as one of the 18 d'rabonon ge'zeiros since it is a general rule of being concerned for the mi'ut whereas all the 18 gezeiros are specific.
Tosafos explains albeit, not so clearly, that there are 3 levels within R. Meir. In the gemara itself it clearly differentiates between a "mi'ut that is common" to which R. Meir is concerned, and an "uncommon mi'ut" to which even R. Meir pays no attention and follows the majority (in other places this is referred to as a מיעוטא דמיעוטא). However, Tosafos says that even within the "common mi'ut" that R. Meir is concerned about, doesn't apply to a girl at birth because at that age it is certainly a very uncommon mi'ut. However, since at some young age there would be a "common mi'ut" that R. Meir would be concerned for on a Torah level, we make a gezeira to include all girls of kusim to be considered a Nida from birth. Therefore, the concern for mi'ut is indeed d'oraysa according to R. Meir (or according to Tosafos in chulin a general d'rabonon), but to consider her a Nida from birth is only d'rabonon.
Tosafos explains that the gemara feels compelled based on the language of the Mishna to say that it is in accordance with R. Meir, not the Rabbonon. However, the actual din in the Mishna to treat kusi girls as Nidos from birth, even the Rabbonon would agree to based on entire separate line of reasoning. The Rabbonon hold that there was a gezeira made against kusim to prevent them from assimilating and mingling among regular Jews. Even if we consider them to be Jewish, the Rabbonon recognized that there had to be artificially imposed lines drawn to separate them from the regular Jewish community, because there was a fear that they would have an influence on the committed Jews. Non-Jews who were clearly not Jewish weren't a risk to the traditional Jews, but since Kusim were performing some mitzvos, there was a tendency to let your guard down and be more accepting of them. Chazal considered this to be a major threat and therefore imposed on the kusim a stricter status than they imposed on goyim.

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Nidah 31a - Women Learning Torah in Utero

The gemara 30b cites a braisa that says that a child is taught כל התורה כולה while in utero and is made to forget it right before he leaves. It isn't clear whether this is only for a male child or even for a female (since she isn't obligated in talmud torah, it is possible that she wouldn't need to be taught it). The Taz writes in Hilchos Mila that the reason we have a sholom zachor after the birth of a boy is to mourn the lost torah. Being that the minhag is not to have a sholom bas (or at least there is no minhag to have a sholom bas), it would imply that the Taz understands that the teaching of kol hatorah kula in utero, is limited to boys and not girls.
However, Rashi 31a clearly understands that the Braisa which speaks about the learning of the entire torah in utero applies to girls as well. Rashi (d.h. derech) is speaking about a girl who is assumed by the gemara to be facing up down inside the uterus and must turn around before birth (because the gemara understands that girls are born facing up), supports this notion from the braisa which says ראשו בין ברכיו, implying that a babies including girls inside the uterus are facing down. Rashi seems to understand that the braisa is not limited to boys, but applies to girls also. Based on this, the minhag to have a sholom zachor and not a sholom bas indicates that the source for this seudah must be for some other reason other than mourning over the torah as the Taz suggests.

Monday, June 18, 2012

Nidah 29b - Mental Loss of Count of 7 Clean Days

There is a well known p'sak attributed to the m'eil tzedaka that a woman must maintain count of her 7 clean days. The Sidrei Tahara offers two approaches to explain the Me'il Tzedaka, 1. we are concerned that she started to bleed without realizing. 2. Although we are confident that she didn't start to bleed, she must mentally maintain her 7 clean days as a count. Therefore, forfeiting her count, even mentally, disqualifies the entire count. Most Achronim including the Chochmas Adam understand that the second approach is the opinion of the Meil Tzedaka. However, from Rashi on 29b it seems that the main concern is the first approach. The gemara cites a braisa that discusses a woman who shows up in town not having any awareness of the halachos and not knowing where she stands in terms of when she may have miscarried and how to become clean. The gemara explains that during the second and third week she must immerse during the day because there is a concern that she is a zava who requires 7 clean days which could be ending any day in week 2 or 3. However, in week 1 she doesn't need to immerse during the day since there is no concern that she is completing her 7 clean days - the reason that the gemara says on 30a is - בעינן ספורים לפנינו. The 7 clean days must be counted in our presence. Rashi (d.h. eimar) explains:
אבל שבוע ראשון לא טבלה ביום, ואע"ג דבכל יום איכא לספוקי שמא הרחיקה לידתא והשתא כלין ימי הספירה, משום דבעינן שבעת ימי הנקיים לפנינו ודאין, והני דקודם לכן ספק הוו נקיים ספק לא הוו
If it were true that they only count as 7 clean days when she is attempting to count them, it is obvious why it wouldn't qualify at ספורים לפנינו. Why would rashi have to say that we are concerned that she started to bleed? From the fact that Rashi makes the concern that she may have bled without realizing it, it implies like the first approach of the me'il tzedaka.

For a more elaborate discussion of the meil tzedaka - see below:
הפ"ת (ס"ק ג') הביא בשם המעיל צדקה באשה שמצאה כתם בימי ליבונה ולערב הפסיקה בטהרה מחדש ואח"כ אמרו לה חברותיה שצריכה להמתין עוד ה' ימים קודם הפסקת טהרה, ורק אחר ב' ימים נודע לה שטעו חברותיה ושבאמת א"צ להמתין ה' ימים, ופסק דמאחר שהחזיקה עצמה בטמאה אין לה לספור אותן הימים שעברו ולא הביא טעם הדבר. כד נעיין בס"ט (ס"ק י"ח) תמצא שמביא דברי המ"צ באריכות יותר וכתב שיש ב' טעמים בדבר. א. דכל שלא כוונה לאותן ימים שיעלו לז' נקיים לא עלו לה. ב. כשלא נתנה דעתה שיהיו הימים נקיים מדם חיישינן דלמא ראתה ולאו אדעתא כיון דלא רמיא עלה לידע. הס"ט הסכים לסברא שניה של המ"צ, וגם האריך להאלים הסברא ראשונה דבעינן כוונה ודעת למנות ז' נקיים ואל"ה אין כאן ספירה ואין עולין לה. כבר הבאתי לעיל שהס"ט הביא ראיה מבדיקה ביום ח' שאינו מועיל וס"ל שהטעם משום כוונתה, שכוונה ליום א' עד יום ז' ולא ליום ב' עד יום ח'. ודחאו השמלה שאין הטעם משום כוונה כלל אלא הטעם משום שהרחיקה בדיקתה מההפסק טהרה כ"כ ששוב אין מצטרפין בהדי הדדי. אחר כל הפלפול של הס"ט מסיק דבאמת למ"ד דלא בעינן ספורים לפנינו [והיינו רב דסגי בבדיקה אחת כל ז' כדמוכח בש"ס נדה סט ע"א] לא בעינן ספירה כלל, אבל למ"ד דבעינן ספורים לפנינו [כדעת הסמ"ג וסמ"ק שפסקו כר"ח בגמ' דבעינן לכל הפחות א' וז'] ודאי בעינן דעתה וכוונתה לספירה. לכן העלה הס"ט וז"ל א"ו דמאן דמצריך תחילתן וסופן טעמיה משום דבעינן ספורים לפנינו וכיון שכן הא המחבר פסק דאין להקל בלא בדיקת ראשון ושביעי כהפוסקים דפסקו כרבי חנינא, מעתה ודאי הדין דין אמת כמו שפסק בספר שו"ת מ"צ כיון דבדעתה היה שלא לספור הימים ראשונים לנקיים שוב אינן עולין עכ"ל. וכן בחכ"א (כלל קי"ז סי"ב) הסכים לסברת המ"צ וכתב וז"ל ודוקא שעכ"פ לא הסיחה דעתה מלמנות אלא שלא בדקה, אבל אם פסקה בטהרה או בשאר ימים הנקיים הסיחה דעתה מלמנות לנקיים כגון שסברא שבעלה נוסע למקום אחר ולא תצטרך לטבול כעת, או שמצאה כתם בימי ספירתה ופסקה בטהרה ואמרו לה חברותיה וכו' בכל זה כיון שהסיחה דעתה מלמנות אינם עולין לה וצריכה פסיקת טהרה מחדש עכ"ל. הרי סובר החכ"א דלא רק כשסברה שהיא טמאה דאין הימים עולים לה, אלא אף כשרק הסיחה דעתה מפני שבעלה נוסע ולא תטבול בסוף הז' נקיים נמי אין הימים עולין לז' נקיים. אמנם בד"ת (ס"ק כ"ז) מביא הרבה אחרונים [מהרש"ם עונג יו"ט בית שלמה] שמקילים באשה שלא חשבה שהיא טמאה רק שהסיחה דעתה מפני שבעלה בדרך וכיוצ"ב ולא כוונה שיעלו לה הימים, שיש להקל. שוב עיינתי בשו"ת עונג יו"ט (יו"ד ס' פ"ג) והביא שם ב' ראיות נגד המ"צ. חדא מהגמ' נדה כ ע"ב גבי רב שטימא בלילה וביום חזר וטיהר ולא שאלה שמא היא עומדת תוך ז' נקיים וכשפסק בלילה שטמאה הסיחה דעתה מספירתה, א"ו דלא אזדא הימים ע"י היסח הדעת. עוד הביא ראיה ממשנה יג ע"ב בשוטה שפקחות מתקנות אותה, ואי בעינן דעתה על ספירתה כמש"כ המ"צ היכי מתקנות אותה. שוב דחה דאולי דעת חברתה עולה לה כאילו כוונה. מ"מ מוכח שלא כטעם השני של המ"צ דאי באמת חיישינן להרגשה כשלא רמיא עלה ולאו אדעתה, ניחוש בשוטה להרגשה א"ו לא חיישינן לזה. והעלה העונג יו"ט להקל אא"כ לא היתה דעתה על ספירתה ביום א' וביום ז', משא"כ כשהסיחה דעתה תוך הז' נקיים אינו סותר הז' נקיים [ונראה בכוונת העונג יו"ט שכיון שלדידן דקיי"ל כר"א ואליבא דרבי חנינא דבעינן בדיקת א' וז' ולא בימים שבינתיים ע"כ הדין ספורים לפנינו הוא רק באותן הימים]. עוד הביא הד"ת בשם בית יצחק שאם לא הסיחה דעתה יום שלם שפיר מהני לז' נקיים אף לדעת המ"צ, שכל הענין של היסח הדעת שייך רק כשהוא יום שלם ששוב אין ז' ימים רצופים. העולה מדברינו שכדאי לכתחלה להחמיר לסברת המ"צ ולא תסיח דעתה מספירתה בינתיים אא"כ ברה כחמה שהיא טמאה.

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Nidah 26a - Shiur of Shofar is a Tefach

The gemara lists 5 items that have a minimum shiur of a tefach. At the end of the sugya, the gemara explains that all of these items are כתיבן ולא מפרשי שיעורייהו, meaning they are d'oraysa, but the Torah itself doesn't tell us their shiur. It isn't clear from the gemara whether the intention is that the torah doesn't have a shiur, and the entire shiur is only rabbinic, or whether the Rabbonon are needed to tell us what the shiur d'oraysa is. Rashi explains that the beam of a mavoy doesn't make it into the list because it is only rabbinic - דכל מצותו מדברי סופרים. From Rashi one can deduce that for the 5 that are listed, they are all Torah mitzvos, but their shiur may only be Rabbinic. However, the simpler understanding is that the Torah doesn't clearly teach the shiur, but the shiur is considered to be a d'oraysa shiur.
The shiur given for shofar is כדי שיאחזנו בידו ויראה לכאן ולכאן טפח. The difficulty is that if the shiur were to make the shofar visible when held by one's hand, it is not really a shiur of a tefach, rather a method of making it visible. And if the shiur were truly a tefach, why do we need a reason given for the shiur being a tefach? If the shiur was only m'drabonon then we can accept the shiur not really being a tefach, rather making sure the shofar was visible so it didn't look like one was blowing in their hand. The Rosh in Maseches Rosh HaShana (3:6) writes explicitly that the reason for the shiur being that it must extend out of one's hand is כדי שלא יאמרו לתוך ידו הוא תוקע. From the Rosh it would seem that the entire shiur of tefach was only d'rabonon. Minchas Chinuch (end of mitzvah 405) cites Pri Megadim who says explicitly that the shiur is only d'rabonon and that min ha'torah there is no shiur at all. The Minchas Chinch disagrees by citing Tosafos in Succah 7b who indicates that the shiurim of tefach are min ha'torah, not merely rabbinic. The Biur Halacha suggest that even according to the Rosh who implies that the shiur of tefach is only rabbinic, doesn't undermine the concept of shiur d'oraysa. It could be that on a torah level the shiur is that it be large enough to blow through, then the rabbonon institute the shiur of a tefach.
The Tosafei HaRosh on our gemara writes that really the shiur of holding it and being visible on both sides is equal to a tefach, but the braisa wants to teach the reason for this shiur - ונקטינן בהאי לישנא כדי לפרש הטעם. It seems from the Rosh as he writes in Rosh Hashana that the shiur of being visible is to prevent the appearance that he is blowing into his hand. It is not clear whether this would be subjective. Meaning, one who has very large hands and is blowing shofar should perhaps require a larger shofar.
Tosafos questions why we don't mention the shiur tefach that we find in chulin in the context of treifos. Tosafos writes that according to the conclusion of the gemara that we are only speaking about things which are Rabbinic, only shiurim of things that are in the Torah when the shiur isn't explicit in the Torah. The Maharatz Chiyus point out that this is implies that shiurim by treifos are only d'rabonon. This contradicts the general assumption that they are d'oraysa from a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai.

Monday, June 11, 2012

Nida 23a - Formation of Mountains

The gemara asks that if a woman would discharge something in the shape of a mountain, it should qualify a birth to make her tamei since the term יוצר is used in the context of mountains as it is by humans. The gemara says that it isn't considered a "mountain" if it is discharged from a woman's body, it is merely a stone or clump of dirt. However, the yerushalmi answers that the Torah doesn't use the term יצירה on the initial creation of mountains, therefore it cannot be learned from a person.
Scientists consider mountains to have formed through the earths plates colliding into one another, causing them to both rise or one to end up on top of the other. The Maharatz Chiyus cites "stories of nature" that the original creation of the earth didn't contain mountains or valleys, it was a smooth ball. However, over time given various weather conditions and the mabul (flood), mountains and valleys formed. He explains that it is for this reason that we are able to find bones of animals and remnants of plant life at altitudes above where they can survive. They were originally living at lower altitudes and later rose up with the formation of mountains. This is somewhat consistent with scientific theory. According to this Hashem didn't "create" mountains during sheishes yimei b'reishis, rather they formed later. This is what the yerushalmi may mean by it not saying יצירה by the original creation of the mountains, because there was no original creation of the mountains. They were formed afterward over time by the nature that Hashem carved into the world, indirectly, so it wouldn't be accurate to use the term יצירה or בריאה to refer to mountains during the time Hashem created the earth.
This approach seems to be refuted by the Mishna in the 9th perek of Brachos that says that on mountains we make a blessing of עושה מעשה בראשית. Clearly, chazal consider mountains to have been created during the 6 days of creation, and not formed later.

Sunday, June 10, 2012

Nida 21b - Blood Exiting Through a Shfoferes (tube)

The gemara questions whether blood that would exit the uterus through a tube would render her tamei. The gemara concludes that the pasuk of בבשרה is to the exclusion of a tube. Meaning, blood exiting a tube wouldn't render her tamei. The gemara makes a distinction between blood in a tube and blood in a piece of flesh, in that blood in a piece of flesh is normal, whereas through a tube is not normal.
It isn't clear from the gemara whether the issue of the blood exiting through a tube is a problem of chatzitzah, meaning that בבשרה would demand that the blood be in contact with her flesh when it exits her body, or whether it the problem is that the blood is being drawn out using the tube rather than flowing out naturally. According to the second approach, the fact that the blood isn't in contact with her body is irrelevant, since it flows out naturally it would render her tamei.
Rashi clearly writes that the issue is that of a chatzitza because rashi says that the advantage to a the piece of flesh is that מין במינו לא חייץ, implying that by a tube the issue is that it is a chatzitza. However, the Shulchan Aruch HaGraz (188:8,9) cites two opinions. He understands that the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch who says that blood in a piece of flesh that is cracked and therefore in contact with her body on the way out, would still not render her tamei, clearly implies that the issue is not one of chatzitza but rather any blood being forced out by a tube or by a piece of flesh, wouldn't render her tamei. According to this approach, a woman could not avoid being a nida by simply lining her cervix with some synthetic material. However, he quotes from Tosafos and the Rambam that it is an issue of chatzitzah. Based on that approach a woman can avoid becoming a Nida by lining her cervix so that the blood exits the uterus without contact to her body. Even if the blood flows out in its natural course and is not forced out, it would still not make her tamei.

Friday, June 08, 2012

Nidah 20b - Paskening for your wife

The gemara says that Yalta, who is famously known as the wife of Rav Nachman, showed her blood to rabba bar bar chana for a p'sak. Tosafos HaRosh points out that perhaps Rav Nachman either didn't know or was out of town. However, from the end of the story it sounds as if she ALWAYS showed it to Rabba Bar Bar Chana. It would seem from here that a husband is not allowed to pasken on the ma'aros of his wife. Tosafos rejects this possibility based on the mishna in negaim 2:5 which discusses other things a husband can't pasken for a wife, but makes no mention of this. Therefore, Rav Nachman was either not an expert in paskening on blood or perhaps he was concerned that he would be too machmir, or that she would be מתגנה on him.
The Chochmas Adam 109:6 paskens that although a husband may pasken on the ma'aros of his wife, he can't pasken on mikvah questions as he explains in Binas Adam 3 that when there is a chezkas issur the husband isn't allowed to pasken. She doesn't have a chezkas issur that she will continue bleeding forever so he may pasken on the ma'areh that the bleeding stopped, even on a hefsek tahara. But she does have a chezkas tu'mah until she goes to the mikva, so he can't pasken on chatzitza issues.

Nidah 20b - "Nature" - טבע

It is well known that the term טבע doesn't appear in tanach. The truth is that it hardly appears in chazal. The Ramban in Hilchos Deios definitely uses the term to mean nature in describing the nature of fire. Our gemara is one of the few places that we find the term being used in chazal - טבעא דבבל גרמא לי דלא חזאי דמא. The ya'avetz points out that the term was well used in his time by scientists to refer to nature, and the source seems to be from here where it refers to the biological nature of the babylonians. Perhaps the root of the word is based on the gemara in Sanhedrin 37b where it says that Hashem is different than a normal craftsman. When human being who טובע כמה מטבעות בחותם אחד - makes many coins with the same stamp, they will all look the same. However, Hashem uses the same stamp to be מטבע all man kind and everyone looks different. The term טבע really means the stamp of Hashem which he used to stamp the world and set it in motion allowing it to take its natural course.

Wednesday, June 06, 2012

Nida 18a - Is Rov a Statistic?

Rav Yochanan presents 3 cases where we follow rov against a chazaka (tosafos d.h. achar, and on amud 2 d.h. l'mutei point out that we are only including and excluding cases where there is a chazaka fighting the rov). The gemara questions why doesn't he list the famous case of 10 stores, 9 selling kosher and one selling treif where we follow rov. The gemara says that we are only looking for cases of tu'mah, not issur. However, the fact that the gemara even suggests this as an option forces Tosafos to write that there is a chazaka of all meat starting off as issur prior to being shechted, fighting against the rov that it is kosher.
There is a very interesting machlokes between the Binas Adam (sha'ar ha'kavua #16) and the Chavos Da'as (y.d. 119) whether we follow the majority of stores that sell kosher meat, or the majority of kosher meat. The Binas Adam holds strongly that we follow the majority of meat, therefore if the one treif store sells more meat that the 9 kosher, the meat would be treif. His rationale is very simple, we don't know whether the meat fell from a seller or a buyer. The only factor that would incorporate all buyers and sellers would be the amount of meat available for sale. He proves this point from a Mishna in Shekalim (7) that says that when we find money and don't know whether it is from shekalim or from donations, we assume it fell from whatever it is closer to. The Bartenura asks, how can we follow "karov", since the rule is that Rov trumps Karov? He answers that we are speaking in a case where the amount of money in the shekalim is equal to the amount of money in the donation boxes, so there is no "rov" to speak about. This doesn't seem to make sense because there are 6 donation boxes, and only one shekel box, so even if the money is equal, we still have a rov? From here we see that rov depends on the amount of money, not from the amount of places it could have come from and since the amount of money in the shekalim box equals all 6 donation boxes, there is no rov. Similarly, we should follow the amount of meat being sold in the city, not the amount of stores that it could have come from.
The Binas Adam cites the Chavos Da'as in 119 who brings the exact same proof from shekalim which seems to support his own position, but the Chavos Da'as 110 takes for granted that we follow the amount of stores, NOT the amount of meat being sold. The Chavos Da'as (110) proves that we should follow the amount of stores, not the quantity of meat from the case where one finds an object in a city where most inhabitants are Jews. Why must he assume it fell from a Jew? Goyim are richer than Jews and have more items than Jews so if we follow the majority of the items it would be assumed to belong to a goy, yet we assume it belongs to a Jew! From here we see that we follow the amount of sources that it could have come from when designing the rov. The Binas Adam rejects this proof for two reasons: 1. Even though goyim own more objects than Jews, they all walk the streets carrying the same amount of items in their pockets, therefore the only rov to follow is the rov of people in the city. 2. The issue by hashavas aveida is WHO it fell from, so we focus on jews vs. goyim, but the issue by the meat and coins is what it's status is, so we should focus on the quantity of that item.
The Binas Adam proves his point from Tosafos in our sugya who says that the chazaka on the meat goes against the rov that it is kosher. If the rov is on the stores then the chazaka on the meat doesn't in anyway impact the fact that most stores sell kosher meat. However, since the rov is on the meat that it comes from the majority of kosher meat in the city, it makes sense for the chazaka of the meat to be fighting the rov.
The Binas Adam concludes that when he had the opportunity to visit the Chavos Da'as in Lisa (in the hakdama of the chochmas adam he also mentions visiting in the year 5570 and the chavos da'as advised that he organize the chochmas adam according to the order of shulchan aruch, which he did) he presented his argument to him and the chavos da'as was silent. He understood this to mean that the chavos da'as consented to him that we follow the quantity of meat in the city, not the number of stores from which to purchase meat.
The Pischei Teshuva (y.d. 110:2) cites the Beis Ephraim who says that if the question is on a chicken or piece of meat bought by an individual, the question is really which store he went into so we follow the majority of stores, not the amount of meat. However, if all the meat was sold in all the stores, then we follow the majority of the quantity that was put out on the market. He cites the Ran who writes explicitly that the fact that the shas makes no distinction between the amount of meat in the stores, it apparently makes no difference. This is also the way that the Nodeh B'yehuda leans, but is not תוקע עצמו on it to be lenient.
In short, the machlokes between the Chavos Da'as and Chochmas Adam seems to be whether we follow the source of where the item came from - רוב חנויות מוכרות בשר שחוטה, or the statistical chance of it being kosher - רוב בשר טריפה. The Binas Adam holds firmly that we follow the statistical chance of it being kosher and therefore disregard whether there are 9 kosher stores and 1 treif, or 9 treif and 1 kosher, since it is all dependent on the quantity of meat for sale in that city. The language of chazal - רוב חנויות, was assuming equal amounts of meat in all stores.
I once received a shaila that I consulted many gedolim on. One of the issues that were raised is whether rov is a realistic statistic or an invention of chazal in making assumptions. For example, when trying to determine the yichus of a child found in a city, if the city is inhabited by mostly gentile woman and a small minority of Jewish women, but almost all the gentile woman are post menopause whereas most Jewish women are of child bearing age, do we assume the child is a goy (blindly following the rov) or a Jew (statistically the mother is Jewish)? Rav Hershel Schachter (as reported by his son R. Shay) held strongly that rov is a statistical reality and therefore the child is Jewish, whereas Rav Asher Weiss held strongly that rov of the city is goyim so the child is a goy. To me it seems that if it were truly impossible for the gentile women to conceive, they wouldn't be part of the rov, but if it is possible albeit unlikely (for example the goyim were all in their 40's and the Jews all in their 20's), they should be part of the rov rendering the child a goy (Rav Hershel would maintain that we follow the statistical chance therefore if it were more likely that the child would be born from a Jewish woman, we would ignore the fact that most women in the city are goyim). 
At first glance it would seem that the Binas Adam supports the approach of Rav Hershel Schachter - we follow the statistic reality that this meat comes from the majority of the meat in the city and don't get caught up in the language of chazal רוב חנויות. However, in truth even the Binas Adam may hold that we include in the rov all possible sources and we would not use statistics to limit who we allow into the rov. For example, if the issue were the wife of a kohein being raped and we had to determine whether the rapist was from the rov k'sheirim, or mi'ut p'sulim, we would include every rav, rosh yeshiva, and magid shiur in the rov kesharim since they are all potential albeit unlikely rapists. Statistics may say she was raped by someone who is passul, but we would still follow all the potential people who could have raped her, even those who are unlikely to have done so (my understanding is that Rav Hershel would hold that we follow the statistical evidence even in this case). The Binas Adam doesn't necessarily hold that we follow statistics to limit the pool, but rather if we are judging on the meat we have to look at all the meat around. If we are judging on people such as Jews vs. goyim for hashavas aveida or rape, we would look at the entire pool of people.

Tuesday, June 05, 2012

Nidah 16b - Angel Appointed Over Birth

The gemara makes reference to an angel that is appointed over conception. Tosafos raises a question from the gemara in Ta'anis 2a that says that the key to birth remains in the hands of Hashem and isn't entrusted to an angel. Tosafos HaRosh answers that Hashem deals with conception Himself, but then hands it off to an angel to take over. However, Tosafos seems to make a distinction between conception and birth. An angel is appointed over conception but Hashem Himself deals with the birthing process. This implies that we consider birth to be a greater miracle than that of conception so that G-d must deal with it himself.

Monday, June 04, 2012

Nida 16a - More about vestos d'oraysa

The gemara questions again whether vestos are d'oraysa or d'rabonon. It is clear from the sugya that the difference between the two approaches is when a woman forgot to do a bedika during the time of her veset, but does a bedika after the time of her veset and comes out clean, whether she can assume a status of taharah. The opinion who holds vestos are d'oraysa require he to assume that she bled during her veset and because she failed to do a bedika she didn't notice the blood.
One of the major questions regarding this machlokes is raised by the maharatz chiyus 15a. In all other areas of halacha we apply a concept of chazaka. When something occurs 3 times, we assume it will happen again. What is the rationale to say that vestos are only d'rabonon - shouldn't it be d'oraysa due to the chazaka?
There are many different approaches to this. The Pischei Teshuva (184:3) cites the Nodeh B'yehuda and Chasam Sofer who say that the chazaka of being tehora contradicts the chazaka of orach b'zmano ba, therefore we don't have a d'oraysa chazaka telling us that she became a nidah since it is countered by the status quo of not being a Nidah. They continue to explain that this works only when looking back trying to determine whether she became a Nidah during the veset. However, when one looks forward to be concerned that a woman will become a Nidah, the status quo doesn't help to say she will always remain in the state of tahara since we know for certainty that she will NOT always remain in this state. They apply the concept of שמא מת לא חיישינן, שמא ימות חיישינן - we aren't concerned that a person died because they have a chazaka of being alive, yet we are concerned that they will die. Therefore, even if vestos are only d'rabonon, that means that after the time of the expected period, she is still assumed to be tahora, but during the time that she is expecting her period she is forbidden according to the Torah from having relations since there is a d'oraysa fear that she will become a Nidah during the veset time.
An alternate approach is indicated by the Chavos Da'as (cited in Pischei Teshuva 18). Although a woman has a chazaka that she will become a Nida during her veset, the lack of hargasha proves that she didn't become a Nidah. Therefore, although the chazaka may be d'oraysa the fact that she didn't have a hargasha creates a rei'usa in the chazaka. Based on this the Chavos Da'as holds that if a woman did something during her veset to mask her hargasha, such as doing a bedika and losing the cloth, or even urinating, then the lack of hargasha cannot prove that she is tahorah. She would need to be concerned that she actually had a hargasha without realizing it and is tamei. It would also seem based on this approach that the chavos da'as would agree with the nodeh b'yehuda and chasam sofer - she would have to be concerned during the time of her veset that she may get a hargasha and start bleeding. This is a d'oraysa concern even according to the opinion who holds that vestos are only d'rabonon.
Both these approaches seem to assume that the chazaka of the veset is itself a regular chazka, just that there is something counter acting the chazaka demoting the chazaka to be only a d'rabonon concern and not d'oraysa.
The Chazon Ish has a different approach. He understands that all agree that chazaka wouldn't apply here since there are so many variables that can impact a woman's menstrual cycle. Even the opinion who holds that vestos are d'oraysa doesn't attribute it to chazaka but rather to a special halacha l'moshe misinai, as rashi writes on both 9a and 15a. The opinion who holds vestos d'rabonon holds that there is no halacha l'moshe misinai. Following this approach, it is very understandable why rashi holds that according to the opinion that vestos are only d'rabonon, even without a bedika to confirm she is tahora, we can assume she is tahora. This is apparent in rashi in his comment at the start of the sugy, and against Tosafos who seems to say that she is only tahora after confirming it through a bedika at some point later on. Based on this approach, we aren't concerned about doing an activity that may have masked the hargasha because the entire concern of having a hargasha and seeing was created by the rabbonon, not by a real chazaka.

Sunday, June 03, 2012

Nidah 15a - Vestos D'oraysa or D'rabonon

A few times in the gemara it raises the issue whether vestos are considered d'oraysa or d'rabonon. There are many aspects to this issue, most fundamentally to define the concept of vestos d'roaysa. In the next post I hope to discuss the more fundamental aspect. However, today I want to point out that within the opinion of vestos d'oraysa, there seems to be a machlokes between Rashi and Tosafos. Rashi (d.h. d'oraysa) writes something cryptic - vestos are d'oraysa from a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai, that we establish her to have safeik tu'mah. Rashi seems to understand that the halacha l'moshe mi'sinai itself is a halacha that only establishes a questionable status of tu'mah, but doesn't establish her as definitely tamei. Tosafos (d.h. afilu) raises a question within the opinion that vestos are d'rabonon, how can a woman be permitted m'dorasya at the time of her veset, the gemara in shavuos seems to learn out from a pasuk that she is forbidden. Tosafos answers that she is certainly forbidden at the time of her veset, but after she waits enough time to go to the mikvah after the veset passes, and the husband doesn't know if she went to the mikva, according to the opinion that vestos are d'rabonon she is permitted without him verifying her status. However, according to the opinion that vestos are d'oraysa, Tosafos writes that we assume she "definitely" saw, therefore a chance of immersion doesn't take away the "definite" status. Tosafos seems to argue on rashi and understands that the assumption she saw is a va'dai, not a safeik.
The gemara on 15b says that when a woman has a veset, her husband can calculate the days of her veset and assume she went to the mikvah when enough time has passed. The gemara refers to the reason that he can be so lenient is because it is only a safeik whether she saw. According to rashi this fits even with the opinion who says that vestos are d'oraysa but according to tosafos it only fits with the opinion that vestos are d'rabonon.

Nidah 13b - Geirim in Arvus

The gemara says קשין גרים לישראל כספחת. Rashi and Tosafos offer various explanations. Rashi suggests that since they aren't experts in doing mitzvos it will result either in punishment or negatively influencing others. Rashi then cites that some say it is because all jews are responsible for one another - כל ישראל ערבים זה בזה, therefore we suffer for their lack of performance. Rashi rejects this approach because he writes that Geirim were never included in arvus and proves this from a gemara in Sota 37b. Tosafos rejects the proof because it may simply be that we didn't know the number so it couldn't be delineated, but cites the mechilta that does suggest a number. 
Rashi in Rosh Hashana 29a explains that the source for one being motzi others in mitzvos that he has already performed is this concept of כל ישראל ערבים זה בזה. Therefore it should follow that geirim who aren't included in arvus cannot be shleluchei tzibur to be motzi others in mitzvos that they themselves are fulfilling. For example, a ger who already hears shofar or made kiddush can't blow or make kiddush for others. The Pri Megadim (eishel avrohom 53:19 at first says that a ger cannot be motzi others based on this rashi, but backs off based on the shulchan aruch that a ger can be a shliach tzibbur.
Perhaps there is a difference between the concept of responsibility for one another, and liability for failing to do for others. The concept of אע"פ שיצא מוציא - being motzi others, is based on the responsibility that all Jews have for one another, even geirim. Since they are part of klal yisroel, anytime another Jew is deficient in a mitzvah, it is as if they themselves are deficient. However, it is possible that Rashi holds that we wouldn't punish geirim for aveiros of others. Responsibility for aveiros committed by others comes from failing to rebuke and influence, which may not apply to geirim since their influence on משפחתות מיוחסות בישראל is limited.

Thursday, May 31, 2012

Nida 12a - Hargasha Without Seeing Blood

The Shulchan Aruch (190:1) cites the Terumas HaDeshen that if a woman were to have a hargasha (a sensations that would indicate bleeding - see pischei teshuva for 3 types), she must assume that she bled even though she didn't notice any blood. The rationale is that the Hargasha itself is evidence that there was actual bleeding.
Rav Zeira asks whether a woman who is not involved in taharos should examine herself prior to relations before being with her husband. R. Abba asks whether she should examine herself after having relations to figure out whether they need to bring a korban. The gemara responds to both questions by saying that she shouldn't examine herself because if she would, he would be hesitant to have relations with her. Rashi (d.h. im kein) seems to interpret the gemara to be questioning whether chazal impose such an examination on her. According to this approach the response of the gemara is that by Chazal imposing a requirement to do a bedika, they are indicating that there is a concern that she will bleed, this will cause him to abstain from having relations with her. However, if she were to decide to do a bedika on her own, we wouldn't stop her. Tosafos on the other hand seems to indicate that by her doing a bedika, even as a chumra, would indicate that she must have had a hargasha and cause him to abstain from relations with her. Why would he abstain from relations? Let her do a bedika and if it's clean it would indicate that she is not a Nidah. It seems that Tosafos supports the opinion of the Terumas HaDeshen and if she were to have a hargasha, even if followed by a clean bedika, she would be considered tamei. Therefore we are afraid that he will abstain from relations even if the bedika is clean out of fear that she had a hargasha.

Sunday, April 29, 2012

Meilah 16b - Shiur for Eating Sheratzim

Rav says that to receive malkus for eating sheratzim, one must eat a kezayis. Since the Torah uses the term "achila" it follows the rule of all issurim that malkus requires a kezayis. The gemara challenges this from a braisa that compares the issur achila to tu'mah which is b'kadasha (lentil), and concludes that when one eats a live sheretz the shiur is kezayis, but a dead one on which there is tu'mah for the size of a lentil, one would also receive malkus for consuming the size of a lentil. This distinction is paskened in the Rambam, but not explicitly paskened in shulchan aruch since even a chatzi shiur is forbidden, and the only application is for malkus.
In truth, this issue is paskened in shulchan aruch and even has a practical application. In Y.D. 104:1, the Shulchan Aruch discusses עכברא בשכרא, a rodent that falls into beer. The Shulchan Aruch writes that even if there is 60x to be mevatel the rodent, if there are pieces of it in the food that it fell into so that it can be felt upon chewing, although it is unable to be separated out, it makes the entire food forbidden. There is a big dispute between the Taz and Shach as to the rationale for this prohibition. The Taz understands this to be a rule with all non-kosher items that fall into a food from which they cannot be separated but are distinguishable when eating it, that they aren't batul. It wouldn't matter how small the pieces are, they wouldn't be batul (the Taz continues to qualify this  - we are only concerned if there is a possibility that one will be eating the issur standing alone without the mixture of the kosher food). However, the Shach understands that this is an issue specific to one of the 8 sheratzim that the Torah forbids. The nature of this halacha is that since the shiur for malkus is k'adasha, the size of a lentil, we are extra strict about allowing it to be eaten through bitul. Since there is malkus for the size of a lentil we treat it like a בריה and don't allow it to be batul. Therefore, according to the shach if the pieces were smaller than the size of a lentil, or by other issurim even if the pieces were larger than a lentil, it would be batul and permissible.
This issue may really be a machlokes between rashi and the Ran. Rashi explained that the stringency of the sheretz has something to do with the shiur of malkus being the size of a lentil, but the Ran asks what do we need that for, just say it is because of חצי שיעור אסור מן התורה. The Shach explained that by other issurim we wouldn't be machmir since they are nosein ta'am l'fgam and the actual issur is batul, it is only for a sheretz where the shiur is k'adasha that we are machmir. The Mateh Yehonassan suggests that chatzi shiur that falls into a mixture no longer retains it's status of issur, unless one could consume a kezayis within an achilas p'ras. Therefore, issurim for which one can eat a shiur is not going to be batul even if there is less that a kezayis in an achilas pras. That is why we are machmir for a sheretz because even if there is less than a kezayis in achilas pras, it would still retain its status of issur so long as one can eat a lentil size of it within an achilas p'ras (it would be like any other issur in which there was a kezayis in an achilas pras).

Tuesday, March 27, 2012

Krisus 10a - Opening of Uterus Will Always Cause Bleeding

I previously posted about this topic HERE and explained the position of Rav Moshe who assumes it is the size of a pinkie finger making the diameter to be about 7mm (and maybe even 1cm which is 10mm).
Rav Moshe says that aside from the Mishna in Ohalos which gives an unfamiliar shiur and assumes that it would be larger than the size of one's pinkie. However, in our gemara it discusses a woman who miscarries a 40 day old fetus as a dry birth which doesn't render her tamei. The gemara asks that the opening of the uterus should definitely cause some blood, to which the gemara concludes that it must be אפשר לפתיחת הקבר בלא דם. This would be the source of the Rambam to reject the entire notion of אי אפשר לפתיחת הקבר בלא דם, because the gemara would clearly be saying that it is possible. However, the gilyon hashas quotes an alternate girsa from the Rashba. The gemara thought that even the opening of the uterus caused by a 40 day old fetus should be considered an opening of the uterus for the purpose of assuming there will definitely be blood, to which the gemara responds that since the fetus at 40 days is so small, it won't cause bleeding. The girsa of the Rashba actually states clearly that the size of the fetus at 40 days is exactly the shiur for this assumption of אי אפשר לפתיחת הקבר בלא דם. According to ultrasound measurements that we are privy to nowadays and scientific estimations, a fetus that is between 5 and 6 weeks from conception will be between 2mm and 4mm in size. Therefore it should follow that any time a physician inserts an instrument with a diameter larger that 4mm into the uterus we would have to say אי אפשר לפתיחת הקבר בלא דם and render her tamei. This is a big chumra because it reduces the shiur of R. Moshe by half and seems much clearer that trying to estimate the shiur referenced in the mishna in ohalos.

Thursday, March 15, 2012

Temurah 31a - Animal that is raised on non-kosher food


The Mishna says that an animal that nurses from a treifa mother is forbidden to be used as a korban. The gemara qualifies that it cannot mean that animal that gained a few pounds by eating non-kosher food becomes assur. The gemara explains that we are speaking about an animal that nurses daily from a treifa animal an amount that is sufficient to sustain it entirely, therefore even if the animal eats other things, it is forbidden to be brought as a korban.
The Mishna implies that an animal sustained primarily from issur food is forbidden as a korban, but permitted to be shechted and eaten. However, Tosafos writes - ולפום ריהטא אפילו להדיוט, meaning that it seems it would be forbidden even for a regular person to eat. The Rama in Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 60:1) follows Tosafos and writes an animal that ate non-kosher is permitted, but אם לא נתפטמה כל ימיה רק בדברים אסורים אסורה - if it only ate issur it's entire life, it becomes forbidden. The Pischei Teshuva cites the Levushei Sered who suggests that this is a fixable problem. If one were to feed the animal kosher foods for a few days, it would lose it's status as an animal that was raised it's entire life on non-kosher foods.

The difficulty with both Tosafos and the Rama is that the mishna implies that this is a problems specifically for korbanos. If this were an issue with even chulin animals forbidding them to be eaten, why would this halacha be said in the context of korbanos? The Gr"a deals with this question and suggests that the Mishna and Gemara are speaking about an animal that primarily is sustained by forbidden food (such as milk from a treifa) but throughout the course of the day will also eat other things. In that circumstance it is forbidden for a korban since the non-kosher milk is sufficient to sustain the animal without any other food, but is not forbidden to be eaten. The Rama is speaking about an animal that ONLY ate non-kosher foods and then becomes forbidden even for a regular person so shecht ant eat it. According to the Gr"a it would seem that that one can certainly do as the Levushei Sered suggests, to feed the animal kosher food for a couple of days and then shecht it to eat.

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Temurah 30b - Having relations with one's wife while pregnant


Rava says that if one were to commit bestiality with an pregnant animal, the fetus will also assume a status of "nirva" and be forbidden to be brought as a korban because היא וולדה נרבעו. The gemara explains that this issue is dependent on the notion that the child is a "limb" of the mother - עובר ירך אמו הוא, therefore anything done to the mother is as if it were done to it's child. Based on the same rationale, if a pregnant animal kills, the fetus is also considered a "no'geiach" and killed. Since the fetus is part of the mother it is as if it participated in the actions of the mother. 
R. Akiva Eiger (Kesavim 172) asks a very strange question. Based on the rationale of the gemara that היא וולדה נרבעו, it should be forbidden for one to have relations with their pregnant wife since it is tantamount to having relations with their own child? R. Akiva Eiger offers a technical answer. Since chazal don't consider it to be an act of relations when a girl is less than 3, it wouldn't be a torah violation. Although it would normally be a Rabbinic violation to have relations even with a girl less than 3, the violation is based on wasting seed which obviously doesn't apply when he is having relations with his pregnant wife. In short, R. Akiva Eiger considers having relations with one's wife while pregnant to be having relations with the fetus itself.

The Yachin Bo'az says that R. Akiva Eiger's entire approach doesn't make sense. If we truly consider every act done to the mother as if it were done to the child, there should be a violation to shecht the mother since it is as if he were shechting the mother and child on the same day. The Tiferes Yisroel (Boaz) explains that the answer lies in the gemara's assumption that עובר ירך אמו. Since the fetus is considered part of the mother it is not considered to be having relations with the fetus, just with the mother. The concept of היא וולדה נרבעו doesn't mean that it is as if he committed the aveira with both the mother and the child, but rather since the child was part of the mother at the time of the aveira, it assumes whatever status the mother has. The concept of עובר ירך אמו הוא doesn't make it as if he were having relations with the fetus, rather it makes that the relations he had with the mother causing it to assume a status of a נרבע would also apply to the fetus. In a situation where there is no status placed on the mother, there is no effect at all on the child. According to this approach the phrase היא וולדה נרבעו isn't to be taken literally, it is merely an expression meant to convey that the status of the mother will apply to the child as well.

Thursday, March 01, 2012

Temurah 16a - Halachos Forgotten in Aveilus of Moshe

The gemara says that 3000 halachos were forgotten when Moshe died. The people asked Yehoshua to retrieve the lost halachos from Hashem to which he responded לא בשמים הי. Generations later they asked Shmuel to retrieve it, to which he responded אלה המצות - שאין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה. Both responses seem to be similar, the only Navi who is able to transmit Torah from Hashem is Moshe. Once it was transmitted by Moshe, it was not simply shared with the Jewish people, but literally given to the Jewish people so that all decisions had to take place following a halachic system. The only way to retrieve lost halachos is to do as Asniel Ben Kenaz did, to use principles available and analysis (piplul) to retrieve the lost information. Even when machlokes develops, the only way to decide who is correct is using the system of אחרי רבים להטות as the gemara says was done after Moshe died - אם רבו מטמאין טמאו, אם רבו טהורין טיהרו (although rashi explains that the machlokes about semicha was the first machlokes ever to exist, that means it was the first machlokes where they couldn't reach an agreement by voting, but surely there was machlokes much earlier - the gemara in Sanhedrin (2nd perek) suggests that Shaul and Dovid had a halachic debate about המקדש במלוה).
It is unclear from the gemara why when Yehoshua was asked to retrieve the halachos his response was לא בשמים היא, whereas Shmuel responds אלה המצות - שאין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה, since they are essentially the same point. The Maharsha asks this question as suggests that for Yehoshua it may not have been a violation of אלה המצות since he had heard these halachos from Moshe himself, just that he forgot them. He needed to be reminded of them, but didn't need to learn them from scratch. Therefore, it wouldn't be a violation of introducing something new, nevertheless couldn't be done due to the limitation of לא בשמים היא.
The gemara in Megilla 3a says that the "tzofim", meaning the nevi'im, introduced the מנצפ"ך, meaning all the letters that have a different font when they appear at the end of a word. The gemara asks how could the nevi'im have introduced something so fundamental, it is a violation of אלה המצות - שאין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה. The gemara answers - שכחום וחזרו ויסדום. Originally, they were given by Moshe, but they were lost and the nevi'im were used to retrieve the lost halachos. This clearly implies that even when Nevi'im restore lost halachos that they have never heard before, it isn't a violation to אלה המצות. Why does our gemara consider the restoring of forgotten halachos to be a violation of אלה המצות?
It seems that the answer lies within the words of Rabbeinu Chananel in Megillah who writes:
ואקשינן ואלה המצות שאין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה, ופרקינן לעולם מתוקנים היו, וכן היה מסורת בידם מהנביאים להיות הפתוחים באמצע תיבה והסתומים בסוף תיבה, ושכחום וחזרו הצופים ויסדום
Rabbeinu Channanel seems to explain that they had a mesorah from the nevi'im about these letters and exactly where they should be placed, the function of the nevi'im who restored them was only to remind people of the mesorah. It seems from here that once it has entered the chain of mesorah, it can be restored by nevi'im, but when taught by Moshe and immediately forgotten, since it never entered the realm of מסרן ליהושע ויהושע לזקנים וזקנים מסרוה וכו, it can't be restored by nevi'im.

Sunday, February 26, 2012

Temurah 14b - Reciting written Torah by heart

The gemara says that oral torah cannot be written, and written torah cannot be recited by heart. It compares one who writes halachos to one who burns a sefer torah. Rashi explains that if a fire would break out on shabbos it would be forbidden to violate shabbos to save the sefer of halachos, therefore the initial writing of it causes it to be burned. Rashi offers a second interpretation that it is destructive to the oral Torah to commit it to writing. The second explanation is difficult, why is it equivalent to burning of a Torah? It seems that the problem with writing oral torah is that it make what should be infinite into something limited and finite. Therefore, by writing halachos one is inherently considering it to be no longer disputable and no longer open for debate. He is "burning" the torah that could have been discussed and introduced on this topic by committing the torah to writing. The exception to this rule the gemara says is when one writes a chiddush that presumably would otherwise be forgotten. The writing of a chiddush is necessary for the preservation of torah and therefore wouldn't be a violation of writing what shouldn't be written.
Similarly, one is not allowed to read the written torah by heart. Tosafos asks from various written sections of the Torah that were accustomed to being recited by heart in the context of davening. Tosafos answers that it is only problematic when one recites a written section by heart with the intent of being motzi someone in their obligation i.e. reading krias shema for someone who is going to be yotzei through sho'meia k'oneh. Tosafos also limits the violation to chumash as opposed to nevi'im and kesuvim.
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 49) says that sections which people are familiar with such as shema and birchas kohanim one is allowed to do by heart, but doesn't quote Tosafos who permits anything which is not being done to be motzi others. The rationale of the Shulchan Aruch seems to assume that the problem is that we afraid of one making an error and misquoting from torah she'bichsav, therefore things which are well known are permitted. This is also the implication of the biur halacha citing Tosafos Yeshanim to permit reciting hallel by heart. However, the limitation of Tosafos to when one is being motzi others seems to be that when done casually and not to be motzi someone's obligation, it isn't significant enough to qualify as a prohibition.
The Mishna Berura uses Tosafos as cited by the Gr"a and Radvaz to permit one to read the parsha along with the ba'al koreih even though they don't have a chumash open in front of them. The M.B. also quotes from the chavos ya'ir to permit one to recite tehillim by heart combining the heter of the chavos ya'ir that it qualifies as tefilla and the heter of tosafos that one isn't being motzi others. It is interesting that they don't quote the other distinction of tosafos who limits the prohibition to chumash.

Monday, February 20, 2012

Temurah 8a - Not to sell a bechor or ma'aser in the market

The Mishna in Bechoros 31a says that one is not allowed to sell the meat of a bechor or ma'aser b'heima on the regular meat market because the extra money gotten from selling on the market will only benefit the owners but in no way benefit hekdesh (to the exclusion of pesulei hamukdashin where the original redemption price will be determined by how much the meat can be sold for so hekdesh will benefit). By making the heter to sell in the market dependent on whether hekdesh benefits indicates that the issur is only d'rabonon. However, Tosafos in Bechoros proves from or sugya that it must be d'oraysa because the gemara says that since it has these halachos restricting their sale, it is not included in the word בהמתה by an עיר הנדחת because we only include things that can be eaten בתורת בהמתה. If these restrictions would only be d'rabonon, it wouldn't make sense to exclude it from עיר הנדחת based on a pasuk. Tosafos isn't sure what the pasuk would be to forbid this and suggests that there must be some pasuk that forbids degrading hekdesh unless there is a gain for hekdesh. Perhaps the source of this can be the gemara 7a that says that being makdish a ba'al mum is a violation of לא תקריבו even though it only assumes status of kedushas bedek habayis because it is degrading to hekdesh to be makdish a ba'al mum since within the same species there are animals that are fit for a korban - בזיא מילתא וכו' כיון דאיכא במינו. Since the nature of this issur is the degrading of hekesh, perhaps it can be expanded to include the degrading of bechor and ma'aser meat by being sold on the open market.
The Minchas Chinuch (361) cites Tosafos in Zevachim who says that according to some the prohibition is only d'rabonon as the simple reading of the Mishna would imply. If the nature of the prohibition is only d'rabonon, how are we to explain our gemara that exempts it from the שלל עיר הנדחת based on these prohibitions? The gemara darshens from בהמתה to exclude anything that isn't eaten as a regular animal. Although the restrictions against selling and weighing are only Rabbinic, the fact of the matter is that it isn't able to be eaten the way a regular animal is and is therefore excluded from ir ha'nidachas. The Torah may not recognize the Rabbinic issur but nevertheless excludes anything which is practically and actually not treated as a regular animal.

Friday, February 17, 2012

Temurah 4b - When the Torah says not to do it, does it work anyway?

The gemara launches into a major discussion about the concept of כל מילתא דאמר רחמנא לא תעביד, אי עביד לא מהני. Meaning, when the Torah says not to do something, is there a built in mechanism that makes it ineffective even if it is done (rava), or is it effective. The gemara explains that according to Abbaye it must be effective because otherwise there was nothing violated for which to receive malkus, but according to Rava the malkus is for performing the action that the Torah said not to, but it will not be effective.
R. Akiva Eiger (Comments to Y.D. 10:1) explains that the application of this concept is only in cases where by the Torah saying it doesn't work, the Torah is accomplishing something. Meaning, there is a preventative clause built in to any aveira that if the issur can be reduced by it not going into effect, the Torah doesn't enable the issur to go into effect. For example, if one were to shecht on shabbos, the concept of אי עביד לא מהני would not apply to invalidate the shechita because even if the shechita were invalidated, it would in no way reduce the violation of shabbos. We can only apply this concept to a places where by invalidating the effect, it would lessen the violation such as divorcing a woman who one raped. The Torah doesn't want her to be divorced so by invalidating the divorce, the violation is lessened (but the gemara learns from a pasuk that the this is an exception to the rule and the divorce is binding).
Therefore, R. Akiva Eiger asks that if one would shecht an animal with a knife that is forbidden to benefit from because it is avoda zarah, it would make sense to apply אי עביד לא מהני to invalidate the shechita. The benefit from the knive is dependent on the shechita being valid, therefore invalidating the shechita would prevent the violation of benefiting from the knife. R. Akiva Eiger points out based on the Turei Even in Rosh Hashana that even Abbaye who holds אי עביד מהני would only say that in a situation where even if we undermine the effect of the issur, it doesn't negate the fact that he violated the din of the torah. In other words, since even after we undermine the effect of the issur, he nonetheless violated the מימרא דרחמנא (for which rava says he gets malkus), there is no point in negating the effect of his actions since it doesn't truly rectify the violation. However, in a case where undermining the effect will completely undermine the violation, even Abbaye would agree that we apply the concept of אי עביד לא מהני. Therefore, when one shechts with a knife that they are forbidden to derive benefit from, by invalidating the shechita and rendering the animal a ne'veila, we are completely circumventing the violation becasue the violation is not to do an action, it is to benefit. By rendering the animal a neveila it comes out that he never even violated the מימרא דרחמנא so even Abbaye should agree that the animal is considered a ne'veila. R. Akiva Eiger leaves with at צריך עיון.

Friday, February 10, 2012

Erchin 30a - Who can redeem at a prorated rate?

The mishna has various restrictions regarding the rules of redeeming. For example, one cannot sell another property or borrow to obtain capital with which to redeem. Also, one is not allowed to redeem just a piece of the property, they need to wait until they have enough to redeem the entire amount. There is also a system of calculating the redemption price by dividing the sale price by the number of years (with a few more details to compensate for fluctuations in the price of the property, and if it is resold at a different price), from hereon in referred to as prorating. The Rashash questions whether these details of redemption apply specifically to the owner of the property or even to his relatives when they redeem in his place. The Rashash quotes from Toras Kohanim that all the rules apply to the relatives also, except for the concept of prorating which only applies to the actual owner. The Rashash says that the pesukim clearly imply "to one who has a sharp eye" that only for an owner do we prorate to force the buyer to sell him his field back, but when a relative redeems we don't impose this on the original buyer, rather we make the relative redeem at full price.

The Torah talks about prorating both in the context of an inherited field (Parshas Behar 25:25-27) and when one is sold to a ger toshav (48-50). In both places the torah first speaks about relatives redeeming for him but then says that if he comes across money so that he can redeem it by himself or redeem himself, the price is prorated. From this the Rashash understands that it is only prorated when he redeems, not when his relatives redeems.
However, the Meshech Chochma seems to take for granted that even when relatives redeem it is prorated. He asks why does the Torah speak first about relatives redeeming and then about redeeming himself. If relatives can redeem him, surely he can redeem himself when he gets the money together. The Meshech Chochma suggests based on chazal who understand from the pesukim that the prorating must be done meticulously so that the buyer is not being cheated in any way. Therefore, it first says that when relatives redeem we have to be careful to make sure the buyer isn't cheated. Even if the seller himself redeems, he is required to be meticulous about the calculation and not cheat the buyer. The Meshech Chochma seems to understand that both the redemption of the seller and the relatives are included in the system of prorating (unlike the rashash) but it is more of a chiddush to say that even the seller himself must be meticulous about the calculation.

Thursday, January 26, 2012

Erchin 16a - Loshon Ho'rah in the Presence of Three

I already blogged about this previously and presented the different approaches - SEE HERE.
Reading the gemara simply, it seems to imply like the approach of the Rambam that once loshon hora was violated in the presence of 3 people, it can be assumed that it is already public info (even though the way it becomes public info is through an issur being violated) and can be said over by the 3 who heard it.
Being that the heter is based on the assumption that the word will get out, the Chofetz Chaim (perek 2) has many stipulations as to when it will be permitted:
1. It can be told over casually but not with the intention of spreading the news further. The Yad Ketana holds that even when said casually, it can only be said if that was the topic of conversation, but one cannot move the conversation in that direction in order to share the loshon hora.
2. It cannot be repeated back to the one it was said about. Although the Rashbam permits even this and doesn't consider it to be a violation of rechilus, the chofetz chaim isn't willing to pasken like that.
3. Only one who was part of the group of 3 can say it over, but not the person who heard it from him until it has become well known information.
4. If any of the group of 3 are exceptional yarei shamayim who wouldn't repeat it over, it cannot be repeated over by anyone in the group. He learns this from the gemara in sanhedrin 29a that considers the judges revealing their votes to be loshon hora even though the 3 judges know about it. He suggests that if any of the 3 wouldn't repeat it over because they are the subjects friends or family, it also cannot be repeated.
5. It can only be repeated to places where the news would have spread such as within the city. Mostly likely this condition no longer applies since information spreads very quickly to the 4 corners of the world.
6. If the original person who told it over warned the 3 listeners not to say it, one cannot assume that it will spread and cannot repeat it.
7. One cannot embellish the story in any way. It has to be said exactly as it was heard.
8. The heter is only for the one saying it over, but the listener still cannot believe it as factual. Therefore if the one telling it over knows the nature of the listener and that he would accept it as fact, he cannot tell it to him.

Sunday, January 22, 2012

Erchin 10b - Hallel on Yetzias Mitzrayim

The gemara offers 3 explanations for why we don't say Hallel on Purim. 1. We don't say Hallel for a miracle that occurs outside of E.Y. after the Jews have already entered E.Y. 2. The reading of the Megilla is in place of the Hallel. 3. It wasn't a complete redemption since we remain slaves to Achashveirosh. The entire question as to why we don't say Hallel on Purim is predicated on the gemara's answer that we do say Hallel on Chanuka due to the miracle, even though it isn't called a Mo'ed and there is no prohibition of work. Therefore, all the distinctions as to why we don't say Hallel on Purim, do not apply to Chanuka. It is a miracle that occurred in E.Y., there is no reading to be in place of Hallel, and it was considered a "complete" redemption (although short lived - approx. 200 years). Rashi in Ta'anis 28b seems to understand that the reciting of Hallel on Chanuka would be considered d'oraysa, since the concept of saying of Hallel on a miracle is a Torah requirement.
The gemara challenges the first distinction between Chanuka and Purim from the fact that we say Hallel on the miracle of yetzias mitzrayim (and is forced to respond that prior to entering E.Y. we say hallel on chutz la'aretz miracles). It isn't clear from the gemara which Hallel it is referring to that is said for yetzias mitzrayim. The Turei Even in Megillah explains that it can't be referring to Hallel said on the first day of Pesach because that is a Hallel for the Yom Tov, not for the miracle. Therefore, he suggests that it is referring to the Hallel on the night of Pesach. The Mahartz Chiyus (here) understands the Turei Even to be speaking about the Hallel in shul on the night of Pesach because the Hallel in the Hagada is interrupted by the meal and wouldn't qualify as Hallel. The Maharatz Chiyus asks that to be referring to the Hallel said in shul on Pesach night is also difficult because the minhag ashkenazim based on the Rama is not to say it. It seems to me that the Turei Even is referring to the Hallel said within the Hagada. Although it is not said as a complete entity and wouldn't qualify as a "Hallel", it would nonetheless qualify as a "shira" and would prove that we do say shira even on a chutz la'aretz miracle.
The Rambam (Hil. Chanuka 3:6) paskens like the middle answer of the gemara - קריאתה זו היא הלילא. The Hallel of Chanuka is achieved by the reading of the megillah. This raises a big discussion in the poskim (sha'arei teshuva) in Hilchos Purim, if one doesn't have a megillah to read on Purim, should they recite the full Hallel (and perhaps even with a bracha). However, it seems that when the gemara says that megilla is in place of Hallel it doesn't just mean that it fulfills the obligation of Hallel, rather that reading the megilla is the expression that chazal instituted as the hallel for purim. Therefore, even if one were not to have access to a megilla they couldn't recite hallel with a bracha (and couldn't say a full hallel) since there was no takana to say hallel on purim.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Erchin 7a - Brain Death

The gemara says that before beis din would carry out capital punishment on a pregnant woman, they would kill the fetus inside of her to prevent the nivul that would occur if they were to kill her first. The gemara concludes from this that if they would first kill her, she would die before the fetus. However, the gemara asks from a source that indicates that a fetus would always die prior to the woman carrying it. The gemara reconciles this by making a distinction between a woman who is murdered in which case she may die first, and a woman who dies naturally in which case the fetus will ALWAYS die first.
It is reported that this gemara was a strong indication for Rav Shlomo Zalman to reject brain stem death as being dead. Since a brain stem dead patient can carry and deliver (Cesarean) a child, it must not be considered dead because it would contradict the gemara's rule that the child will always die before the mother. The fact that the mother can be brain dead and deliver a healthy child indicates that brain death is still alive.
However, in the very next line the gemara says that shabbos may be violated to save the unborn fetus of a pregnant woman who died in childbirth. The implication is that although she died naturally, her fetus may still be living. Rashi comments that sometimes the mother will die before the fetus which creates a safeik pikuach nefesh that justifies the violating of shabbos to save the fetus. According to Rashi it seems that there cannot be a rule that a mother will always die before the child. This would certainly undermine Rav Shlomo Zalman's assumption because the fact that a viable child may be born from a brain dead patient would not prove that brain stem death is still considered living. In truth, Rashi's approach is quite difficult. Just as we are able to assume in the case of inheriting from the mother to bequeath to the father's relatives, that fetus perished before the mother based on the rationale of the gemara - איידי דוולד זוטרא חיותיה עיילה טיפה דמלאך המות ומחתך להו לסימנין, we should be able to rely on that assumption for shabbos as well. Yet, Rashi would seem to hold that we can make that assumption when dealing with monetary issues but it will not be overwhelming enough to prevent an attempt at saving the fetus on the chance that it outlived the mother.
The Shita Mi'kubetzes (15) reconciles the apparent contradiction with a smoother approach. The Shita explains that when a woman is carrying a child but hasn't yet gone into labor, any natural cause of death would affect her fetus before it affects her, therefore her fetus will die first. But, when she has already gone into labor and the fetus has gotten some degree of independence, it is possible and even likely that the fetus will be able to live even after the mother has died (therefore permitting the violation of shabbos to save the fetus). According to this approach the original rule remains strong that prior to labor, when a pregnant woman dies a natural death, her fetus will always die before she dies. Therefore, it is reasonable for Rav Shlomo Zalman to assume that if a brain dead woman can "live" on life support for weeks until her baby is born, it is an indication that she isn't truly dead because a dead woman cannot produce a live baby.
Many years ago, there was an experiment done in Israel led by Dr. Avrohom Steinberg (a proponent of brain stem death being halachic death) to disprove Rav Shlomo Zalman's source. The experiment involved decapitating a pregnant sheep while hooked up to a heart-lung machine, and then successfully delivering a live lamb. There is no debate that a decapitated person or animal is considered dead, yet the baby lamb was able to outlive the trauma of the mother's decapitation. What does this prove? Seemingly it would prove that the gemara's principal is outdated. In the time of the gemara the rule may have been true that a fetus cannot remain alive after it's mother has died, but with modern technology it is a possibility. Therefore, the gemara would not disprove the concept of brain stem death being halachic death.
The problem with this experiment (which i surprisingly couldn't find discussion about) is that the gemara itself differentiates between natural death and one who is killed. The gemara accepts that when one is killed, the fetus can outlive it's mother. It is only when the mother dies through natural causes that the fetus must die first. Therefore, the sheep experiment would concur to the gemara's principal that killing the mother would not kill the fetus, yet when the mother would become brain dead without the trauma of being murdered, it would still be a viable source that brain death is not halachic death. It is unclear to me what exactly this experiment was meant to prove. It seems that the experiment wasn't meant to technically undermine the proof from our gemara. Rather the experiment was just meant to show that the heart and lung can continue to work well after decapitation, proving that life cannot be determined by heart and lung functionality.

For Dr. Steinberg's presentation of the experiment to Rav Shlomo Zalman, CLICK HERE. For an easier read and more cynical article detailing Israeli politics on this issue that was printed in Ha'aretz in english CLICK HERE.

Sunday, January 15, 2012

Erchin 3b - Chatzitza for Tefillin

The gemara says that without a mishna explicitly obligating kohanim to wear tefillin, we would have thought that they were exempt from the head tefillin while doing the avoda. The rationale is that since they cannot wear the arm tefillin while wearing bigdei kehuna because it will be a chatzitzah, they should also be exempt from the head tefillin, therefore we require a mishna to say that they aren't exempt from the head tefillin. It is clear from the gemara that while doing the avoda the kohanim were not able to wear the arm tefillin. There are techincally two options regarding the arm tefillin. Either to wear it under the bigdei kehuna which the gemara rejects due to the chatzitza or wear it over the bidgei kehuna which rashi and tosafos both reject because והיה לך לאות ולא לאחרים לאות, meaning that the tefillin shel yad must be covered and not exposed.
The Rashba in a Teshuva (תרכ"ז) permits one to wear tefillin even if there is something separating between the tefillin and his skin. He derives this from the fact that the only problem that rashi and tosafos mention with putting tefillin on top of the bigdei kehuna is that tefillin shel yad can't be exposed, it must be hidden. This implies that we aren't concerned for chatzitza and for tefillin shel rosh which should be exposed, there is not issue at all with placing them on top of something else. The Shulchan Aruch (27:5) relies on the Rashba for one who has a head injury to put the tefillin shel rosh on top of a bandage or thin cap (without a bracha). The M.B. (18) similarly permits one to put tefillin shel yad on top of a bandage (without a bracha) relying on the rashba when there is no alternative. However, under normal circumstances the Shulchan Aruch (4) writes that chatzitza is an issue and the tefillin must be placed directly on one's arm and head without anything blocking. The Rosh and Gr"a cite the source from על ידך and בין עיניך implying that it must be directly one one's skin without any chatzitzah.
Our gemara seems to support the position of the Rosh (against the Rashba) because the gemara questions why the tefillin shel rosh isn't a problem while wearing the hat, and responds that the hat sat higher on the head behind the tefillin. Why couldn't the gemara say that the tefillin was placed on top of the hat? It must be that the hat would be a chatzitza for the tefillin just as the tefillin would be a chatzitza for the hat. Perhaps this is why the Shulchan Aruch when relying on the Rashba insists on a "thin" hat, because he understands from the gemara that a thick had similar to the one worn by kohanim would indeed be a chatzitzah. However, it is hard to understand why a thin hat wouldn't be a chatzitza and thick one would, therefore the M.B. explains the problem with the thick hat to be that the tefillin will not be situated in the right place.
Another point that we can derive from this gemara is that kohanim are obligated to wear tefillin shel yad while doing avoda. The shita mikubetzes (6) asks that this seems to contradict a gemara in zevachim which exempts kohanim from the mitzvah of tefillin entirely while doing avoda based on עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה. The Shita explains that עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה only applies when he would have to put on tefillin at a time where otherwise he would be doing avoda so that the mitzvah would be a bitul of the avoda, but he is required to put on tefillin prior to the avoda and continue wearing them while doing the avoda since there is no contradiction. One of the commentaries in the back (Rashash Toibish) answers based on the Ran in Succah 25a who says that one is exempt from a mitzvah while performing another mitzvah even if he can do both. However, it would seem that since one can put on tefillin prior to beginning the avoda at a time when he hasn't even begun the avoda, even the Ran would require him to do so.

Friday, January 13, 2012

Erchin 2b - Avoiding Mitzvos

The Gemara says that when a child reaches an age that he knows how to wrap himself in clothing, his father is obligated to purchase tzitzis for him. Tosafos points out that the nature of the mitzvah of tzitzis is not an absolute obligation and therefore the father is only obligated to purchase tzitzis for his child when the child has a four cornered garment. But the father is not obligated to purchase a four cornered garment for his child to train him in the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tosafos points out that although the gemara in Menachos 41a considers one who avoids or evades the mitzvah of tzitzis to be deserving of punishment, that is only in those days when they were accustomed to wear four cornered garments, therefore one who went out of their way to avoid it was clearly trying to evade a mitzvah. However, nowadays where most garments are made without having four corners, if one would neglect purchasing a garment that is obligated in tzitzis they aren't deserving of punishment. Tosafos seems to imply that in a time when it was normal to wear four cornered garments, not only should one not avoid the mitzvah for their own garments, they shouldn't even avoid the mitzvah for their child's garments.
The Shita Mi'kubetzes adds that although nowadays it isn't a punishable offense to avoid the mitzvah of tzitzis, it is still proper for one to purchase a four cornered garment to intentionally create an obligation on themselves of tzitzis. The source is from Moshe who yearned to enter Eretz Yisroel to fulfill mitzvos.

In the additions to my sefer Nasiach B'chukecha, I pointed out that there seem to be four levels of avoiding/obligating oneself in mitzvos that they aren't technically obligated in. See Below:

הגדרה בחיוב להכניס עצמו להיות חייב במצות ולפטור את עצמו ממצות:
לענ"ד נראה שיש ד' שלבים לגבי הא דאין לו לאדם לבקש תחבולות לפטור את עצמו מן המצות והחובה להכניס את עצמו לחיוב מצוה. מצינו ענין זה בד' מקומות בש"ס. א. בגמ' קדושין לג ע"א גבי מפני שיבה תקום, קאמר שיכול יעצים עיניו כמו שלא ראהו, וקפריך אטו ברשיעי עסקינן, ומפרש שיכול יעצים עיניו מקמי דלמטי זמן חיובא דכי מטא זמן חיובא הא לא חזי ליה דקאים מקמיה ת"ל תקום ויראת. ופרש"י דילפינן מהכא שיש לך לירא מן היוצר היודע מחשבותיך שאתה מבקש תחבולות להפטר ממצותו. וראיתי בספר דברות משה (קדושין הערה ל"א) שמפרש שזה חמור מהא דאמר מלאך לרבי קטינא דענשינן בעידן ריתחא, שהרי הכא ילפינן מקרא שלא מהני תחבולותיו לפטור את עצמו מן המצוה כלל, והוא מבטל המצוה בידים אלא שנפטר מדין אנוס שלא ידע שעבר מחמת עצימת עינים [ויותר מזה ראיתי בגור אריה (פרשת בהעלותך פרק ט' פסוק א') על פרש"י שם דלא פתח הפרשה בענין הקרבת הפסח משום שהיא גנותן של ישראל שלא הביאו קרבן פסח כל מ' שנה חוץ מזו. התוס' בקדושין לז ע"ב כתבו או שלא היו חייבים עד שנכנסו לארץ או שהיו חייבים אלא שפטורים משום שהיו ערלים, ומ"מ גנות הוא להם שנשארו במדבר מ' שנה מחמת חטא המרגלים. אבל המהר"ל כתב שם וז"ל ולפי דעתי אין צריך, שאף אם הוא פטור מן המצוה או מחמת אונסה או שפטרו, גנאי הוא לו, דסוף סוף לא עשו המצוה כמה שנים שהיו במדבר, שכל מי שהוא פטור מן המצוה מחמת שהוא אונס גנאי הוא לו שלא עשה המצוה, דלא אמרינן בבב"ק כח ע"ב אונס רחמנא פטריה רק לענין פטור מן העונש, אבל מ"מ גנאי הוא לו שלא עשה המצוה והיה לו זכות, וכאן לא היה להם זכות אותו המצוה עכ"ל. הרי סובר דגנאי הוא שלא לקיים מצוה אע"פ שהוא רק מחמת אונס, וכ"ש בנידון דידן שמכניס עצמו למצב כזה ובודאי לאו שפיר עביד שהוא מכניס עצמו למצב שיהיה גנאי לו במה שלא יקיים המצוה. עיין במשך חכמה (פרשת בא י"ג, י') שיש הבדל בין ביטול עשה באונס, לעבירת ל"ת באונס, דבל"ת אין העשיה נחשב לכלום וכאילו לא עשה, אבל בעשה אף כשהיה אנוס מ"מ לא מיחשב כמאן דעביד דסוף סוף לא עשה. ובזה מיישב קושיית התוס' בנדה סא ע"ב אמאי שייך לועג לרש בציצית ולא בכלאים, וכן אמאי קפדינן על בדיקת תפילין ומזוזה יותר מבדיקת ריאה, וכן אמאי קפדינן על שמירת המצה רק למצות לילה הראשונה]. אכן, מדברי הביה"ל (או"ח ס' קכ"ח ס"ב בד"ה או, וכן בס"ד בד"ה אינם) משמע שסובר דקרא ד"ויראת מאלקיך" כללא היא ושייך הכי בכל מקום שמבקש טצדקי לפטור את עצמו ממצות, ואינו דין מיוחד בקימה מפני שיבה, וגם אינו מיוחד למי שמכניס עצמו למצב של אונס. אלא שצ"ע דא"כ אמאי קאמר מלאכא דבעידן ריתחא ענשין, הא יש בזה ביטול מצות "ויראת מאלקיך" וזה חמורא יותר מהא דענשינן בעידן דריתחא, לכן נראה שדרכו של הדברו"מ מדוייק טפי. ב. בגיטין פא ע"א וכן בברכות לה ע"ב אמר רבב"ח אמר ריו"ח משום ר"י בר אילעי בא וראה שלא כדורות הראשונים דורות האחרונים, דורות הראשונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך טרקסמון כדי לחייבן במעשר, דורות האחרונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך גגות ודרך קרפיפות כדי לפוטרן מן המעשר. ונראה שגם זה חמור מהא דאמר מלאכא לרבי קטינא, שהרי הכא הם בקשו תחבולות שלא כדרך העולם כדי לפטור את עצמן מן המצות, ונתכוונו לכך שעיקר תכליתם הוא למפטר נפשייהו. ולא דמי לרב קטינא שמסתמא לא נתכוין לפטור את עצמו מן המצוה, רק שניכר לאינשי כן כדהעיר שם בדברו"מ. והנה, בגמ' מנחות סז ע"ב מדמה ענין זה להא דרבי אושעיא שמערים להכניס במוץ כדי להאכיל לבהמתו, וגם למי שאופה פחות מחמשת רבעים ועוד כדי לפטור את עצמו מן החלה. וכל החילוק בגמ' הוא אם גזרו משום בעלי כיסין שהיו מוכרים לעכו"ם ואמרו שאף בשל עכו"ם חייב בתרו"מ, וקאמר דבתרו"מ אע"פ שאפשר להערים להכניסו במוץ כדר"א או להכניסו דרך גגות וקרפיפות לא חששו שיעשה כן משום דהוא מילתא דפרהסיא וזילא ביה מילתא שיאמרו פלוני מערים לפטור את עצמו, ולכן לא נשאר רק עצה למכור לעכו"ם לכך גזרו אף בשל עכו"ם. משא"כ גבי הפרשת חלה שאפשר לאפות פחות מכשיעור בצנעא לא ימכרנו לעכו"ם ומש"ה לא גזרו. מ"מ משמע שבכל ענין שיעשה אפילו כשרק אופה פחות מכשיעור איכא איסורא במה שמערים לפטור את עצמו מן המצוה. ג. במנחות מא ע"א דמלאכא אשכחיה לרב קטינא שהיה לובש בגדים בקייטא ובסתוא שפטורים מציצית, וקאמר ליה קטינא קטינא, סדינא בקייטא וסרבלא בסיתוא, ציצית מה תהא עליה. ומפרש בגמ' דהכי קאמר ליה "טצדקי למפטר נפשך מציצית". ופרש"י וז"ל תבקש תחבולות לפטור עצמך מציצית עכ"ל. ומפרש בדברו"מ הנ"ל דעיקר החשש משום שנראה לאנשי שהיה מבקש תחבולות לפטור את עצמו מציצית דומיא דדורות האחרונים שהכניסו פירותיהן דרך גגות, אע"פ שבאמת זה לא היה כוונתו, ואעפ"כ ענשינן ע"ז בעידן דריתחא. ונלענ"ד שזה מדוייק מאוד בדברי המרדכי (ס' תתקמ"ה) הובא בב"י (או"ח ס' כ"ד) שכתב דמי שיש לו טלית בת ד' כנפות ומבקש עלילות ליפטר נענש, ומשמע מזה דכשאין לו טלית בת ד' כנפות אינו נענש שזה דומה לשלב הד' דמידת חסידות הוא להכניס עצמו למצב של חיוב. ועוד כתב המרדכי וז"ל ודוקא בימיהם שהיו רגילים ללבוש טליתות בת ד' כנפים אבל אנחנו אין דרכנו בבגדי ד' כנפים אפילו בעידן ריתחא לא מיענשי, ומיהא מצוה מן המובחר היא כדאמרינן לא נתאוה משה ליכנס לארץ משום פירותיה אלא כדי לקיים מצות התלויות בה, וה"ה בציצית שגדולה מאוד ומתן שכרה מרובה כדאמר ששקולה כנגד כל המצות. תוס' שאנ"ץ עכ"ל [גם הרא"ש במו"ק (פ"ג ס' פ') כתב כדברי המרדכי דרק כשהיו להם ד' כנפות שייך הא דנענשין מי שלא היתה לו, אבל בזמננו הא דיש לו לחזור אחר ציצית הוא רק מדין משה שביקש ליכנס לארץ לקיים מצות התלויות בה וכ"כ השטמ"ק בערכין ב ע"ב במה שהוסיף על התוס' ד"ה הכל]. ולפמש"כ האגרו"מ אתי שפיר דרב קטינא עצמו לא נתכוין לפטור את עצמו ממצות אלא שמאיזה טעם לא לבש בגד של ד' כנפות. לפיכך כל טענת המלאך לרבי קטינא הוא שניכר לאינשי שמבקש תחבולות לפטור עצמו ממצות ציצית, ולכך כתב המרדכי שזה שייך בזמן שבני אדם רגילין בבגד של ד' כנפות, ולא בזמן הזה [אכן, באמת נחלקו התוס' והמרדכי אם שייך הא דענשין בעידן דריתחא רק כשיש לו ואינו לובשה כמש"כ המרדכי מתחלה דקמיירי דוקא כשיש לו, ומשמע מזה דכשאין לו אף בעידן דריתחא לא ענשינן ליה במה שאינו מחפש אחריו לקנותו. אבל התוס' כתבו דרב קטינא לית ליה בגד המחוייב בציצית, ואעפ"כ קאמר מלאכא דענשינן בעידן דריתחא. עיין בביאורים של הגר"מ בנעט דלדעת המרדכי ניחא דרק שייך למ"ד חובת גברא דקמיירי כשיש לו מש"ה ענשינן בעידן דריתחא אבל אין כופין על קיום מצוה כיון דאינו מחוייב עד שעת לבישה. אבל למ"ד חובת טלית לא שייך הגדרה זו דאין כופין ואעפ"כ ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, דאי כשיש לו מחוייב ועומד וכפינן ליה, ואי כשאין לו הא לא ענשינן. אבל לדעת התוס' קמיירי בדלית ליה ורק משום דחובת גברא ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, אבל אי חובת טלית לא ענשינן כיון שאין החיוב מוטלת אקרקפתא דגברא לא נחשב מי שאין לו כמי שפוטר את עצמו מן המצוה. והשטמ"ק (אות ח') מפרש דלמ"ד חובת טלית נמי ענשינן בעידן דריתחא כשאין לו אלא דשמא היה לו בבית, מש"ה אילו הוי חובת טלית לא הו"ל להמלאך לטעון עליו במה שאינו לובשו]. ד. הבאתי בפנים מתוס' בפסחים קיג ע"ב שמי שאין לו בגד של ד' כנפות יש לו לחזור ולהביא עצמו לידי חיוב, כמו שעשה משה רבינו ע"ה כדאיתא בסוטה יד ע"א שביקש ליכנס לארץ כדי לקיים מצות התלויות בארץ. ונראה דהכא ליכא איסור כלל, שהרי אינו מבקש תחבולות לפטור את עצמו אלא הוא מדת חסידות להכניס עצמו למצב שיהא מחוייב בהמצוה כמו שעשה משרע"ה [וק"ק על האגרו"מ (או"ח ח"ד ס' ד') שהשוה דברי התוס' להא דמלאכא לרב קטינא, דלכאורה לא דק. אמנם באמת יש סתירה בדברי התוס' עצמם שהרי כתבו במנחות דקמיירי בדלית ליה ואעפ"כ ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, וא"כ אמאי כתבו בפסחים שהוא רק בגדר הא דמשה ביקש ליכנס לארץ. ואפשר דדעת התוס' דמי שעומד במצב שהוא פטור אלא שבידו להתחייב עצמו כמו שעשה משה, ולא הכניס את עצמו למצב של חיוב נמי ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, ובזה מיושב גם דברי האגרו"מ שהשוה התוס' בפסחים להא דענשינן בעידן דריתחא וצ"ע]. ויש לעיין בזה, דבשלמא קיום מצות התלויות בארץ שיש בהם תועלת גדולה, שייך חומרא כזה להביא את עצמו לידי חיוב, אבל במצות השמטת כספים או מצות שלוח הקן, או פדיון פטר חמור, או גירושין וכיוצ"ב יש לעיין אם שייך חומרא בזה להביא את עצמו לידי חיוב. ומסתברא שיש לחלק בין מצוה למצוה. ולפמש"כ בשם המרדכי נראה דדוקא במצות גדולות שייך מידת חסידות להכניס עצמו למצב של חיוב כמו מצות התלויות בארץ וכן ציצית ששקולה כנגד כל המצות, אבל בשאר מצות שאין מתן שכרן גלויה לנו, אף ממידת חסידות א"צ להכניס עצמו למצב של חיוב, וצ"ע בזה ואכמ"ל.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Bechoros 57b - Issur to use animals without ma'aser b'heima

The Mishna says that chazal established 3 time periods throughout the year when they required everyone to do the ma'aser b'ehima. The way they imposed this requirement was by considering all animals to be like tevel when the time comes until they separate ma'aser be'heima. When the time comes one is not allowed to eat or sell any of the animals just as they aren't allowed to use grains that are tevel until separating terumah and ma'aser. This is a Rabbinic institution of tevel, which implies that m'doraysa there is no prohibition. Rashi writes explicitly that on a Torah level there is no prohibition at all to use or eat animals before ma'aser b'heima has been separated. Rashi implies that on a Torah level the mitzvah of ma'aser be'heima doesn't impose any restrictions against using the animals.
This is very difficult because by using the animals prior to ma'aser be'heima one can essentially be causing a bitul to the entire mitzvah. Let's say one has only 10 animals or 100 animals - by using any of the animals they are causing a bitul of ma'aser be'heima. How can there be no Torah prohibition to use an animal or animals when it can very likely be causing a bitul of the mitzvah? Furthermore, even when there is no bitul mitzvah, it would seem logical to assume that since there is no time limit by which this mitzvah must get done (one cannot mix animals of two years but they aren't required to do ma'aser be'heima by the end of any given year), shouldn't the mitzvah inherently include an issur to use it until the mitzvah is performed? A similar discussion is raised in the context of using a keli without tevilas keilim. Since the Torah demands that one do tevilas keilim, it should be prohibited to use a keli without doing tevila m'd'oraysa. If not, then one can indefinitely push off this mitzvah without ever being in violation of it. The Biur Halahca (323:7) takes for granted the the prohibition to use a keli prior to immersion in a mikvah is only m'drabonon. It would seem more logical to me that this would be an issur d'oraysa because otherwise one can never be considered to have violated or been me'vatel this mitzvah. Even if we assume like the biur halacha that it is only an issur d'rabonon, here by ma'aser be'heima it is worse since the use of it will often cause a complete inability to do the mitzvah later such as in the case where he has a number divisible by 10 so that any animal used will cause a remainder of 9 on which one can't perform this mitzvah.
It seems to me that Rashi is troubled by this question and is therefore compelled to write - 
אבל קודם לכן מותר דמצוה בעלמא הוא לעשר בהמותיו, דהעשירי קודש מאחר שקרא עליו שם, הבל הרשות בידו לאוכלו בלא מעשר
Rashi understands that the mitzvah is not an obligatory mitzvah, just a מצוה בעלמא. It sounds like he is trying to say that this mitzvah isn't an absolute obligation that one is being me'vatel by using the animal, rather it is a mitzvah to do it but not a violation not to do it.

Wednesday, January 04, 2012

Bechoros 53a - Uprooting Ma'aser B'heima

The gemara says that although m'doraysa the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima applies outside of E.Y. and even without a Beis HaMikdash, the Rabbonon uprooted the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima. At first the gemara thought that they uprooted it because of a gezeira משום יתום, meaning an animal that is technically not chayev in ma'aser b'heima and would end up being put in the coral for ma'aser b'heima and may end up as a korban. The gemara asks that if that were the concern they should have been concerned even when there was a Beis HaMikdash - אי הכי מעיקרא נמי לא. Therefore the gemara concludes that they abolished the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima due to a gezeira of תקלה, meaning that people would have animals that have kedusha status sitting around and it would lead to using them in forbidden ways. When there was a Beis HaMikdash the ma'aser b'heima would quickly be brought as a korban so that this wasn't a concern, but post beis hamikdash it is a concern.
The Minchas Chinuch (287) explains this gemara by first establishing a concept. We know from the gemara in Yevamos 90 that chazal are empowered to abolish a positive mitzvah in the Torah if it would lead to a violation of some sort as they did with shofar and lulav on shabbos for concern that one would carry it. The achronim ask why didn't they abolish the mitzvah of shofar out of fear that one will make a musical instrument which certainly seems a more likely concern. They answer that a gezeira that one may make an instrument would apply equally to yom tov as it would to shabbos, therefore they would have to completely abolish the mitzvah of blowing shofar on Rosh Hashana. Although they have the power to abolish a mitzvah for a particular time period, they don't have the authority to do so permanently. Therefore, had they based themselves on a reason that applied to Yom Tov also, they couldn't abolish it even on shabbos. They had to find a reason that only applied to shabbos and not Yom Tov.
The gemara at first suggests that they abolished ma'aser b'heima due to the gezeira of a יתום, that one will bring animals that are technically exempt from ma'aser b'heima. However, this gezeira would apply equally with our without a beis ha'mikdash (actually the concern would even be greater when there was a beis hamikdash and one would end up bringing an animal as a korban that is exempt). The Rabbis couldn't make a gezeira that would eradicate entirely the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima. This is the gemara's question of אי הכי מעיקרא נמי לא. The gemara doesn't just mean to ask that they should have made the gezeira even when the Beis Hamikdash was standing, but rather the gemara means to say that since the gezeira should apply even when the Beis Hamikdash was standing and they couldn't limit their eradication of the mitzvah, they couldn't make this gezeira at all. They were powerless to make a gezeira that would eradicate the mitzvah under all circumstances. Therefore, the gemara is compelled to say that their motivation was תקלה which was a problem that only exists when there is no beis hamikdash but would disappear with the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash when people will once again have the ability to sacrifice the ma'aser b'heima as a korban.
A question that can still be asked is why weren't they gozer against doing ma'aser b'heima outside of E.Y. even when there was a beis hamikdash, since R. Akiva held that the animals from outside E.Y. couldn't be brought as a korban - the problem of תקלה should apply as much as when there was no beis hamikdash? Perhaps when there was a beis hamikdash people were more familiar with how to treat kodshim animals even outside of E.Y. and therefore the תקלה concern wasn't as much of a concern.

Tuesday, January 03, 2012

Bechoros 51b - Pidyon HaBen With the Intent of Receiving the Money Back

The gemara tells that R. Tarfon and R. Chanina would often return the money that he received for pidyon ha'ben (the gemara indicates that there is an advantage to this - קיים זה אף הלכה זו. Rabbeinu Gershom explains that the advantage is to publicize that the halacha allows for the money to be returned. This is similar to what the Rosh explains in Pesachim (Perek 1, 10) that there is an advantage to doing things that are not obviously permitted in order to educate people that it is indeed permitted). The gemara then tells of a situation where someone was hanging around R. Chanina after doing pidyon ha'ben and waiting to get his money back. R. Chanina realized that the person didn't give the money whole heartedly and only gave it because he expected it to come right back. R. Chanina told him that the pidyon ha'ben wasn't effective [Rashi has two versions as to whether it is not effective only if it is returned, or even if it isn't returned. Rabbeinu Gershom and Shulchan Aruch (305:8) assume like the first approach of rashi that so long as it isn't returned, the pidyon ha'ben will be effective. Perhaps after R. Chanina would tell him he can't return the money and the giver would accept that, he would be able to return it].
Tosafos asks that the gemara in Kiddushin says that if one would give pidyon ha'ben to the kohein as a gift with the intent of getting it back, it would be effective. This seems to contradict R. Chanina who held that since the person expected it back, it wouldn't be effective. Tosafos answers that had R. Chanina accepted the money with the intent to return it, as the giver had intended, it would be binding. But, since there is a halacha that a kohein isn't allowed to provide incentive to receive pidyon ha'ben (כהן המסייע בבית הגרנות), R. Chanina didn't receive the money with the intent of returning it. Had both the giver and receiver both intended that it should not be returned, or both intended that it should be returned, the pidyon ha'ben would be effective. The problem in the case of the gemara is that the giver intended to receive it back and the receiver received it without the intent of returning it back. Tosafos question seems to assume that the intent to receive it back should be no worse than the explicit condition to receive it back which is effective. 
However, the Gr"a (shulchan aruch 305) points out that according to the Rosh in Succah, Tosafos question doesn't even begin. The Rosh in Succah (3,30) explains that a מתנה על מנת להחזיר is a very specific and rigid agreement that requires a kinyan on the return end as well. It isn't merely an informal assumption that the money will be given back. Therefore, the case of R. Chanina doesn't meet the requirements of a מתנה על מנת להחזיר. When the giver intends to give it for only a short amount of time and then receive it back, it is like a מתנה לזמן, a gift with an expiration date which doesn't qualify as a matana at all and wouldn't work for pidyon ha'ben.