Gittin 80b - Dating Gittin based on Creation of World

The mishna and gemara require gittin to be dated by the malchus that it is written in. If not, R' Meir holds the gett is pasul and the child born from a second marriage is a mamzer. The Rabbonon argue on R' Meir - According to R' Yehuda in the name of Shmuel they say that if dated by the "santer" [ya'avetz points out that it is the same word as "senator"] then she is divorced b'dieved. According to R' Huna in the name of Rav, even with the date of another malchus, the child would at least be kasher. However, Tosafos asks, that all seem to agree that l'chatchila we must write the date based on that particular malchus, how can we date based on bri'as ha'olam?

Tosafos offers 3 approaches:

1. Rabbeinu Elchonon says that certainly chazal originally required mentioning the king. However, if the king was not mentioned but the santer was mentioned the gett can be used. If it was dated by another malchus the gett cannot be used but if she had a child from another marriage, he is not a mamzer. Based on this, writing from the creation of the world should be passul b'dieved, but things changed since even the non-jews are no longer careful about this. Therefore, even though it is a violation of the original takana, the takana no longer applies.

2. Rabbeinu Yosef suggests that the original takana of the gemara was only to write the date of the malchus in a situation where the malchus is makpid. The original takana is still in existence but includes a dispensation for anything that the malchus is not makpid about. It is not the takana that changes with passing generations, rather the level of kepeida of the malchus changes. Just as writing the santer is kasher because the malchus was not makpid, so too writing bri'as ha'olam nowadays kasher nowadays since the malchus isn't makpid. Maharam Shif points out that even R' Meir would agree since the entire takana even according to R' Meir may have been not to write something that the malchus is makpid on [just that R' Meir and Rabbonon argue whether writing the santer is something they are makpid on].

3. Rabbeinu Tam writes that according to the Rabbonon there was never a takana to write the date based on the malchus at all. R' yehuda in the name of Shmuel is saying that even if one were to write the date based on the santer which could cause animosity from the king, would be kasher l'chatchila. Certainly, writing bri'as ha'olam which will not cause animosity, will be kasher l'chatchila. Based on this, we pasken exactly like the gemara, nothing changed - the gemara was simply saying a chiddush that even if dated by the santer it would be kasher. Our minhag would therefore be based on the Rabbonon according to shmuel, but would not fit with R' Meir.

4. The Ran has another approach that the entire takana was against writing another malchus which would cause jelousy. But there was never a requirement to write the malchus that you are in, therefore if you write based on creation which is benign, it would be kasher even according to R' Meir. Rashi (80a d.h. mi'shum) clearly implies that the institution was to give prestige to the malchus that one resides in, not just a prohibition against writing another malchus, not like the Ran.

Gittin 77b - Giving a gett on shabbos

In sefer Atzei Besamim # 34 (from the rosh kollel in milwaukee - R' sederovic) he discusses a very interesting question. A man was being me'agen his wife for many years by refusing to give a gett. They managed to convince him to give her a gett over a shabbos that he was in town, but by the time shabbos would be over he would be gone. Is it permitted to set up the sofer, eidim and shliach on shabbos, to write sign and deliver the gett after shabbos, or is the set up also assur?

The first question is would one be able to give a gett on shabbos in this circumstance. The gemara permits someone who is dying to be makneh the gett to his wife with a kinyan chatzar (or agav - see rashi), but not to move the gett. The Rosh explains that it is possible that if need be chazal would be matir the issur to move the gett (muktzah) also, just that they prefer to be matir the issur of making an acquisition on the chatzer [The Rosh explains that we already find that they were matir kinyan for a sh'chiv meirah in baba basra 156b, so they would rather be matir something that they were already matir elsewhere. The Ran explains that it is less recognizable that she is doing a kinyan than it would be to move the gett, so they prefer to be matir the issur kinyan. The korban nesanel (3) suggests that they prefer to be matir an issur that will be simultaneous with the gett going into effect]. However, aside from the issur kinyan on the chatzer and the moving of the gett, there is also an issur to divorce on shabbos. Tosafos and Rosh say that they were also matir this issur for a sh'chiv mei'rah. Why? Tosafos here says that it is to prevent her from falling to the yaveim. But, in Baba Basra the gemara says that it is to prevent the sh'chiv meira from tiruf da'as and causing his death [that is why they were matir kinyan on shabbos. The Rosh here and Tosafos there both connect the heter in our sugya to that sugya]. The sefer atzei b'samim makes a very good point. If the heter is based on igun, it should apply in our case as well. But if the heter is based on tiruf da'as of the sh'chiv mei'ra, that is not applicable here.

But it seems to me that the entire issur geirushin is not applicable in this case. The sefer Atzei Besamim suggests that whether the issur geirushin on shabbos would include setting up the sofer/eidim/shliach depends on somewhat of a discrepancy in Beitzah 36b between the simple reading of the gemara and tosafos whether the problem of divorcing on shabbos is because of leading to writing or making a kinyan. He suggests that kinyan would not apply to setting up the sofer, eidim and shliach, but he assumes that the issur of coming to write would apply. It seems to me that even if chazal were normally concerned by kiddushin, gittin and other business transactions that you will come to write, they were only gozer on the ma'aseh of kiddushin/gittin.... but not on the preliminary set up. The setting up of the sofer/eidim/shliach is at most a problem of making a shliach on shabbos [tosafos 22b holds that the sofer and eidim aren't even shluchim, it is only a din of l'ishma that they must be appointed]. It is clear from the Rosh that there wouldn't be any problem with setting up a shliach on shabbos [from the fact that he rejects the rashbam who holds that the concern was to avoid carrying in the reshus harabim, by saying that he can simply appoint a shliach to go to the place where the gett is and give it to her]. Therefore, even if normally the gezeira against marriage and divorce is that it would lead to writing, they were only gozer on the actual ma'aseh of marriage and divorce, but not on the preliminary set up which is no more than appointing shluchim.

Gittin 76b - Remarrying before conditional time expires

The gemara asks regarding a gett that was given to be effective from now on the condition that he does not return for 12 months, and he dies within 12 months; in the presence of a yaveim, can she remarry someone else within the 12 months since the condition will definitely be met making the gett effective retroactively or must she wait until the 12 months expires. The gemara does not explain what the rationale would be to wait until the 12 months expires. Tosafos suggests that m'doraysa she can certainly remarry immediately upon his death, but m'drabonon we are afraid that people will not hear that he died and think that she is permitted to remarry relying on a gett with a pending condition. The Ran suggests that we are concerned that although he said that gett should be effective from now retroactively, he was certainly not expecting to die and therefore he may have only really wanted the gett to be effective after 12 months (immediately before his death). Based on the Ran, the Beis Shmuel (144:5) points out that it would possibly be a d'oraysa violation to remarry with in the 12 months. The Ramban has another approach, that chalitza is necessary until the condition has been actually met - it is not sufficient to just know for sure that it will be met.

The Poras Yosef quotes a fouth apporach from the yerushalmi. Although he meant the gett should be effective retroactively from today, it will only be effective if he truly does not return. We have to be choshesh for techiyas hameisim, and that he will return. Therefore, it is like any other condition that is pending where we cannot permit her until the condition is fulfilled out of fear that it won't be fulfilled. The korban ha'eida asks, if so, how can a widow ever remarry, we should be concerned that her husband will return. To this the Poras Yosef answers, that by all other women, the death of their husband is matir them. Even if they were to return through a miracle, they are no longer married to their wives. But here where he stipulated "if i don't return for 12 months", and he returns within 12 months after having techiyas hameisim, the gett will not be effective and she will be a widow who is zekuka to the yaveim.

This brings up another issue in understanding how the death of the husband is matir the issur of eishes ish. The gemara in kiddushin 13 searches for a source that the death of the husband is matir the wife. Ultimately the gemara learns it out from a hekesh to divorce. But what aspect of the death is matir her? Is it the act of dying which serves as a matir or is it that she no longer has a husband? The nafka mina would be in a situation where the time of death cannot serve as the matir but the person is dead and will never return. R' Elchonon (kovetz shiurim 2:28) quotes a machlokes between the Ramah and beis yosef (y.d. 267) when a ger dies and leaves behind slaves who are ketanim and cannot be koneh themselves through his death - Ramah holds that these slaves are stuck, since they don't go free with the death of the owner, they can never be freed. Beis Yosef argues because he understands that the nature of death serving as a matir is not an act, rather a continuous status of not having the owner alive. Now, if we understand that the heter of misas hab'al for an eishes ish is an act of dying (like Ramah) then the Poras Yosef is correct in his distinction between a regular almana and our case of condition. But if we understand that death is a continuous state of being where she doesn't have a husband, not a one time act that is matir her for ever, then if we are concerned for techiyas hameisim, we should never be matir a widow to remarry.

Gittin 75b - T'nai and Ma'aseh in the same object

The gemara says that one who would give a gett on condition that the gett be returned is a violation of the condition and action being in the same object i.e. the gett itself. Tosafos explains this issue that it is not just a technical condition in stipulation. The problem is that the condition to retain the gett is an inherent contradiction with the action of giving her the gett. Since the gett is only effective after the condition is fulfilled and at that point the gett is already back in his hands, it is impossible for the gett to be effective. But in a case where there is no contradiction between the action and the condition, the condition is allowed to be in the same object as the ma'aseh. The Beis Shmuel (E.H. 38:7) points out that the Rosh in Baba Basra disagrees with Tosafos. The Rosh asks on the case of giving an esrog to someone al m'nas - on the condition, that it be returned is a violation of t'nai u'ma'aseh b'davar ehcad. The language of "al m'nas" implies that the condition will make the action go into effect retroactively at the time that it was received, the condition does not in anyway interfere or contradict the action, yet the Rosh maintains that this would still be a violation of t'nai u'ma'aseh b'davar echad. It seems that the Rosh and Tosafos argue whether the concept of "t'nai u'ma'aseh b'davar echad" is a technicality in rules of tenaim like t'nai kaful, and t'nai kodem l'ma'aseh, or is is a practical consideration that the condition can't contradict the ma'aseh.

The B'nei Ahuva (from R' Yonasan Eibshitz Ishus 6:2) mentioned by R' akiva eiger (C.M. 241:6) asks on Rabbeinu Yerucham who seems to pasken that by a gett that is given on the condition to return the paper it is written on, is a violation of t'nai u'ma'aseh b'davar echad, so the condition is void and the gett is effective. Yet, when one gives an esrog on the condition that it be returned, the condition is binding and the receiver will only fulfill the mitzvah if the condition is met. Why is there a difference? R' Yonasan Eibshitz explains that really he holds like the Rosh that there is a violation of t'nai u'ma'aseh b'davar echad, even when there is no contradiction (since we pasken that al m'nas is k'meiachshav, so there won't be a contradiction). However, when one stipulates that the esrog must be returned the condition does not have to be fulfilled with the same esrog, rather the receiver can return a different esrog so long as it is just as good. But by the gett where the husband clearly is trying to cause anguish by demanding the paper back, the condition cannot be fulfilled with anything other than the paper the gett was written on and is therefore a problem of t'nai u'ma'aseh b'davar echad.

The rationale of R' Yonasan Eibshitz that when one borrows an esrog on condition to return it, can return another esrog, is based on the Rosh (3rd perek of Succha) who says that the original owner wants an esrog to be yotzei with (therefore returning money would not be sufficient). Therefore it should not matter whether it is the same esrog or another one that is just as nice that he can use to be yotzei with.

Gittin 74b - Giving against the receivers will

The gemara has 2 versions of Rava whether when one gives against the receiver's will, but in his presence, whether that qualifies as having been given (when not in the receiver's presence all agree that it does not qualify as giving). Tosafos qualifies the opinion that considers giving against the receiver's will not to be considered giving - this only applies when it is detrimental to the receiver to get the money because he will have to give something in return, but if the receiver will not loose anything then it would be considered giving provided that the money is owed. But if the money is a gift, all would agree that one cannot force someone else to receive a gift against his will. In short, all agree that a gift cannot be given against the receiver's will. All agree that when the money is owed and the receiver has nothing to loose by receiving it, it is considered giving even against his will. They argue only in a situation where the money is owed, but the receiver has something to loose.

The Beis Yosef has a discussion what the definition of "giving against his will" is. Does it mean that you can force him to physically receive the money (by forcing the money into his hand) or is it sufficient to simply give it without him receiving at all? The Taz (E.H. 143:9) proves that the opinion who considers giving against his will to be considered giving, will hold that you can simply throw it down in front of him, and there is no requirement that he receive it at all. Tosafos asks that according to the opinion that giving against his will does not qualify as giving, why should the purchaser of a house in a walled city have to hide to avoid the seller redeeming his house; he should simply refuse to receive the money? From the fact that Tosafos doesn't ask this question even in the opinion that giving against his will qualifies as giving, implies that according to that opinion the refusal to receive the money would not help because he can just throw it down in front of him, therefore the buyer had to hide.

The gemara earlier had a discussion where he make a condition with her that it would only be a gett if she would give him a specific garment. We pasken like the Rabbonon that money cannot be given instead. The Rosh holds that this is only if the husband insists on the garment, but if he agrees to accept money all agree that the condition can be met by paying money. The Beis Shmuel (143:10) points out that based on this, the entire machlokes Rashbag and Chachamim would only be when he demands the garment and does not agree to accept money in it's place.The Rabbonon would say that since a garment was stipulated, he cannot be forced to accept money in lieu of the garment. The B"S points out that this doesn't relate to the argument of giving against his will, because even if normally he can be forced to accept the money against his will, however, when the garment was specifically stipulated he can insist on receiving the garment itself. However, the B"S points out that we should be able to point out from here that normally giving against his will qualifies as giving, since the only reason he cannot be forced to accept the money is because the garment was stipulated, but otherwise he can be forced to accept the money?

Gittin 70b - Shoteh between writing and giving

Tosafos seems to say that we have to make sure that a person dying who is giving a gett to his wife does not loose his cognitive abilities in between the writing and the giving since that would invalidate the gett. The Maharsha asks that he doesn't know where Tosafos gets this from. Although he must retain his mental state for the writing and during the shlichus of giving it to her, why should he have to be in a good mental state in between the two? The Beis Yosef agrees with the question of the Maharsha and therefore stretches Tosafos to be saying that he must be in a good mental state during the time of the giving of the gett. One may have thought that the fact that he improves after the giving the gett would indicate that he was in a good mental state when it was in fact given, to which Tosafos says that we cannot rely on that assumption. Based on this the Beis Yosef holds l'halacha that he does not have to retain a good mental state between the writing and giving. Beis Shmuel (121:5) suggest l'chatchila being machmir for Tosafos, but me'ikar hadin agrees with the beis yosef.

The Rashash justifies the simple reading of Tosafos that he must remain mentally stable from the writing thru the giving. The rashash compares this to dichuy by mitzvos where we have a discussion whether if something is pushed off whether it can become fit once again. However, the rashash doesn't directly address the question of the Beis Yosef, that the Mishna implies that kurdaykos i.e. bad mental state, doesn't ruin his original command to write the gett, certainly it should not ruin a gett which has been written. The Taz (121:4) takes the same approach as the rashash, reading Tosafos as it implies, not like the Beis Yosef, and therefore requires his mental stability in between the writing and giving. He responds to the question of the Beis Yosef by saying that if someone had only commanded to give a gett the shlichus begins only when the sofer begins to write, so if he would loose his mental abilities before the writing begins and then become cured, it would not invalidate the shlichus. But in our case where the gett is already completed and ready to be given, if he would loose his mental abilities so that it could not be given at that moment, the gett is invalid at that time and cannot be fixed by restoring his mental ability.

Gittin 68a - Aveni Eifod and the Shamir Worm

The gemara implies that the shamir worm was needed for the avnei eifod to carve out the name of the shevatim, as rashi explains based on sotah. Tosafos proves that the shamir must have existed in the time of the bayis sheini becasue in the story with dama ben nesina they needed the eifod stones, and that story took place in the second tempe era [from the fact that they had a para aduma]. The eifod stones would be useless without the shamir, since there was no other way to carve on the stones, which implies that they had access to the shamir in the second beis hamikdash. Although Shlomo had a hard time accessing the shamir, Tosafos assumes that they kept it from the time of Shlomo through the destruction of the bayis sheini.

The Ramban in Chumash in Parshas Teruma (cited by rashash) says that only the avnei choshen needed a shamir because it says "במלואתם", but the avnei eifod to not need a shamir [and the gemara which says avnei eifod is not precise] and can be scratched with a knife. Based on this, we no longer are able to prove from the story of dama ben nesina that there was a shamir in the second beis hamikdash, since the stones they needed were not choshen stoner, just eifod stones. Based on this, the Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 95) suggests that there is a machlokes in sotah 48b if the shamir was needed for the stones of the beis hamikdash. Although the gemara implies that we pasken like R' Yehuda that we need the shamir for the beis hamikdash stones, the Rambam paskens like R' Nechemia that the shamir wasn't needed [rather they used knives to cut the stones outside of the har habayis area]. The Minchas Chinuch is bothered by what compels the Rambam to pasken like R' Nechemia that they didn't need a shamir. He suggests that the Rambam held like the Ramban and therefore there is not gemara compelling that the shamir existed in the second beis hamikdash. Since they were able to build the second beis hamikdash even in the absence of a shamir, it must be that we pasken like R' Nechemia that the stones could be cut with metal knives so long as it is outside the area of the mikdash.

Gittin 66b - Words given to a shliach - 'mili mimsaran l'shliach'

The Maharit (1:127) has a discussion whether one can make a shliach to be makdish something, because the hekdesh is achieved through speech and should be a problem of mili lo mimsaran l'shliach. The Nodeh B'yehuda (tinyana, Y.D. 147 - written by his son) writes that the issue of the maharit seems completely unconnected with the concept of mili lo mimsaran l'shliach (mlm"l). The concept of mlm"l means that a shliach who is told to do something with words such as told to write a gett, cannot give over that shlichus to a second shliach because all he is giving over to the second shliach is the command to write the gett [nothing but words]. This is apparent from Rashi on 66b and from Rashi on 29a d.h. rava - שלא מסר להם אלא דברים ואין בדברים כח להיות חוזרים ונמסרים לאחר

But one is perfectly able to set up a shliach to do something that only involves speech such as be makdish something for him, and this in no way violates mlm"l. The issue would only be when Reuven would appoint Shimon a shliach to be makdish something for him, whether shimon can now go and appoint levi to do it - based on mlm"l shimon doesn't have the ability to give over mere words to a second shliach.

However, R' Shlomo Vilna points out that Rashi on 71b seems to hold that any shliach who is appointed to just do says words to someone. Based on this rashi it would be plausible that one cannot set up a shliach to be makdish something because of mlm"l. To deal with the contradiction in Rashi to explain the nature of mlm"l, R' Shlomo Vilna suggests that it depends whether we are allowing "omer imru" - meaning whether reuven telling shimon to tell levi would work. According to the approach of mlm"l, but omer imru would work, it must be that words can in fact be given over to the first shliach, just that the first shliach is unable to appoint a second shliach (as rashi says on 29a and 66b). But according to the approach that "omer imru" doesn't work either, it is possible that the problem is that a shliach can only be appointed to do an action but can never be appointed to just say something.

The Nodeh b'yehuda asks 2 questions on the maharit, who doesn't allow a shliach to be makdish something. 1. It is omer imru, and even though all hold mlm"l, some to hold that omer imru works. 2. The maharit understands that mlm"l means one cannot appoint a shliach to say something, which is against Rashi on 29a and 66b. Based on R' Shlomo Vilna that the definition of mlm"l is completely dependent on whether we accept omer imru, and if we would accept omer imru then the maharit's understanding is correct - both questions of the nodeh b'yehuda are really one - since some pasken omer imru therefore one should be able to be makdish through a shliach (but if we would pasken that omer imru doesn't work, then being makdish through a shliach would in fact be a violation of mlm"l).

Gittin 63b - Shliach Must Return To Say He Fulfilled His Shlichus

The gemara says that if a husband would make a shliach to bring a gett to his wife (shliach l'holacha), and then the wife would turn him into her shliach to receive the gett (shliach l'kabala), the gett is not valid because the shliach is not able to return to tell the husband he did the shlichus. What does this mean? Rashi explains that the basis for this concept is:

שליח שחזר ונעשה שליח למי שנשתלח לו ניתק משליחות הראשון עד שלא היה לו שהות לחזור אצל שולחו ולומר עשיתי שליחותך

Both the Taz and Avnei Miluim (E.H. 141) explain that by becoming a shliach l'kabala he looses his status of shliach l'holacha, and therefore there is no time between being his shliach and her shliach to report back to the husband that he did the shlichus. Based on Rashi, the shliach who accepts status of shliach l'kabala, will loose his prior status of shliach l'holacha, and therefore even if he decides to hand the gett into her hand, she will not be divorces - since he is no longer a shliach l'holacha. However, the Rambam clearly writes that under these circumstances she is not divorced by the shliach becoming her shliach l'kabala, but as soon as the gett would be given in her hands she would be divorced since the shliach would retain his original status of shliach l'holacha. In short, Rashi and Rambam argue whether the issue of the shliach not being able to report back prevents him from becoming her shliach l'kabala but he retains status of his shliach l'holacha (Rambam) or does the acceptance of becoming her shliach l'kabala make him loose status of shliach l'holacha so that even if he would decide afterwards to give the gett into her hands she would not be divorced (Rashi).

Gittin 62a - Shalom Aleichem to Goyim

The Mishna 61a says that chazal were matir to give shalom to goyim because of darkei shalom. Rashi explains that the reason it should be prohibited m'ikar hadin (if not for darkei shalom) is because shalom is a name of Hashem and there is only a heter to use it in giving shalom to another jew. However, the gemara 62a asks: "if one is allowed to give words of encouragement to a goy who is working, he should surely be allowed to give shalom". The gemara proceeds to say that the argument for prohibiting it is specifically during their holiday where it is likely to cause them to thank their idols for the Jew showing them respect. Based on Rashi in the mishna there is a very significant chiddush in being able to give them shalom, in that one is entitled to use the name of Hashem. If so, what is the question of the gemara? The Rashash is bothered by this question and says that even when one gave words of encouragement to continue working, the name of Hashem was invoked. Therefore, the gemara asks that since the name of Hashem was invoked for that purpose, it can certainly be used to give Shalom.

The gemara says that Rav Kahana gave shalom to a goy by saying "Shalom to Mar". Rashi explains that he didn't intend to refer to the goy, but rather to his Rebbi. Tosafos doesn't understand what would compel rashi to say such a thing since we only find a prohibition in repeating shalom, but for saying it only once we don't need a heter of darkei shalom [Tosafos also asks that it seems to be a geneivas da'as of the goy]. Tosafos seems to imply that there is some inherent prohibition to repeat shalom, and is not clear why. Rashi however explains that the problem with repeating Shalom is predicated on the problem with saying it in the first place, in that it is using the name of Hashem. Therefore rashi explains that although the heter of darkei shalom would permit saying it once, it would not permit repeating it. We can now understand why Rashi l'shitaso is compelled to say that R' Kahana would have intent for his rebbi when giving shalom, because rashi is trying to explain how R' Kahana avoided the prohibition of using Hashem's name for a goy [and apparently didn't want to invoke the leniency of darkei shalom, whereas R' Chisda who would give them Shalom was willing to rely on the darkei shalom heter (the Ran adds that the chiddush of R' chisda is that he jumped at the opportunity to say shalom first based on the darkei shalom heter, because if he waited for them to say shalom first the expectation would be to repeat it twice so he tried to think ahead to avoid that)]. Perhaps rashi would hold that the issue of geneivas da'as would also not apply since he truly did intend to greet the goy, but the for the use of the name of Hashem he had to intend to give the bracha of Shalom to his rebbi.

Gittin 61a - לפני עור ומסייע ידי עוברי עבירה

בסוגיא דמשאלת אשה לחברתה נפה וכברה בגיטין סא ע"א, אציע הכללים המוסכמים מסוגיית הש"ס. לכאורה לא שייך כאן האיסור לפני עור מדאורייתא דהוי כחד עברא דנהרא, ומש"ה לא הזכיר רש"י רק הדין מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה. נמצא שכל האיסור שאנו דנין בה הוא רק מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה וכמש"כ התוס' והרא"ש ריש שבת, שאסור מדרבנן מידי דהוי אקטן אוכל נבילות שב"ד מצווין להפרישו, וכ"ש שלא לסייע אותו בידים. לפיכך באשה החשודה על השביעית וכן בטומאת חלה שאיסורי דאורייתא הם, אסור לסייע החשודה להיות בוררת וטוחנת מפני שמסייע בידים בשעת מעשה ואסור מדרבנן משום מסייע. אלא שבמשנה מתיר ב' דברים משום דרכי שלום: א. לסייע החשודה בידים בדבר שכל איסורו הוא רק מדרבנן כמו להיות טוחנת עמה בדמאי, או בטומאת חולין. ב. לסייע שלא בשעת עבירה אף בדבר שאסור מדאורייתא כמו להשאיל לחשודה על השביעית נפה וכברה. אכן, ב' התרים הללו מבואר במתניתין שהתירו רק משום דרכי שלום, אבל מעיקר הדין וכן במקום דלא שייך דרכי שלום אין להתיר אפילו בדבר שאיסורו מדרבנן, ואפילו כשאינו מסייע בשעת מעשה עבירה. נמצינו למדים שהאיסור לסייע ידי עוברי עבירה אסור בין באיסור דאורייתא בין באיסור דרבנן, בין בשעת עבירה בין שלא בשעת עבירה

והנה, הש"ך (יו"ד ס' קנ"א ס"ק ו') מחדש דכיון שכל האיסור מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה הוא רק משום שחייב להפרישו, בישראל מומר ליכא איסור מסייע. וביאר הדגמ"ר שם דאין חילוק בין מומר לשאינו מומר, שהרי אפילו מומר חייב במצות ומצווה להפרישו [ויש שחולקים על הדגמ"ר בהבנת הש"ך, ואכ"מ להאריך]. אלא החילוק הוא בין שעושה במזיד דשרי ובין שעושה רק בשוגג דאסור, וטעמא דמילתא משום דמקור האיסור הוא מהא דקטן אוכל נבילות שמצווה להפרישו [כלומר דאף למ"ד שאין מצווה להפרישו, בגדול כה"ג כו"ע מודו דמצווה להפרישו], וכמו דקטן אוכל נבילות הוי כשוגג, ה"ה בכל שוגג חייב להפרישו, אבל העובר במזיד אין ללמוד משם ככלל, וממילא אינו מצווה להפרישו. באגרו"מ (יו"ד ח"א ס' ע"ב) כתב שיש לסמוך על דברי הש"ך מעיקר הדין, והביא ראיה מהגמ' בב"ק סט דאין מחוייבין להפריש הגנב מאיסור גניבה במה שמציין שהפירות של ערלה, כיון שהוא עובר במזיד, וקאמר ר"ש בן גמליאל דכמו שאין מחוייב להפרישו מאיסור גזל שהוא עושה במזיד כמש"כ הש"ך, ה"ה דאינו מחוייב להפרישו מהאיסור ערלה שיעשה במה שיאכל מגזילתו. ואע"פ שבסוף התשובה (ד"ה ובדבר) כתב שיש להחמיר לדברי המג"א (ס' שמ"ז ס"ק ד') שחולק על הש"ך ואוסר לסייע אף כשעושה במזיד (עיין גם בשעה"צ שם), מ"מ מעיקר הדין סובר האגרו"מ כהש"ך. עוד חידש באגרו"מ שם דאף המג"א שאוסר, הוא רק בנותן לו דבר שיעשה בו רק מעשה עבירה אבל בדבר שהעיקר הוא למעשה היתר כגון כלי סעודה, לא שייך בזה איסור מסייע. וראייתו ממנהג העולם שאין אנו מקפידין מלמכור למחללי שבת ולאוכלי טרפות קדרות וכלי בישול, וע"כ הטעם משום דאף שידוע שיבשלו בשבת ויבשלו בשר בחלב מ"מ "כיון דעיקר הדבר אינו לאיסורין לא אסרו בזה משום מסייע כשליכא איסור לפני עור". ורצה להוסיף דאף במקום דהוי כתרי עברי דנהרא דשייך לפני עור דאורייתא, אינו ברור לאסור בכה"ג עיי"ש ראייתו ממשנה שביעית

והשתא, לכאורה כל הסוגיא שלנו סותר את דברי הש"ך וגם סותר החידוש של האגרו"מ. שהרי בסוגיא דידן אי לאו משום דרכי שלום, משמע שאסור להשאיל נפה וכברה וריחים ותנור לאשה החשודה. והא אשה החשודה ודאי חשודה היא לעבור על האיסור במזיד, שבשוגג לא מקרי "חשודה". ובפרט לפמש"כ התוס' בד"ה משאלת, בשם ר"ת, דקמיירי כשידוע שפירותיה של שביעית שודאי חשודה לעבור במזיד, ואעפ"כ אי לאו משום דרכי שלום הוי אסרינן לסייע אותה בעבירה. הרי משמע מהסוגיא נגד הש"ך. גם יש להקשות על החידוש של האגרו"מ שכתב שאף המג"א מסכים להתיר בדבר שהעיקר הוא למעשה היתר, והא נפה וכברה וכיוצ"ב ודאי הם בעיקר למעשה היתר ואעפ"כ אוסר אי לאו משום דרכי שלום. ודוחק גדול לומר שכל התירו של הש"ך שייך רק במקום דאיכא משום דרכי שלום דהו"ל לפרש דבריו - וצלע"ג

Gittin 61a - Burying a Jew near a Goy

The gemara says that we bury non-jews as well for darkei shalom. But rashi points out that we don't bury gentiles in jewish cemeteries. The Ran explains that the source for this din is that we don't bury a rasha next to a tzadik. Based on this, would it be permitted to bury a Jew who is a rasha in a non-jewish cemetery? R' Moshe (Igros Moshe Y.D. 3:146) elaborates about this issue. He assumes that the issur of burying a tzadik next to a rasha will only last for a limited amount of time. The gemara (Sanhedrin 46a) allows one to bury a rasha who was killed by beis din, in the kever of his fathers after their is "ichul basar" i.e. he begins to decompose, since that will serve as an atonement and he will achieve the status of a tzadik. R' Moshe is not convinced that reshaim who die a natural death would achieve atonement so quickly, but assumes that after 12 months, even they will achieve the status of a tzadik. Therefore, after 12 months has passed, the rasha can be buried next to a tzadik. Furthermore, based on the fact that the halacha fails to mention that after the 12 months pass we are not required to seperate the rasha from the tzadik who were buried together, implies that the entire halacha is only l'chatchila. Meaning, l'chatchila a rasha and tzadik can't be buried together, but if it is done we do not have to move them, even within the 12 months.

Regarding a gentile however, R' Moshe explains that the Ran doesn't mean to suggest that a jew is assumed to be a tzadik and a gentile a rasha, because based on that rationale it should be permitted to bury a jew next to a goy who kept the 7 mitzvos (and we don't find this distinction). Rather, the Ran meant to say that the kedushas yisroel of the jew will always give the him an advantage, just as the tzadik has the advantage over the rasha. Being that it is not based on merit, rather on kedushas yisroel, the time passing doesn't matter and even after 12 months they cannot be buried together. Therefore, it is plausible that just as we are machmir even after 12 months, we are also machmir b'dieved, and even after they are buried together they have to be separated.

R' Moshe does provide a leniency that so long as there is a 10 tefach fence around the grave of the jew, he is not considered to be in a non-jewish cemetery.

Gittin 60a - Eis La'asos L'hashem

Simply speaking the heter to write down torah sh'bal peh, even though it is a violation of "These you should write", as the gemara says on 60b, is "eis l'asos..." meaning that we violate the Torah in order to preserve it. However, the maharsha points out that the concept of "hefeiru tora'secha", is not just a violation of the Torah but rather a rejection of the whole concept in why we are not allowed to write it down in the first place. The maharsha explains that the reason why Torah Sh'bal Peh must remain Ba'al Peh is that it is impossible to incorporate the entire Torah in writing, therefore the writing of it places a limitation on the Torah which does not exist. Therefore in the earlier generations it was forbidden to write down the oral torah, so that they can use their time more efficiently in reviewing the Torah. However, when people became unable to grasp the entire Torah orally, and began to forget, it was necessary to put it into writing to preserve it. This was not just at the expense of the violation of the prohibition against writing it, but rather, as the maharsha writes: שיהיו המצות סדורים לו בכתיבה אע"פ שעל ידי זה הפרו תורתך, שלא יחזור על משנתו ותלמודו תמיד כי יסמוך על הכתיבה

Meaning the decision to write down the oral Torah was considered destructive to the continuity of Torah, since it would be impossible to fully master. Nevertheless, the decission was made to forfeit the sections that could not be incorporated into writing that would be lost, to preserve the section that could be incorporated into writing that would now be mastered. "Hefeiru Torasecha" wasn't just a violation of an issur, it was to literally push away a section of Torah b'ydayim that would be lost forever. This explains why the pesak was so controversial.

Gittin 55a - Korban Gezula and Tikun Ha'olam

I think that my peshat in this was wrong so i just changed it: 4:40pm Eastern

בגמ' אמר עולא דמה"ת חטאת גזולה אינה מכפרת משום דיאוש כדי לא קני, אלא שתקנו חכמים מחמת תיקון העולם דהיינו שיהיו הכהנים עצובין במה שאכלו חולין בעזרה (כדפרש"י, שהוא גנאי יותר ממה ששחטו חולין בעזרה כמש"כ הרש"ש. עוד אפשר דהרבה כהנים אוכלים ורק כהן אחד שחט וזרק וזה לא יגרום ביטול מזבח), דכשלא נודעה מכפרת. אלא דהקשה רש"י כיון דמדאורייתא אינה מכפרת וחייב להביא חטאת אחרת, היאך עקרו רבנן חיובא דחטאת המוטלת עליו. ותירץ דיש כח בידם לעקור בשב וא"ת (וכ"כ התוס' רי"ד). אמנם הרשב"א הקשה ע"ז דמלבד הא דפטרו אותו מלהביא חטאת אחר, הא הכשירו קרבנו והתירו הכהנים לאכלו, וזה מקרי עקירת דבר בקום ועשה. לכך העלה דעיקר הטעם משום הפקר ב"ד העמידו אותו ברשותו. ובאמת כך פרש"י בעצמו בע"ב גבי הא דאוקמוה רבנן ברשותיה אף להקדישו משום "הפקר ב"ד הפקר". ויש לתמוה על רש"י דמאחר שהוצרך הטעם דהפקר ב"ד, למה הוצרך לומר דבשב וא"ת עקרו דין תורה, הא לא צריך לזה

ואפשר לומר דבעמוד א' עדיין לא נחית רש"י לטעם דהפקר ב"ד, שהרי לא ניחא ליה בזה, דאינו פשוט כ"כ שע"י הפקר ב"ד אפשר להעמידו ברשות הגזלן, דלא מהני הפקר ב"ד אלא להפקיע רשות הנגזל, והיאך אוקמוה ברשותיה (עיין ברשב"א לעיל לו ע"ב דפליגי אמוראי בזה). לכך לא רצה רש"י בעמוד א' לפרש שהטעם משום הפקר ב"ד, אלא דלגבי הא דפטרו אותו מחטאת היינו משום שעקרו דבר תורה בשב וא"ת. ולגבי הא דהתירו הכהנים לאכלו, נראה לפרש בהקדמת דיוק מהגמ'. שהרי משמע שהיו הכהנים עוברים על איסור חולין בעזרה וגם על איסור לאכול מחולין בעזרה שהוא קדשים פסולים, ואעפ"כ לא תקנו חכמים מידי כדי שלא יעברו הכהנים על עבירות הללו. אלא שהכהנים שהיו עוברים על עבירות הללו עצבים היו, וממילא גרמו לביטול מזבח מפני שהיו יראים להביא קרבנות שמא יארע עוד תקלה כזה, משום ביטול מזבח עמדו חכמים ותקנו תקנתם. לפיכך לגבי הא דפטרו אותו מחטאת הוצרך רש"י להביא מסוגיא דיבמות שיש כח לעקור דבר מן התורה, אבל הכא לא היו צריכים לעקור כלום, שהרי אף לבסוף היו הכהנים עוברים על האיסור חולין בעזרה. מ"מ מאחר שפטרו אותו מלהביא חטאת אחת, לא עלו על דעת הכהנים שהיה הראשון בגדר חולין בעזרה אלא לפי דעתם חשבו בטעות שהוא כשר וממילא לא היו עצבים וממילא לא היה המזבח בטל. אבל בע"ב שינה רש"י מפירושו וכתב שהיה ע"י הפקר ב"ד הפקר כנ"ל לפרש דברי רש"י

Gittin 55a - Feeding Terumah through Rabbinic Marriage

The gemara says that a chareshes who marries a kohein pikeiach cannot eat even teruma d'rabonon, even though her marriage is binding m'drabonon. The reason is that we make a gezeira of a case where a cheresh kohen marries a pikachas and will feed her teruma d'oraysa, and since she is a pikachas she will be violating the issur of a non-kohen eating teruma. But we are not concerned by a kohein pikeiach who marries a chareshes that if he feeds her teruma d'rabonon, he will come to feed her teruma d'oraysa, because even if he does, so what, she is not chayev in mitzvos.
The question is, based on Tosafos who says that included in the heter of the mishna to feed a ketana teruma d'rabonon, is to even feed her b'yadayim (which is permitted even if we assume like the shulchan aruch at the end of hilchos shabbos that one is not allowed to feed a child even an issur d'rabonon, because through the rabbinic marriage the teruma d'rabonon is permitted to her and not considered an issur at all). That is why the mishna only allows the ketana who marries a kohein to eat teruma d'rabonon, but not teruma d'oraysa, because the husband will be in violation of "feeding" issur to a child b'yadayim. Based on this why can't we say that the issur when a kohein pikeiach marries a chareshes is that if we allow her to eat teruma d'rabonon, he will come to feed her b'yadayim, teruma d'oraysa and violate the prohibition of feeding issur to a child? Similarly, why is the mishna matir to feed teruma d'rabonon to the young girl, we should be concerned he will come to feed her b'yadayim teruma d'oraysa and violate the prohibition of feeding issur to a child? [Tosafos only explains why we are not gozer that if we allow the young girl to eat d'rabonon we don't make a gezeira that she will come to eat teruma d'oraysa, since even if she does, she is only a ketana and not liable. But, why aren't we concerned that her husband will "feed" her, in which case he would be doing an issur of feeding her issur d'oraysa?].

This question is asked by the m'lo ha'roim.

Gittin 54b - עד אחד נאמן כשהוא בידו

בגמ' פליגי אביי ורבא בנאמנות דעד אחד, דלאביי כל שבידו נאמן, ולרבא כל שאמר לו בפעם ראשון שראהו נאמן. רש"י פירש דלאביי נאמן רק כשהוא בידו לעשות כמו שמעיד (שאם מעיד שטימא טהרותיו, אינו נאמן אא"כ עדיין בידו לטמאן, וכן לפיגול) אבל לרבא לא בעינן שיהיה בידו, רק שיאמר לו בפעם הראשון שרואהו - והטעם משום שבעצם הוא נאמן אף כשאינו בידו, אלא שאם ראהו כבר ולא אמר לו מידי הוי כרגלים לדבר שמשקר (וצ"ע אם יש לו אמתלא במה שלא אמר לו בפעם הראשון, אם נאמן בפעם השני כיון דבכה"ג ליכא רגלים שהוא משקר). ונראה פשוט שהוא נאמן אף לקולא למר כדאית ליה ולמר כדאית ליה, דאי רק נאמן לחומרא הא לא שייך להאמינו לגבי פיגול שעי"ז יביא קרבן אחר ויעבור על חולין בעזרה

והנה, התוס' כתבו דהא דאמר רבא שנאמן אף כשאינו בידו, היינו רק כשעכ"פ היה בידו מתחלה, אבל כשלא היה בידו אף מעיקרא אינו נאמן (אלא דשתיקה כהודאה, וכשויא אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא כמש"כ המהרש"א על התוס'). ונראה דלפי דרכם של רש"י ותוס' דלרבא נאמן אף כשאינו בידו עכשיו, כל הני עובדות דגמ' אתיין רק כאביי. שהרי ההוא דא"ל לחבריה שטימא טהרותיו "ביום פלוני" וקאמר רב אמי שאינו נאמן, הא לרבא לכאורה הוא נאמן ובלבד שיהא בפעם הראשון. וזה תמוה שהרי ההוא עובדא דס"ת משמע דאינו נאמן רק משום שהוא ביד הלוקח, אבל אילו היה עדיין בידו, אע"פ שכבר גמרו היה נאמן אע"פ שאין בידו לפוסלן. וקשה דלאביי אמאי נאמן כיון שאינו בידו, ולרבא אמאי אינו נאמן ביד הלוקח (אא"כ הוא כבר ראהו ולא אמר לו מידי) - ואף אם אתיא כרבא, הא ב' עובדות היו של רב אמי, ואי אפשר לומר דעובדא דטהרות כאביי ועובדא דס"ת כרבא! אכן, לפמש"כ התוס' רי"ד לפרש פלוגתא דאביי ורבא, כל הני עובדות אתיין כרבא. הא דלא בעי רבא שיהיה בידו היינו דלא בעינן שיהיה בידו למפסליה עכשיו אבל בעינן שיהיה החפצא בתוך רשותו, שעדיין לא החזירו. לפיכך בעובדא דרב אמי קמיירי כשאין הטהרות בידו לפיכך אינו נאמן, וכן בההיא דס"ת, דנהי שנגמר הספר ואין בידו לפוסלו עכשיו מ"מ כל שהוא ביד הסופר נאמן, ורק כשכבר הוא ביד הלוקח דאינו ברשותו כלל אינו נאמן - וזה מדוייק במה שהוצרך רב אמי לשאלו "ס"ת בי מי" עיין בתוס' רי"ד

Gittin 54b - Bitul Issur l'chatchila

The gemara asks on the fact that R' Yehuda only makes a penalty for a shogeg by a d'oraysa but not by a d'rabonon, that we see from these "egozei perech" of orlah that fall into others, although they are batul m'doraysa immediately, they are not batul m'drabonon because of their importance. If the person would crush them which would remove their status of chashivus therefore enabling bitul, R' Yehuda says that we penalize him even if it is done b'shogeg. This seems to contradict the fact that R' Yehuda does not penalize shogeg by a d'rabonon.
The difficulty with this gemara is that in order to make the violation only d'rabonon the gemara has to say that m'doraysa it is batul immediately, even though it is chashuv (as rashi explains), so the act of crushing it is really only an issur d'rabonon of being mevatel issur l'chachila. Why does the gemara need to say this? Even if on a d'oraysa level the egozim were not batul when they first fell in, it would still be only an issur d'rabonon to be mevatel them lichatchila (as beis yosef quotes from Ra"n in y.d. 99, not like ra'avad - also brought in shach). Since the issur of crushing them would only be d'rabonon even if they were not batul m'doraysa before hand, we would have a valid question on R' Yehuda that we penalize for shogeg even by a d'rabonon, even without prefacing with the fact that bitul took place immediately md'oraysa. So why does the gemara feel that it is necessary to preface with the fact that there was bitul d'oraysa; (In other words, the fact that the gemara has to preface with the fact that bitul d'oraysa takes place immediately to reduce the issur to only a d'rabonon, implies like the ra'avad that bitul issur lichatchila of a d'oraysa is in fact assur m'doraysa)?

R' Yehuda's opinion of penalizing for a d'oraysa and not a d'rabonon is that we only penalize for a severe issur, but not for a low level issur (as rashi explains 53b). When the gemara asks the question on R' Yehuda that we find that even by a d'rabonon we penalize b'shogeg, the gemara strengthens the question by illustrating that this d'rabonon is really a very low level d'rabonon. The gemara does this by showing that not only is the act of crushing only d'rabonon, but the actual item is not even assur m'doraysa. Had the gemara only dealt from the perspective of being mevatel issur, one could answer that since right now the mixture is assur m'doraysa and through his actions he is changing it to be mutar, it is tantamount to violating a d'oraysa and appropriate to penalize even b'shogeg. Therefore, the gemara prefaces that before he does anything the issur d'oraysa is already batul, which indicates that the act of crushing is purely d'rabonon and still R' yehuda give a penalty.

Gittin 53a - Hezek She'eino Nikar

The gemara has a machlokes whether m'doraysa a damage that is not recognizable is considered a damage that one is liable for. Simply speaking the peshat of "hezek she'eino nikar" being patur is that it doesn't qualify as an act of damage. Similar to grama which is patur because it isn't considered an act of damage (just that by grama they don't even make a penalty to compensate since there wasn't any act done at all, whereas here there was at least an act done - as Tosafos Rid explains). However, this approach doesn't fit well with the gemara that says that if one steals a coin and the government then discontinues it, or chometz and pesach comes and assurs it from benefit, the thief can simply return the item as is - this proves "hezek she'eino nikar" is not called a damage. Tosafos questions this comparison. Perhaps when one does the damage actively, just that it is "hezek she'eino nikar", it will qualify as a damage, but here the act of damage happened by itself i.e. the government discontinuing the coin, or pesach assuring the chometz b'hana'ah. Why is this conclusive evidence that "hezek she'eino nikar" is not called a damage? Tosafos is forced to answer that if "hezek she'eino nikar" is called a damage, it is no longer considered the same item that was stolen and therefore the gazlan acquires it b'shinuy, and fully responsible. From the fact that he is not responsible indicates that "hezek she'eino nikar" is not called a damage.

This doesn't fit well into rashi who writes: מכדי מיגזל גזליה מדמשכיה וקם ליה ברשותיה, וכי קמשלם ליה דבר הניזק משלם ליה ולא כמה שגזל. Rashi seems to hold that the problem is in the pay back of the item rather than the gazlan acquiring through shinuy like tosafos says. Also, rashi seems to imply that the gazlan acquires the item through meshicha, prior to the government decision to discontinue the coin, and prior to pesach making the chometz assur.

Perhaps rashi holds that the rationale behind "hezek she'eino nikar" not qualifying as a damage, is that although the act of damage may be considered an act of damage, since the damage is not recognizable in the item, the actual object is considered the same that it was. Therefore, as soon as the damager does the act of damage, it is as if he returns the item to the owner as compensation, and the item has no recognizable damage in it, and is therefore considered a valid reimbursement for the damage. Based on this approach, it is easier to understand the connection to a gazlan. The main issue is in the pay back of the item - do we consider it to be the same item? If "hezek she'eino nikar" is not called a damage then we consider it to be the same item, but if "hezek she'eino nikar" is called a damage then we don't consider it the same item. Therefore, a gazlan who returns the coin after it is discontinued or chometz after pesach, if "hezek she'eino nikar" is not called a damage, he is essentially returning the item that he stole and is considered a valid reimbursement. That is what rashi means: וכי קמשלם דבר הניזק משלם ליה ולא כמה שגזל, meaning that since it is called a damage we don't consider it the same item, but if it would not be called a damage it would be the same item.