Baba Kama 4a - Adam HaMazik: Damaging in your sleep

Tosafos quotes from the yerushalmi that even though a person is chayev for damages that he does while sleeping, that is only if he goes to sleep near keilim so he was somewhat negligent by going to sleep there. But if someone only brought the keilim after he fell asleep and he damaged them, he is patur. The Maharatz Chiyus points out a machlokes between Tosafos and Nemukei Yosef, exactly why is he patur? Tosafos writes "they caused it". Meaning, we don't hold the sleeping damager responsible since someone else caused the damage by putting the keilim there. The primary liability and responsibility for the damage is the person who put it there (but he is probably exempt because of grama), which removes responsibility from the sleeping mazik. Based on Tosafos the rationale to be patur is not "o'nes", rather it is that we don't consider the person who damaged to be the cause of the damage. However, the Nimukei Yosef says that he is patur becaue he is o'nes. Based on this, the maharatz chiyus asks, why does the rambam write that if one's life is threatened unless he takes money from his friend, he is responsible for taking the money. Why don't we exempt based on the claim of o'nes? The Shach makes a distinction between a case where one damages unintentionally to one who damages due to o'nes of his life being threatened. Whenever the action is done with intent, even though he was under duress, he is liable. But when he is sleeping, the action is not done with any intent so he is patur.

This sevara is similar to the concept of mis'asek. When one does a mitzvah and has no intent for the action that he is doing, it doesn't count. For example, if he would be trying to clean out a shofar by blowing through it and it made a sound, even if mitzvos don't need kavana, he isn't yotzei. But if he had intent for the action that he is doing, just that he is forced to do it, the gemara in rosh hashana 28a (kaf'uhu parsi'yim) is clear that according to the opinion that mitzvos don't need kavana he would be yotzei.

Baba Kama 3a - Shein and Regel are Patur in Public Domain

The Rif says that shein and regel are exempt for damages in a public domain because "it is normal" - meaning that the type of damage is not out of the ordinary. The Rosh is bothered with why the Rif feels compelled to offer a rationale for the exemption in public domain, it is just a gezeiras hakasuv that the gemara learns on 21b that shein and regel are only chayev in reshus hayachid. The Rosh explains that the Rif is coming to explain the Torah's exemption, since it is normal for them to go in the public domain and damage by just normal activities, it is impossible for the owner to watch them and prevent these types of damage. Therefore, if there is a beam half in the public domain and half in the private domain, and the animal steps on the beam in the public domain which causes damage to vessels in the private domain, the owner is exempt. Had it just been for a pasuk the owner would be liable since the damage occured in a private domain, but since the rationale for exempting in reshus harabim is because the animal has a right to walk there freely, the owner is even exempt for damages that are caused in a private domain from the animal that is in the public domain.

The Yam Shel Shlomo offers a simpler understanding of the Rif. The Rif is not coming to be mechadesh halachos, rather just trying to help us categorize the different forms of damage. Anything which is normal qualifies as shein and regel which are exempt in reshus harabim. This idea is supported by the Nemukei Yosef 15b. The gemara says that if a dog eats large sheep that are not normal for a dog that size to eat, it qualifies as keren, but if they are small sheep then it qualifies as shein since it is normal. The Nimukei Yosef explains that anything which is abnormal is considered keren even if the animal is doing it for the pleasure of eating, and therefore the damage qualifies as a "penalty" which we don't have the power to collect outside of Israel. The Rif is also explaining that the primary characteristic of shein and regel is that they are normal, to the exclusion of anything which is abnormal automatically qualifies as keren rather than shein or regel.

Kiddushin 82a - One Last Post on Hilchos YICHUD

ג' טבת תשס"ט

הערות בענין יחוד

א. בקדושין פא ע"א קאמר רבה בעלה בעיר אין חוששין משום ייחוד. רש"י מפרש שהוא רק לענין מלקות מפני דמסתפי מבעלה דהשתא אתי. אבל התוס' השיגו עליו וקושייתם ממעשה דרב ביבי דאיקלע לבי רב יוסף וקאמר רב יוסף "שקולי דרגא מתותי ביבי" דהיינו להעביר הסולם שלא ירד מן העליה להבית מקום שאשתו של רב יוסף נמצאת, וקפריך בגמ' מהא דרבא דבעלה בעיר אין חוששין משום ייחוד, ומשני דשאני רב ביבי דשושבינתיה הויא וגייסא ביה. כלומר, דכיון דגייסא ביה מסתמא גייסא גם בה ובזה לא שייך כל ההיתר של בעלה בעיר. והקשו התוס' על פרש"י דאי כדבריו מאי קפריך מבעלה בעיר, הא אף בעלה בעיר מועיל רק לענין מלקות ולא לענין איסור. לפיכך כתבו התוס' דאין חוששין כלל משום ייחוד ואפילו איסורא ליכא היכא דבעלה בעיר. וראיתי בבינת אדם (שער בית הנשים ס' י"ז) שכתב ליישב פרש"י וז"ל נ"ל דרש"י ס"ל דהכי מקשה הש"ס, דבשלמא דאם שהיא מתיחדת אסור מדאורייתא שייך לגזור שלא יבא לידי יחוד, אבל כיון שאם בעלה בעיר אין בו יחוד דאורייתא להלקות אפילו אם הוא עמה ביחוד בחדר נעול, אלא מדרבנן לכתחלה אסור, א"כ לא שייך למיגזר לשקול דרגא שמא ילך ויתיחד עמה, וא"כ לא קשה מידי קושיית התוס' עכ"ל. ובזה מיישב נמי עוד קושיא על רש"י דכבר אמר בגמ' דאין מלקין על היחוד באשת איש שלא תהא מוציא לעז על בניה, וא"כ אף כשאין בעלה בעיר נמי אין מלקין על היחוד. אלא כוונת רש"י דנהי דאין מלקין הוא רק מדרבנן שלא להוציא לעז, אבל מדאורייתא ראויה להלקות, אבל כשבעלה בעיר אין בזה ייחוד דאורייתא רק מדרבנן ומש"ה מדאורייתא אין מלקין [וא"צ לדחוק כמש"כ הב"ח דלולי בעלה בעיר הוי מלקין ומכריז כדעביד מר זוטרא].

נמצינו למדים מדברי החכ"א בביאור דעת רש"י, דבמצב ששייך ייחוד דאורייתא איכא למיגזר שמא יבא לידי ייחוד, אבל במצב שאף אם יתייחד הוא רק מדרבנן, אין לאסור משום שמא יבא לידי ייחוד. וזה מדוייק בפרש"י שכתב בעובדא דרב ביבי וז"ל שקולו דרגא, שאכלו בעליה וירדו רב יוסף ואשתו, והוא נשאר בעליה, שקולו דרגא מתותי ביבי שלא ירד ויתיחד עכ"ל. הרי משמע מרש"י דאם אם לא שקלו הדרגא לעליה, אילו היה נשאר רב ביבי בעליה לא מקרי ייחוד, אלא שאסרו מדרבנן שמא יבא לידי ייחוד. לפיכך לא גזרו אלא במקום ששייך לבא לידי איסור ייחוד דאורייתא ולא כששייך לבא רק לידי איסור ייחוד דרבנן כגון היכא דבעלה בעיר.

אמנם יש לעיין בפרש"י אהא דקאמר אביי בין כשאנשים מבפנים ונשים מבחוץ בין איפכא, חוששין משום ייחוד. הרמב"ם מפרש דלא שייך איסור ייחוד אלא במצב שפירש אחד מהם, אבל רש"י מפרש וז"ל שמא יצא אחדמהם ויתייחד עם הנשים עכ"ל. הרי אף בזה סובר רש"י דחיישינן שמא יבא לידי ייחוד. איברא, שאינו ברור כ"כ מה החשש בזה בפרט לפרש"י, שהרי לדעת רש"י אשה מתייחדת עם ב' אנשים עכ"פ בעיר וביום [ודלא כהרמב"ם ושו"ע דסתם אנשי אינם כשרים אלא פרוצים, כיון שאף האמוראים חששו על עצמן שאינם כשרים]. אלא שכבר הרגיש רש"י בזה וכתב בעצמו דאם תכנס היא לפנים לא איכפת לן דאשה מתייחדת עם שני אנשים, אלא החשש הוא שמא יכנס או יצא אחד מן האנשים להיות בין הנשים. אלא שגם זה קשה לפרש"י פב ע"א על המשנה דתנן כל שעסקיו עם הנשים לא יתיחד עם הנשים, שפירש רש"י דהא דאסרינן לעיל איש אחד בב' נשים, דוקא הוא וכדפרש"י פ ע"ב דשתיהן נוחות להתפתות, אבל בג' או ד' נשים מותר להתייחד משום שכיון שאי אפשר לפתותם, ע"כ כל אחת מתביישת לעבור לפני חברתה. וכבר עמדו התוס' פב ע"א בזה, וחלקו על רש"י דדעתם שאין חילוק בין אשה אחת לשנים או שלש, שהכל אסור [והא דמחמירין בעסקו עם הנשים היינו אף כשאשתו עמו]. ולפי"ז הא דחיישינן שמא יכנס או יצא איש אחד בין הנשים, ע"כ קמיירי בב' נשים ולא יותר, או כשעסקו עם הנשים דאל"כ ליכא איסור ייחוד כלל. עכ"פ בב' נשים ודאי חיישינן שמא יכנס או יצא איש אחד ביניהם ויבא לידי ייחוד, ולכן אסרו לגמרי נשים ואנשים כשיש דרך זה על זה ליכנס או לצאת כדי שלא יבא לידי ייחוד. ולפי חידושו של החכ"א הנ"ל דלא אסרינן מפני החשש שיבא לידי ייחוד רק באופן שאם יתייחד איכא איסור דאורייתא, אבל במצב שאפילו אם יתייחד ליכא אלא איסור דרבנן כמו בבעלה בעיר, אף דאסרינן להתייחד, לא חיישינן שמא יבא לידי ייחוד. וא"כ יש להוכיח מכאן דהא דאסרינן ייחוד מדאורייתא אין זה רק באיש אחד ואשה אחת, אלא אף איש אחד בב' נשים נמי הוי איסור ייחוד דאורייתא. דנהי דבגמ' פ ע"ב דיליף איסור ייחוד מקרא ד"כי יסיתך" קמיירי בבן עם אמו, לאפוקי איש אחד ואשה אחת, מ"מ אהני לן סברת הש"ס דנשים דעתן קלות וכדפרש"י ששתיהן נוחות להתפתות, לאסור מדאורייתא באיש אחד וב' נשים.

ותמהני על החכ"א בעצמו שכתב בבינת אדם (שם ס' ט"ז) דאינו אסור מדאורייתא רק איש אחד עם הערוה, אבל איש אחד עם ב' נשים אינו אלא מדרבנן. שהרי לפי דרכו שאין זה אלא מדרבנן, אמאי חיישינן בנשים מבפנים ואנשים מבחוץ וכן איפכא שמא יתייחד איש בין הנשים, הא לשון נשים ודאי משמע דקמיירי בב' או יותר, וא"כ אין בזה איסור דאורייתא, והרי החכ"א בעצמו סובר דכל היכא שאם יתייחד ליכא איסור דאורייתא לא חיישינן שמא יבא להתייחד.

והנה, באגרו"מ (אהע"ז ח"ד ס' ס"ד אות ג') כתב לאסור ליסע יחד עם אשה במכונית אפילו ביום שמא יניחו המכונית על הדרך ויתרחקו למקום סתר ויבעלנה. אלא שהתיר בשעת הדחק משום שמשמע לו דאין חושששין מדינא לשמא יטה מן הדרך בכשרין ורק חיישינן שמא יתקוף היצר ויעברו במקום שנמצאים. ותלה זה בפלוגתא בין הרי"ו ומהרש"ל הובא בב"ש (ס' כ"ב ס"ק ט') והעלה להקל בשעת הדחק. אכן, לפי מה שביארנו דבמצב שאין שם ייחוד ממש, אלא דבקל יכול לבא לידי ייחוד, ודאי חיישינן לזה באופן שהאיסור ייחוד תהוי מדאורייתא, וא"כ ה"נ שבקל יכול להטות מן הדרך למקום סתר יש מקום לחוש שיבא לידי ייחוד באופן שהייחוד אסור מדאורייתא כגון באחד מן העריות כשאין בעלה בעיר.

ב. באור שמח דייק מלשון הרמב"ם דלא מהני בעלה בעיר אלא להתיר האשה עצמה אבל כשיש שם עוד נשים, אסור לאדם להתייחד עמהן, ולא אמרינן שאשה זו שבעלה בעיר משמרתן. וראייתו מהא דכתב הרמב"ם בהל' ח' לא תתייחד אשה אחת אפילו עם אנשים הרבה עד שתהיה אשתו של אחד מהם שם, דמשמע דבעינן בעלה ואשתו עמו ואז מותר לאשה אחרת להתייחד עם האנשים הנמצאים [זה הרמב"ם לשיטתו דאסרינן אשה אחת עם ב' אנשים או יותר]. וקשה למה בעינן שתהא הבעל וגם אשתו שם, הא אף כשאין הבעל שם אלא אשה שבעלה בעיר ועוד אשה אחרת עם הנשים הרבה נמי מותר כיון שהאשה שבעלה בעיר משמרת חברתה. א"ו מדבעינן הבעל וגם אשתו, מצינו דבעלה בעיר אינו מועיל אלא לעצמה ולא לאחרים עד שתהא בעלה שם עמה [ובסוף דבריו כתב שיש לדחות דאולי איירי הרמב"ם כשהוא גס עמהן, לכן בעי שיהא בעלה עמה ממש, ולא מהני בעלה בעיר]. עיין באגרו"מ (אהע"ז ח"ד ס' ס"ד אות ו') שנתקשה הרבה בלשון הב"ש דמשמע כדברי האור שמח, דאשה אחת עם הנשים הרבה בעינן שתהא אחד מהאנשים הבעל של האשה, ותמה דאף כשליכא שם בעלה רק שנמצא בעלה בעיר מותרת להתייחד עם אנשים, וממילא ליכא איסור ייחוד אף על נשים אחרות דכיון שהיא לא תזנה יכולה לשמור את חברתה. ובאמת כתב האגרו"מ (שם אות ח') סברא לומר דאשה שבעלה בעיר יכולה לשמור חברתה טפי מקרובו, שהרי שגם להאשה שבעלה בעיר איכא תאוה לזנות וכיון שהיא מונעת גם הן ימנהו, אבל מה שנמנעות הקרובות הוא משום שאין להן תאוה אבל יתכן שאשה שאינה קרובה ויש לה תאוה תזנה. ואף שלדינא דחה סברא זו דאף אשה שהיא קרוב לו יכולה לשמור אחרות, מ"מ מסתברא לו דאשה שבעלה בעיר הוי שומרת לגבי אחרות יותר מקרוב.

ג. החכ"א (כלל קכ"ו ס"ו) כתב דלא מהני סברא דבעלה בעיר אלא בביתה דחוששת שמא יבא בעלה, אבל כשתלך לבית אחר אין אימת בעלה עליה כיון שאין בעלה יודע היכן היא. עוד החמיר באשה שהלכה ברשות בעלה וכ"ש כשבעלה נתן לה רשות לדבר עם איש אחד דבר סתר ולסגור הדלת, דלא מהני בעלה בעיר בכה"ג. באגרו"מ (אהע"ז ס' ס"ד אות כ"א) השיג על החכ"א מפני שהבין בסברתו של החכ"א דכל שבעלה נתן לה רשות דבר עם אחד בסתר, אין אימת בעלה עליה, והקשה דמה בכך שנתן לה רשות, הא אכתי איכא למיחש שמא יבא ואימתו עליה עדיין שאומרת השתא אתי. וכן כשנתן לה רשות לילך לאיזה מקום הא יודע לילך לשם ואין להחשיב ייחוד לשם כסתירה ששייך שיבא ואימתו עליה. גם ביאר דהא דהקפיד החכ"א דדוקא בביתו ליכא איסור אבל כשתלך לבית אחר איכא איסור ייחוד, הוא דוקא כשהלה למקום שאין רגילה ללכת אבל כשרגילה ללכת לשם ובעלה יודע המקום שהלכה, הוי כביתה לענין זה וליכא איסור ייחוד. לדינא, כתב שבדין שלישי אף החכ"א מודה, אבל בדין ראשון ושני לא מסתבר כלל כדברי החכ"א מ"מ יש להחמיר שלא בשעת הדחק. ונעלנ"ד דלא עיין בדברי החכ"א בבינת אדם שביאר שיטתו בזה, שהרי אין כוונת החכ"א לומר דכשנתן לה רשות אין אימתו עליה. אלא כתב בבינת אדם (ס' י"ז) דהא דמהני בעלה בעיר מפני שאימת בעלה עליה, אין הכוונה שמתיירא שמא יבא הבעל בשעת ביאה ממש, דא"כ אמאי לא מהני גם כשלבו גס בו. אלא הסברא הוא שמתיירא כשביא הבעל וימצא שהיא מתיחדת עם איש שאינו גס בה יחשוד אותה דמסתמא זנתה עמו דלא"כ מאי בעי גביה, וכיון שיודעת שאם יבא בעלה יחשוד אותה וידרוש ויחקור אם באמת זנתה עמו, שומרת את עצמה שלא לזנות עמו מפני אימת הדרישה וחקירה. אבל בגס בו לא יחוש הבעל אם ימצא שהיא מתיחדת עמו ולכן תזנה ג"כ. לפיכך סובר החכ"א דכל שנתן לה בעלה רשות הוי כגס בו ממש שהיא יודעת שאין הבעל דורש וחוקר על הייחוד, וסוברת בדעתה דמסתמא לא יבא בשעת ביאה ממש, ותזנה עמו. איברא, שדברי החכ"א מחודשים הם, דלפי הפשטות הא דמהני בעלה בעיר מפני שמפחדת שיבא בשעת ביאה, מ"מ לפי דרכו שפיר השוה הא דנתן לה רשות להתייחד עם איש אחד לייחוד עם מי שגס בו דלא מהני בעלה בעיר כדמפורש בגמ'.

Kiddushin 81b - Yichud with Relatives

MAZAL TOV ON SEDER NASHIM!

R' Moshe (E.H. 4:64:1) was asked whether a family who converts have an issur yichud since halachically they are no longer related - גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי. His basic approach is that the heter for yichud is not based on the halacha of being related, rather on the metzius of whether or not there is desire for these relatives. Being that both jews and goyim don't have a yetzer hara for blood relatives, he paskens that there isn't any issur of yichud.

In the course of the discussion, R' Moshe raises a tremendous question. Rashi explains that the reason that there is no yetzer hara for a mother and daughter is because the anshei k'neses ha'gedola davened to remove the yezter horah for blood relatives. However, the gemara on 80b learns out from a pasuk that yichud with a mother. Clearly, even prior to the anshei k'neses ha'gedola there was a heter of yichud with one's mother, so the heter can't be based on their tefillah to remove the yetzer hora? Based on this question R' Moshe explains that between a parent and child the nature from the time of creation is that there is no yetzer horah. That explains why Lot's daughters had to give him to drink wine in order to sleep with them, since he had no desire for them. Rashi is citing the gemara in sanhedrin where they davened to remove the yetzer horah for arayos, to explain why there is no issur yichud by a sister. This is not part of the nature of the human being, and was only a result of their tefillah. Included in the tefillah of anshei k'neses hagedola is also the sister of one's parent, where prior to their tefillah, there was a desire for them. Nevertheless, R' Moshe assumes that even the removal of the yezter horah for sisters and aunts, applies to goyim just as it applies to jews.

Kiddishin 81a - Yichud

The Chochmas Adam (126:7) says that when there are 2 rooms, one outer and one inner room - if a man is in one and a woman is in the other, it would be a machlokes rashi and rambam whether this is a yichud problem. In the Binas Adam (18) he elaborates. Rashi says that the case of men on the inside and women on the outside, or the opposite, is assur because it will lead to yichud. Rashi implies that the issur is not for the man to go in to the place of the women, but even to set up a situation which will lead to yichud if the man will go into the women is assur. However, the Rambam understands that the issur is only when the man actually goes into the area where the women are present, but the set up of a situation which will lead to yichud, is not yichud.

It seems that this machlokes would also apply to a house when a man and woman each go into separate room in the same house. Under the present state there isn't any yichud, but since it can easily lead to yichud by the man or woman leaving their room, rashi would hold it is assur to set up such a situation. The Binas Adam suggests that even the Rambam is only lenient because there are many men and women in the gemara's case, but in the case where a man and woman are alone in a house, being in separate rooms would be an issur yichud even according to the rambam. But, he then rejects it, and assumes that the rambam would be meikil so long as each stays in their private room. He considers this a safeik hashakul, and is therefore lenient by yichud with a p'nuya which is only d'rabonon but is machmir with yichud of a nidah which is d'oraysa.

Kiddushin 78b - Claiming your son is a Mamzer

In the mishna there is a machlokes whether one is believed to claim that his son is a mamzer. The Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 4:29) says that although we pasken like R' Yehuda that a father is believed that his son is a mamzer, a mother is not believed. R' Moshe has many teshuvos where the mother claimed her son is a mamzer because she was married prior to this marriage, and never received a gett. R' Moshe (E.H. 4:23:2) ignored all these claims, and held that the mother is not even believed to create a safeik, because the din of "yakir" is only on the father. In regard to believing the father, R' Moshe writes (4:23:1) that it only applies when we know that he is father such as a case where he is married to the mother. But if the fact that he is the father is purely based on his claim, then he is not believed. He proves this from the Rambam (Issurei Biah 15:16):

אבל האב שהוחזק שזה בנו ואמר בני זה ממזר הוא נאמן

Clearly, the Rambam implies that only if it is "huchzak" that this is his son, is he believed about him to make him a mamzer. But, if the we have not chazaka that this is the father because he is not married to the mother and the son didn't live with him, he is not believed to create the status of even a safeik mamzer. R' Moshe then launches into a big discussion based on the Rambam that a man is believed to claim about someone in the street "this is my son and he is a bechor". Since both the right to claim he is a bechor and the right to claim he is a mamzer come from the same source - "yakir", why by the bechor is he believed even on someone who is not muchzak as his son?

Kiddushin 77a - Kedushas Kehuna

Recently, we had a situation where a kohein who is married to a goy was called up for an aliya. The policy in the shul is to give aliyos to ovrei aveiros (which will hopefully change one day), but the question is whether a kohein is worse. The Shulchan Aruch (128:40) writes that a kohein married to a gerusha is not called for the first aliya and looses all privileges of being a kohein, but implies that he is allowed to get an aliya. I assume that the same would hold true with a kohein married to a goy, even though it is obviously a much more sever issur.

R' Moshe (O.C. 2:33) has an interesting teshuva to the Sridei Eish, regarding a kohen who is married to a gerusha. R' Moshe says he agrees with the sridei eish that the kohen is not allowed to get the first aliya but is allowed to get an aliya. He also comes to answer the question of the pri megadim: Since a Talmid Chacham comes before a Kohein, because kedushas hatorah takes precedence, certainly a Yisroel who keeps mitzvos should come before a kohein who does aveiros. Why is the halacha that only aveiros of kehuna make the kohein loose his rights to get the first aliya, but for other aveiros he will not loose his rights?

R' Moshe elaborates in explaining that a talmid chacham doesn't have more kedusha then a kohein, he merely has rights of kedima because others have a higher responsibility to honor him. Kedusha comes only from being chayev in more mitzvos. Therefore, a talmid chacham comes before a kohein due to the responsibility to be mechabeid him, but his kedusha is still less. Therefore, a kohein who is a rasha would come before a yisroel who is shomer mitzvos, since there isn't any chiyuv to honor a yisroel who is shomer mitzvos and the kohein is obligated in more mitzvos still has more kedusha.

Kiddushin 76b - Appointing a Ger to a Position of Authority

The gemara darshens that one is not allowed to appoint a ger to a position of authority, unless the mother is a jew. The Rambam (Melachim 1:4) writes that this applies not only to a first generation ger, but for all future generations as well (just at the heter for a ger to marry a mamzeres applies to future generations, not only to the first generation, as the gemara says 74b). Kesef Mishneh writes that a Jewish father will also work to allow him to assume a position of leadership. The gemara means that even a Jewish mother would give him enough yichus to assume such a position, but certainly a father would also work. Based on this he explains that Rechav'am the son of Shlomo was able to be king even though his mother was Na'amah Ha'Amonis. However, the Hagahos Maimon says that having his mother from a yisroel (or father) only works for other positions of leadership, but to be king he must be completely from yisroel because we require "muvchar she'biachicha". That is why Agrifos (Sotah 41b) was unfit to be king even though his mother was a jew. Based on this there would be a question how Rechav'am was able to be king.

R' Moshe (Igros Y.D. 4:26) was asked whether a ger can be a rosh yeshiva. He rejects the proof from Shemaya V'avtalyon who were descendents from sancheirev and were leaders, because it could be that they have yichus from a jewish parent, or that since they were so much greater than anyone else, it was a hora'as sha'ah.

R' Moshe then says a wild chiddush. Part of the mitzvah of "v'ahavtem es ha'ger" would demand that we be lenient in these areas whenever possible. Based on this, he develops a sevara to be meikil. Being a Rosh Yeshiva doesn't qualify as a position of authority, because the purpose of the yeshiva is to teach students who choose to enroll on their own. The Rosh Yeshiva has no authority over people against their will. His authority is only similar to that of a business owner over his employees, who chose to work for him in the first place. Although in an earlier teshuva he discusses the notion of a woman being a mashgiach and considers it a position of authority, that is only because the mashgiach has power to go against the ba'al habayis to maintain the kashrus standard, and therefore qualifies as a position of authority.

R' Moshe also suggests that the issur is only on the people to accept him as a leader, but there is no prohibition on the ger to assume a leadership position on his own. Perhaps this is how Shemaya Avtalyon and Devorah became leaders - they just assumed a position due to their greatness without being formally appointed.

Kiddushin 73a - Tefisas Kiddushin for a Safeik Mamzer

Yevamos 16: R' Yehuda in the name of R'  Asi says a Goy who is mekadesh a Jewish woman nowadays we are choshesh for kiddushin because maybe he is from the 10 lost tribes. Rashi explains we are concerned that his father is from the aseres hashvatim and married a non-jewish woman, and R' Asi holds that a Jewish father and non-jewish mother will create a mamzer. So we are choshesh that this guy who was mekadesh this woman is a mamzer, not a goy. Tosafos challenges Rashi, since it is clear from the mishna and gemara at the end of the third perek of kiddushin that we follow matrilinial descent to determine his status as a Jew. Tosafos explains that all the mishnayos that imply that the child of a non-jewish woman is a goy hold that a child born from a jew and goy is not a mamzer. But, R' Asi holds like R' Akiva that an issur lav creates a mamzer so the child born from a jew and goy will be a mamzer.

Avnei Miluim (4:12) asks that if R' Asi holds like R' Akiva so that this "goy" may really be a Jewish mamzer, why should we be concerned about the kiddushin, since a mamzer is a chayvei l'av so that according to R' Akiva there is no tefisas kiddushin?

Avnei Miluim explains based on our gemara that a safeik mamzer is permitted to marry k'hal. R' Akiva holds that by chayvei l'avin including a mamzer there is no tefisas kiddushin. BUT, for a safeik mamzer there would be tefisas kiddushin since the Torah permits him to marry into k'hal. Therefore, R' Asi says that when a "goy" is mekadesh a woman, he is a safeik mamzer (because a jew and goy as parents would make a mamzer), so there is a concern for kiddushin. We cannot say "m'ma nafshach", if he is a mamzer then there is not tefisas kiddushin because of being chayvei lavin, and if he is not a mamzer then he is a goy. Because, the idea of tefisas kiddushin for a safeik mamzer is not based on safeik, rather it is a gezeiras hakasuv (even if it is tarti t'sasri), so that even on the tzad that he is a mamzer, there is tefisas kiddushin since he is only a safeik to us.

Kiddushin 71a - Revealing Mamzeirim

There is a famous Ran on this gemara who proves that it is assur for one to reveal a family that has a mamzer in the family. In the future, even when it will be possible to identify the p'sul, the family and even the individuals will remain mutar. The Ran does suggest that tzenuim who know about a p'sul in the family should let their friends in on the secret privately because the family doesn't qualify as a mishpacha miyucheses, but they should not tell others. At first the Ran questions whether the heter of being metaher families with pesulim mixed in applies now or only l'asid l'avo, in the end the Ran concludes:

וכיון שאין אליהו עתיד לגלותן, אף היודעים בהם עכשיו אין מגלין אותם שאין בין העוה"ז לימות המשיח לענין זה כלום

Meaning, that nothing can change between now and then, therefore if they are mutar then they are mutar now.

R' Moshe (Even HaEzer 4:9:3-4) offers 2 possibilities in understanding the Ran. Why is the issur of marrying a mamzer different than other issurim in the Torah? Just as one is obligated to prevent their friend from violating another issur in the Torah, they should be obligated to prevent their friend from marrying a mamzer, and not cover up the p'sul!

A. The issur of marrying mamzeirim and other p'sulei yichus is dependent on the knowledge. Although by most issurim we consider the lack of knowledge to merely be an o'nes, but not an actual exemption. In this context, we truly follow "what you don't know won't hurt you". The issur is only realized through ye'diya, and without it there is no issur. Based on this, one should technically not reveal even a private individual who they know to be a mamzer and is not mixed up into a larger family. However, Chazal were concerned that it will cause a takala in that even people who know will marry them, so they require one to tell about an individual who is a mamzer, but not to tell if the mamzer is mixed in with kasherim.

B. It is not the knowledge that is matir, rather it is the ta'aroves that is matir. If one can identify an individual who is a mamzer, they are obligated to identify him, but when that individual is mixed in a family, the ta'aroves of the kesheirim with the pesulim will be matir the entire family. Once the ta'aroves occurs, and is not able to be identified following rules of Rov and Chazaka, he is permitted even if he can be identified by Eliyahu through Nevuah. Therefore, if witnesses know about an individual who is a mamzer, they are obligated to reveal, but if they know about a family who has a mamzer mixed in, their revelation won't have any affect since the mamzer remains mixed in with kasherim and can't be identified.

Kiddushin 70b - Arvus for Geirim

Tosafos proves that geirim were not included in arvus. Based on this it should come out that the halacha that allows one to make kiddush and blow shofar for another even after being yotzei himself should not apply to a ger. I am troubled that the exclusion of a ger from arvus isn't mentioned by the halachos where we use arvus to be motzi others such as kiddush. Is anyone familiar with a source? 

(I found an article from my brother R' Aryeh, where he quotes R' Shternbach who says a drush to distinguish between arvus for communal responsibility for them, and arvus on the personal level to be motzi them. However, I find this very hard to swallow).

Kiddushin 69a - Mamzer marrying a Shifcha

The gemara says that R' Simlai would have counseled a mamzer to marry a shifcha to make his children mutar l'kahal based on R' Tarfon. The gemara questions whether the right to marry a shifcha is even l'chatchila or only b'dieved (since there is an issur to be a kadeish that should apply to a mamzer as well). Even on the tzad that one cannot marry a shifcha l'chatchila, the gemara says that R' Simlai would have advised stealing so that the can be sold as an eved ivri and then be permitted to a shifcha. The Tosafos Rid explains that it would be permitted to steal with the intent of eventually paying back, since it is being done for the purpose of being m'etaher his children. But, the Maharsha asks that it should still be problematic, because the children that the eved ivri has with the shifcha will be owned by the master and he will not be allowed to free them since it is a violation of לעולם בהם תעבודו?

R' Elyashiv points out in his sefer that the maharsha only asks the question on the gemara, but not on the mishna. Why doesn't he ask on the mishna itself that the entire approach of R' Tarfon requires the master freeing the children which would be a violation of freeing an eved. R' Elyashiv explains that based on the Ran in Gittin that this issur of selling an eved follows the rules of "lo sei'chanem" - it cannot be done for the benefit of the eved, but can be done for the benefit of the master, there is no question. R' Tarfon would advise that the Mamzer purchase a shifcha to be owned by him so that the children he has with her will be avadim that are owned by him. When he allows them to go free, it is for his benefit of being metaher his own children. The question can only be asked on the gemara where the method of having children with a shifcha will involve being sold as an eved ivri, in which case the children will be owned by someone else and not by him.

Kiddushin 66a - Believing an Individual Witness

In the machlokes between Abaye and Rava where an individual witness testifies that an eishes ish committed adultery, Tosafos explains that there are certain premesis that they both agree to in order to understand the exact point of argument. All agree that there is a concept of אין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים, but Abaye holds that the concept is limited to an act where the witnesses are necessary to make it happen such as gittin and kiddushin. But, when the witnesses are only there to serve the purpose of testifying what transpired, even by davar sh'berva and eid echad is believed. Tosafos also explains that all agree to the concept of שויא אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא so  that if the "shtika" is considered admitting guilt, she would be forbidden to her husband [If not for Tosafos, I would have said that שויא אנפשיה cannot be acheived through שתיקה כהודאה since shtika k'hoda'ah is a concept of ne'emanus - trust, but will not form a neder which is the foundation of shavya anafshei]. But, Tosafos explains that Rava rejects the notion of "shtika k'hoda'ah" since there are other things that the silence can be attributed to (such as the gemara pointed out in the "tzricha" before). Rava holds that the issue at hand is not whether she is considered to admit, rather it is purely focused on whether we trust the testimony of the individual witness. Therefore, Rava disagrees with Abaye on 2 points. 1. Abaye holds that being quiet is tantamount to admitting, and Rava holds that it isn't. 2. Abaye holds that  אין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים applies only to gittin and kiddushin, but Rava holds that it applies even to making a woman forbidden to her husband.

The difficulty that I have with Tosafos is that once Tosafos establishes that Rava rejects the notion of "shtika k'hoda'ah", and we know that Abaye holds shtika k'hoda'ah, that should be sufficient to answer why Abaye isn't bothered by the davar sh'berva aspect. Meaning, even though  אין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים, Abaye holds that when she admits she should be assur due to shavya anafshei. Why does Tosafos have to say that Abaye holds that  אין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים only applies to gitting and kiddushin, even if it applies to z'nus she should still be assur based on shtika k'hoda'ah?

Perhaps Tosafos holds that if an eid echad is not regarded in matters of erva at all, it would not even qualify as shtika k'hoda'ah. For example, we certainly wouldn't say that if someone hears a parrot say that he owes his friend money, that if he remains quiet it is shtika k'hoda'ah. Shtika k'hoda'ah only applies when it is stemming from a credible source. Therefore, Tosfaos must first reject the notion of  אין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים in this context to determine that an eid echad is a credible source and only at that point would she be assur based on shtika k'hoda'ah.

Practically speaking we pasken like Rava, that we don't say shtika k'hoda'ah. BUT as Tosafos points out and Shulchan Aruch (179:9) paskens, if the husband considers the individual witness so credible that he trusts him like 2 witnesses, then she will be assur to him. Based on this we see that even Rava has limitations for when we apply  אין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים. It only applies absolutely to the chalos of gittin and kiddushin, but in the realm of believing the witness, it depends on how much the husband trusts him.

Kiddushin 65a - Eidei Kiyum and Eidei Birur

The gemara asks about a case where kiddushin is done in the presence of only one witness, but both he and she admit to the kiddushin. Rashi seems to understand that the question is whether we require eidei kiyum to create the chalos kiddushin or do they only serve as eidei birur just to clarify that it was done. However, further on in Rashi (d.h. v'i leka) he implies that the gemara knew that at least one witness is necessary to create the kiddushin. By simply having him and her admit to being married the gemara understood all along that there would not be any chalos kiddushin. The only question is that maybe a single witness is sufficient to create the status of kiddushin (just as he can be mechayev a shavua) and the admission of the husband and wife is sufficient to confirm that they were married in the presence of a witness.

The gemara concludes that without the presence of 2 witnesses there is no chalos of kiddushin at all. Yet, by monetary issues the gemara 65b concludes that witnesses only serve the purpose of preventing the parties from denying. The Ketzos Hachoshen 241:1 raises a major question: How can monetary issues serve as the source to require 2 eidim for the chalos of kiddushin? How can we learn from monetary issues where eidim are only l'vrurei, that by gittin and kiddushin we need eidim l'kiyumei?

The Ketzos explains that really by monetary issues we also require eidim to make the chalos of the kinyan. Just that in dinei mamonos we have a concept of hoda'as ba'al din, so that the people involved in the kinyan will always serve as "100 witnesses" to make the kinyan go into effect. Since gittin and kiddushin are consisered a chov for others, so that we cannot use the concept of hoda'as ba'al din, we require actual witnesses to make the kinyan go into effect. 

Relying on Chazakos and Eid Echad for Capital Punishment

The Rambam (Sanhedrin 16:6) explains that when we require 2 witnesses for malkus, it is only for the act of the aveirah that we require it. But, the issur itself such as the status of the meat being assur can be established even through an eid echad. Based on this the Chasam Sofer (cited in pischei teshuva Even Haezer 169:13) rules that even if witnesses verify the age of someone to be 13 based on the father being machzik the child as a 13 year old (for example, he was wearing tefillin for a few months), it is sufficient for dinei Torah to assume that he is old enough to do chalitzah. The Chasam sofer argues that if we reject the Rambam's assumption that we can uses chazakos that were established prior to the situation at hand, we would never be able to be mechayev someone for having relations with a nida, because the witnesses would certainly not know that she is a nida (they would presumably only witness the act of bi'ah).

The Pischei Teshuva asks, that this seems to contradict the Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 169:11) in the context of chalitzah who says that the age of the child has to be established based on neighbors who know his status completely independent of the father. Why would we require that their knowledge be independent of the father?

It seems from rashi in our sugya that he also assumes not like the Rambam. Rashi writes that if she is machzik herself as a married woman by saying that she received kiddushin herself, and then she committed adultery in the presence of witnesses, she is not stoned. Rashi writes:

ואף על פי שהחזיקה עצמה קודם הזנות בחזקת ארוסה

Even though it may be true that we have a gezeiras hakasuv giving ne'emanus to the father, and we have no pasuk giving ne'emanus to her. Why should he being machzik herself as a married woman be any worse than another chazaka that is established prior to the violation, where we rely on the chazaka and don't require witnesses?

Kiddushin 62b - Kabalas Hamitzvos in front of Three

The gemara says that a ger needs a beis din of 3, but isn't clear about what part of the conversion requires 3. Rashi seems to hold that both the tevila and to inform him of mitzvos requires 3. However, Tosafos proves from the gemara in yevamos that tevila can work even when done for other purposes such as to become tahor from keri, which is obviously not in the presence of 3. Based on this Tosafos holds that only kabalas hamitzvos absolutely requires a beis din of 3. The two answers of Tosafos seem to dispute whether the tevila would at least require 3 l'chatchila or not at all. The Shulchan Aruch (268:3) paskens like Tosafos (first answer) that tevila and mila require 3 l'chatchila, but b'dieved would work even if done in the presence of one. However, kabalas hamitzvos must be in the presence of 3. The Gr"a (15) points out that our gemara is a proof that without 3 the kabalas hamitzvos is absolutely invalid, because if it were only a l'chatchila requirement, it should be considered b'yado to convert. From the fact that we don't consider it b'yado implies that we always need 3 for some aspect of the geirus.

The rationale for kabalas hamitzvos requiring 3 more than the tevila, the shach and Taz quote from the Rosh, that kabalas hamitzvos is like techilas din which requires 3, but mila and tevila are like the g'mar din which can be done even at night and therefore would be more lenient. Based on this approach the dagul m'rvava explains that for a ger kattan where there isn't any kabalas hamitzvos, we would require a beis din of 3 for the tevila which is the primary act of conversion.

The Shulchan Aruch quotes that the opinion of Ri"f and Rambam is that even mila and tevila require 3 and are invalid if done not in the presence of 3.

Kiddushin 58b - Payment for mitzvos

The mishna implies that one is allowed to receive payment for para aduma ashes (from the fact that it has value when you are mekadesh an isha with it -עיין ביש"ש שמפרש דפליגי רש"י והר"ן וכן הרמב"ם והראב"ד אם מקדש בגוף הדבר או בשכר שיכולה לקבל על הבאת האפר), but the mishna in bechoros says that one cannot receive payment? The gemara makes a distinction between the transporting from place to place that one can receive payment for, but for the actual sprinkling one cannot receive payment for. What is the point of distinction?

The distinction seems obvious. One cannot receive payment for the actual performance of a mitzvah, but can receive payment for enabling a mitzvah so long as they are not doing the actual mitzvah. Transporting the material is not the mitzvah, it merely makes the mitzvah possible. This peshat is mentioned in the Tosafos R"I HaZaken, but is not the peshat of Rashi.

Rashi implies that even if it is not the ikar mitzvah, there is still a prohibition to take payment. The only heter to take payment is for something that has a significant tircha, you can take payment for the difficulty of doing it. But when there isn't any major tircha, it is assur to take payment.

Based on Rashi it should be permitted even for a witness to take payment (so long as it is from both sides, so that it does not create a bias in his testimony), when it is a bother for him to come to court. In fact the Taz in Choshen Mishpat (on the rama in 34:18) says exactly that based on our gemara. The Rama allows one to receive payment to go watch something so that they can testify on it, but once they have watched the event, they cannot receive payment for going to court since after witnessing the even they are obligated to testify (and it is a mitzvah incumbent on them). The Taz adds that if there is a difficulty for the witness to go to court he can receive payment for that just as he can receive payment for the transporting of the ashes.

Upon further analysis of Rashi, it seems that the Rama is correct (and it seems that the Taz does not have a good comparison from rashi's peshat). Rashi writes:

 בשכר הבאה האפר ממקום למקום ושכר מילוי המים דמילתא דטירחא היא ורחמנא לא רמיא עליה ושרי למשקל אגרא

Why does Rashi add the words "the torah does not obligate him"? Rashi seems to hold that the entire distinction between the transportation where there is tircha, and the sprinkling where there is no tircha, only applies to a type of mitzvah that is not an obligation on this individual. Meaning, there is no individual who is personally responsible to do the mitzvah of eifer parah, therefore we allow the one doing it to receive payment for his tircha. However, a mitzvah that is incumbent upon an individual in particular such as testifying in court about what they saw, cannot take payment even if there is a tircha involved in going to court. Based on this, one cannot use a heter of "tircha" to permit payment for Talmud Torah because the mitzvah to teach torah is incumbent on every individual. כנלענ"ד

Kiddushin 57a - Darshening "es" in the Torah

The Maharsha explains that the rationale for darshening every "es" in the torah is to show kavod hatorah by proving that there is no extra word or letter (as rashi explains at the end of sotah, when r' akiva died batla kavod hatora). But, when shimon ha'amsuni couldn't darshen "את ה' אלקיך תירא", he retracted from all of them and commented that just as he received reward for showing kavod hatorah by darshening every word, he also received reward for showing kavod hatorah that nothing can be equated with yir'as hashem. However, R' Akiva held that including talmidei chachamim also showed kavod hatorah.

The Chasam Sofer (pesachim 22b) also has a beautiful approach to this gemara. Shimon Ha'amsuni realized that the pasuk can be darshened to include talmidei chachamim. However, he was concerned that this would force the explanation of את ה' אלקיך תירא to mean Yira'as Haromimus - awe for the greatness of Hashem, rather than fear of punishment, since fear of punishment is not applicable by talmidei chachamim. He was afraid that by publicizing this drasha it would scare people off and intimidate them, since most people can't achieve this high level of awe. He abstained from this drasha and declared that since he is abstaining l'sheim shamayim, he will receive reward as if he publicized it. However, R' Akiva who came from nothing, and accomplished everything, personified the ability to have achieve incredible heights in yir'as hashem. He was able to publicize the derasha because when people will see what he accomplished they will be more encouraged rather than discouraged by the difficulty to achieve yira'as haromimus.

kiddushin 56b - Mekadesh with Issur Hana'ah

בתוס' ד"ה המקדש, הקשו אמאי אינה מקודשת כשמקדש אשה באיסור הנאה, הא יכולה ליהנות שלא כדרך הנאתו. ותרצו דקמיירי כשאין בשלא כדרך הנאתו שו"פ, או שאשה סבורה שיכולה ליהנות ולא סמכה דעתא על הנאה שלא כדרך הנאתו. היוצא מדבריהם שאם שוה פרוטה שלא כדרך הנאתו ואמר לה בהדיא שתתקדש בזה, שהיא מקודשת. עיין בתוס' ע"ז סב ע"א בד"ה בדמיהן, שכתבו דאסור לו לקדש אשה בדבר האסור בהנאה משום דהוי כמו מכירה חשובה, אבל אין דבריהם שם מספיק אלא לגבי האיסור לכתחלה אבל אינו מספיק לפרש אמאי אינה מקודשת

עיין במשנה למלך (פ"ה מהל' יסודי התורה הל' ח' בד"ה וראיתי) שתמה על תוס' שהרי אפילו למ"ד דשלא כדרך הנאתו שרי מדאורייתא, איסורא דרבנן מיהא איכא, וכו"ע מודים שהמקדש אשה בדבר שהוא אסור בהנאה מדרבנן שאינה מקודשת אף מדאורייתא כיון דסוף סוף אינו שו"פ. א"ו ס"ל להתוס' דשלא כדרך הנאתו אפילו איסור דרבנן ליכא. אמנם עיין בקובץ שיעורים בקונטרס דברי סופרים שמתחיל בחקירה זו שהמקדש באיסור הנאה דרבנן אי מקודשת מדאורייתא. ויש סברא לומר שמדאורייתא מיהא מקודשת, שהטעם שהמקדש באיסור הנאה שאינה מקודשת אינו משום שיש איסור השתמשות אלא שמדאורייתא לא מקרי ממונא, אבל איסור הנאה דרבנן מקרי ממונא מדאורייתא ודו"ק

Kiddushin 56a - Ma'aser money and Lifnei Iver

Rashi explains that when someone has ma'aser sheini money and intends to purchase an animal (which would become ma'aser sheini) to eat outside of yerushalayim, it would be a violation of lifnei iver for the seller to sell it to him. Tosafos (d.h. aval) asks that this should not be a violation of lifnei iver because lifnei iver only applies by "two sides of a river". In other words, lifnei iver would only apply if the buyer could not find someone else to sell him the animal, but since he can find someone else to sell him the animal, it is not lifnei iver for this seller to sell it to him.

Although Tosafos in Shabbos 3a understands that there would still be an issur d'rabonon of supporting and aiding in the doing of an aveira, even if the seller would not be in violation of a real lifnei iver, he should still be in violation of an issur d'rabonon. Perhaps Tosafos is assuming that the buyer we are speaking has a status of a mumar, and based on Tosafos in Avoda Zara [explained by the shach (y.d. 151:6) ], the issur of supporting in doing an aveira wouldn't apply. Furthermore, based on dagul m'rvava there, the issur of helping do an aveira wouldn't apply to anyone who is intentionally doing an aveira, which is certainly the case here. Also, it is possible that Tosafos held that for an issur d'rabonon we would not impose such a penalty on the seller.

It seems to me that Tosafos question on Rashi can be answered based on the Mishna l'melech (malveh v'loveh 4:2) cited by pischei teshuva (y.d. 160:1) who explains that one who borrows with interest violates lifnei iver by causing the lender to do an aveira, even if their are other borrowers who are willing to borrow from this lender with interest. His rationale is that the fact that if reuven and shimon are the two potential borrowers, they can't each be moreh heter saying that it is not "two sides of a river" since the other can borrow b'issur. Just as when reuven sees shimon about to pass wine to a nazir and quickly jumps to pass it himself, is still in violation of lifnei iver, so too when reuven sees shimon about to borrow with interest and jumps to borrow himself, would be in violation. Here too, the fact that the buyer can purchase from another seller who would sell it to him b'issur would not help to remove the lifnei iver from this seller.