achilas keva - a pshat question

the gemara come out that acc to rebi elizer shabbos and truma makes you unable to eat even temporarily but preparing the food with your words does not make it achilas keva since you can return the rest to the pile.

but according to chachamim that preparing the food with words does make it achilas keva should they not surely agree that shabbos and truma make it achilas keva.

it comes out they hold opposite sevaros??

lighting a fire on y"t?!

the mishna berura says that lighting a fire is "nolad" and is prohibited since it is 'machshirin' and it could have been done before y"t (based on rambam).
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does this mean that if one was busy and was searching after a lost object and didn't have a chance to light a fire before y"t that he would be allowed to do this on y"t? (be careful - maybe yes but "ain morin ken"!) and if he is allowed, does he have to try and go to a neighbor?

beita 33 heating tiles vs cooling an oven

כמה הערות באיסור חיסום רעפים כנגד היתיר צירוף התנור לצורך אפיה וביאור השיטות המובאות בשעה"צ. מפאת האורך קצת שמתי בהערות

beitza 32-33 בענין אין סומכין את הקדירה בבקעת

בענין אין סומכין את הקדירה בבקעת כבר ציין הגהש"ס שברש"י מובא שני טעמים. בל"ב ע"ב רש"י אומר משום "קסבר לא ניתנו עצים אלא להסקה לפיכך מוקצים הן אצל כל תשמיש" ובל"ג ע"ב רש"י מבאר "...אבל עצים הואיל ודרכן לדבר האסור כגון לעשות כלים לא התירו לטלטלן אלא להסקה". י
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ונראה פשוט שהנפ"מ היא אי אסור גם למאן דשרי מוקצה, דטעם ראשון שייך רק למאן דאסר מוקצה וטעם דגזירה שייך לכ"ע. ולכן רש"י מבאר תחילת הסוגיא משם מוקצה כיון גבגמרא מפורש שלר"ש מותר אך לקמן שחכמים במשנה בדף ל"ג סברי דלא יטול קיסם לחצוץ שיניו הטעם משום חשש שיקטום כמבואר בתוספות ולכן שייך גם גזירה דומה בכל עצים שמא יעשה כלים.
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ולמעשה נחלקו הפוסקים אי למאן דשרי מוקצה אסור לסמוך בבקעת. והקשו שהרי ר"ש מתיר בפירוש אך לרש"י ניחא דאף שר"ש מתיר עדיין אפשר לומר דאף למאן דשרי מוקצה ס"ל שאסור משום הגזירה ויוצא דשיטת חכמים שהיא הרבים יכולים לסבור כר"ש במוקצה. ועיין בב"י ובמג"א ובמ"ב.

בענין עשית כלי אליבא דרבי יהודה ־ מ"ח ראשונים? י

ui סתימת הפוסקים דאפילו לרבי יהודה א"א לעשות כלי ביו"ט רק אפשר לתקן כלי. ובשעה"צ מבואר דראיה לדבר ממשנה ל"ב ע"א דמשמע שאף לר' יהודה אין פוחתין את הנר וכו' וכן משמע מרש"י שרק בל"ב ע"ב אומר שהמשנה שם אליבא דרבנן אך בע"א משמע שגם לר' יהודה

אך צ"ב מדוע אסור אליבא דר"י לעשות כלי אם א"א מאתמול הרי הוי מכשירי אוכל נפש? ולמשל בעשית נר הוי אוכל נפש כיון ש"הדלקת נר ביו"ט צורך אכילה היא" ־ לשון רש"י כ"ז ע"ב. אך ביאור הדבר ע"פ הר"ן בט"ו ע"א בדפי הרי"ף דעשית כלי נחשב עשיה לימים הרבה ואסור כמו אוכל נפש שאסור לימים הרבה כהני ראשונים

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אך נראה דלהני ראשונים שחולקים שם על הר"ן וס"ל דלר"י מותר להשחיז סכין במשחזת של אבן לכאורה יסברו דגם כל עשית כלים מותר לר' יהודה. וכן נראה מוכח מתוס'כ"ח ע"ב שמבאר דגריפת התנור שמותר אליבא דר"י היינו המכה בפטיש של עשית התנור ולכאורה מפורש דלר"י עשית התנור מותרת ביו"ט לר"י היכא דא"א מבעוד יום

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ואח"כ מצאתי במגיני שלמה בדף ל"ב דהמשנה שאין פוחתין את הנר דלא כר"י. ולענ"ד תלוי במ"ח ראשונים. ועל טענת הר"ן שכל עשית כלי הוי ימים הרבה כבר תירץ הקרבן נתנאל בפ"ג סימן י' אות ק' "דדמיא להא דתני לעיל דף ט"ז ממלאה אשה כל התנור פת אפי' א"צ אלא לפת א' ....ה"נ האי דהשחיז בטוב עד שנעשה כלי לימים רבים הכל הוא עושה לכבוד היום" וקצ"ע מסתימת הפוסקים דלא מבארים דהוי מ"ח ראשונים

אחר העיון והדיון מצאתי דכן הובא מ"ח זה בפוסקים, עיין בשעה"צ תק"ט י"א

Beitza 31b - Wood Chopping

Rishonim ask, why is it permitted to chop wood with a kupitz (cleaver), it is machshirei ochel nefesh that could have been done before yom tov since we are speaking about a beam that broke before yom tov began? Ran answers that since you are benefiting from the wood itself by providing heat, it is considered ochel nefesh, not just machshirin. It is different than sharpening a knife e.t.c. bec. there you are only using the item to prepare what will ultimately provide benefit to you (once we are matir chopping for heat which is ochel nefesh, we allow chopping even for cooking using 'mitoch'). It seems clear from the Ran that ochel nefesh does not include just "food", but rather all direct "hana'ah". I think that the source of the Ran is the gemara 21b that suggests to allow making a fire even acc. to beis shamai (who does not hold of 'mitoch'). Rashi explains the rationale is bec. 'hana'as haguf' is similar to ochel nefesh. Even though the gemara concludes acc. to beis shamai that it would not qualify as ochel nefesh, the ran seems to understand that acc. to beis hillel it is actual ochel nefesh, rather than just a regular 'han'ah', and therefore would not require 'mitoch'.

It comes out that the statement of the mishnah 21b that beis hillel is matir heating water for hands, feet and face requires 'mitoch', whereas making a fire for heat does not require 'mitoch'. Therefore, heating water to wash ones entire body (i.e. shower) is hana'as kol haguf and regarded as ochel nefesh so it would not require 'mitoch', but it would still be assur acc. to tosafos since it is not shaveh l'chol nefesh (unless times changed).

Beitza 30a - Gezeiros being batul

Tosafos writes that nowadays since people are not experts in making or fixing instruments, there is no issur to clap or dance.

Why isn't this considered a davar shebiminyan and remain assur even if the reason is no longer applicable?

It seems that Tosafos understands this to be similar to the cases where an issur had a time expiration, so we do not require a minyah acher l'ahtiro (tosafos 5a). This concept is further illustrated in Tosafos 6a where Tosafos claims since there are no longer "chavri", we can bury people on yom tov sheini - it is not davar shebiminyan bec. the reason was not just the cause for the gezeira but was said as part of the gezeira, so when the reason no longer applies, neither does the gezeira. Here too, Tosafos seems to understand that the gezeira wasn't "don't clap" bec. you may come to make an instrument, but rather "don't clap bec. you may come to make an instrument", therefore, when the reason no longer applies it is like a gezeira with an expiration time that does not need a minyan acher l'ahtiro.

However, Rashi who feels that even a gezeira with a time expiration needs a minyan l'hatiro, would certainly require a minyah l'hatiro in a case where the reason is no longer applicable.

See Rema (339:3) who adds that since people are not experts it is "uncommon", so the Rabonon weren't gozer. It seems that the Rema is coming to add, that even if one is an expert in making an instrument, there is no gezeira since most people aren't experts so it is a milsa d'lo shchicha, and there is no gezeira.

rav yehuda - building an oven

acc to tosfos greifas hatanor is the final blow of making the oven. does this mean that acc to tosfos one may also build an oven from scratch acc to rebi yehuda? and if tosfos agrees (to the ran) on this point, how is this different?
note: i did find an argument between the rosh and ran if acc to rw yehuda you may sharpen the knife on a stone thing and the kurban nesanel explains that acc to the rosh sharpening the knife is no more 'long term' then many breads in an oven wich is mutar bec it helps the bread. does that mean that any building of dishes is mutar acc to rw yehuda?

Beitza 27b - Destroying Teruma T'meiah

Tosafos asks why we assume that terumah temeia cannot be burnt on yom tov, since you are allowed to benefit from it it's ochel nefesh?

Rabbeinu Yitzchok answers that anytime tzorech hedyot and tzorech gavoha are equal, the tzorech govoha is dominant and the tzorech hedyot is batul to it. Tosafos asks, if so why should one be allowed to roast a korban pesach on yom tov, the mitzvah of roasting should be dominant and over power the ochel nefesh aspect? Bec. of this question, tosafos rejects the r"iy.

I think that if the tzorech hedyot and tzorech govoah are equal needs (i.e. sacrificing nedarim and burning terumah temeia for light), the tzorech govoha is dominant and it is assur. Similarly, if there would be an independent mitzvah to roast a korban pesach (even w/o eating), then roasting should also be assur on yom tov bec. the tzorech govoha and tzorech hedyot are equal. But, since the mitzvah is not to roast, rather to eat it roasted, the mitzvah aspect is batul to the tzorech hedyot.

Someone pointed out that the ya'avetz seems to indicate a similar answer (in very few words).

Beitza 26a - Paskening on Bechor

The gemara concludes that acc. to r' shimon there is no difference whether the bechor gets a 'mum' on yom tov or has a 'mum' from before yom tov, even if the chacham would pasken that it is a 'mum', since the pesak only took place on yom tov, it would be assur bidieved. Tosafos explains that the issue is really a muktzah issue. Since it is assur for a chacham to pasken acc. to r' shimon, it is not considered muchan and is muktzah. However, Rashi (on the mishna) says that R' Shimon would not hold of muktzah even in such a situation, therefore the reason it is assur even bidieved is because he violated the prohibition of paskening on yom tov (which is similar to either judging or tikun). The M.B. (498:52) says that Rashi's reason is not sufficient to assur bidieved, therefore the reason to assur bidieved must be bec. of muktzah. What is the peshat in Rashi? The issur to be matir a bechor on yom tov is because the pesak is not merely a revelation of torah knowledge, but rather even if it is clear to all that it is a 'mum', it is necessary for the chacham to formally pasken that it is mutar (to the exclusion of a milk-meat question) [m.b. 50]. The issur is not the revelation of knowledge that the blemish qualifies as a mum, but is rather the effect of it becoming mutar. Therefore, by chazal being mesaken that a pesak issued on yom tov is not binding, they are actually causing that there was no issur done by issuing the pesak on yom tov. Now it makes sense why it is assur even bidieved acc. to Rashi. The difficulty with this approach is that since the pesak issued on yom tov was not binding, it will need a new pesak of a chacham after yom tov, which would be somewhat of a chiddush.

beitza 25a בענין חזקת אבר מן החי

בענין חזקת אבר מן החי

תוספות מקשה על רש"י איך שייך חזקת איסור אבר מן החי לאחר מיתה , ושמעתי מרב אחד להקשות על תוס' דהרי אבר מן החי שייך גם לאחר שחיטה עד סוף זמן הפירכוס וא"כ גם לרש"י שייך חזקת איסור אבר מן החי לאחר שחיטה.

עוד הערה בענין, צ"ע מה חידש רב הונא להחמיר בספק שחיטה הרי כל ספק דאוריייתא לחומרא. ועיין פנ"י.

Beitza 25b - eating before checking for treifos

Tosafos asks how the gemara can say that it is only an eitza tova to search for treifos before eating from the animal, when just a few lines later the gemara will state that the laws of orlah should serve as a lesson for butchers who eat before checking for treifos, strongly implying that it is forbidden to eat before checking and not just an eitza tova? The Mishkenos Yakov (Yoreh Deah #16 in a teshuva to Rav Efraim Zalman Margalios) suggests an interesting answer: It is certainly prohibited for a butcher to eat before skinning and checking the animal. However, this prohibition is only for "a butcher" who does this on a consistent basis. A regular person who does this once can rely on the chezkas kashrus of the animal. It is different for a butcher because statistically speaking, if he keeps on pushing his luck eventually he will eat a treifa. The Mishkenos Yakov compares this to what some rishonim say that when two kosher pieces of meat get mixed with one non-kosher piece, the same person can't eat all three because eventually he will be eating an issur. (Even those who do allow it in that case only allow it because "issur nehepach l'heter" as opposed to our case where there is no bitul).

Beitza 25 - Misukenes - Boalei Nidda

Misukenes

1. The gemara in pesachim 46b says that if you hold of ho'il then you don't have to actually eat a kezayis of the misukenes, but if you don't hold of ho'il then you have to be gomer da'as to actually eat a kezayis before night. Is it enough to decide you will eat a kezayis and then change your mind or do you have to actually eat otherwise it is ha'arama (shita mikubetzes says you don't have to eat it).

Boalei Niddos

2. Rashi explains that they jump the gun and have bi'ah before she goes to the mikvah and will definitely violate an issur. This is not so consistent with the butcher where it may or may not result in an issur treifa. I was thinking based on gemara Nida 67b, that it is speaking of a zava who is tovel on the 7th day and has bi'ah before night. If she will become a nidah after the bi'ah before nightfall, she will ruin the niki'im and retroactively be a zava. In this case the jumping the gun is more similar to treifa since it is a safek whether it will come to issur.

beitza 24b - Rashi???

Rashi says that fruits that a goy plucks off a tree and brings for a jew is muktzah even according to R' Shimon for it is like the raisins case.
here are some of the question that rishonim and achronim deal with in rashi - see pnei yehushua:

1. Rashi himself in Shabbos says that acc to rav shimon its only muktzah if you have 2 factors: A) not fit to eat and B) you pushed it off with your hands, so here even if you accept that you pushed it away, its still food.
2. Why does Rashi not explain simply that you may not enjoy the goy's action on shabbos?
3. Why is it called muktzah if you hold like the yerushalmi that there is no muktzah by a goy's objects?
4. Why couldn't rashi say like the Magen Avrohom (based on a tosfos in shabbos) that anything which is forbidden to eat becomes muktzah like a stone?

Beitza 24a - Safek Muchan

The gemara explains the Tana Kamma in the mishna holds that safek muchan is assur. The rationale is that it is a davar sheyesh lo matirin. However, on Yom tov Sheini which was originally introduces only as a safek, the ran says you can be lenient with safek muchan bec. it is a sfek sfaika by a davar sheyesh lo matirin. Shulchan Aruch in O.C. (497:4) paskens like the Ran (even opinions brought in m.b. 11 who argue, that is only bec. yom tov sheini is stronger than a safek). The Rema doesn't seem to take issue with this and agrees to be lenient in a sfek sfeika b'davar sheyesh lo matirin. However, in Y.D. 110:8, the rema seems to contradict himself bec. he recommends being machmir by a sfek sfeika of a davar sheyesh lo matirin since it will become mutar later?

The Taz (y.d. 110:11) asks the opposite question on the Rema. The Ran is only matir sfek sfeika b'davar sheysh lo matirin by an issur derabonon, but the Rema implies we can be meikil m'ikar hadin to be matir sfek sfeika by a davar sheyesh lo matirin even by an issur d'oraysa. Nekudas Hakesef explains that the Ran in the first perek equates deoraysa and derabonon by a sfek sfeika of davar sheyesh lo matirin, therefore, in the third perek where he leans to be lenient, it would even apply to an issur d'oraysa. Based on this, perhaps the Rema takes a stricter approach in Yoreh Deiya than in Orach Chaim, bec. he is speaking about an issur d'oraysa, but by an issur d'rabonon there is no recommendation to be machmir.

Any better ideas to explain why the Rema is more lenient in O.C.?

Beitza 23b - Rashi's opinion of ochel nefesh

Rashi at the beginning of the perek 23b holds that ochel nefesh is only a heter for melachos that could not have been done before yom tov. Rashi indicates this way in 2 other places (12b d.h. mahu, 14b d.h. avul). Tosafos 3a already rejects this approach as does the rosh and ran bec. only by machshirin do we make this distinction, but by ochel nefesh there is no difference. Furthermore, Rashi on 12a is extremely liberal when it comes to 'mitoch' even for no need, yet he will be machmir for actual ochel nefesh if it could have been done before!
R' Yaacov M'lisa (in a sefer called kehillas ya'acov printed with Toras Gittin) says that Rashi holds like the opinion of the Ramban (mentioned in m.b. 495:12) that any melacha that is generally done in advance is assur, but any melacha that is generally done for that day, even if you could have done it before is mutar. Whereas by machshirin we are only matir (acc. to R' Yehuda) if it is normally done for that day AND could not have been done before.

extinguishing for enjoying food

נחלקו רש"י והר"ן ועוד ראשונים אם מותר לכבות אש לרבנן לצורך יו"ט. דהיינו אם ביתו יתעשן ולא יהיה לו מקום לסעוד ויצטרך לאכול בצינה ושרב די"א דמותר אף לרבנן כיון שזהו אוכל נפש ויש אוסרין. ומחלוקתם צריך ביאור
ונראה, דהנה בלתקו השיפוד וכדומה דהוי מכשירי אוכל נפש יש פה תרתי לריעותא. א' שלא מתעסק באוכל ממש, וב' דזה רחוק מההנאה של יו"ט דהיינו יש שתי שלבים עד שיגיע ההנאה. וא"כ בכיבוי יש רק חדא לריעותא דהרי לא ממש מתעסק באוכל להשביחו אך מצד שני ההנאה מגיעה מיד כשמכבה ובזה נחלקו הראשונים אם רבנן מודים. לא רציתי להאריך אך לפ"ז יובנו שתי התירוצים של תוס' בכתובות ז ע"א ומובא ברא"ש הכא

carrying keys on y"t without an eiruv when you only need one for y"t

מהרב קאליש,
יש מחלוקת ר' שלמה זלמן ור' אלחנן ועוד פוסקים אחרונים אם מותר ריבוי בשיעורין כאשר לא כל חלק ראוי בשבילו. דהיינו למשל אם מותר לרבות בשיעור הוצאה של מפתחות בטירחא אחת אף שרק ראוי לו מפתח אחד
והנה יש פה ראיה מהסוגיא: דשאלו את רב הונא בהמה חציה של נכרי וחציה של ישראל מהו וכו' מ"ש מקרבנות ואחכ אומרת הגמרא וטעמא מאי? ומתרצת א"א לכזית בשר שלא שחיטה. ורש"י מבאר דטעמא מאי היא סוגית הגמ' והמהרש"א מבאר דרש"י היה חייב לומר כן דלר' הונא לא נצטרך להיתיר של ריבוי בשיעורין הכא כיון דלקמן בעמוד מתיר רב הונא לאפות אפי' בטירחא יתירא לבני באגא כיוון שראוי ליתן מהפת לינוקא וא"כ ה"ה הכא
וכעת אם היתיר ריבוי בשיעורין הוא אפילו כעין המפתחות שלא כל אחד ראוי, א"כ הכא בבהמב רב הונא צריך לחדש דין ריבוי בשיעורין ויהיה מותא אפילו אם לגוי יש חלק מסויים בבהמה אלא מוכח מרש"י אליבא דמהרש"א דגם ריבוי בשיעורין רק מותר אם כל חלק ראוי לו וא"כ בהוצאת מפתחות ברה"ר בלי עירוב אסור אם רק ראוי לו מפתח אחד

Beitza 21b - Peshat in Tosafos

I am not posting this as a post, rather as a comment bec. it is slightly long. It is a thought that I had to explain some of the difficulties in Tosafos. If you get a chance to read over shabbos (copy,paste and print), let me know if you have any thoughts about it.

Beitza 21a - bathing/ machlokes BS-BH

1. tosfos says that acc. to Bais Hillel you can only wash your feet but the whole body is assur. Tosfos says a sevara "davar hashaveh lekol nefesh baenan" Where does tosfos get that sevara that the heter of ochel nefesh on yom tov only applies by a davar that is shoveh lekol nefesh?
2.From the begining of the mesechta until the second mishna on amud beis every mishna is a machlokes bais hillel and bais shamai. (the mesachta starts off with the 3 areas where bais shamai is makil. and now you have the 3 time raban gamleil was machmir like bais shammai) what is the shaychus between hilchos yom tov and bais shamai and bais hillel? I think it has to do with what the mishna in chaggiga says that the 1st machlokes in yisroel was on semicha on yom tov and from there to the other machlokesen between bais hillel and bais shamai. since it is from hilchos yom tov that machlokes started thats why you find bais shammai and bais hillel being cholek in many areas of hilchos yom tov .

Beitza 20b - Nedarim and Nedavos

The gemara asks, acc. to opinion that nedarim and nedavos can't be brought on yom tov, what would be if one violated shechita, would you sprinkle the blood. The gemara says that if the meat is around all agree that you can sprinkle the blood (and violate a shevus of zrika - see pesachim 65b) in order to eat the meat on yom tov (ochel nefesh pushes off the shevus of zrika).

R' Yisroel Gordon raised an interesting question. The gemara implies "avar vishachat" that he intentionally violated the prohibition to shecht the korban, so the meat should be assur m'drabonon to eat just like one who cooks on shabbos b'mazid the food is assur (beitza 17b!). If it is assur to eat the meat there is no longer a heter to do the zrika (acc. to rava)? He suggested that since there is a mitzvah to eat kodshim, we can apply mitzvos la'av l'eihanos nitnu to allow eating the korban. To me it seems that this would only work with the chiddush of r' moshe (o.c. 1:126:3) that we are magdir even the issur d'rabonon of ma'aseh shabbos as an issur hana'a so that the heter of mitzvos la'av leihanos nitnu would apply. If it would be a regular kenas derabonon not to eat it, there wouldn't be a heter of mitzvos la'av leihanos nitnu.

I couldn't find anyone else (i.e. tzlach, pnei yehoshua, sfas emes) address the question.

Beitza 20b - Zeman Kavua

Beis Shamai and BH argue about whether an olas ri'iya can be brought on yom tov. All agree that if it would be "zeman kavua", it can be brought. The argument is, do we consider it zeman kavua, since it can be brought on chol hamoed and does not need to be brought on Yom Tov. Beis Hillel says, that since there is a finite time that it can be brought, as it cannot be brought after chag, it is called zeman kavua. Simply speaking this could mean that since the zeman for the korban is the duration of the chag, it is called zeman kavua. However, Rashi is apparently bothered by this idea, the fact that it can only be brought for the duration of the chag is not a justification for bringing it on yom tov (since it can be done on chal hamoed).

Rashi says 20b (and also 19a) that we are concerned he will be negligent or o'nes and not bring it on chol hamoed. Why is that a rationale to push off yom tov? It seems that Rashi defines "zeman kavua" as a korban that if not done on yom tov, has a chance of being lost not done at all. Only karbonos whose opportunity will not expire cannot be done on yom tov. But since there is a chance of negligence on chal hamoed and a concern that it will be missed entirely, we consider it zeman kavua to push off yom tov. It should follow from this that any korban who's time is limited and expires, is considered zeman kavua and can be brought on yom tov. Acc. to Rashi's approach it would seem that the fact that the zeman is the entire chag, is merely coincidental, but even if the zeman would be 2 weeks, so long as there is a limited time that it can be brought bec. of an expiration on the zeman, there is a chance that if we don't allow it to be brought on yom tov it may not be done ever, it is considered zeman kavua and could be brought on yom tov!

הערה בנוסח דעירוב מנין לרמ"א דמעכב

הרמ"א סובר דנוסח "בהדי עירובא וכו" מעכב ולדידיה חוזר ומברך ומניח, וכבר תמהו הנושאי כלים מנין לו העיכוב? ויותר צ"ע (שמעתי להקשות) דכל הנוסח לא מפורש בגמרא ומנין כל זה?

וחשבתי שאולי מקורו מהגמ' טז ע"ב

אמר רב הונא ערובי תבשילין צריכין דעת. פשיטא דעת מניח וכו' וברש"י שם שידעו שלשם כך נעשו ורב הונא לא פירש וכו'וכבר מקשים האחרונים מה הנידון הרי זכין לאדם שלא בפניו. אך אולי כוונת רב הונא כרמ"א שצריך דעת מפורשת ששם העירוב לבשל ולאפות וכדו' וא"כ יש הו"א שגם צריך דעת מי שהניחו בשבילו. (ומחשבה תמיד צריכה דיבור חוץ מקדשים שהיא אולי מ"ח רש"י ותוס'

what do you think?

עוד הערה: מי של"צ לבשל האם יש עליו מצוות עירוב? ולראשונים לקמן שגם לאדלוקי שרגא צריך א"כ יצטרך אך לראשונים שחולקים מאי? ויש לי קצת לדייק מהמשנה שהתחילה דינה מדין שלא יבשל בתחילה לשבת אך אם הותיר מיו"ט יאכל, ואם הוי חיוב מדוע לא התחילה לומר שחייב אדם בעירוב. ואם ניחות לדא, א"כ יהיה קשה על הראשונים שמצריכים עירוב כדי לאדלוקי שרגא.

Beitza 15b - Eiruv Tavshilin

הערה מאת הסבא הרב גפן ביצה טו: - משנה: ועושה תבשיל מערב יוט וסומך עליו לשבת. ב"ש אומרים שני תבשילין ובה אומרים תבשיל אחד ושווין בדג וביצה שעליו שהן שני תבשילין בדרך כלל כשהתנא מביא מח' בין ב"ש וב"ה וממשיך ואומר ושווין, המובן הוא שאם כי הם חלוקים כאן אבל ביחס לדין אחר בנין דומה הם שווין לדוגמא עיין שבת יז/יח בנתינת עור לעבדן ע"ש שב"ש סוברים דבעינן שיעשה מבעוד יום וב"ה מתירין עם השמש וממשיך התנא לומר ששווין שטוענים קורת בית הבד ועיגולי הגת וכן בביצה יז: ב"ש אומרים מטבילין הכל מלפני השבת וב"ה אומרים כלים מלפני שבת ואדם בשבת ושווין שמשיקין את המים בכלי אבן לטהרם אך כאן הלשון ושווין צ"ע קצת משנתנו שב"ש וב"ה מסכימים שדג וביצה שעליו נחשבים לשני תבשילין אך לב"ה מאי נפקותא יש להם אי הוי כב' תבשילין או אחד, הרי לדידהו די בתבשיל אחד ?כל שהתנא צריך לומר הוא ומודים ב"ש לב"ה בדג וביצה שעליו. ואני רציתי לומר שכשם שמצינו לגבי הטיה בק"ש שהמטה כב"ש ראוי להתחייב בנפשו, כן כאן אם ירצה אדם להחמיר כב"ש דוקא בב' תבשילין אינו ראוי ולכן אמר ששווין בדג וביצה שעליו שלב"ש הם שני תבשילין בעוד שלב"ה יכול להחשב כתבשיל אחד

אך הסבא לא קיבל דברי שנימוק שהיה צ"ל להאמר שאסור להניח שני תבשילין

Beitza 19a - Tevillas Keilim Bein Hashmashos

Rashi writes that you can't be tovel a kli during bein hashmashos because it is "not for a yom tov need". Maharsha asks, why doesn't rashi just say that it is assur bec. of all the 4 reasons mentioned earlier i.e. nir'ah kimisaken? He explains that it is going according to the opinion that during Bein Hashmashos all shevus is permitted, so he has to explain the issur is tevilla for a non-yom tov use, since it needs he'rev shemesh. It seems from the maharsha that the issur rashi refers to is not nir'ah kimsaken, but rather an issur to prepare on yom tov for afterwards. It should follow from the Maharsha that anytime you need the kli on shabbos you can be tovel it during bein hashmashos. The problem with this approach is that it seems to be against the halacha bec. we pasken like the mishnah in 2nd perek of shabbos (shulchan aruch 261:1), that you cannot be tovel keilim during bein hashmashos even if you will use them on shabbos.

I would like to suggest a slightly different peshat in rashi:

The m.b. (261) brings from magen avrohom (s.k. 6) that the mishna (and shulchan aruch 261:1) which says you cannot be tovel keilim during bein hashmashos is only speaking about a case where you have other keilim for shabbos, but if you need this kli bec. you don't have others, you can be tovel it during bein hashmashos (we pasken that they were not gozer on shevus only if it is absolutely necessary). Perhaps this is what rashi means. We are assuming that he needs this kli and has no others (that is why he is running to be tovel it during bein hashmashos). So, if this tevilla during bein hashmashos would be usable on yom tov, it would be permitted, but since it needs he'rev shemesh and is not usable for yom tov, therfore it is assur to be tovel it. The reason for the issur is not bec. of preparing for after yom tov, but rather that we are gozer on shevus that are not needed during bein hashmashos, so the issur is in fact bec. of nir'ah kimisaken.

Neshama Yeseira discussion

I saw that the discussion we had regarding Neshama Yeseira (i.e. women) was deleted, and I thought it was chaval to lose such an interesting discussion, so here it is in the comments.

beitza 18 - man going to the mikvah today on shabbos

biur halacha and a question on him:

• biur halacha explains (i think 328) that today going to the mikveh is worse and better. Worse, because it is more obvious that one is going to the mikveh since our minhag is not to bath on shabbos; and better because out tevilah doesn't accomplish anything halachically since a baal kery can learn and daven. Therefore, there is a great debate in poskim if today a baal kery is allowed to go dip.
• the biur halacha says that according to everyone it seems permissible if one became a baal kery on shabbos or y"t and his proof is our gemara that if one becomes tame on y"t then the braysa says (acc to rashi and tos) that one is allowed to go to mikveh.
• my question is, in our gemara the reason this is allowed is because becoming tameh on y"t for a dish is not common and chachamim didn't make a gzeira, but becoming a baal kery is common so it seems that he has no proof from our gemara. i mamash dont chap?

Beitza 17a - Ribuy Shiurim

The gemara in today's daf makes a distinction between cooking extra and baking extra. Really there is no difference between cooking and baking, but rather whether it is done in one shot (i.e. putting a large full pot on the fire) or in multiple shots (sticking loaf after loaf to the oven wall). Really cooking extra should be an issur torah, but the Ran explains that increasing shiurim over what is needed for ochel nefesh is permissible on yom tov, so long as it is done in one shot (to the exclusion of putting a pot on the fire and then putting in piece after piece).

However, acc. to Rashi that mitoch is matir even something which is not a yom tov need, it would seem that the prohibition to cook extra on yom tov would at most be an issur derabonon of hachana for after yom tov (unless you say that cooking for after yom tov is worse than for no reason at all, which would answer tosafos question 12a from pesachim 46b, as pointed out by r' yossi in an earlier comment). It comes out that acc. to Rashi the concept of Ribuy shiurim may only apply to remove an issur derabonon such as preparing from yom tov for chol.

This approach would be very helpful in dealing with the Ran's question from menachos where the gemara seems to imply that cutting a stem with more figs than one needs for pikuach nefesh, is assur min hatorah, why don't we say since it is done in one shot it is Ribuy shiurim and permitted, like we do here?

Acc. to Rashi the answer is that we only rely on this concept to remove an issur derabonon of hachana, but ribuy shiurim would not be matir an issur torah of kotzer. Therefore, Rashi will not have to make a distinction between yom tov and shabbos or between pikuach nefesh and ochel nefesh like the Ran.

beitza 17 - eiruv from y"t to shabbos

1. why does rashi not mention hachana in the whole sugya, rashi explains that you may not put an eiruv from y"t to shabbos because you are fixing, what happened to the gemara in eiruvin of hachana?
2. just pointing out that there is an obvious argument betwen rashi and tosfos as to what it means that you cannot acquire shvita on y"t. acc to rahi it is probably because of fixing or something similar because rashi has to find a heter for eiruv tavshilin, but acc to tosfos it is because of acquiring a house. the obvious nafka mina is eiruv chazeros, although the gemara omits, we hold (based on the Rosh, Rif) that one may make a tnay on eiruv chazeros although one cannot on techumin, but acc to rashi this would seem to be wrong.

Beitza 15b - Simchas Yom Tov

The gemara in today's daf asks on R' elazar why he was so strict about leaving the drasha, simchas yom tov is a mitzah? The gemara says that acc. to r"e it is only a reshus since he holds you can do all for hashem or all for lachem.

I think the gemara fits nicely into the rule that you are not mevatel learning for a mitzvah that can be done later (or by someone else as we see in moed kattan). Simchas yom tov is not a mitzvah like lulav, but rather applies every minute of the day and requires one to be in a state of simcha, so the gemara asks it is a mitzvah that can't be done later so why didn't r"e want people to leave (since they were getting hungry, they were not violating the mitzvah of simchas yom tov)? To this the gemara answers that acc. to r"e it is a reshus - meaning that although it is certainly a kiyum mitzvah, it is not a chov bec. one can choose to devote the entire day to learning or eating or split as he wishes (ya'avetz), therefore it is not a mitzvah that must be done now so you may not stop learning for it.

beitza 15 - sending a toaster to a friend on y"t

the gemara says that one may send tefilin on y"t but not the spiked sandal.

what about a toaster oven? is it similar to tefilin or sandal?

from my brief look, it seems that there is a machlokes tosfos yom tov and rav akiva eiger if tefilin on y"t are a kli shmlachto leisur. acc to rav akiva eiger it is not (only shabbos it is - see there because carrying) therfor a toaster might be asur lest he will use it, however acc to tosfos y"t maybe sandal is especially assur but tefilin and other things that are melachto leisur will be mutar.

would love to hear from the rabbi's on this one. either case, can we agree that what people are makpoid not to give a sefer as a gift on shabbos is wrong and should be mutar?

Beitza 14a - Safek Derabonon L'kula

Tosafos says a rule that we only apply safek derabonon l'kula to situations where one side is a clear leniency and the other clearly stringent. But if each side has a kula and chumra, it is impossible to be lenient by both since that is definitely an issur, and you can't choose one over the other, so you are forced to be machmir by both. We find a similar sevara in the Ran in Pesachim 108a (and in megilla by safek walled cities) where acc. to one side the first 2 cups need leaning and according to the other the last 2 need leaning, therefore the Ran says we have to lean by all 4 because we have no way of choosing one over the other, and to be lenient by both would be uprooting the mitzvah of leaning completely. Would our Tosafos definitely agree with the Ran and would the Ran definitely agree with our Tosafos?
It seems that Tosafos would not be forced to agree with the Ran, because in our case if you were lenient to grind spices when you knew before yom tov what you planned on cooking and also the spice doesn't loose flavor, you are doing an issur of grinding according to everyone. But in the case of the Ran you are only passively loosing a mitzvah, not doing an issur (furthermore, you are only loosing reclining of the 4 cups, but are still fulfilling reclining with matzah).
But, would the Ran be forced to say like Tosafos?

Beitza 12a - Rashi on "mitoch"

נחלקו רש"י ותוס' בפירושו של מתוך שהותרה וכו'. לתוס' שייך הכי רק כשהוא צורך היום קצת, ולרש"י מותר מה"ת אף כשאינו צורך היום כלל. נמצא דלתוס' יש לפרש מתוך שהותרה וכו' בב' אופנים: א. פירושו של "מתוך" היינו "כיון", כלומר כיון שלצורך או"נ מותר ממילא מותר לגמרי, דלא מסתברא להו לחלק בין או"נ לשאר הנאת הגוף ואגב אוכל נפש גררינן כל צורך היום כעין לא פלוג. ב. פירושו של "מתוך" היינו "מכלל", כלומר שכל הנאות הגוף הם בכלל ההיתר של או"נ (כ"כ הקה"י בשם היראים). אמנם לפרש"י שלא לצורך היינו אף שלא לצורך כלל ע"כ צריך לפרש דלא חלקה תורה בעצם המלאכה לאסור ולהתיר, וכל מלאכה שהותרה לצורך או"נ הותרה לגמרי. והנה, רש"י מפרש דלפי ההו"א דטעמא דב"ה משום דאין עירוב והוצאה ביו"ט לא שייך לאסור טלטול אבנים מדרבנן דכל איסור טלטול הוא רק שלא יבא לידי הוצאה. אבל למסקנא דטעמא משום מתוך וכו' כיון דאכתי שייך איסור הוצאה ביו"ט שייך לאסור טלטול אבנים מדרבנן (דטרחא שלא לצורך הוא) עכת"ד. וצ"ע דכיון דלרש"י פירושו של מתוך וכו' הוא דליכא איסור הוצאה ביו"ט כלל כדביארנו, הא אף למסקנא דטעמא דב"ה משום מתוך, לא הו"ל לאסור טלטול אבנים כיון דא"א לבא לידי איסור תורה של הוצאה.
ונלענ"ד עפמש"כ בביה"ל ריש ס' תקי"ב דאף לפרש"י דאמרינן מתוך אף להתיר דבר שאינו צורך היום כלל מ"מ לצורך נכרי גזה"כ הוא לאסור דכיון שגילתה תורה "לכם" ולא לנכרי, גרע טפי מלא לצורך כלל ויש בזה איסור דאורייתא. ובסוף דבריו בשם השטמ"ק דאף הוצאה לצורך נכרי אסור מדאורייתא, ולא אמרינן מתוך וכו'. נמצא דלפי המסקנא דטעמא דב"ה משום מתוך וכו' שפיר שייך איסור הוצאה כשהוא מוציא לצורך נכרי וממילא שייך לאסור טלטול אבנים מדרבנן ודו"ק

בסוגיא דתריסין אם יש איסור משום טירחא

ברש"י י ע"א מבואר דיש הו"א לאסור החזרת תריסין משום טירחא, אך בסוגיא הכא משמע ברש"י ־וכן הבין המ"ב־ שהצד לאסור הוא שיש דין בנין בכלים מדרבנן משום גזירה ולא הזכיר טירחא

וצ"ע דלמסקנה שבשאין בו ציר כלל מותר אפילו בבית, הפוסקים כותבים דמותר אפילו להחזיר אך אם יש טירחא צ"ע אם מותר. ובפנ"י משמע שכשאין ציר אין גם טירחא כי נמצא דהחנות קטנה, אך לפ"ז צ"ע מדוע נקט רש"י לעיל סברת טירחא. ועיין בפנ"י ולא עיינתי

Beitza 9b - Opinion of Beis Shamai by Kisuy Hadam

This point on the daf yomi was raised by R' Menachem Spira. In the situation of Kisuy Hadam, there are 2 issues, one is a chafira issue that the gemara says is not deoraysa since you don't need the hole, and the other is a muktzah issue that deker na'utz hepls for (Beis Hillel is only willing to rely on deker nautz bidieved, but l'chatchila they require afar muchan or eifer kirah). When the Gemara suggests that we don't have to swap BS and BH, because BS maybe is really more machmir in simchas yom tov than BH, but the reason he is more lenient by Kisuy Hadam is bec. there is a deker na'utz so there is no issur at all. It seems that this is not sufficient, as Tosafos points out 8a (d.h. v'eino) that there is still an issur derabonon of chafira for the dirt (melacha shein tzricha l'gufa), and BS is lenient bec. of simchas yom tov. Therefore, the mishna should still imply that BS is more lenient by simchas yom tov than BH!

rov and karov

שאלה בסוגיא דרוב וקרוב

האם דין קרוב דומה לרובא דליתא קמן? דלכאורה שניהם תלויים בסברא? אך לפ"ז צ"ע דאנן קיי"ל דרוכ עדיף מקרוב אך נ"ל קי"ל דרובא דליתא עדיף מרובא דאית לן ־ עיין שמעתתא ג פט"ו וד' פ"א

beitza 8b

בדין רבא דמוכן לודאי לא מוכן לספק

נשאלתי- צ"ע מדוע המוכן לודאי לא מוכן לכוי הרי סו"ס מדין ספק תמיד צריך לכסות הכוי

עוד צ"ע היכן מצינו דיש המוכן לדבר אחד ולא לשימוש אחר, אם האפר מוכן מדוע שיהיה מוקצה לכוי

ומצאתי שתי הקושיות בספר של משפחת אלישיב וכן עיין שפ"א שמשתמש בסרא ראשונה לומר פשט בגמ' לקמן בעמוד

ושם מבואר דמצינו לקמן ל"ב־ל"ג דעצי הסקה מוכנים רק להסקה א"כ ישנו מושג שדבר קצת מוקצה ומותר רק לשימושים מסויימים ע"ש בראשונים. וא"כ הכא נמי באפר עדיין קצת מוקצה ולכן צותר שימושו רק לסוג א' של שימוש ולא לספק. אך כשדעתו בפירוש לספק מהני. דהיינו בדבר ש'קצת מוקצה' צריך דעת בפירוש לסוג השימוש. כך הבנתי דבריהם.

ועיין דאף דאנן פסקינן שחוששים להתרת חלבו עדיין לצל"ח במובא במ"ב )תצ"ח צ:ה( נוגע להלכה דכל המ"ח בכוי שהוי בריה

בפנ"ע אך לכוי שבא מתיש וצבי אין חשש התרת חלבו.

good luck in the dinner down west!

Beitza 7b - Safek Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin

The Gemara says that an egg laid when no rooster is around, and we are not sure if it was laid before yom tov or on yom tov, is mutar misafek (it is only assur if you checked before yom tov and didn't find it). Tosafos explains that even though it is a non-fertilized egg, it is more likely that it was laid by day before yom tov, so you can be lenient (rashi seems to imply the same). The Ran is still bothered that we don't use "rov" to be mevatel by a davar sheyesh lo matirin, so why should we assume it is from before yom tov, even though it is more common. He explains that when there is definite issur present, we don't allow bitul b'rov, but to go after rov and assume that what is more likely to happen actually happened, is followed even by a davar sheyesh lo matirin.
This answers another question. Earlier the gemara implied that it was possible to hold we would be lenient misafek by yesh lo matirin, even though we would not rely on bitul b'rov. In a case where an assur egg falls into 2 kosher eggs they are all assur, even though each one is only a safek if it is the assur one. By definition when we don't allow bitul, we also are machmir misafek! The answer is that certainly a safek created by a mixture which is ischazek issura would be assur without r' ashi. When we thought that safek is more lenient than bitul that is only bec. it is not ischazek issura; whereas bitul is always in a situation when it is ischazek issura. Therefore, even R' Ashi who is mechadesh that safek is assur even when it is not ischazek issura; but if there is a greater chance of it being born before yom tov than on yom tov, we follow the greater chance to be lenient because we follow rov when it is not ischazek issura.

Beitza 6a - Burial on Yom Tov

The gemara seems to be struggling with 3 different problems. 1. It is a degrading for a non-jew to do the burial. 2. It is degrading to violate yom tov for burial. 3. It is degrading to leave the corpse without burial.

It seems that on YomTov we consider the order of importance for these problems to be 3-2-1. Therefore, on Yom Tov rishon we allow the meis to be buried, but only through a non-jew so as to lessen the Yom Tov violation. On Yom Tov Sheini, it is less of a violation of Yom Tov so the order is 3-1-2. Therefore, we bury specifically through a Jew (even when a non-jew is available). But on Shabbos which is most severe, we are most concerned with #2 and therefore even though it is a only a derabonon through a goy, we do not allow it (see Tosafos Baba kama 81a).

The question is on Yom Tov Sheini, why did chazal have to turn it into "a weekday" for a meis? Is the reason because even things which are not really needed but do add to the kavod of the meis are more important than yom tov sheini and therefore they should be done. Or was it simply a method of lessening the degradation to yom tov by declaring it to be like a weekday in the presence of a meis, so they can be done, but they would not encourage doing things which aren't really integral to burial?

4a Hachana derabbah

It seems there is a machlokes between rashi and tosfos in the understanding of hachana drabbah. Rashi both on 2b and 4a subsutitues the word hazmanah with hachana. Therefore when it comes to a beitza which is nolad on shabbos and the question is if you can eat it on the next day yom tov the reason why you can't is pasut to rashi because there was no hazmana beyom chol ( Hazmana, pshat is a active hazmana because achsevei lesudas shabbos). but tosfos 4a has to try to find a reason that in such a case you still have hachana on shabbos, if the beitza was negmar on chol.If he held of hazmana he would answer pashut like rashi.