Zevachim 15b - Two quick hearos

1. The mishna gives a list of people who are passul for doing kabbalas ha'dam, the second being an o'nen. Rashi defines an o'nen - כל זמן שלא נקבר המת, pre-burial. This doesn't seem accurate because the din o'nen in the Torah who cannot eat ma'aser sheini or kodshim is even after the burial, so long as it is the day of death. The Rambam in pirush hamishnayos writes explicitly that the o'nen we are referring to here also is one who lost a relative that day, regardless of whether it is before or after the burial. Rabbeinu Yona in Brachos elaborates about this that chazal extended and modified the definition of o'nen and applied it to any preburial situation even after the first day, but this isn't the definition when used by the Torah. Does rashi mean to say that pre burial even after the day of death an o'nen would passul the korban by doing kabbalas ha'dam on a rabbinic level?

2. The Rambam in the pirush hamishna points out that kohanim would not wear tefillin shel yad when doing the avoda because it would be a chatzitza between the bigdei kehuna and his skin, but would wear the tefillin shel rosh would even be worn by the kohein gadol between the tzitz and the mitznefes.

Zevachim 13b - Pigul

Rashi defines as having a machshava at the time of doing one of the 4 avodas - shechita, kabala, holacha, zerika - to intend to either feed people (meat) or the miz'beiach (eimurin/dam) after the appropriate time. The gemara says that when a korban becomes passul due to a thought of pigul, it is only considered pigul if it was completed properly without any other p'sul mixed in. But, if the korban would become invalid by something done later such as a machshava of lo lishma by chatas, or a machshava of the wrong place by all korbanos, it would retroactively remove the issur pigul. Meaning, that the more severe prohibition of pigul for which the punishment is kareis, only applies when the korban retains is kashrus in all other areas.

R. Yakov Kaminetzky (parshas kedoshim) conceptualizes this point. The more precious something is, and the holier that it is, the easier it is to defile because the impurity is more noticeable. It is for this reason that the Torah places greater demands on klal yisroel than the other nations, because any impurity will stand out. He points to the statement we make in selichos - Ashamnu mi'kol Am - we are guiltier that all other nations. That is certainly not true. But it means that since we are meant to be the showcase of behavior and represent Hashem on earth, any impurity stands out like an ugly stain on fine white material. Therefore, when a korban becomes passul for some other reason, it no longer retains its stature and retroactively isn't susceptible to becoming pigul.

Zevachim 8b - Difference between chatas and pesach

Both korban chatas and korban pesach are listed in the mishna as exceptions to the standard rule. The standard rule is that if shechita is done shelo lishma the connection from the owner is broken, but it remains a kasher korban. Whereas chatas and pesach that are shechted shelo lishma are entirely invalid korbanos. Chatas and pesach are essentially the same in that their essence is to work for the owner, if the connection to the owner is broken, the korban becomes completely worthless. It would seem that there is no difference at all between chatas and pesach.

However, the gemara on 3a says that a chatas that is shechted l'sheim chulin (having in mind that it has no kedusha at all), doesn't impact the korban in any way. The rationale, as the gemara explains is - דמינה מחריב בה, דלאו מינה לא מחריב. This means that in order to be considered "shelo lishma" it must be something within the same general category as the korban, namely another korban, to the exclusion of chulin which is so out of left field it doesn't even qualify as shelo lishma. It should follow that a korban pesach that is shechted l'sheim chulin also has no impact on the korban for the same reason. BUT the Rambam (pesulei hamukdashin 15:11) writes that a korban pesach that is shechted l'sheim chulin becomes invalid. Why is korban pesach any different that chatas in this respect? Why don't we say by korban pesach as well that דמינה מחריב בה, דלאו מינה לא מחריב?

The Meshech Chochma (bo, 12:27) refers to his Ohr Sameiach where he elaborates on this issue. R. Meir Simcha explains that the whole concept of "l'sheim chulin" only applies to the act of slaughtering which applies to chulin, but doesn't have any place by the kabala and zerika which don't at all apply to chulin. That explains why chulin kavana during shechita could invalidate. Now, most korbanos have one function - to do the avoda of the blood to serve Hashem. Therefore, chulin which has an entirely different function - to eat the meat, has no commonality with kodshim in their essential purpose. That is the rationale behind דלאו מינה לא מחריב - l'sheim chulin doesn't ruin it since it is fundamentally so different. However, korban pesach if very different than other korbanos. Korban Pesach is primarily for the purpose of eating. That is why it is eaten b'tumah, and it must be shechted for eaters... Since korban pesach is fundamentally for the purpose of eating, it isn't so different than chulin in that respect. That is why intent for chulin will ruin a korban pesach. Although chulin is considered לאו מינה of most korbanos, it is considered מינה of chulin.

Zevachim 7a - Types of shinuy kodesh and shinuy ba'alim

Rava makes a few statements in the gemara:

1. Chatas that is shechted for chatas even for a different aveira is kasher and works for the owner (rashi), but if it is shechted for o'lah it is entirely passul (rashi).

2. Chatas of Reuven that is shechted for Shimon, if he is obligated in a chatas it is passul, but if he is obligated in an o'lah it is kasher.

3. Chatas of Reuven that is shechted for Shimon who is not obligated in anything is passul because he is definitely at least chayev in an aseh. Rambam (pesulei hamukdashin 15:9) writes: maybe Shimon is actually obligated in that korban just doesn't remember.

The most obvious question is: If when we shecht Reuven's chatas for Shimon who is chayev an olah, it is kasher, but if Shimon isn't chayev anything it is passul (because it could apply to an aseh that shimon must have violated)? Rashi 7b explains that when it is shechted for Shimon who has no need for it, such as when Shimon has just designated a korban o'lah for all his aseh violations, it is kasher. But, if Shimon hasn't designated an o'lah it is needed by Shimon for his aseh violations and therefore would be invalid as a shinuy ba'alim.

In case #2 where Reuven's chatas is shechted for Shimon who is obligated in an o'lah, the gemara just says that it is kasher but doesn't make it clear whether or not it works for it's original owner. Rambam (pesulei hamukdashin 15:8) writes that it is kasher and doesn't work for the original owner. Minchas Chinuch (138) asks on the Rambam how he knows that if it is shechted for Shimon who is obligated in an o'lah, it would not work for Reuven? Since by a korban chatas the kashrus of it seems to go hand in hand with it working for the original owner, it would seem more logical that it should work for the owner since the shinuy of using it for Shimon's olah doesn't invalidate it?

The Rambam seems to understand that the rationale that only when Reuven's korban is brought for Shimon who is chayev in a korban "like him" will it be passul, to the exclusion of an o'lah, only helps to maintain the kashrus of the chatas but doesn't help to allow Reuven to fulfill his obligation. In order for Revuen to fulfill his obligation it MUST be brought for Reuven, not for Shimon, even when Shimon is only chayev an olah.

Zevachim 6a - Thought about O'lah atoning for aseh

The gemara discusses whether a korban o'lah can atone for a mitzvas aseh that was "violated" (or not kept) after designating the animal for the korban. The gemara justifies the rationale that it would work, even though by a chatas it wouldn't work, is that an o'lah can atone for many violations whereas a chatas can only atone for one (each aveirah violated would demand a separate korban chatas). Rashi explains that the Torah doesn't require an independent korban olah for each aseh that was violated because it is "only a gift".

It seems to me that Rashi can be better explained based on the Ramaban in the aseres hadibros who writes that a positive mitzvah is a method of representing "love" whereas the lo ta'aseh in the torah is essentially yir'ah - fear. The idea behind mitzvas aseh is that we get up and do something to demonstrate our love and devotion to Hashem. There is no specific consequence or punishment for not doing, because then the doing could be out of fear, and the entire point of these mitzvos is to provide us with a method of showing love for Hashem. Therefore, it follows that a chatas which comes for the violation of an aseh is in place of the punishment that one deserves for the violation. Each aveira deserves it's own punishment and therefore demands it's own korban chatas. But, the concept of a korban olah atoning for a positive mitzva is that it provides us with a method of "donating" a gift to Hashem, thereby grabbing the opportunity to express our love for Hashem that we missed by forfeiting the opportunity to fulfill the aseh. It is for this reason that one Olah can atone for many mitzvos aseh because it is not mitzva specific, rather it is a method of showing our love and devotion for Hashem for the one or many opportunities that we missed to express our love.

This point is supported from the gemara on 7b and rashi which explains that an o'lah can only be brought on an aseh after teshuva has been done and the person technically already received atonement. The entire function of the olah is to serve as a gift. Rashi expresses this in context of a parable of one who committed a crime against the king and already appeased him, when he comes to greet the king he brings along a gift.

Zevachim 5b - Lishma by Goat of Nassi

The gemara says that the passuk of "chatas hu" which is written in the context of the goat brought by a nassi, is the source that it must be shechted l'sheim chatas, otherwise it would invalidate the korban entirely.

The Meshech Chochma (Vayikra 4:22) questions, why specifically in the context of the goat of the nassi does the Torah decide to teach us the integral need for lishma by a korban chatas, rather than telling us this by a regular korban chatas? He explains based on a gemara in Sota 32b that the Torah tells us that a korban chatas should be slaughtered in the same place that the korban O'lah is shechted, so as not to embarrass one who brings a chatas by fooling bystanders into thinking he is actually bringing an o'lah. The gemara says that even though and o'lah is male, whereas chatas is female, it can be covered with the tail. If he chooses to bring a female goat, which has no tail to cover up the gender, that was his choice to embarrass himself, but wasn't compelled by the Torah. The Meshech Chochma suggests that it is for this reason that a Nassi brings a male goat, is to protect his honor so that people will be fooled into thinking that he is bringing an o'lah rather than a chatas. It would degrading for klal yisroel to publicize that a nassi did an aveira for which he has to bring a korban, so bringing a male goat is a method of limiting the chilul hashem. Therefore, one may have thought that the lishma on this korban should also be done l'sheim o'lah rather than l'sheim chatas so that everyone including the kohanim bringing it (and anyone listening according to those who say that lishma must be spoken out - see tosafos 4b, tosafos 2a and gilyon hashas). It is for this reason that the Torah writes "chatas hu" - it must be done l'sheim korban chatas and NOT l'sheim korban o'lah.

The fundamental point of the meshech chochma that a Nassi should hide the fact that he did an aveira and fool the bystanders into thinking he is bringing an olah rather than a chatas seems to me as being incompatible with the gemara in Horiyos 10b - אשר נשיא יחטא- אמר ר' יוחנן בן זכאי אשרי הדור שהנשיא שלו מביא קרבן על שגגתו, אם נשיא שלו מביא קרבן צריך אתה לומר מהו הדיוט, ואם על שגגתו מביא קרבן צריך אתה לומר מהו זדונו

The gemara indicates that when people see that even the Nassi is willing to admit his mistakes and bring a korban, they will be inspired to do teshuva. This seems to indicate that we want to publicize the fact that the Nassi is bringing a korban on his aveira, not hide it. The meshech chochma (4:31) himself acknowledges that for a regular person it is beneficial to embarrass himself by bringing a female goat and publicize that he did an aveira and that is why the Torah writes ריח ניחוח only in the context of a goat brought as a korban chatas, not a sheep. Only when he goes out of his way to embarrass himself over the aveira is his korban worthy of being a rei'ach ni'choach to Hashem. It is only by the Nassi that the Meshech Chochma suggests that it is beneficial to hide his aveira - but based on the gemara in Horiyos it seems that even a Nassi shouldn't hide his aveira.

Zevachim 2b - Stama Li'shma

The gemara makes a distinction between korbanos and gittin. In the context of kodshim we are willing to say that even if one didn't have explicit intent to slaughter the animal li'shma, we consider stam to also be li'shma. However, a woman who is not considered to be pending divorce (and even when she is forbidden to her husband, she can stay married just not have relations - tosafos), therefore stam is not considered li'shma.

To fully understand this concept, there is a basic chakira that opens up the sugya. Is there a requirement of li'shma, or is their a p'sul of it being done she'lo li'shma? If li'shma isn't a requirement, rather shelo lishma is a p'sul, it is obvious that stam would qualify as lishma simply because there is no demand of being lishma. However, if there is a positive requirement of li'shma, the only rationale to consider stam to be li'shma is that there is a subconscious intent of li'shma even though he was never cognisant of it - the intent that he would have had, if he was paying more attention qualifies as li'shma.

The Steipler proves that the approach of saying that there is a subconscious intent of lishma doesn't work because the gemara 3a says that if it is done for the sake of chulin, it is kasher - דלאו מינה לא מחריב בה. Meaning, that since chulin intent is so foreign we consider it as if there is no intent at all, so it defaults to being stam which we consider to be lishma. Clearly, when he is intending for chulin there is no subconscious intent for a korban, yet we apply stam lishma. This indicates that the reason why stam works is because there is no positive requirement of lishma, so long as it is not done she'lo lishma. According to this, it is difficult to understand why there is a difference between gittin where stam isn't lishma and kodshim where stam is lishma. If we assume that lishma isn't a requirement, why would there be a difference? One possibility is to fundamentally distinguish between gittin and kodshim. By gittin there is a positive requirement of lishma and therefore stam doesn't work, but by kodshim there isn't a positive requirement, therefore stam works. This doesn't seem to be the distinction of the gemara. The gemara says - זבחים בסתם לשמן עומדין, אשה בסתמא לאו לגירושין עומדין. The distinction seems to be between the case of kodshim vs. gittin, not a halachic distinction in what the requirement is. Therefore, we must say that both by gittin and by kodshim, there is no requirement for positive intent of lishma. What is the distinction? We consider stam to be completely parve, but the situation has to compensate for the lack of intent. Therefore, an animal of hekdesh that is pending being brought as a korban can fill the void of intent, but a woman who is not pending divorce can't fill the void of intent. According to this, the rationale for stam being lishma is that the situation can compensate for the lack of intent, just as we find by eating cheilev as a mis'aseik where the enjoyment fills the void left by the lack of intent.

The Steipler then questions the mechanics of shelo lishma. In order for the korban which is standing to be brought as a korban to fill the void of lishma, the void must be left empty (parve), but if it is filled with an explicit intent of shelo li'shma, the fact that it is pending to be a korban can't make up for the lack of lishma - in short, we require either lishma or it to be compensated for by the korban, so when it is done shelo lishma, the p'sul is that it is a lack of lishma. Or perhaps there is literally no din of lishma at all. The problem with shelo lishma is not that it undermines the lishma, or prevents the animal pending to be a korban from filling the void of intent. Rather, shelo lishma is an independent p'sul just as pigul is an independent p'sul unrelated to any positive demands. The Brisker Rav (Ma'aseh Korbanos 4) and his father Rav Chaim (quoted by steipler) assume the second possibility, that since we allow stam, we clearly don't require lishma. Therefore, shelo li'shma must be an independent p'sul, not a problem of lacking lishma.

The Steipler proves that both rashi and tosafos are against the Brisker Rav and Rav Chaim . Rashi 3a says that when one slaughters a chatas for a shelamim it is passul becasue - דמינה מחריב בה - דבר שהוא מינו מועיל בה לעקור את שמו. Rashi implies like the first approach that we do require lishma, just that normally when left parve, the fact that it's pending to be a korban can make up for the lack of intent. But when the lishma is totally undermined and ruined by a thought of shelo lishma, the korban is invalid. We also see this from Tosafos in menachos 42b who compares the just as a korban mincha that is done both lishma and shelo lishma is passul, so too when tzitzis is made lisheim tzitzis and shelo lishma it is passul. By tzitzis there is definitely a positive requirement of lishma, so if we assume that by korbanos there is no positive requirement of lishma just a p'sul of lo lishma, we can't prove that tzitzis is passul from korbanos since the positive requirement of lishma was fulfilled. Tosafos must hold that even by korbanos there is a positive requirement of lishma, which is being undermined when there is a thought of shelo lishma.

Zevachim 2b - Stama Li'shma

The gemara makes a distinction between korbanos and gittin. In the context of kodshim we are willing to say that even if one didn't have explicit intent to slaughter the animal li'shma, we consider stam to also be li'shma. However, a woman who is not considered to be pending divorce (and even when she is forbidden to her husband, she can stay married just not have relations - tosafos), therefore stam is not considered li'shma.

To fully understand this concept, there is a basic chakira that opens up the sugya. Is there a requirement of li'shma, or is their a p'sul of it being done she'lo li'shma? If li'shma isn't a requirement, rather shelo lishma is a p'sul, it is obvious that stam would qualify as lishma simply because there is no demand of being lishma. However, if there is a positive requirement of li'shma, the only rationale to consider stam to be li'shma is that there is a subconscious intent of li'shma even though he was never cognisant of it - the intent that he would have had, if he was paying more attention qualifies as li'shma.

The Steipler proves that the approach of saying that there is a subconscious intent of lishma doesn't work because the gemara 3a says that if it is done for the sake of chulin, it is kasher - דלאו מינה לא מחריב בה. Meaning, that since chulin intent is so foreign we consider it as if there is no intent at all, so it defaults to being stam which we consider to be lishma. Clearly, when he is intending for chulin there is no subconscious intent for a korban, yet we apply stam lishma. This indicates that the reason why stam works is because there is no positive requirement of lishma, so long as it is not done she'lo lishma. According to this, it is difficult to understand why there is a difference between gittin where stam isn't lishma and kodshim where stam is lishma. If we assume that lishma isn't a requirement, why would there be a difference? One possibility is to fundamentally distinguish between gittin and kodshim. By gittin there is a positive requirement of lishma and therefore stam doesn't work, but by kodshim there isn't a positive requirement, therefore stam works. This doesn't seem to be the distinction of the gemara. The gemara says - זבחים בסתם לשמן עומדין, אשה בסתמא לאו לגירושין עומדין. The distinction seems to be between the case of kodshim vs. gittin, not a halachic distinction in what the requirement is. Therefore, we must say that both by gittin and by kodshim, there is no requirement for positive intent of lishma. What is the distinction? We consider stam to be completely parve, but the situation has to compensate for the lack of intent. Therefore, an animal of hekdesh that is pending being brought as a korban can fill the void of intent, but a woman who is not pending divorce can't fill the void of intent. According to this, the rationale for stam being lishma is that the situation can compensate for the lack of intent, just as we find by eating cheilev as a mis'aseik where the enjoyment fills the void left by the lack of intent.

The Steipler then questions the mechanics of shelo lishma. In order for the korban which is standing to be brought as a korban to fill the void of lishma, the void must be left empty (parve), but if it is filled with an explicit intent of shelo li'shma, the fact that it is pending to be a korban can't make up for the lack of lishma - in short, we require either lishma or it to be compensated for by the korban, so when it is done shelo lishma, the p'sul is that it is a lack of lishma. Or perhaps there is literally no din of lishma at all. The problem with shelo lishma is not that it undermines the lishma, or prevents the animal pending to be a korban from filling the void of intent. Rather, shelo lishma is an independent p'sul just as pigul is an independent p'sul unrelated to any positive demands. The Brisker Rav (Ma'aseh Korbanos 4) and his father Rav Chaim (quoted by steipler) assume the second possibility, that since we allow stam, we clearly don't require lishma. Therefore, shelo li'shma must be an independent p'sul, not a problem of lacking lishma.

The Steipler proves that both rashi and tosafos are against the Brisker Rav and Rav Chaim . Rashi 3a says that when one slaughters a chatas for a shelamim it is passul becasue - דמינה מחריב בה - דבר שהוא מינו מועיל בה לעקור את שמו. Rashi implies like the first approach that we do require lishma, just that normally when left parve, the fact that it's pending to be a korban can make up for the lack of intent. But when the lishma is totally undermined and ruined by a thought of shelo lishma, the korban is invalid. We also see this from Tosafos in menachos 42b who compares the just as a korban mincha that is done both lishma and shelo lishma is passul, so too when tzitzis is made lisheim tzitzis and shelo lishma it is passul. By tzitzis there is definitely a positive requirement of lishma, so if we assume that by korbanos there is no positive requirement of lishma just a p'sul of lo lishma, we can't prove that tzitzis is passul from korbanos since the positive requirement of lishma was fulfilled. Tosafos must hold that even by korbanos there is a positive requirement of lishma, which is being undermined when there is a thought of shelo lishma.

Horiyos 13a - Chacham more important than King

The braisa quoted in the gemara says that a talmid chacham has precedence in being redeemed from captivity over a king because he is harder to replace. Anyone can be king (it is like being president). The mishna seems to concur because after the entire list of priority, it says that a chacham has precedence over even a kohein gadol. Of course it is possible that the mishna deliberately doesn't mention a king, it is difficult to say that the mishna would disagree with the braisa. This makes the Rambam in his commentary to the mishna very difficult to understand.

The Rambam writes:

וזה שטעם קדימת חכם למלך אינו אלא באמונה בלבד לפי שהחכם תועלתו לאומה גדולה מאוד, אבל במעשה אין להקדים על כבוד המלך שום דבר ואע"פ שהוא עם הארץ שנאמר שום תשים עליך מלך

The Rambam somehow manages to consider the priority of a Torah scholar over a king to be merely theoretical, but claims that in practice a king would still have priority. What does the Rambam mean by this and how does he explain the fact that the braisa lists the priority of a chacham over a king in an actual situation of redemption from captivity?

Although I don't have a full understanding of how the Rambam can do this, it seems to me that the peshat in the Rambam is that he understands that the list of the mishna and braisa is a list of who is more important and/or more essential. Most of the time the more important/essential person should be saved before the other. However, when it comes to a king there is a specific obligation of שום תשים עליך מלך- שתהא אימתו עליך, to show fear and awe for the king. Although the king may be less essential, there is a specific obligation that would demand of every Jew to prioritize the king even at the expense of the more important Torah scholar. Therefore, when faced with a situation the Rambam holds that the king must be prioritized and this idea of the chacham being more important is "only b'emuna" - only in assessing his objective value, but not in practice.

Horiyos 13a - Order of Kadima

This post sounds a bit chauvinistic but my point is simply to clarify the halacha and understand the Rambam.

The mishna says that a man comes before a woman for להחיות ולהשב אבדה, but a woman comes before a man for clothing and redeeming from captivity. However, if there is a threat of being sodomized, the man would come first.

The gemara itself doesn't offer any rationale to explain the order of the Mishna. However, the Rambam in the pirush hamishna explains that men are obligated in all mitzvos whereas women are only obligated in some of them, therefore a man is more "mekudash" than a woman which gives him precedence להחיות. The Shach (Y.D. 251:11) explains that the definition of להחיות is to save them from a life threatening situation, not about tzedaka because that is included in "clothing" where a woman goes first since her embarrassment is greater. This definition is also meduyak in Rashi who says that a kohen gadol who is anointed for war comes before a s'gan for the purpose of להחיות because he is more essential to the Jewish people. Rashi seems to understand that להחיות is speaking about saving them from a life threatening situation and we prioritize the one who is more essential for the klal.

The difficulty is the end of the Mishna that says if both a man and woman are threatened with sexual assault, the man comes first. The Rambam in his commentary to the mishna writes it is because a homosexual assault to the man is worse than a sexual assault to the woman since it is a דבר שאינו טבע לו - against the nature. The Rashash asks, why does the Rambam have to provide a new reason as to why the man should take priority over the woman - even if all things were equal the man would still come before the woman since he is more me'kudash? Perhaps the Rambam understands that kedusha is only a rationale to give precedence to a man when his life is threatened (and certainly his property - hashavas aveida). The point is that the one who has more kedusha should be given the precedence of survival, but in a situation where they are being threatened sexually and survival is not a question, the kedusha difference isn't significant.

Another question is that R. Moshe Feinstein writes in a teshuva (O.C. ?:49) that the kedusha of men is not greater than that of women. Rav Moshe supports this from the fact that all the pesukim that deal with kedusha treat both men and women equally. Even in the bracha of אשר קדשנו במצותיו women make it with the same nusach as men. Rav Moshe continues that any difference in obligation is just because that is the way Hashem wanted it, but is not reflective of a superiority of men over women. The difficulty is that the Rambam seems to say otherwise! Furthermore, the context of the mishnayos is that כל המקודש מחבירו קודם את חבירו which is learned from a kohen who has first priority due to his kedusha, and then discusses a man coming before a woman. The context of the mishna compels the peshat of the Rambam that men have greater kedusha since they are obligated in more mitzvos. How does R. Moshe ignore this?

On another note, the Ya'avetz (quotes in pischei teshuva y.d. 252:7) raises an interesting question. What would be if the threat is not physical but rather spiritual. The community has a choice to redeem either a boy or a girl, but not both. He suggests that perhaps we should save the girl since it won't just be saving her, but it would be saving generations of Jews since her children will be Jewish, whereas saving the boy would only by saving him. However, the Ya'avetz concludes that since the precedence is given to the boy for physical danger, it should certainly be given to him for spiritual danger and we pay no attention to the fact that the girl will have Jewish children.

Horiyos 12a - Aron Was Hidden

The gemara says that Yoshiyahu hid the Aron (and the other items i.e. tzintzenes ha'man, shemen ha'mishcha...) because he understood from th Torah that the Jews were going to go into galus. This is learned from the pasuk in divrei hayamim from the pasuk - תנו את ארון הקדש בבית אשר בנה שלמה בן דוד מלך ישראל. The Rambam (Hil. Beis HaBechira 4:1) writes - ובעת שבנה שלמה את הבית וידע שסופו ליחרב בנה בו מקום לגנוז בו הארון למטה במטמוניות עמוקות ועקלקלות ויאשיה המלך צוה וגנזו במקום שבנה שלמה

There was a stone in the kodesh hakadashim on which the Aron was placed. At the time Shlomo built the beis hamikdash he understood that it was going to be destroyed and therefore built into the structure a place to hide the Aron. It was Yoshiyahu who realized that it was time to follow through on Shlomo HaMelech's initial plan and to hide the Aron. The Rambam cites the pasuk from our gemara. The Tosafos HaRosh (on the side of the gemara) explains that the Aron was already in the mikdash. Why did Yoshiyahu have to say that it should be placed in the bayis? Secondly, why does the pasuk reference Shlomo HaMelech? Clearly, the pasuk is indicating that Shlomo HaMelech initially understood that there would need to be a hiding place built underground in the beish hamikdash where the Aron can be hidden.

The Tosafos HaRosh continues, perhaps the pasuk in Melachim (1:8:21) which says - ואשים שם מקום לארון, refers to this hiding place. Shlomo designed a place for the Aron to be hidden and it was only revealed to very few of the kohanim and leviyim which is why Yoshiyahu spoke - ללוים המבינים לכל ישראל הקדושים להשם which means he told those who had a tradition about where this place was to hide the Aron in that place.

The Meshech Chochma (haftorah on pekudei) suggests that the pasuk of ואשים שם מקום לארון is not a reference to the hiding place, rather it is a sanctification of the place where the Aron stood in the kodesh hakadashim to give it the same kedusha as the Aron itself. He references the Rambam that Shlomo HaMelech understood that at some time in history the Aron will not be in it's proper place, so he sanctified the place of the Aron so that the sprinkling of the blood and burning of spices can be done on Yom Kippur even in the absence of the Aron, as if the Aron was still there. The Meshech Chochma at the end seems to agree with the Tosafos HaRosh (without quoting him). The reference to the "place of the Aron" is actually the hiding place that was designated for the Aron right beneath the kodesh hakadashim so that even when the Aron is in hiding, it is still במקומו - in it's place, to allow the avoda on YK to be done.

The Brisker Rav (letters printed in the back of the sefer pg. 81) was asked about the halacha that in the absence of the inner miz'beiach they were able to burn ketores (incense) in the place where it stood (zevachim 59). The Brisker Rav writes that the place of the mizbeiach had the same kedusha status as the mizbeiach itself, just as the meshech chochma suggests about the Aron. I once heard a fabulous shiur from Rav Nota Greenblatt from Memphis (given in our beis midrash) where he disagreed with the Brisker Rav and proved that that the halacha of ketores is not on the mizbeiach, rather on the makom mizbeiach. Meaning, it wasn't necessary to give the place of the mizbeiach the kedusha status of the mizbeiach because the halacha of ketores was on the place, not on the mizbeiach.

According to the approach of Rav Nota that the ketores doesn't require a mizbeiach so there is no need to say that the makom of the mizbeiach had the kedusha of the mizbeiach, there is a difference between the mizbeiach and the Aron. The halacha of burning ketores and sprinkling on YK in front of the Aron is that when the Aron is hidden underneath the ground, kedusha still emanates from it to sanctify the place where it stood as if it were there. This is very meduyak in the mishna Yoma 53a. The mishna refers to the Aron and to a Paroches. The gemara asks that the two never coexisted. In the first mikdash there was a wall and no paroches. In the second mikdash there was no Aron. The gemara concludes that it is referring to the second mikdash, so when it says "Aron" it means "makom Aron", and when it says "Bein Habadim" (between the poles) it means as if it were between the poles. Since the halacha of burning the ketores and sprinkling require kedushas ha'aron, the mishna talks as if the Aron was still there even in its absence because the kedushas ha'aron was still there.

After discussing this with R. Nota again (11/21/10) he pointed out that the gemara in menachos 27b explicitly says that the ability to burn ketores and do haza'os in the second beis hamikdash was a result of the kedushas hamakom of the aron. The only question would be whether this would require the aron to be hidden in the place that Shlomo designated for it, or whether the makom had kedusha even if the aron would be in the hands of the pelishtim. The simple reading of the gemara implies that it is simply a din in kedushas makom of the aron even without an aron.

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M'inyan L'inyan here is the summary of the shiur:

The Torah never refers to the mizbeiach inside as the מזבח הפנימי (that is loshon chazal), rather it is called the מזבח הקטרת (burning spices was everyday whereas the sprinkling dam ha'par was once a year). BUT after Betzalel makes it (Parshas Pekudei by revi'i), and places it in its place it is called מזבח הזהב. Why is it not called מזבח הקטרת in that one place?

In Parshas Vayikra (by par kohein moshiach) the Torah returns to call it מזבח קטרת הסמים. The Mishna in Menachos 49 says that only ketores works to be me'chaneich the mizbeiach, not with sprinkling the dam of the cow. In Parshas Vayikra regarding the sprinkling the dam of the cow on the mizbeiach, the Torah says it should be sprinkled על קרנות מזבח הסמים אשר לפני השם באוהל מועד. The gemara in Zevachim 40 asks why does the Torah have to say על קרנות מזבח הסמים since it already identifies the inner mizbeiach and not the outer by saying אשר לפני השם? The gemara answers that the sprinkling can only be done on the mizbeiach after it is nis'chaneich through the ketores as the mishna says in menachos. Meaning, the pasuk writing "mizbeiach ha'samim" is not to identify the mizbeiach, rather to tell you that ketores must be done first to sanctify the mizbeiach. The mizbeiach isn't essential for the burning of ketores as we see in zevachim that the ketores can be burned in the makom of the mizbeiach even in it's absence. Why is it called mizbeiach haketores? R. Nota explains that it is called mizbeiach haketores because that is the only way to be me'chaneich and sanctify the mizbeiach. Therefore, after the mizbeiach is made by Betzalel, before it was used, the Torah in Pekudei calls it מזבח הזהב because until it was nis'chaneich through ketores it couldn't be called the מזבח הקטרת. Only after the mizbeiach was nis'chaneich through the ketores could it be called again in Vayikra מזבח הקטרת.

The Brisker Rav held that the halacha of burning ketores in the absence of the mizbeiach is because the place itself had kedushas mizbeiach. The Meshech Chochma (Pikudei on the pasuk of mizbeiach) goes one step beyond the Brisker Rav. He agrees that the the halacha of burning ketores in the absence of the mizbeiach is because the makom itself has the kedushas mizbeiach. He continues by saying the din that when the mizbeiach is missing the ketores can be brought in the makom, only applies in the beis hamikdash but not the mishkan because in the mishkan there was no kedusha to the place of the mizbeiach. Now, if the Meshech Chochma is correct, the mizbeiach in the mishkan was actually essential for the ketores and that is the more obvious reason for it to be called mizbeiach ha'ketores (not necessarily because of chinuch). According to the Meshech Chochma the question would come back - Why would the Torah call it in parshas pekudei מזבח הזהב and not mizbeiach ha'ketores since the ketores is essential for it.

Rav Nota argues that the Brisker Rav and Meshech Chochma are wrong in assuming that you need a mizbeiach for ketores just that the place of the mizbeiach has status of mizbeiach (which allows the meshech chochma to differentiate between the mikdash and mishkan). He argues that the torah describes the halacha of ketores in Parsha Ki Tisa to be ונתת ממנו לפני העדות באוהל מועד, implying that you don't need any mizbeiach at all for ketores, so long as its burned in front of the Aron. Therefore even in the mishkan the din is true that you can bring ketores even in the absence of the mizbeiach so long as the ketores is being burned לפני השם - in front of the Aron. According to this approach, the inner mizbeiach is not called מזבח הקטרת because it is essential for ketores, it is not essential even in the mishkan. It is only called מזבח הקטרת because that is what is necessary to be mechaneich the mizbeiach. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that in one place in the Torah (Parshas Pekudei), after the mizbeiach was constructed but before it was sanctified through ketores that it is called the מזבח הזהב.

Horiyos 10b - Eating Korban Pesach B'achila Gasa

The gemara initially suggests that the case of ופושעים יכשלו בם is a person who eats the korban pesach לשם אכילה גסה. Depending on how we interpret the phrase "l'sheim achila gassa", the pertinent sugya will either be a lishmah/kavana issue, or will be a issue related to the appetite that is appropriate for eating kodshim. I raised this gemara in my sefer nasiach b'chukecha (pg. 178) and in the hashmatos to pg. 136 as it relates to the כוונה-לשמה issue. And in the hashmatos to pg. 93 how it relates to hiddur mitzvah and eating l'teiavon).

Basically, Rashi understands that the issue is a kavana issue. The idea of eating it achila gassa is to the exclusion of eating it l'sheim mitzvah. According to this approach the issue at hand is a lack of intent for the mitzvah, thereby leading the turei even to ask a contradiction in reish lakish. Why would reish lakish consider this a case of not fulfilling the mitzah in it's ideal state, yet fulfilling the fundamental mitzvah - Reish lakish holds that mitzvos require kavana and without intent he wouldn't be fulfilling any mitzvah at all. This question is addressed by the Beis Halevi (3:51:3). It seems that the language of the gemara לשם אכילה גסה rather than saying אכילה גסה is what compels rashi to explain the problem to be his intent rather than his action.

However, the Tosafos HaRosh argues on Rashi by asking that if the problem was merely his intent, then the gemara should say that he ate it שלא לשם מצוה and not focus on the achila gasa aspect? Therefore the Tosafos HaRosh explains that the issue was not what he was thinking but rather what he did. Generally one should be eating kodshim when he is not starving to fulfill the concept of למשחה כדרך שהמלכים אוכלים. It is more respectful for kodshim to be eaten when one is not starving, but one should also be eating it while he still has a desire for food. Eating kodshim when he is already full - לשם אכילה גסה is not an ideal way to fulfill the mitzvah. The Rashash on his own takes a similar approach to the gemara. See also the Maharatz Chiyus who explains exactly the opposite approach, that he should have eaten in while not starving, but he violated the ideal mitzvah by eating it while starving to break his starvation (this approach is very difficult to fit into the language of לשם אכילה גסה).

From the Tosafos HaRosh we learn a fascinating point regarding hidur mitzvah. The more one has a desire to do the mitzvah, even if the desire is motivated by physical desires (i.e. being hungry), and not by the fulfillment of the mitzvah, it would still qualify as hidur mitzvah. Therefore, one who eats kodshim after he is totally full and has no desire to eat any more and is only eating to fulfill the mitzvah, is not fulfilling hidur mitzvah.

Horiyos 6a - Safeik D'oraysa

The gemara is trying to figure out the status of a chatas that belongs to the tzibur when one or all of the members dies, whether it has a status of חטאת שמתו בעליה that must be killed. The gemara tries to prove that this concept doesn't apply to a korban of the public from goat that is sacrificed on Rosh Chodesh as a korban chatas from the money that was collected at the beginning of the year. The fact that we aren't concerned that one of the contributors died thereby rendering the korban invalid, indicates that we don't apply this concept to a communal korban. The gemara rejects this proof because by the Rosh Chodesh korban we aren't sure that someone died, but in the case we are dealing with (sacrificing a chatas for the generation of tzidkiyahu) we know that they have died. Meaning, that when we are in doubt we can bring the korban, but when we know for sure that a partner in this korban died, we can't bring it.

The Mi'lo HaRo'im asks, if when we would know that someone died it would invalidate the korban, now that there is a safeik that perhaps someone died, the korban should also not be brought because it is a safeik of bringing and invalid korban into the beis hamidash - why don't we invalidate the korban of Rosh Chodesh based on safeik d'oraysa l'chumra? The Mi'lo HaRoim answers this question by saying that we can use a chazaka that the contributors are still alive. But, he immediately asks that the chazaka only applies when there is a possibility that the contributors are alive, but by the time you are most of the way through the year, there have DEFINITELY been people who died?

Tosafos HaRosh asks this very question. Every single Jew contributed toward the korban, by the time the month of Adar rolls around there is no question that one of the contributors had died - how can this korban be brought? Tosafos HaRosh answers that although some people have definitely died, we aren't sure that this money that is being used for the rosh chodesh korban is from one of the contributors who died. Since there is a possibility that the money we are using for this korban is from people who are still alive, the korban can be brought. Why can we assume that? Because there is a chazaka that the contributor of this money that is being used is still alive, therefore using the chazaka that all contributors to this korban are still alive, the korban can be sacrificed.

Another possible approach that the Mi'lo HaRo'im rejects is that according to the Rambam that safeik is l'kula on a Torah level, one can be lenient that the contributors are still alive and sacrifice the korban. He rejects this because the Rabbonon are stringent about a safeik d'oraysa so they shouldn't have allowed the korban to be brought. The Mitzpeh Eisan on the other hand does consider this a valid approach. Perhaps the Rabbonon weren't machmir in this situation since it would prevent the ability to sacrifice the goat of Rosh Chodesh. He suggests that even according to those who are machmir for a safeik d'oraysa, that would only be for a d'oraysa prohibition that is explicit in the Torah but not for something like חטאת שמתו בעליה which is just a halacha l'moshe misinai to invalidate the korban - all would agree that safeik on halacha l'moshe mi'sinai is l'kula.

Horiyos 6a - Safeik D'oraysa

The gemara is trying to figure out the status of a chatas that belongs to the tzibur when one or all of the members dies, whether it has a status of חטאת שמתו בעליה that must be killed. The gemara tries to prove that this concept doesn't apply to a korban of the public from goat that is sacrificed on Rosh Chodesh as a korban chatas from the money that was collected at the beginning of the year. The fact that we aren't concerned that one of the contributors died thereby rendering the korban invalid, indicates that we don't apply this concept to a communal korban. The gemara rejects this proof because by the Rosh Chodesh korban we aren't sure that someone died, but in the case we are dealing with (sacrificing a chatas for the generation of tzidkiyahu) we know that they have died. Meaning, that when we are in doubt we can bring the korban, but when we know for sure that a partner in this korban died, we can't bring it.

The Mi'lo HaRo'im asks, if when we would know that someone died it would invalidate the korban, now that there is a safeik that perhaps someone died, the korban should also not be brought because it is a safeik of bringing and invalid korban into the beis hamidash - why don't we invalidate the korban of Rosh Chodesh based on safeik d'oraysa l'chumra? The Mi'lo HaRoim answers this question by saying that we can use a chazaka that the contributors are still alive. But, he immediately asks that the chazaka only applies when there is a possibility that the contributors are alive, but by the time you are most of the way through the year, there have DEFINITELY been people who died?

Tosafos HaRosh asks this very question. Every single Jew contributed toward the korban, by the time the month of Adar rolls around there is no question that one of the contributors had died - how can this korban be brought? Tosafos HaRosh answers that although some people have definitely died, we aren't sure that this money that is being used for the rosh chodesh korban is from one of the contributors who died. Since there is a possibility that the money we are using for this korban is from people who are still alive, the korban can be brought. Why can we assume that? Because there is a chazaka that the contributor of this money that is being used is still alive, therefore using the chazaka that all contributors to this korban are still alive, the korban can be sacrificed.

Another possible approach that the Mi'lo HaRo'im rejects is that according to the Rambam that safeik is l'kula on a Torah level, one can be lenient that the contributors are still alive and sacrifice the korban. He rejects this because the Rabbonon are stringent about a safeik d'oraysa so they shouldn't have allowed the korban to be brought. The Mitzpeh Eisan on the other hand does consider this a valid approach. Perhaps the Rabbonon weren't machmir in this situation since it would prevent the ability to sacrifice the goat of Rosh Chodesh. He suggests that even according to those who are machmir for a safeik d'oraysa, that would only be for a d'oraysa prohibition that is explicit in the Torah but not for something like חטאת שמתו בעליה which is just a halacha l'moshe misinai to invalidate the korban - all would agree that safeik on halacha l'moshe mi'sinai is l'kula.