Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Chulin 122b - How far do you have to go?

The gemara says that for tefilah and netilas yadayim one must travel 4 mil forward, and just under one mil backward. Rashi explains that we are talking about someone who is on the road travelling and he wants to stop for the day, but knows that he will have a shul 4 mil ahead to daven (Tosafos assumes that this means a minyan, not a physical structure), he must continue to go to the shul. Similarly, if one was hungry and wanted to eat bread but didn't have water to wash his hands, he would be required to wait until he travels 4 mil before he eats.
The Biur Halacha (163) assumes that the shiur of 4 mil is really a time requirement. Since it would take 72 minutes for the average person to travel 4 mil, the gemara is demanding that one wait 72 minutes. A possible scenario would be if one is on an airplane and wants to eat bread but can't leave his seat at the moment, since it is very likely that within 72 minutes he will be able to wash, he is obligated to wait. It isn't clear to me why the Biur Halacha assumes that this would be dependent on time. Rashi uses language of "tircha" implying that one must push themselves to continue to travel, implying that the amount of 4 mil was for a circumstance where he was on foot and walking 4 mil is a significant tircha. Perhaps if he were travelling with minimal tircha he would need to wait longer than 72 minutes.
The M.B. also comments that if one isn't certain that by waiting or continuing to travel they will find the shul or water, they aren't required to wait at all. This is certainly the implication of Rashi who writes in definitive terms that there is water and a shul in front of him.
Another point that the Biur Halacha makes in the name of the Chayei Adam is that if one isn't very hungry he should wait even more than 4 mil. However, Rashi gives an example of one who wants to stop while it is still day and the halacha demands that since it is still day time and easy to travel, he must continue. It would seem that a similar case by eating would be when one wants to eat now but can relatively easily delay. Perhaps if one is very hungry so that delaying is very difficult (on the level of travelling at night), they wouldn't even have to wait 4 mil.

Monday, October 24, 2011

Chulin 121a - Concept of Achshavei

There is a halacha that is recorded twice in Y.D., once at the end of hilchos sheratzim and once in siman 155 in the Rama - מותר לשרוף שרץ או שאר דבר איסור ולאכלו לרפואה אפילו חולה שאין בו סכנה. The obvious implication is that for the sake for refuah it is permissible to eat a prohibited item that has become inedible, but when it is not being done for refuah purposes, it is forbidden. The Yad Avrohom explains based on the Rosh (2nd Perek of Pesachim) that when one burns chometz before pesach rendering it unfit for consumption, it would still be forbidden to eat on Pesach since by eating it he is giving it importance - מדאכליה אחשביה. Based on this it would be forbidden under normal circumstances to eat a bug or other forbidden item that has been burned, but if it is merely being eaten for medicinal purposes it is permitted since the concept of אחשביה only applies when one is consuming it as a food item. This is to the exclusion of the Sha'agas Aryeh (75) who considers the concept of אחשביה to apply even when one is eating something for medicinal purposes. Either way, the concept of אחשביה is a Rabbinic concept. On a Torah level it would seem impossible for one's intent or purpose to determine an item forbidden or permitted.

However, according to R. Yehuda in the mishna, when one gathers the small pieces of meat that are attached to the inner side of the hide together to make a kezayis, it would have status of a kezyais neveila. Rav Huna explains that this is only when he himself gathers them together, indicating through his actions that he is considering it to be important - דאחשביה וגלי דעתיה דלא בטליה מעיקרא: רש"י. Rashi writes that the concept of אחשביה can be used here, not only in the realm of טומאת נבילה, but even in the realm of איסור נבילה. Meaning, his intent to consider the scraps to be meat restores their status even in the world of issur. Tosafos asks on Rashi, where do we ever find that intent could be the determining factor as to whether a food item is permitted or prohibited!? This would seem to be a machlokes between Rashi and Tosafos whether the concept of אחשביה can even work on a d'oraysa level in the realm of issur v'heter.

The gemara on 120a said that חלב -animal fat that had been liquefied should not be included in the prohibition of eating חלב since it would be drinking and not eating, and we need a special source in the Torah to include it. However, the gemara says that blood which the torah forbids as an issur to eat in it's natural state (as a liquid) would also be forbidden if it were congealed - כיון דאקפיה אחשובה אחשביה - since he gave it status through the act of congealing it. This gemara seems to support Rashi, because we are using the concept of אחשביה to maintain the issur of consuming blood even when it is in solid form. But, upon further analysis, we can ask a more basic question. Why does the gemara require this rationale and not simply state that if liquid blood qualifies as eating, then certainly solid blood would qualify? It seems to me that the gemara is bothered by another issue. Since blood is naturally in a liquid state, consuming it in it's solid state could be considered שלא כדרך אכילה - not the normal way of eating. The gemara is saying that since he congeals it for the purpose of eating it as a solid, it is still considered a normal way of eating. We aren't using this rationale to transform the status of the blood from issur to heter, only to say that it still qualifies as a normal way of eating.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Chulin 116b - Keiva as Rennet

The mishna speaks about "keiva" which refers to the enzymes that line the stomach wall of the animal, and the "or ha'keiva" - skin of the keiva, which is the actual piece of the stomach wall. The keiva is considered merely "pirsha" and therefore concludes that even the enzymes that line the stomach of a neveila or treifa animal can be used, but one cannot use as rennet the actual wall of the stomach of a neveila animal.

Rashi discusses milk that is found in the keiva of the animal that is then salted together with the stomach of the animal. Rashi points out that to permit using this milk that was salted with the stomach as rennet, we would have to assume that the milk found in the stomach qualifies as "pirsha" similar to the enzymes. Rashi rejects this notion and considers the milk to be actual milk so that when salted with the meat of the stomach qualifies as meat salted with milk and becomes assur m'drabonon as bassar b'cholov. We would then say that חתיכה נעשה נבילה so that all that milk has status of issur and when used as rennet will spread issur to all the milk since we say min b'mino is not batul (this is rashi's opinion 109a and many other places that we pasken min b'mino isn't batul. tosafos disagrees and holds that we pasken min b'mino is batul - but in this case where it is effective in being ma'amid the cheese, even tosafos would agree that we don't say bitul).

Rashi implies that had we considered the milk inside the stomach to be merely "pirsha", we would be able to compare this case to fish that was placed in a meat dish, which can be eaten with milk using the concept of נ"ט בר נ"ט, meaning a second generational no'sein ta'am. Both the Rashash on Rashi and the Shach (y.d. 87, 31) point out that even if we were to consider the milk that was salted with the stomach lining to be "pirsha" it would still not be comparable to the hot fish on a meat plate that can be eaten with a dairy food. The concept of נ"ט בר נ"ט  only applies when the second generation flavor stand alone as a permitted entity that you are now going to use with milk. However, when the milk is salted with the skin of the stomach, the "pareve" milk inside the stomach absorbs a ta'am rishon of meat. We then take that ta'am rishon and mix it with milk to create cheese. Since the ta'am sheini of meat is immediately mixing with milk, we consider that to be an issur. Rashi writes that he originally thought that the milk in the stomach qualified as pirsha and was matir, implying that he holds that if the milk were truly pareve because it was considered to be "pirsha" then we could compare it to the case of hot fish in a fleishig plate that could be eaten with milk, and doesn't seem concerned with the aforementioned distinction. 

Rashi 111b (d.h. nosein ta'am) writes explicitly that one cannot put hot milk in a fleishig bowl because the second generation flavor of meat is going directly and immediately into the milk. The case here, even if we consider the milk in the stomach to be "pirsha" should be exactly identical to the milk being put in a fleishig plate where Rashi himself holds that it becomes assur!

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Chulin 115a - kol she'tavti le'cha

Rav Ashi says that the source for meat and milk being prohibited to eat and benefit from is the pasuk which says לא תאכל כל תועבה from which chazal darshen כל שתעבתי לך הרי הוא בבל תאכל. The gemara suggests that the same problem should apply to food cooked on shabbos, and it should be prohibited to eat and benefit from, but darshens from the pasuk of כי קדש היא לכם that ma'aseh shabbos is permitted. The gemara further tries to suggest that when one violates the prohibition of plowing with an ox and mule together or muzzling while working, the product should be forbidden. The gemara answers that since we permit ma'aseh shabbos, we should certainly permit the products of plowing with an ox and mule, or muzzling it while working. Rashi struggles with an obvious question, why wouldn't we also learn from ma'aseh shabbos that even bassar b'cholov should be permitted to derive benefit from. Rashi explains that there is a difference. When it comes to meat and milk, one is eating the actual issur that the Torah despised, whereas by ma'aseh shabbos and these other aveiros, we are merely speaking about the product of the issur, not the issur itself.
Tosasfos (end of d.h. choreish) struggles with why we consider the food cooked on shabbos to be merely the product of the aveira but not the תועבה itself, whereas by meat and milk we consider the food to be the actual תועבה that was despised by the Torah? Tosafos explains that it must have to do with how apparent the issur is within the item. By meat and milk where the issur is apparent in the product, the product of the aveira is considered the תועבה, but by ma'aseh shabbos where the issur isn't apparent in the product because one cannot tell from the product that it was cooked on shabbos, the food isn't considered the תועבה.
Tosafos approach seems to be using a d'rabbonon style logic to distinguish between bassar b'cholov and ma'aseh shabbos on a Torah level. It would seem difficult to say that appearance of the product would determine whether the Torah renders it a תועבה. The Rashash suggests another distinction to answer Tosafos question. The cooking of meat and milk is that act of prohibition that the Torah forbids, therefore the product of that act is considered a תועבה. But by ma'aseh shabbos the Torah doesn't forbid specifically the cooking of food, rather the Torah forbids any melacha to be done on shabbos. The food that is cooked on shabbos is not a direct product of what is specifically forbidden by the Torah, therefore not considered a תועבה.
I would like to suggest a slightly different approach. According to the approach that meat and milk that have been cooked together are forbidden to eat and benefit from because they are considered a  תועבה due to the fact that an issur was done with them, it should only be forbidden if cooked by a Jewish adult. Had the cooking been done by a child or at least by a goy, where there was no violation in the process of cooking the product shouldn't be considered a תועבה. Yet, Rashi 114b writes that even if cooked by a goy or a child (rashi implies that we don't render an aveira done by a child to be a ma'aseh aveira), we would consider the product a תועבה. Rashi 114b explains that it is not the act of the aveira that renders the product a תועבה, rather the תועבה is the item itself. Rashi understands that it is as if the Torah would have said that meat and milk is a תועבה, therefore stay away from cooking it. When the Torah identifies an item and forbids an action associated with that item, it can be understood that the action doesn't cause the item to be forbidden, rather the torah recognizes the item as something despised herefore forbids the action i.e. cooking. This would only apply when there is a specific item referred to by the Torah such as meat and milk. The Torah considers meat and milk that is cooked together to be a תועבה, therefore forbids any Jew from cooking it. But, even if a goy were to cook it, the item is still a תועבה. In contrast to the issur of ma'aseh shabbos - the Torah doesn't despise the product, therefore forbid the action of cooking. If that were the case then even something cooked by a goy should be included. The fact that it is only considered ma'aseh shabbos when done by a Jew indicates that the action is what is considered forbidden, and the food is merely a product of the forbidden action to cook. This would not give the food a status of תועבה.

Monday, October 17, 2011

Chulin 114a - Is it Forbidden to Benefit from McDonalds?

According to Shmuel there is an extra pasuk to teach that the issur of meat and milk is binding even on top of a preexisting issur of neveila, therefore one who eats neveila cooked in milk would receive lashes. However, the gemara cites an argument between R. Ami and R. Asi limiting the discussion to be whether one who cooks neveila with milk would receive lashes for the act of cooking, but all agree that since the eating is already forbidden due to the issur of neveila, the prohibition to eat meat and milk isn't binding on top of the preexisting prohibition of neveila.
Based on this, the Rambam (machalos assuros 9) paskens that one who cooks neveila with milk would receive lashes for cooking meat and milk, but one who eats it wouldn't receive lashes for eating meat and milk. However, both the gemara and the Rambam (in mishne torah) are silent regarding the prohibition to benefit from meat and milk. Would that be similar to eating and not apply to neveila, or would it be compared to cooking and apply to neveila?
The Dagul M'rvava (y.d. 87) cited by the Pischei Teshuva (6) quotes the Rambam in his commentary to the mishnayos on krisus who suggests that benefit and eating go hand in hand. Since the issur to eat meat and milk isn't binding on top of the prohibition of neveila, the prohibition to benefit is also not binding. The Pischei Teshuva quotes in the name of the kanfei yona who disagrees with the dagul m'ravava, and the Chasam Sofer who says that one who relies on the dagul m'rvava can't be rejected, but in his opinion the kanfei yona is more correct.
The source of the dagul m'rvava is the Rambam in what he refers to as a נקודה נפלאה in his commentary on krisus. The Rambam asks that the issur to eat basar b'chalav should be binding on the issur of neveila since it is an איסור מוסיף by virtue of the fact that meat and milk is forbidden even to derive benefit from. To this the Rambam says that the issur to eat and the issur to benefit aren't independent entities, rather the prohibition to benefit is an extension of the issur to eat (we see a similar concept in succah 35a by an esrog that is forbidden to eat where rashi writes that it doesn't qualify as לכם. Rashi explains that "lachem" implies that you can benefit from it in all ways - an esrog that is forbidden to eat is missing a major source of benefit). Based on this Rambam, the issur to benefit isn't considered a new issur to cause the issur achila to be binding, and the dagul m'rvava therefore proves from here that even the issur to benefit itself wouldn't be binding. There is a lot of discussion about this Rambam because he seems to say that the approach only works because there isn't an independent source to forbid benefiting from meat and milk, yet in sefer hamitzvos he writes himself that the third repetition of לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו is an independent source to forbid benefit.

Thursday, October 06, 2011

Chulin 103b - Rules of Eating to violate Eiver Min Hachai

The gemara (according to Rashi) has two versions of R. Yochanan as to whether the concept of כדי אכילת פרס applies to אבר מן החי, like it would by all other issurim. On the top of the page the gemara assumed that it would not apply, and on the bottom of the page when it deals with eating a half kezayis and then another half kezayis, assumes that it does.The rationale that אבר מן החי would be different and not have this halacha l'moshe misinai is that even inedible foods combine to the shiur of kezayis. Since אבר מן החי is a chiddush, the halacha l'moshe misinai that allows us to combine all eating within כדי אכילת פרס wouldn't apply to a chiddush case. Without the concept of כדי אכילת פרס the gemara assumes that the entire kezayis must be consumed בבת אחת, but then enters a discussion as to what would qualify as בבת אחת - at one time.
There seem to be three opinions in the gemara what would qualify as בבת אחת, and is dependent on the definition of אכילה. R. Yochanan considers eating to be a function of הנאת גרונו - the mouth. Reish Lakish considers eating to be a function of הנאת מעיו - the stomach. Therefore, R. Yochanan will say that as long as there is a kezayis in the mouth at one time, it is considered בבת אחת, whereas Reish Lakish will say that a kezayis must be swallowed at one time (Rashi explains that it is not possible to chew a kezayis and swallow it all at once since it will naturally begin to slip down his throat, so the only way to swallow a full kezayis would be without chewing. Rashi also seems to hold that swallowing something which is normal to chew wouldn't constitute דרך אכילה, therefore the gemara is forced to make the case of גרומיתא זעירתא which is normal to be swallowed without chewing).
Within the opinion of R. Yochanan that it only qualifies as בבת אחת if a kezayis enters the mouth at the same time, Rashi and Tosafos argue whether we require the kezayis to literally be one unit when it is put into the mouth (tosafos), or whether it can be cut in half so long as there will be a full kezayis in the mouth at one time (rashi). Similarly, they will argue in the opinion of Reish Lakish. Rashi should only require a kezayis in the stomach at the same time, even if it were swallowed in parts (this is actually tosafos question on rashi because reish lakish seems to hold that a full unit of kezayis must be swallowed at one time), whereas Tosafos requires a full unit of a kezayis to be swallowed at one time.
However, according to R. Elazar both Rashi and Tosafos would agree that if one would eat a half kezayis and after a slight pause eat another half, it would qualify as an eating בבת אחת to be chayev. The concept of כדי אכילת פרס would have only permitted the pause to be longer between the two half kezaysim. Since we don't apply כדי אכילת פרס, the pause must be very slight - רש"י - שנתרחקו זה מזה מעט.
The Rambam (Ma'achalos Ha'asuros 5:3-4) has a very different approach in this gemara. Firstly, the Rambam understands that the case of חלקו מבחוץ is not when one eats a half kezayis and then another half kezayis as rashi says, nor is it a case where one splits the kezayis in half and puts both halves in his mouth together as Tosafos says. Rather, the case is where he separates the meat from the bone so that it is no longer one unit. The Rambam understands that the chiddush ha'torah which allows you to combine the bones to make up the kezayis only applies when the integrity of the limb is maintained. As soon as one separates the meat from the bone, the bones are no different than bones by other issurim which don't qualify as an eating. Therefore, the case of חלקו מבפנים that you are going to be chayev is when one puts the meat in his mouth with the bone, and only in his mouth do they separate from one another. Since they were placed in his mouth together, they combine.
The Rambam also holds that paskening like R. Elazar wouldn't undermine the assumption of R. Yochanan. R. Elazar who allows one to be chayev even if they would break the eiver into pieces and eat a half kezayis and then another half, would only apply if ultimately he ate a full kezayis of MEAT. Therefore, if he actually ate a full kezayis of meat, he is chayev even though he separated the meat from the bone and ate it little by little (even with slight pause in between) which is the halacha of R. Elazar. But, in order to combine the bones with the meat to fill the shiur of kezayis, he must place the bone in his mouth together with the meat and together they must make up a kezayis - which is the halacha of R. Yochanan. In other words, the Rambam understands that R. Elazar takes issue with the definition of eating בבת אחת that R. Yochanan establishes by relaxing the requirement of putting it in one's mouth together (when there is no need for bones to be considered toward the kezayis), but agrees with the din of when bones can be combined - only when they are together with the meat at the time they are consumed.

Wednesday, October 05, 2011

Chulin 102a - Eiver Min Ha'chai

The gemara says that even though the prohibition of אבר מן החי for a Jew may only apply to kosher animals (acc. to chachamim and R. Meir), for a goy it will apply even to non-kosher animals. Tosafos 33a questions how this can be. Wouldn't this be a violation of the rule that there is nothing prohibited to a goy that is permitted to a Jew - ליכא מדעם דלישראל שרי ולעכו"ם אסור. Tosafos says that since there would be a prohibition for the Jew to eat a non-kosher animal, even though it wouldn't be considered אבר מן החי, it would not violate the principle of something being permitted to a Jew and prohibited to a goy. Tosafos holds that the prohibition on the goy doesn't have to be the same prohibition on the Jew so long as there is some prohibition (R. Akiva Eiger in a teshuva 165 qualifies this idea and says that it would only be when the prohibition on the Jew is a lack of shechita such as a non-kosher animal, to the exclusion of a treifa where it has already been shechted properly and has not relation to the issur of eiver min ha'chai).
It seems to me that Rashi in our sugya is also addressing the same question. Rashi writes -
אבל בן נח מוזהר על הכל, דכל דקרינא ביה בשר לחודיה אכול, קרינא ביה אבר מן החי לא תאכל. Rashi says that whenever it is permitted to eat the meat after being killed, there is an issur of eiver min ha'chai to eat the meat prematurely. Perhaps rashi understands that the principle of there is nothing prohibited to a goy that is permitted to a Jew isn't violated here because the same exact principle that applies to the goy - don't eat alive what you can eat dead, applies to the Jew. The only difference is that the Jew cannot eat non-kosher animals when dead so there is not issur of אבר מן החי when it's alive, but for the goy there is. Since the principle applies equally to the Jew and goy it wouldn't violate the rule of ליכא מדעם דלישראל שרי ולעכו"ם אסור.

Chulin 101b - The Two Prohibitions of Yom Kippur

Rashi explains that when the gemara tries to prove that R. Yossi Haglili holds of איסור כולל from the fact that when yom kippur falls on shabbos and he does melacha he has to bring a korban both for shabbos and for yom kippur. Even though YK and shabbos are entering at the same time, one can only be liable for both since if theoretically one would start before the other, each can be binding on top of the first. Rashi explains that even if shabbos would enter prior to YK, the prohibition of YK would be binding on top of shabbos as an איסור כולל. The fact that YK forbids not only doing melacha, but also eating and drinking makes it an איסור כולל to allow the prohibition of melacha to be binding on top of the prohibition against doing melacha on shabbos - מיגו דאיתסר באכילה משום יוה"כ איתסר ליה נמי מלאכה משום יוה"כ. The difficulty of this rashi is how can we say an איסור כולל from the issur to eat to the issur to do melacha, they are totally separate prohibitions. From rashi we learn a new approach in understanding the nature of the issur to eat and to do melacha on YK. Although in the counting of mitzvos they are completely independent, and would seemingly be two completely separate prohibitions that apply on the 10th of Tishrei, that is not how rashi is viewing it. Rather, the kedusha of YK results in two halachos, one is a prohibition of eating and the second is the prohibition of melacha. Both are outgrowths of the kedushas ha'yom and not independent prohibition that apply to the calendar date of 10th of Tishrei. It would now make sense that Rashi can consider YK in the general sense to be an איסור כולל from eating to melacha, since both are merely outgrowths of the kedusha of YK.
I would like to suggest that the Rambam would not agree with rashi. Rambam (Hil. Shevisas Asor 1:6) writes that the mitzvah d'oraysa to add to YK before and after is limited to YK (not shabbos and yom tov) and limited to the עינוי of YK, it doesn't extend m'doraysa to the issur melacha. The Minchas Chinuch clearly understands the Rambam this way. The Rambam would seem to hold that m'doraysa when one is me'kabel YK early, they are prohibited from eating but not prohibited from doing melacha. The fact that by accepting kedushas ha'yom one can be prohibited from eating but not from melacha implies that the they are not an outgrowth of the kedushas ha'yom, rather two independent halachos that apply on the 10th of Tishrei and could theoretically exist one without the other.

Monday, October 03, 2011

Chulin 99b - Bitul in more that 60x

The Rama (y.d. 98) writes that foods with a very strong flavor such as spices are not batul in 60x because the flavor is still able to be tasted, however the Rama limits this to when the item is prohibited in and of itself (i.e. teruma or avoda zara), to the exclusion of spices that just have a non-kosher item absorbed in it. The source for the Rama is our gemara where we see that "grissin" which fall into lentils can give flavor even if there is 100x as much to be mevatel. Clearly, the idea of 60x is an assumption but doesn't apply to cases where the flavor is actually tasted. But, regarding the Rama's stipulation that this rule would not apply to foods that have the taste of issur absorbed in them, but are not assur themselves, the Gr"a quotes those who disagree. The Gr"a writes that in our gemara we find that fish brine isn't going to be batul until there is 192x as much, even though the actual water and vinegar in the brine isn't technically assur, just that it has the flavor of the fish fat absorbed inside of it. The same should apply to a spice which has the flavor of non-kosher meat - so long as the spice could be tasted in whatever dish it falls into, it should be assur even if there is 60x as much.
The Shach writes that when spices are able to assur foods even when there is more than 60x, it is only an issur d'rabonon. R. Akiva Eiger quotes the Ran who disagrees and holds that it would be d'oraysa. The Ran is easy to understand, but the Shach is harder to understand - why would it only be d'rabonon? It seems that the Shach understands that once there is 60x of the mutar food to the assur food, the flavor is weakened to a point that it isn't considered true ta'am and therefore it is only assur m'drabonon.

Sunday, October 02, 2011

Chulin 99b - Gid Hanashe is Prohibited to Derive Benefit From

The gemara has a discussion in Pesachim about things that are prohibited to eat, whether they should also be prohibited to derive benefit from. Either way, one of the approaches to understand the nature of issurei achila - things that are prohibited to eat, is that it is essentially a prohibition to derive benefit, but the Torah only forbids the epitome of benefit from the item - eating. Meaning, that the nature of issur achila is that it is prohibited to derive the benefit that this item is meant to provide which is the benefit of eating. This would explain for example why we wouldn't consider an achila gassa (over eating), or eating of something which taste bad to be a violation of eating, since there is no pleasure or benefit associated with that eating. 
However, Tosafos makes a calculation in our sugya that undermines this premise. Tosafos proves from the gemara in Pesachim that according to the opinion who considers giddin (sinews) to have flavor, it is only prohibited to eat. But according to the opinion who doesn't consider it to have flavor, it is even prohibited to derive benefit from. Since we rule that Gid Ha'nashe doesn't give off flavor, we must rule that one cannot derive benefit from it - therefore it cannot be gifted to a goy, if the presence of the gid hanashe will raise the stature of the gift. Now, if one were to eat gid hanashe they would certainly be in violation of the prohibition to eat gid hanashe, even though there is no flavor so that they cannot be in violation of the issur to derive benefit. If it were true that the prohibition to eat is a form of deriving benefit, one couldn't be in violation of eating gid hanashe since there is no benefit and would only be in violation on selling or giving to a goy in which there is benefit. The fact that one is in violation even for the eating of gid hanashe which has no flavor, indicates that eating is in no way contingent on the pleasure or benefit one receives from the food, rather it is an act that the Torah forbids regardless of the benefit it provides.