Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Yoma 78b - Feeding Issurei D'rabonon to Children

The Shulchan Aruch writes in Hilchos Shabbos (343) that it is forbidden for an adult to "feed" something which is forbidden either by the Torah or M'drabonon, to a child. This concept is not based on the mitzvah of chinuch, but is rather based on a specific prohibition of לא תאכילם, from which the gemara learns out in Yevamos 114a - להזהיר גדולים על הקטנים. The Rashba cited by the Biur Halacha (quoting R. Akiva Eiger) disagrees and holds that if it is only an issur d'rabonon and being done for the sake of the child, not for the sake of the adult, it is permitted.
There is a major machlokes Rishonim addressed by Tosafos 77a, and by the Ran and Tosafos Yeshanim at the beginning of the perek whether the other inuyim (aside from eating and drinking) are forbidden by the Torah, or only m'drabonon. Rashi 74a d.h. shabason, seems to hold that they are only assur m'drabonon because Rashi equates the d'rabonons of Shabbos for which "Shabbason" is used as an esmachta, to these inuyim for which shabbason is also used as an esmachta. Yet, when explaining our gemara which says that one cannot put shoes on children because people will say אינשי עבדו ליה - an adult did it for him, Rashi writes that the Torah forbids an adult from feeding an issur to a child. Therefore, if we allow children to wear shoes, people will assume that an adult violated this prohibition by putting the shoes on the feet of the child. Even though Rashi holds that these inuyim are only M'drabonon, and even though it is being done for the sake of the child, Rashi assumes that there would be a violation of לא תאכילם - להזהיר הגדולים על הקטנים. This seems to be against the Rashba and is a support for the Shulchan Aruch who holds that even for an issur d'rabonon done for the sake of the child, we don't allow an adult to be the direct cause of it.

Tuesday, January 21, 2014

Yoma 77a - Smearing Non-kosher Fats On One's Skin

Someone asked me not long ago whether it is permitted to smear on one's skin items that are not kosher. This person in particular is very health conscious and is trying to figure out creative ways of absorbing certain items that they believe to be healthy into their body without violating any issurim. The question is, when the gemara makes the claim that סיכה כשתיה, how seriously do we take that? Do we view smearing oneself with something to be tantamount to drinking it? There is no question that in the context of Yom Kippur, the gemara clearly does. In the context of one who is forbidden to eat teruma using it to on their body is also explicit in the gemara Nidah 32a that it is prohibited. It is also obvious that issurei hana'ah one cannot use at all, therefore one could certainly not use Orlah which is assur b'hana'ah (as the gemara says in Pesachim 25b). The question is whether one can use other forms of forbidden foods to smear themselves with.
Tosafos 77a d.h. d'nan writes in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that aside from eating and drinking all the עינויים of Yom Kippur are only d'rabonon. Tosafos continues that the Rabbonon were only gozer that סיכה כשתיה by Yom Kippur and for Teruman, but nowhere else. Clearly Rabbeinu Tam holds that it is perfectly permissible to use all forms of ma'achalos ha'asuros and rub it on one's skin, so long as they don't ingest it. However, it seems from Tosafos that this approach is predicated on the assumption that the concept of סיכה כשתיה even where it does apply (Yom Kippur and Teruma) is only d'rabonon. However, if we assume that the עינויים of Yom Kippur are d'oraysa, as the Ran quotes from the Rambam, the concept of סיכה כשתיה must be d'oraysa at least in the context of Yom Kippur. Similarly, the Rambam (Terumos 10,2) implies that eating, drinking and anointing are all forbidden forms of using teruma (for one who may not use teruma), and that they are all the same, meaning that they are d'oraysa.
The question becomes, according to the Rambam who holds that the concept of סיכה כשתיה is d'oraysa, how does it apply to other issurim aside from Yom Kippur and Teruma. Do we assume that it is only d'oraysa in those two places, or are we to learn from there that it is always d'oraysa? And even if it is only d'oraysa in those two places, is it at least an issur d'rabonon elsewhere or is it completely mutar?
Even within the opinion of the Rambam that סיכה כשתיה is d'oraysa by Terumah and Yom Kippur, the Machane Ephraim (hearos at end of sefer - pg. מא in the old editions d.h. עוד בדין) writes that only a sicha done for the purpose of enjoyment would be d'oraysa, not if done for medicinal purposes. Therefore, the proof of Tosafos from Yoma 77b about one who has head injuries being able to do sicha is not a question on the Rambam because it is not for ta'anug, therefore only d'rabonon, and for refuah they weren't go'zer.
The Taz (Y.D. 117:4) cites the Beis Yosef quoting the Orchos Chaim that one may not anoint themselves with pig fat דסיכה בכלל שתיה היא. The Taz rejects that based on our Tosafos, and from the Rashba who permits anointing with pig fat, even when there is no sakana. However, The Taz concludes by citing the Issur V'heter that it is only permitted if there is some level of tza'ar, one who is perfectly healthy and is only using it as a moisturizer or for תענוג בעלמא, it may not be done. The Taz comments - וכן עיקר, implying that it can only be done to alleviate a tza'ar but cannot be done for just simple enjoyment.
It is very difficult to understand the hagdara of the Issur V'heter and Taz. If we say סיכה כשתיה is should be a regular issur, whether d'oraysa or d'rabonon, and should not be mutar to avoid tza'ar. The fact that it is mutar to avoid tza'ar implies that it is not a real issur, so why is it assur to use for pleasure?
The Nekudos Hakesef also quotes the same sources and seems to hold that Tosafos clearly permits it entirely, even for תענוג בעלמא, which is also the p'sak of the Bach. However, the Nekudas Hakesef comments that he saw those who are machmir not to wash with non-kosher soap, "and that is correct". He then continues to try and justify a minhag of not using pig fat in particular, while still using other forms of non-kosher fats.
In short, both the Taz and Nekudas Hakesef seem to conclude that it is technically permitted to use non-kosher items on one's skin, but one should preferably abstain from doing so for the sake of enjoyment. One should only use it if they NEED it. Similarly, the Aruch Hashulchan (29) justifies the practice of using soap from non-kosher items even for no particular need since it is already pagum, which implies that he agrees that otherwise it should not be used lichatchila. The Hagdara of the issur still needs explanation.
Perhaps the Issur V'heter holds that the distinction between תענוג and to alleviate צער is not a practical distinction of how necessary it is, Rather, he holds that the real issur of סיכה כשתיה is only when done for תענוג, as the Machaneh Ephraim says explicitly, but when done to avoid tza'ar, that does not qualify as ta'anug. Therefore, even other issurim outside of Y.K. and Teruma, we only permit it when it is to help alleviate tza'ar, but if it is done for ta'anug the Issur V'Heter is concerned for the opinion of the Rambam that it is d'oraysa on Y.K. and for Teruma, and therefore may apply to other issurim as well.
Regarding the issue of anointing oneself using items that are meant to be ingested, there is definitely not going to be an issur d'oraysa because the Rambam (Terumos 10:2 and 11:1) implies that even for Teruma we only say סיכה כשתיה if it is meant to be used in that way. If it is meant to be ingested, even the Rambam would hold that at worst it would be a d'rabonon. Being that we don't know what the Rambam would hold for other issurim outside of Terumah and Yom Kippur, and Tosafos is matir explicitly, one who feels that they need this item for their health can certainly be lenient to use it.

Thursday, January 16, 2014

Yoma 70a - Rolling the Sefer Torah B'tzibur

The gemara explains that the first two parshiyos that were read by the kohen gadol, since they were in close proximity to one another, it can be rolled from achrei mos to emor. But the third parsha which was in parshas Pinchos could not be rolled to and therefore he must read it by heart. The gemara explains that rolling wasn't an option because it was a lack of kavod tzibbur, as rashi explains, having everyone sit silently until they reach the spot. The gemara explains that although generally we take out multiple sifrei torah, that is only when each sefer torah is read from by a different person so that there was no insult to the original sefer torah and no issue of causing an extra bracha (since each person is going to anyway make their own bracha), but this was not an option for the Kohein Gadol's reading (it would be a problem of p'gam and causing an unnecessary bracha).
The Tosafos Yeshanim points out that although reading by heart is not a perfect solution because it is a violation of reading the written torah orally, it is the lesser of the two evils. The Tosafos Yeshanim (in first answer) understands that the issue of reading written Torah by heart is only a מצוה מן המובחר, and is therefore trumped by kavod tzibbur.

It would seem from the gemara that on a shabbos rosh chodesh where we need to read from two separate places, we take out two sifrei torah rather than roll. If there is only one sefer Torah, it would be better for one to read the second section by heart rather than rolling the Torah and causing the tzibbur to wait. However, this is clearly not the minhag.
The Beis Yosef (144) writes that the hagahos mordechai and Ritva both say that it is better to disregard the kavod tzibbur, rather than disregard the takanas chachamim to read the inyana d'yoma of rosh chodesh (or 4 parshiyos). It is unclear how they would work this into the gemara which seems to say the opposite. Perhaps they would say that in the time of the gemara it wasn't set as an absolute takana to read the korbanos of mussaf from a sefer torah, but once it has become the overwhelming custom, it is like a takanas chachamim that overrides kavod hatzibbur.
The Rashba in a teshuva cited in the beis yosef was asked about the possibility of reading the second section from a chumash when there is only one sefer torah, rather than rolling. The Rashba answers and proves from our gemara that it is better to read from a chumash rather than roll, because even reading by heart is better than rolling. Clearly, the Rashba holds that reading from a chumash which avoids both the kavod tzibbur problem and the issue of reading the written torah by heart, is the best solution.
Yet, the Shulchan Aruch paskens like the Ritva that we roll rather than read from a chumash, and the Darkei Moshe agrees. The Magen Avrohom (7) asks this question on the Shulchan Aruch, that the gemara itself says that even if there is no alternative but to read by heart, we prefer that to the rolling of the Torah b'tzibbur. How does the pesak of the Shulchan Aruch fit with the gemara (The Magen Avrohom is apparently not content with saying that it only developed into a "takana" to read that section b'tzibbur, after the time of the gemara)? The Magen Avrohom writes that the concern of Kavod Tzibbur was only in the large group that was in the ezras nashim to hear the Kohein Gadol read from the Torah, it doesn't apply to the small groups in shul because מסתמא מוחלין על כבודם כדי לקיים קריאת המפטיר דשבת ור"ח ומפטיר דיו"ט דהוא תקנת הגאונים. The Magen Avrohom seems to hold that the takana alone wouldn't trump kavod tzibbur, but since there was a takana to read the inyana d'yoma from the sefer torah, we assume the tzibbur would be mochel on their honor.
The Nesiv Chaim (gilyon of shulchan aruch) explains the position of the hagahos mordechai. In the time of the gemara where the one getting the aliya read from the Torah it was impossible for the section to be read by heart because no one knew who would get that aliya (it was only possible for the kohen gadol who knew that he would be reading it to memorize it in advance). Since that was not a solution, the custom became to roll the torah b'tzibbur, which carries over into nowadays when there is a ba'al korei who can technically prepare it in advance since we also have a shortage of people who can read it by heart. Being that it became impossible to sustain the reading of the parsha by heart, the tzibbur is mochel on their kavod to allow the rolling. The difficulty with this approach is that it can still be read from chumashim as the Rashba suggests.
The Pri Chadash actually writes that the Shulchan Aruch following the Ritva and Hagahos Mordechai on only allowing the rolling since we can assume the tzibbur is mochel. They are not suggesting that it is a better solution to just reading from a chumash. Therefore he writes that if they want to read from a chumash rather than rolling the sefer torah, they can certainly do that.
A simple answer would have been that reading from a chumash is more of a lack of kavod tzibbur than rolling, therefore we roll rather than read from a chumash. The Pri Megadim rejects this answer because the reading from a chumash is only a lack of kavod tzibbur because they don't have a Torah (so we don't allow them to read from a chumash to make them feel bad and purchase a Torah - Beis Yosef 143), but in this case where there is a sefer torah, there is no lack of kavod tzibbur to allow the second reading to be done from a chumash.

Monday, January 13, 2014

Yoma 69a - Benefiting from Bigdei Kehuna

The gemara concludes that when one is already wearing bigdei kehuna to do the avoda, they can continue to wear it even after the time of the avoda - מפני שבגדי כהונה נתנו ליהנות בהן. But, the braisa says that the kohein wearing bigdei kehuna must remain in the beis hamikdash and not go out to the "medinah". Rashi explians that it would be a problem of treating the bigdei kehuna as non-kodesh garments. The language of Rashi implies that the nature of this prohibition would only be d'rabonon. Tosafos points out that just as one cannot go out l'mdinah wearing the bigdei kehuna, it would also be forbidden to put on the bigdei kehuna when one is not putting them on for the purpose of doing the avoda. The leniency is only to continue wearing them once they are on, but not to actually put them on. Tosafos understands this from the gemara in kiddushin which justifies the practice of wearing them after the time of the avoda as לא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת which implies that since it is unavoidable, it is permitted, but to put them on is certainly avoidable and not permitted (According to Tosafos perhaps one cannot wear them for much time after the avodah either because that is also easily avoidable).
The Mishna gives an option of reading the parsha either in the bigdei lavan that the kohein gadol was wearing until now, or to change into special clothing that was made for this purpose. The Tosafos Yeshanim points out that it does not offer the option of changing into the bigdei zahav to read the parasha. Perhaps the rationale is based on what Tosafos points out that he cannot lichatchila put on bigdei kehuna when unnecessary.
Tosafos adds an additional chiddush. Tosafos explains that the tzitz was an exception to the other bigdei kehuna because there is an explicit pasuk permitting it to be worn "always" - והיה על מצחו תמיד. This implies that the issur of putting on bigdei kehuna unnecessarily is not merely a d'rabonon violation (as rashi explains for walking out l'medina), but rather a Torah violation which is only waived by the Torah itself for the tzitz. Perhaps Tosafos will hold that just as placing on the bigdei kehuna not at the time of avoda is a Torah violation, the continuing to wear too long after the avoda where there is no justification of  לא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת, would also be a Torah violation. And perhaps Tosafos will hold that even walking out l'medinah would be a Torah violation, against Rashi who writes - שנוהג בה דרך חול, which implies that it is only a drabonon violation.
There is another point that is apparent from Rashi at the beginning of th sugya. The entire discussion is whether one is allowed to benefit from bigdei kehuna שלא בשעת עבודה, but it seems to take for granted that it is perfectly permissible to benefit from them and enjoy their warmth while doing the avoda. There doesn't seem to be any requirement to avoid the intention of pleasure that is being derived by the clothing that he is wearing while doing the avoda. Although when it comes to the concept of מצות לאו ליהנות ניתנו, the Ran (and most rishonim) holds that one cannot derive a hana'as ha'guf that is simultaneous with the mitzvah, this seems to be different. The bigdei Kehuna seem to be similar to a succah, where although there is an issur d'oraysa to benefit from a succah (learned from chagiga - succah 9a), one can enjoy the shade and protection of the succah while sitting in it for the mitzvah. The rationale is that the definition of succah is to be a protection from the elements, as the definition of clothes is to provide warmth, therefore we assume that these benefits that are simultaneous with the mitzvah are permitted.