Monday, August 29, 2011

Chulin 66a - Shechting Grasshoppers

Rashi writes that the kosher chagavim (grasshoppers) don't need shechita because they are mentioned in the pasuk after fish which don't need shechita. The Rashba (chulin 27a) when the gemara talks about fish not requiring shechita explains that the default is that nothing requires shechita unless the Torah says it does. The only reason that the gemara 27a searches for a source that fish don't require shechita is because of the pasuk of הצאן ובקר ישחט להם אם את כל דגי הים יאסף להם, which implies that fish require some positive act of "asifa" in place of shechita. The gemara concludes that asifa- gathering is actually to the exclusion of shechita. In short, Rashi and the Rashba seem to argue whether we need a source that grasshoppers don't require shechita or whether without any source the default is that no shechita is required.
The language of the gemara באסיפה בעלמא סגי להו in the context of fish, is somewhat ambiguous. Do fish require a positive act of "asifa" which would demand that they be gathered from the sea by a person while they are still alive, or is it just a way of saying that they don't require any act and can be eaten even when found dead? The Kesef Mishna (Hil. Shechita 1:3) cites the opinion of Rav Sadya Gaon who says that fish require "asifa" and if they are found dead they are forbidden to be eaten (this would be similar to nechira prior to the requirement of shechita, which required the animal to be killed but would not permit a neveila). Rav Hai Gaon disagrees and says they can even be eaten when found dead. The Kesef Mishna understands that the Rambam holds like Rav Hai Gaon, not Rav Sadya Gaon, but in truth the language of the Rambam is very cryptic. The Rambam begins by implying that fish require a positive act of "asifa", but in the end says that even if they die in the water they can be eaten.
רמב"ם - דגים וחגבים אינן צריכין שחיטה אלא אסיפתן היא המתרת אותן, הרי הוא אומר הצאן ובקר ישחט להם ומצא להם אם את כל דגי הים יאסף להם ומצא להם, אסיפת דגים כשחיטת בקר וצאן, ובחגבים נאמר אוסף החסיל, באסיפה לבדה. לפיכך אם מתו מאליהן בתוך המים מותרין, ומותר לאכלן חיים
The Rambam doesn't say that fish and grasshoppers don't have a "matir", rather he says that the gathering of them is the matir in place of shechita. This would imply that they would need to be gathered from the sea while still alive, yet the Rambam concludes "therefore if they die by themselves in the water, they are permitted". Aside from the first statement seemingly contradicting the second, the Rambam connects them using the term "therefore"! Although the kesef mishna tries to explain that once shechita isn't necessary, there is no longer any method demanded to kill the fish, thereby permitting even fish that are found dead; if this were the Rambam's intention his language should have been that there is no matir necessary for fish and grasshoppers?

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Chulin 61a - All Birds That are דורס Aren't Kosher

The Mishna has a rule that birds which are do'reis aren't kosher (What does it mean to be do'reis? Rashi explains that it lifts it's prey with it's nails, Tosafos argues that even a chicken does that [rashash says he never saw a chicken do that], and therefore explains that it begins to eat prior to the prey being fully killed.
Tosafos wonders where this rule comes from. There are two possibilities. Either Chazal were zoologists and spent time searching all birds which are do'reis and found that every bird that is do'reis is tamei. It is doubtful that they would have invested so much time into doing the research to determine that there is no kosher bird at all that is do'reis. Another possibility is that they weren't disclosing a fact, rather a halacha that they had from Moshe - הלכה למשה מסיני, that any bird which is do'reis isn't kosher. The problem with the approach of being a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai is that it makes the pasuk of פרס or עזניה superfluous since one of the two is do'reis and therefore not kosher due to the halacha l'moshe misinai. See Maharatz Chiyus who discusses the possibility of something being a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai and supported by a pasuk as an אסמכת בעלמא. Tosafos concludes that it is not a halacha but rather a tradition from Noach who did all the research when he was gathering the birds for the teiva.
The Maharatz Chiyus raises and interesting point. Although we don't generally learn things from before matan torah, natural facts can be learned from before matan torah. Therefore, if we had a tradition from Noach that all do'reis birds are tamei, we would be able to use that as a source making any passuk unnecessary. Just as Tosafos assumes that if we had a halacha l'moshe misinai testifying that all do'reis birds are tamei, it would make the pasuk of peres or azniya extra, so too when we have a tradition from Noach to that fact, it should make the pasuk of peres or azniya extra?

Monday, August 22, 2011

Chulin 59a - Checking Simanim before eating

The mishna teaches what the qualifications are for a kosher animal, bird, fish and chagav. The Rambam in sefer hamitzvos (149-152) counts each of them as a separate positive mitzvah. Although the Ramban in his comments on the mitzvos doesn't write anything, in the sherashim of sefer hamitzvos (shoresh 6) he articulates his opinion that none of these deserve to be counted as a מצות עשה. The rationale of the Ramban is quite logical. There is no obligation to eat these items at all, and therefore the mitzvah to check the simanim is essentially teaching what is allowed and not allowed to be eaten, without any command. The Ramban does consider the positive mitzvah to be an additional violation for one who would eat a non-kosher animal in which these simanim are absent, but does not consider it a mitzvas aseh to actually check the simanim. The Ramban and Behag (quoted by ramban) seem to differ whether the eating of a non-kosher animal should even be counted as a separate aseh, but they both agree that the checking for simanim isn't worthy of being counted as an aseh.
By looking more carefully at the language of the Rambam in sefer hamitzvos (149) we get a better appreciation as to how the Rambam considers these to be positive mitzvos. The Rambam writes
והענין במצוה זו מה שזכרתי לך, והוא שאנו מצווין לבדוק אלו הסימנים בכל בהמה וחיה ואז מותר לאכלן, והדין הזה הוא המצוה
The Rambam seems to understand that the nature of this mitzvah is not an obligation to check the simanim. Rather, the Rambam seems to hold that the very nature of the din which distinguished between kosher and non-kosher, is worthy of counting as an independent mitzvah. This doesn't mean that by checking for simanim one fulfills a mitzvah aseh, but rather the existence of dinim that are necessary to abide by in order to achieve a desired result, qualifies as a mitzvah. A similar logic would have to be applied to explain why the Rambam counts shechita (146) as a mitzvas aseh - although there is no obligation to eat meat, the dinim of shechita that one must abide by to render the animal kosher, qualifies as a mitzvas aseh. The mitzvah of writing a gett would be similar, not an obligation, rather a set of dinim that one must abide by if they want to achieve a particular result. However, the Megilas Esther and Kin'as Sofrim (two classic commentaries on sefer hamitzvos - shoresh 6) both seem to take the approach that the act of checking according to the Rambam is a fulfillment of a positive mitzvah. The Kinas Sofrim explains that if one were to eat an animal without determining that it is kosher and only after consumption realizing that it was indeed kosher, they would be in violation of this mitzvah aseh. The same should be true if one were to eat in a restaurant without verifying that it is kosher and only afterward finding out that it was indeed kosher - the laxity in failing to examine prior to eating is a violation of the mitzvas aseh. According to this approach, the failure to pre-examine the kashrus status prior to consumption is very different than other issurim. If one were lax about other prohibitions and not pay close attention to whether it is actually permitted, and then find out it was permitted, it would fall under the category of מכוין לאכול בשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה, which requires teshuva but is not a violation. However, according to the Rambam even the laxity in determining the kashrus status of an item would be a specific violation of a mitzvas aseh. The statement of chazal that one needs to do teshuva when they try to eat pork and end up eating kosher meat, is actually a strong question to undermine the kin'as sofrim's approach to the Rambam. Why would chazal just say that you need teshuva for the intent of the aveira, you should need teshuva for violating the aseh and not inspecting the food before consumption? It therefore seems to me that the Rambam considers even a din of inspecting to be counted as a mitzvah even though there is no obligation to do so.
As an aside, the language of the Rambam at the beginning of ma'achalos ha'asuros contradicts his language in sefer ha'mitzvos. In the mishne torah the rambam uses the term לידע, implying that the nature of the mitzvah is to learn and be knowledgeable to be able to discern between kosher and treif, whereas in sefer hamitzvos he uses the term לבדוק implying that the nature of the mitzvah is to actually examine?

Thursday, August 18, 2011

Chulin 54b - Defining the word "רשאי'

The Node B'Yehuda has a famous teshuva where he explains why the halacha requiring one to greet their rebbi on the 3 regalim (pesach, shavuos and succos) isn't codified in Shulchan Aruch. The Nodeh B'Yehuda explains based on the gemara in kiddushin 33b that one is not allowed to stand up for their rebbi more than twice a day so that the honor being shown to a rebbi shouldn't exceed the honor being shown to Hashem through the acceptance of Him as king in the reading of Shema which is only twice a day. Similarly, when there was a beis hamikdash, there couldn't be a halacha requiring one to visit their rebbi more than 3 times a year (even though it is technically appropriate every shabbos and rosh chodesh - as the gemara cites לא חודש היום ולא שבת היום). Now that there is no beis hamikdash and there is no mitzvah to be oleh regel on yom tovim, the halacha of visiting a rebbi is completely inapplicable for the same reason so that the honor shown to a rebbi shouldn't exceed the honor shown to Hashem.
The Node B'yehuda certainly assumes that the definition of the term רשאי in the context of אין אדם רשאי לעמוד בפני רבו אלא שחרית וערבית שלא יהא כבודו מרובה משל שמים, has to mean - NOT PERMITTED, as it would be simply translated. However, Tosafos says that in hour gemara when it cites the phrase אין בעלי אומניות רשאין לעמוד מפני ת"ח בשעה שעסוקין במלאכתם, can even be speaking about when they are doing their own work so there is no issur to stand, but the term רשאי means obligated. Meaning, workers aren't obligated to lose money and stand for Talmidei chachamim while they are busy with their own work. Tosafos says that the term in the gemara kiddushin can be translated the same way, one is not obligated to stand for a rebbi more than twice a day, but would certainly be allowed to. But, in truth this may work even better for the Nodeh B'yehuda because there is no halacha that nowadays one is not allowed to visit their rebbi on regel, just that it can't be an obligation. It would work well since it is based on the source of one not being "obligated" to stand up for their rebbi more than twice a day - they are allowed just not obligated.
On another note, the gemara concludes that we can't prove from our gemara that honor shown to those going to do a mitzvah should supersede the honor shown to talmidei chachamim, because it could be that the requirement to stand for those who bring bikurim is simply שלא תהא נמצא מכשילן לעתיד לבא - meaning that they must be shown extra honor in order to encourage them to invest the energy and time to come again. From here we see that there is an obligation on everyone not only to do mitzvos, and not only to abstain from preventing the doing of mitzvos, but to actively do things that encourage others to do mitzvos.

Friday, August 12, 2011

Chulin 48b - Treifos are halacha l'moshe m'sinai

A few weeks ago I was in Sha'arei Tzedek with R. Moishele Weissberg (who i am training by to become a mohel) and an older guy walked over dressed in shorts and sandals (not looking very well put together). He said that he had a question, but not about milah, rather about a chicken (Moishele spent over 25 years as a shochet). The question was that he has a chicken who is missing a leg at the knee and he wants to know if the chicken is kosher, because he wants to keep it alive and eat the eggs. Moishele didn't know the answer, so he called another shochet who said that it depends on the tzomet ha'gidin, whether or not they are in tact.
I didn't fully grasp the importance of the tzomet ha'gidin at that point. However, the gemara says that in treifos one cannot compare one thing to another based on the assumption that the rules should always be consistent and logical. The gemara says
אין אומרין בטריפות זו דומה לזו, שהרי חותכה מכאן ומתה חותכה מכאן וחיה
Rashi (unlike tosafos in baba basra 130b who says this is referring to a hole in the spleen) says that so long as no bones are broken, if the meat of the chicken is cut off the bones, if it is above the tzomes ha'gidin it is kasher, but on the tzomes ha'gidin it is a treifa. This proves that the laws of treifos aren't intuitive because it could be a treifa when less is missing, and kasher when more is missing.
Rashi at the beginning of the perek 42a also made this point by saying that there is no rationale when it comes to treifos because it is all a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai. It is for this reason that the chazon ish explains that the ability to keep a treifa alive would not change it's status as being a treifa since the list of 18 treifos are halacha l'moshe misinai.

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Chulin 46b - 47a - Sircha/Hole in Lungs

The gemara discusses the common problem of sirchas (strands that attach lobes of the lung to one another or to the rib cage) being an indication of a treifa. The gemara distinguishes between כסדרן and שלא כסדרן. Simply speaking כסדרן refers to an attachment of the lobes of the lungs that are adjacent to one another, which the gemara says is kosher because היינו רביתייהו, whereas an attachment between lobes that aren't adjacent -שלא כסדרן, renders that animal a treifa.
For background purposes, the lung has 4 lobes on the right side and 3 on the left. The very large lobe on the right and the left is called an אומא, and the upper ones (3 on the right and 2 on the left) are called אונא. Rashi and Tosafos both quote a major machlokes whether a sircha between two adjacent lobes are considered acceptable only in the אוני or even when there is an attachment between the אונא and the אומא. Additionally, there is a lobe in the center of the lung that is referred to as the עינוניתא דוורדא for it's rose like appearance - any sircha between that and another lobe of the lung is considered to be a problem.
Rashi in his explanation of this sugya clearly chooses the former of the two approaches that i mentioned in the previous blog. Rashi writes that the problem with a sircha is that it is indicative of a hole which is then filled up by the forming of a sircha. Rashi continues that even though it successfully covers the hole so that no air can penetrate, we pasken קרום שעלה מחמת מכה בריאה אינו כרום שסופו ליסתר. The last two words of Rashi - שסופו ליסתר, clearly indicate that the problem is that the closure will not hold, implying that if it were to hold such as surgical stitching, it would remove the problem of treifa. Regarding the distinction between כסדרן ושלא כסדרן which the gemara attributes to כסדרן being רביתייהו, rashi explains that adjacent lobes protect one another so that the sircha can strengthen rather than weaken. The entire approach of Rashi clearly implies that any fix that will actually hold is sufficient to remove the concern of treifa, even though the fix only came later and wasn't present from the beginning. Tosafos asks on Rashi, why would כסדרן be kasher, it should be no better than a krum that develops on an injury which doesn't fix the problem. Tosafos suggests that it could be that a sircha which attaches itself to another place (such as an adjacent lobe) has a tendency to strengthen and closes the hole better than a "krum" that is not attached to any other place. This further compliments the approach that a hole that renders that animal a treifa can be fixed, so long as it is strong enough to be maintained. Based on this, the Rashi 43a that we discussed in the previous blog would hold that if it is a permanent fix, the animal is no longer a treifa even if it develops later. But, rashi explains that even when the hole isn't truly plugged up, and is just being blocked by another organ, since it was there from the very beginning, this also allows that animal to be considered kasher and not a treifa.
Tosafos quotes Rabbeinu Chananel who takes the exact opposite approach to explain why a sircha is a problem. Rather than the sircha being an indicative of a preexisting hole, it is an indication that a hole is about to form. Tosafos points out that both the approach of rashi and rabbeinu chananel fail to explain why a hole can be tested by blowing into the lung while in a bucket of water. According to Rabbeinu chananel it will not bubble because the hole has not yet formed, and according to rashi it will not bubble because the sircha is blocking it from bubbling but is prone to fall off and therefore doesn't truly fix the hole.

Sunday, August 07, 2011

Chulin 43a - Bloat in Cattle

This is from wiki:
In cattle, bloating is most often caused by the animal eating young and lush pasture, usually if the pasture has a high proportion of legumes(medicks, clover or lucerne (alfalfa)).[23] Legumes contain foaming agents which trap air bubbles in the ruminant's rumen and prevent them from belching to relieve the pressure. This causes a build up of pressure in the rumen which manifests as an obvious swelling on the left side. Signs of bloat in cattle are distended left abdomen, stopping of grazing, lethargy, appearing distressed, difficulty in urinating or defecating, rapid breathing and staggering. In mild and moderate cases an antibloating agent will be administered orally or through a stomach tube and the ruminant should be exercised. In severe cases a wide bore trochar and cannula can be inserted into the rumen on the left flank to release the gas and liquid. In emergency cases of frothy bloat, this may not be enough and a 10–20 cm incision may need to be made in the animal’s side and the froth manually removed. Veterinary care is then needed to clean and stitch the wound and administer an antibiotic to the animal.

To treat this problem, there is often an incision made in the keiva of the cow and then stitched up. Is found a very interesting discussion about this issue in the new picture book on chulin by rabbi lach (page 146). The question is whether a hole that renders the animal a treifa can be fixed so that the animal is no longer a treifa. If once a treifa, always a treifa, any animal that undergoes such a surgery, even after it heals is a treifa rendering all it's milk to be non-kosher. The issue is based on an apparent contradiction in Rashi when he explains the gemara which says a "krum" - membrane that grows over a wound in the esophagus doesn't fix the hole and the animal remains a treifa. Rashi at first writes that even if it is thick membrane, it will not last, therefore it is as if the hole remains and the animal is a treifa - אפילו עלתה בו סתימה עבה אינה מתקיימת. According to this rationale, the problem is that the hole cannot fix itself properly, but when the hole is stitched up and heals properly, the animal will no longer be considered a treifa. However, Rashi continues by creating a rule that any holes that render the animal a treifa cannot be fixed even if it heals afterward, unlike a hole in the lung that if closed by the wall of the inside of the animal is kasher, because that seal was there originally. The implication of the second statement of Rashi is that once it is a treifa, it remains a treifa and even if repaired properly remains a treifa. The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav - 33:4) understands from rashi that if the closure of a hole isn't present at the time the hole forms, it cannot be fixed by a membrane or healing afterward. The Pri Megadim explains that the fact that the closure or membrane will allow the animal to live, doesn't in anyway change it from being a treifa. The concept of a treifa not living 12 months is to be used as a siman to determine whether a safeik treifa is a treifa. But, when it is known that the animal is a treifa, even if it lives for many years, it remains a treifa. The pri megadim doens't explain how he would read the beginning of Rashi. Perhaps he understands that the statement of rashi - אפילו עלתה בו סתימה עבה אינה מתקיימת, is referring to the beginning of the healing process. Meaning, even if it begins to scab originally, that seal will not remain forever, therefore we give the animal a status of treifa. Once we give the animal a status of treifa, even once the hole fully heals, it no longer loses it's status since that is considered a closure that occurs later. This approach would seemingly invalidate even a hole in the stomach (since rashi asks from the lung and liver, and doesn't answer that this is a special din of the esophagus, it implies that the principle applies to holes in any organ).
Rav Belsky wrote an article available here being matir all milk. He explains that even if the procedure would render the animal a treifa, it would be mutar, and the suggests that one of the procedures doesn't render the animal a treifa based on many different rationales for this: 1. There are 3 linings to the stomach and the piercing of the needle is not at the same point through each lining. 2. Even if this hole could kill the animal, it would have a din misukenes but not treifa and since the hole is made to heal the animal it doesn't even qualify as a misukenes. There is another procedure which stitches the stomach of the animal to it's side. In this type of stitching there is definitely a how made straight through the stomach. Rav Belsky understands that the correct reading of Rashi is the first approach, that any closure which isn't a permanent fix doesn't work, implying that if it is indeed מתקיימת, it works to remove the status of treifa. The reason why rashi had to come up with the alternate explanation - דטרפות לא מהניא להו סתימה דסלקא בהו לאחר זמן is because it isn't obvious that these closures are permanent, but since they are there from the very beginning and remain there, they are considered closures. He then suggests that even if we take the stricter approach, the type of stitching called toggle bolt, would qualify as the hole being fixed immediately and not as something that only occurs later. He therefore concludes that the process done to milk cows qualifies as a סתימה המתקיימת and as a סתימה מעיקרא. He also elaborates to argue with the concept that a treifa cannot be fixed, that it is a rule that is contradicted from the gemara 68b. The gemara on 68b actually uses the term כיון שנטרפה שוב אין לה היתר, but Rav Belsky explains that it doesn't mean to say that every treifa, once it is assur can never be fixed. The gemara on 54 explains that any problem that can be fixed with medicine isn't part of the list of 18 treifos - this clearly implies that treifos can be fixed. Therefore, the gemara on 68b also means to say that the definition of treifa is a problem that can't be fixed. If it is possible to fix the problem, it no longer qualifies as a treifa. Even though the ability to keep an animal that has one of the 18 treifos alive wouldn't remove the status of treifa, the ability to fix the actual problem so that the hole is no longer present, Rav Belsky holds would help to remove the status of treifa.

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

Chulin 39b - Shlichus for a Goy

The gemara tells of arabs who gave money to purchase a part of an animal that was to be shechted by a jew and questions whether there is concern that the arabs intent to have his share shechted for avoda zara would invalidate the entire animal. The gemara says that if the arab is strong in the sense that the Jew cannot break away from him, then the animal is assur, but if the Jew is able to break away from him it is mutar. Rashi explains that if the Jew is able to break away from the arab then - אינו נעשה שלוחו על כרחו, the Jew doesn't become an automatic agent of the goy to assur the animal, but if the Jew is is unable to break away, he serves as an agent for the goy to assur the animal. Rashi seems to understand that the concept raised by the gemara of זה מחשב וזה עובד works as shlichus meaning that the shochet serves as the shliach of the owner as if the owner himself were actually shechting for avoda zara. The Maharatz Chiyus raises a question that the concept of "shlichus" between a jew and a goy doesn't exist. The gemara in Baba Metzia 71b derives from a pasuk that there cannot be any shlichus between a Jew and a Goy in either direction. Based on this, how can we apply the concept of shlichus to make the animal assur?
Rashi in Baba Metzia concludes that we do consider their to be shlichus between a Jew and a Goy l'chumra. This helps to explain Rashi in Shabbos 153a. Rashi explains the gemara's question as to how a Jew could give his money to a goy to carry as shabbos is beginning, that it should be assur because the goy is serving as his shaliach. Rashi seems to understand that the concept of amira l'nachri is based on the goy serving as the shaliach of the Jew. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav articulates this point clearly:
הגר"ז בס' רמג ס"א וז"ל אסרו חכמים לומר לנכרי לעשות לנו מלאכה בשבת וכו' שכשהנכרי עושה בשבת הוא עושה בשליחות הישראל ואע"פ שאין אומרים שלוחו של אדם כמותו מה"ת אלא בישראל הנעשה שליח לישראל וכו' אבל הנכרי אינו בתורת שליחות מה"ת, מ"מ מדברי סופרים יש שליחות לנכרי לחומרא עכ"ל
Therefore, it is possible that in our context also, Rashi will hold that m'drabonon we are machmir to consider the Jew a shliach of the goy, whenever the Jew doesn't have the ability to break away from the goy. In truth, Tosafos also writes that the issur on the animal when the Jew can't get away from the goy would only be m'drabonon (but Tosafos seems to say that it is only d'rabonon because there is something lacking in the s'michas da'as). It seems that Rashi would hold that the entire issur on an animal shechted by a Jew when the Non-Jewish owner had intent for avoda zara would work through shelichus and would only be assur m'drabonon. Another possibility is that when money exchanges hands we could consider a goy to be a shliach of the Jew or a Jew to be a shliach of the goy. This is the sevara of the machaneh ephraim in the context of a goy building a ma'akeh for a Jew and allowing a Jew to make a bracha - יד פועל כיד בעל הבית דמי. Therefore, in our case where the Jew accepted money from the goy and cannot break away, even m'doraysa he may be his shaliach.
The Rashash explains the concept of an איניש אלמא who the Jew cannot break away from based on the Rambam in Hilchos Chometz U'matza (4:4) that when the Goy will be able to force the Jew to take responsibility for the chometz, the Jew is obligated to be destroy it before pesach as if he willfully accepted responsibility. Here too, since the goy can force the Jew to maintain the partnership in the animal and prevent the Jew from breaking away, the machshava of the goy qualifies to assur the animal.

Monday, August 01, 2011

Chulin 39a - Pigul: Machshava or Dibur?

The Rosh (Hilchos sefer Torah 3) quotes Rabbeinu Baruch as holding that pigul can only be violated if it is done with dibur, meaning that one articulates the pigul, but machshava alone doesn't create pigul. The Rambam (Pesulei Hamukdashin 18:1) disagrees and holds that pigul can be violated by the mere thought of chutz l'zmano. In our gemara we are trying to find a case where something would be a violation of pigul by kodshim but not a violation of a machshava of avoda zara by chulin. The gemara says that if machshava of avoda zara wouldn't invalidate the animal by chulin, then what would be a case where one does shechita for avoda zara. Tosafos says that if pigul can b e violated through machshava (Rambam), then we have a simple case where pigul is a problem by kodshim but machshava for avoda zara wouldn't be a problem by chulin - because machshava for avoda zara without dibur wouldn't invalidate the animal, but with dibur it would. Tosafos seems to be uncertain whether pigul requires machshava or dibur.
In Baba Metzia 43b Tosafos seems to assume like the Rosh that pigul needs dibur, whereas the gemara in gittin 53a seems to hold that one does require dibur by comparing pigul to hezek sh'eino nikar, yet distinguishes between hezek sh'eino nikar and pesulim of machshava.
The Rashash on 39b writes that if we require dibur for pigul, then we should also require dibur when one shechts chulin for avoda zara, otherwise the kal v'chomer of R. Yossi doesn't make sense because there would be a pircha that pigul is only violated with dibur. The Rashash points out that the gemara seems to understand that shechita for avoda zara wouldn't require dibur because we apply the concept of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו, meaning that machshava afterward reflects on the shechita. This would only make sense if it is a p'sul of machshava but doesn't make sense if it is a p'sul of dibur. Therefore, it should follow that pigul can be violated even with machshava.
To be explain the opinion of the Rosh, it seems that the concept of dibur by pigul isn't a din of dibur similar to kriash shema and kiddush, rather it is a din to have a machshava with a gemiras da'as that is only achieved through dibur. The function of the dibur is to be me'galeh that there was a clear machshava. Therefore, even according to the Rosh that dibur is necessary, the concept of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו would still make sense since the core p'sul is a p'sul of machshava, and the dibur is only a verification of that machshava. A similar sevara can be used to explain the function of dibur in sefiras ha'omer and when making a neder.

Chulin 37b - Eating From What a Chacham Was Matir

The gemara says that one of the chumros that Yechezkel kept was that he never ate from an animal that a chacham was matir. This is paskened in the Rama 116:7 that an animal that a chacham was matir based on sevara but the din is not explicit that it is permitted, a ba'al nefesh should be machmir not to eat it. The difficulty with the Rama is that the gemara is trying to find chumros that were kept by Yechezkel but weren't necessary to be kept by others. The gemara even proves from the fact that Yechezkel didn't eat an animal that was a misukenes, that it must be permitted for everyone else. It is possible that the Rama is encouraging anyone who wants to be a ba'al nefesh to keep the chumros of Yechezkel, but it still seems strange that a ba'al nefesh should have to keep the chumros of Yechezkel.
The Pischei Teshuva (10) quotes a chumra of not relying on bitul in 60 times as much, and asks that the Rama clearly says that such a chumra can only exist if a chacham is matir something with sevara, but wouldn't apply to an explicit din. The Pischei Teshuva explains that even bitul in 60x is not required that a ba'al nefesh be machmir but if he wants to it would be considered a mitzvah. He then quotes in the name of the Toras Ha'asham that one who wants to be machmir on something that we don't find the amora'im were machmir about is considered an apikores and his loss outweighs his gain.
According to the Rama it seems clear that even Yechezkel wasn't machmir about a din that is explicit. The Rama seems to understand that the case where Yechezkel was machmir is when a chacham had to be meikel based on sevara, and therefore suggests that every ba'al nefesh do the same. However, Rashi writes that Yechezkel didn't eat from any animal that was ever brought as a question to a chacham. This implies that even if the din was explicit, since the chacham had to be asked about it, he wouldn't eat from it. It seems to me that according to Rashi the only room for such a chumra is a form of ma'aras ayin. Since people saw that a shayla was asked on this animal, Yechezkel didn't want to give even the slightest impression that he was eating from something that wasn't 100% kosher. But it doesn't seem that there should be an inherent advantage to abstain from something that a chacham who is fit to pasken, was matir. The Torah gave the authority to the chachamim to pasken even using their shikul hada'as.