Chulin 103b - Rules of Eating to violate Eiver Min Hachai

The gemara (according to Rashi) has two versions of R. Yochanan as to whether the concept of כדי אכילת פרס applies to אבר מן החי, like it would by all other issurim. On the top of the page the gemara assumed that it would not apply, and on the bottom of the page when it deals with eating a half kezayis and then another half kezayis, assumes that it does.The rationale that אבר מן החי would be different and not have this halacha l'moshe misinai is that even inedible foods combine to the shiur of kezayis. Since אבר מן החי is a chiddush, the halacha l'moshe misinai that allows us to combine all eating within כדי אכילת פרס wouldn't apply to a chiddush case. Without the concept of כדי אכילת פרס the gemara assumes that the entire kezayis must be consumed בבת אחת, but then enters a discussion as to what would qualify as בבת אחת - at one time.

There seem to be three opinions in the gemara what would qualify as בבת אחת, and is dependent on the definition of אכילה. R. Yochanan considers eating to be a function of הנאת גרונו - the mouth. Reish Lakish considers eating to be a function of הנאת מעיו - the stomach. Therefore, R. Yochanan will say that as long as there is a kezayis in the mouth at one time, it is considered בבת אחת, whereas Reish Lakish will say that a kezayis must be swallowed at one time (Rashi explains that it is not possible to chew a kezayis and swallow it all at once since it will naturally begin to slip down his throat, so the only way to swallow a full kezayis would be without chewing. Rashi also seems to hold that swallowing something which is normal to chew wouldn't constitute דרך אכילה, therefore the gemara is forced to make the case of גרומיתא זעירתא which is normal to be swallowed without chewing).

Within the opinion of R. Yochanan that it only qualifies as בבת אחת if a kezayis enters the mouth at the same time, Rashi and Tosafos argue whether we require the kezayis to literally be one unit when it is put into the mouth (tosafos), or whether it can be cut in half so long as there will be a full kezayis in the mouth at one time (rashi). Similarly, they will argue in the opinion of Reish Lakish. Rashi should only require a kezayis in the stomach at the same time, even if it were swallowed in parts (this is actually tosafos question on rashi because reish lakish seems to hold that a full unit of kezayis must be swallowed at one time), whereas Tosafos requires a full unit of a kezayis to be swallowed at one time.

However, according to R. Elazar both Rashi and Tosafos would agree that if one would eat a half kezayis and after a slight pause eat another half, it would qualify as an eating בבת אחת to be chayev. The concept of כדי אכילת פרס would have only permitted the pause to be longer between the two half kezaysim. Since we don't apply כדי אכילת פרס, the pause must be very slight - רש"י - שנתרחקו זה מזה מעט.

The Rambam (Ma'achalos Ha'asuros 5:3-4) has a very different approach in this gemara. Firstly, the Rambam understands that the case of חלקו מבחוץ is not when one eats a half kezayis and then another half kezayis as rashi says, nor is it a case where one splits the kezayis in half and puts both halves in his mouth together as Tosafos says. Rather, the case is where he separates the meat from the bone so that it is no longer one unit. The Rambam understands that the chiddush ha'torah which allows you to combine the bones to make up the kezayis only applies when the integrity of the limb is maintained. As soon as one separates the meat from the bone, the bones are no different than bones by other issurim which don't qualify as an eating. Therefore, the case of חלקו מבפנים that you are going to be chayev is when one puts the meat in his mouth with the bone, and only in his mouth do they separate from one another. Since they were placed in his mouth together, they combine.

The Rambam also holds that paskening like R. Elazar wouldn't undermine the assumption of R. Yochanan. R. Elazar who allows one to be chayev even if they would break the eiver into pieces and eat a half kezayis and then another half, would only apply if ultimately he ate a full kezayis of MEAT. Therefore, if he actually ate a full kezayis of meat, he is chayev even though he separated the meat from the bone and ate it little by little (even with slight pause in between) which is the halacha of R. Elazar. But, in order to combine the bones with the meat to fill the shiur of kezayis, he must place the bone in his mouth together with the meat and together they must make up a kezayis - which is the halacha of R. Yochanan. In other words, the Rambam understands that R. Elazar takes issue with the definition of eating בבת אחת that R. Yochanan establishes by relaxing the requirement of putting it in one's mouth together (when there is no need for bones to be considered toward the kezayis), but agrees with the din of when bones can be combined - only when they are together with the meat at the time they are consumed.

Chulin 102a - Eiver Min Ha'chai

The gemara says that even though the prohibition of אבר מן החי for a Jew may only apply to kosher animals (acc. to chachamim and R. Meir), for a goy it will apply even to non-kosher animals. Tosafos 33a questions how this can be. Wouldn't this be a violation of the rule that there is nothing prohibited to a goy that is permitted to a Jew - ליכא מדעם דלישראל שרי ולעכו"ם אסור. Tosafos says that since there would be a prohibition for the Jew to eat a non-kosher animal, even though it wouldn't be considered אבר מן החי, it would not violate the principle of something being permitted to a Jew and prohibited to a goy. Tosafos holds that the prohibition on the goy doesn't have to be the same prohibition on the Jew so long as there is some prohibition (R. Akiva Eiger in a teshuva 165 qualifies this idea and says that it would only be when the prohibition on the Jew is a lack of shechita such as a non-kosher animal, to the exclusion of a treifa where it has already been shechted properly and has not relation to the issur of eiver min ha'chai).

It seems to me that Rashi in our sugya is also addressing the same question. Rashi writes -

אבל בן נח מוזהר על הכל, דכל דקרינא ביה בשר לחודיה אכול, קרינא ביה אבר מן החי לא תאכל. Rashi says that whenever it is permitted to eat the meat after being killed, there is an issur of eiver min ha'chai to eat the meat prematurely. Perhaps rashi understands that the principle of there is nothing prohibited to a goy that is permitted to a Jew isn't violated here because the same exact principle that applies to the goy - don't eat alive what you can eat dead, applies to the Jew. The only difference is that the Jew cannot eat non-kosher animals when dead so there is not issur of אבר מן החי when it's alive, but for the goy there is. Since the principle applies equally to the Jew and goy it wouldn't violate the rule of ליכא מדעם דלישראל שרי ולעכו"ם אסור.

Chulin 101b - The Two Prohibitions of Yom Kippur

Rashi explains that when the gemara tries to prove that R. Yossi Haglili holds of איסור כולל from the fact that when yom kippur falls on shabbos and he does melacha he has to bring a korban both for shabbos and for yom kippur. Even though YK and shabbos are entering at the same time, one can only be liable for both since if theoretically one would start before the other, each can be binding on top of the first. Rashi explains that even if shabbos would enter prior to YK, the prohibition of YK would be binding on top of shabbos as an איסור כולל. The fact that YK forbids not only doing melacha, but also eating and drinking makes it an איסור כולל to allow the prohibition of melacha to be binding on top of the prohibition against doing melacha on shabbos - מיגו דאיתסר באכילה משום יוה"כ איתסר ליה נמי מלאכה משום יוה"כ. The difficulty of this rashi is how can we say an איסור כולל from the issur to eat to the issur to do melacha, they are totally separate prohibitions. From rashi we learn a new approach in understanding the nature of the issur to eat and to do melacha on YK. Although in the counting of mitzvos they are completely independent, and would seemingly be two completely separate prohibitions that apply on the 10th of Tishrei, that is not how rashi is viewing it. Rather, the kedusha of YK results in two halachos, one is a prohibition of eating and the second is the prohibition of melacha. Both are outgrowths of the kedushas ha'yom and not independent prohibition that apply to the calendar date of 10th of Tishrei. It would now make sense that Rashi can consider YK in the general sense to be an איסור כולל from eating to melacha, since both are merely outgrowths of the kedusha of YK.

I would like to suggest that the Rambam would not agree with rashi. Rambam (Hil. Shevisas Asor 1:6) writes that the mitzvah d'oraysa to add to YK before and after is limited to YK (not shabbos and yom tov) and limited to the עינוי of YK, it doesn't extend m'doraysa to the issur melacha. The Minchas Chinuch clearly understands the Rambam this way. The Rambam would seem to hold that m'doraysa when one is me'kabel YK early, they are prohibited from eating but not prohibited from doing melacha. The fact that by accepting kedushas ha'yom one can be prohibited from eating but not from melacha implies that the they are not an outgrowth of the kedushas ha'yom, rather two independent halachos that apply on the 10th of Tishrei and could theoretically exist one without the other.

Chulin 99b - Bitul in more that 60x

The Rama (y.d. 98) writes that foods with a very strong flavor such as spices are not batul in 60x because the flavor is still able to be tasted, however the Rama limits this to when the item is prohibited in and of itself (i.e. teruma or avoda zara), to the exclusion of spices that just have a non-kosher item absorbed in it. The source for the Rama is our gemara where we see that "grissin" which fall into lentils can give flavor even if there is 100x as much to be mevatel. Clearly, the idea of 60x is an assumption but doesn't apply to cases where the flavor is actually tasted. But, regarding the Rama's stipulation that this rule would not apply to foods that have the taste of issur absorbed in them, but are not assur themselves, the Gr"a quotes those who disagree. The Gr"a writes that in our gemara we find that fish brine isn't going to be batul until there is 192x as much, even though the actual water and vinegar in the brine isn't technically assur, just that it has the flavor of the fish fat absorbed inside of it. The same should apply to a spice which has the flavor of non-kosher meat - so long as the spice could be tasted in whatever dish it falls into, it should be assur even if there is 60x as much.

The Shach writes that when spices are able to assur foods even when there is more than 60x, it is only an issur d'rabonon. R. Akiva Eiger quotes the Ran who disagrees and holds that it would be d'oraysa. The Ran is easy to understand, but the Shach is harder to understand - why would it only be d'rabonon? It seems that the Shach understands that once there is 60x of the mutar food to the assur food, the flavor is weakened to a point that it isn't considered true ta'am and therefore it is only assur m'drabonon.

Chulin 99b - Gid Hanashe is Prohibited to Derive Benefit From

The gemara has a discussion in Pesachim about things that are prohibited to eat, whether they should also be prohibited to derive benefit from. Either way, one of the approaches to understand the nature of issurei achila - things that are prohibited to eat, is that it is essentially a prohibition to derive benefit, but the Torah only forbids the epitome of benefit from the item - eating. Meaning, that the nature of issur achila is that it is prohibited to derive the benefit that this item is meant to provide which is the benefit of eating. This would explain for example why we wouldn't consider an achila gassa (over eating), or eating of something which taste bad to be a violation of eating, since there is no pleasure or benefit associated with that eating. 

However, Tosafos makes a calculation in our sugya that undermines this premise. Tosafos proves from the gemara in Pesachim that according to the opinion who considers giddin (sinews) to have flavor, it is only prohibited to eat. But according to the opinion who doesn't consider it to have flavor, it is even prohibited to derive benefit from. Since we rule that Gid Ha'nashe doesn't give off flavor, we must rule that one cannot derive benefit from it - therefore it cannot be gifted to a goy, if the presence of the gid hanashe will raise the stature of the gift. Now, if one were to eat gid hanashe they would certainly be in violation of the prohibition to eat gid hanashe, even though there is no flavor so that they cannot be in violation of the issur to derive benefit. If it were true that the prohibition to eat is a form of deriving benefit, one couldn't be in violation of eating gid hanashe since there is no benefit and would only be in violation on selling or giving to a goy in which there is benefit. The fact that one is in violation even for the eating of gid hanashe which has no flavor, indicates that eating is in no way contingent on the pleasure or benefit one receives from the food, rather it is an act that the Torah forbids regardless of the benefit it provides.

Chulin 94b - Rules of Geneivas Da'as

The gemara on amud alef has three answers to explain the mishna. Tosafos writes that according to the first answer of the gemara that the mishna is speaking in a place where they call out so it is permitted to purchase from a goy, the mishna would contradict the braisa. To reconcile the contradiction Tosafos is forced to distinguish between a sale and a gift - only by a sale where money is being paid is there an issur of g'neivas da'as. However, according to the second and third answer Tosafos says that only when you explicitly lie is it considered g'neivas da'as, but if you just do something where the other party draws his own conclusion it would be considered איהו הוא דקא מטעי נפשיה (as we see in the gemara and isn't considered gneivas da'as). Tosafos modifies this slightly by saying when one does an action that is suggestive such as opening up a barrel of wine in the presence of the guest indicating that it is in his honor, that is tantamount to actually saying that you are doing it for him. Rashi seems to maintain that once the gemara introduces the concept of איהו הוא דקא מטעי נפשיה, we limit ALL the cases of geneivas da'as to where he explicitly told the person that he is doing it for him, or explicitly told the person that it was shechted meat. We see from here that one is not obligated to correct his friends misunderstanding of the situation, but cannot actively mislead him.

Chulin 94a - Geneivas Da'as

The gemara in trying to figure out the p'shat in the mishna that prohibits sending meat from which the gid ha'nashe was removed to a goy, offers a few explanations. The final explanation is that it is a violation of geneivas da'as. Being that the first two answers are able to explain the mishna without inventing a concept of geneivas da'as, perhaps we shouldn't pasken like the approach that relies on this concept. The Rosh takes this approach and rejects the notion of geneivas da'as when one sends a gift to a goy, such as the case in the mishna and limits the problem of geneivas da'as specifically to a sale. With this he is able to work out the various other sources that indicate geneivas da'as is a real prohibition, but rejects applying the concept to the case of the mishna since it was being sent as a gift rather than a sale (עיין במעדני יו"ט ס' ר' שמוכיח מהש"ס שאין חילוק בין מכר למתנה). It would seem from the Rosh's approach that geneivas da'as applies to a sale but not a gift, that it is essentially an offshoot of the prohibition to steal. When one is giving a gift and not receiving anything in return as part of the compensation, it cannot be considered stealing. But, when one is receiving some level of compensation, it is prohibited to fool the buyer since the entire compensation is now being given under a false pretense (even though the buyer may have paid the same price even had he known the truth).

In my opinion there are 3 approaches to the nature of the issur of geneivas da'as. The Rosh holds that it is an offshoot of actual theft. Rashi and the Rambam reject the approach of the Rosh, yet differ in how they portray the issur.

Rashi writes  multiple times in the sugya - ונמצא מחזיק לו טובה חנם. This implies that the prohibition is not stealing the compensation because rashi uses this logic even in the case of a gift where there is no compensation. Rather, the prohibition is not at the time of the geneivas da'as, it is violated afterward when you accept the goodwill of the receiver and his interest in responding in kind for something that he thinks you did for him, when in truth you didn't do for him as much as he thinks you did. It would seem from rashi that if one would notify the goy immediately after the violation of the geneivas da'as before he will have feelings of goodwill, he will avoid the entire prohibition. The issur is not in fooling the goy, nor is it in stealing compensation for the goy, but is is accepting his goodwill.

The Rambam in Hil. Dei'os 2:6 has what would be considered the simplest approach to the nature of geneivas da'as. The Rambam writes

אסור לאדם להנהיג עצמו בדברי חלקות ופיתוי, ולא יהיה אחד בפה ואחד בלב אלא תוכו כברו והענין שבלב הוא הדבר שבפה, ואסור לגנוב דעת הבריות ואפילו דעת הנכרי, כיצד לא ימכור לנכרי בשר נבילה במקום בשר שחוטה, ולא מנעל של מתה במקום מנעל של שחוטה וכו' ואפילו מלה אחת של פתוי ושל גניבת דעת אסור, אלא שפת אמת ורוח נכון ולב טהור מכל עמל והוות

The Rambam considers the prohibition to have nothing to do with the subject of the geneivas da'as. It is a violation of the מידת האמת that is expected of a Jew, and by lying to the anyone, even a goy, he is undermining this essential midah of being truthful. The difference between the Rambam and Rashi is that according to Rashi the prohibition exists because of the outcome of the undeserved goodwill that the Jew will receive from the goy, whereas according to the Rambam the issur is the act of deceiving another human being.

Chulin 89b - Merit of Avrohom Comparing Himself To Dirt and Ash

The gemara says that in the merit of Avrohom Avinu comparing himself to dirt and ash, the Jewish people merited the parah aduma which involves ash and the Sotah which involves dirt. The Maharsha explains that it doesn't mean to say that had Avrohom not made the comment אנכי עפר ואפר, we would never have a way to remove the tu'mah of tu'mas meis and would never have a method for the Sotah would never have a method to return to her husband. Rather, there would have been a far more complex and difficult process to achieve these results. In the merit of Avrohom humbling himself with the statement of אנכי עפר ואפר, they were able to achieve these results in an easier form using mere dirt and ash.

I would add that the attribute that most greatly separates between people is that of arrogance. Humility is an attribute that breeds togetherness. In the merit of Avrohom's humility, we were zocheh to two mitzvos that bring people back together. The ashes of the para aduma allow tamei people to once again interact with the tahor, and the dirt of the sotah allows her back to her husband.

The gemara asks that the mitzvah of כסוי הדם should have also been in the merit of Avrohom comparing himself to dirt.The gemara responds that there has to be a tangible benefit that comes from the mitzvah, and by covering the blood there is no tangible benefit. It seems to me that Rava who is the person making the statement is li'shitaso. We find that Rava himself on 89a takes a position of מצות לאו ליהנות ניתנו, which simply means that the merit of the mitzvah in itself doesn't qualify as a benefit. Only physical benefits qualify as real הנאה. Therefore, Rava holds that the benefit of having a mitzvah to perform thereby an opportunity to receive reward in the world to come, doesn't qualify as a benefit and therefore isn't significant enough to be the reward for Avrohom's statement. It is only the physical and tangible benefit that come from פרה אדומה and עפר סוטה that can be the reward for Avrohom's statement.

As an aside, Rashi says that the ability to eat the meat cannot be considered the "benefit" of כסוי הדם since the kashrus of the meat is not at all dependent on kisuy ha'dam. The Pri Megadim (y.d.sifsei da'as 28:2) says that we cannot prove from here that it is permitted to eat the meat without kisuy ha'dam. Perhaps Rashi means to say that if there wouldn't have been a mitzvah to cover the blood, it would have been permissible to eat the meat, so we can't consider this mitzvah to be a real benefit. However, now that there is a mitzvah to cover the blood, it is entirely plausible that until it is done, the meat cannot be eaten. Nonetheless, l'ma'aseh we assume that the mitzvah of kisuy ha'dam has zero to do with the ability to eat the meat. Even if by tevilas keilim for example, the use of the vessel prior to tevila may be a bitul of the mitzvas aseh, by kisuy ha'dam the kashrus of the meat doesn't seem to be at all connected to the mitzvah on the blood.

Chulin 87a - Paying 10 Gold Coins

The gemara discusses the issue of paying 10 gold coins for robbing someone of their mitzvah. The gemara questions whether a mitzvah containing multiple brachos such as birchas hamazaon is 10 zehuvim per bracha, or 10 for the entire mitvah. Assuming it is per bracha, the gemara assumes the amount for birchas hamazon would be 40. Rashi explains that 10 per bracha, which means that the fourth Rabbinic bracha of ha'tov v'hamei'tiv would also have 10 zehuvim. Tosafos (d.h. v'chayvu) questions when one is called to the Torah and another grabs the aliya whether the latter owes 10 zehuvim. Tosafos offers two arguments why the person who "stole" the aliya wouldn't have to pay: 1. the rights to an aliya belongs to everyone (perhaps this is only when one was supposed to get the aliya, but wasn't yet called up?). 2. Even if a Yisroel stole the aliya of the kohein he wouldn't have to pay because וקדשתו - לכל דבר שבקדושה לפתוח ראשון ולברך ראשון, is only an אסמכת. Tosafos seems to hold that the requirement of וקדשתו is only d'rabonon, and since it's not from the Torah, there isn't any obligation to pay for stealing that right.Yet, in the very next Tosafos they seem to hold that one is required to pay 10 zehuvim for both ha'tov v'hameitiv and borei pri ha'agfen, both of which are only d'rabonon?

To me it seems that Tosafos isn't focusing on whether the mitzvah of וקדשתו  is d'oraysa or d'rabonon. First of all, the magen avrohom (201:4) points out that the gemara in gittin 59b clearly holds that וקדשתו is d'oraysa. Secondly, even if it d'rabonon, there should be a requirement of 10 zehuvim. Tosafos fully agrees that the requirement to give kedusha to the kohein is d'oraysa. However, the Rabbonon came along and gave specific examples in which the kohein must be honored, one of the being the first aliya. But, both the Torah and the Rabbonon never gave this as a right and entitlement of the kohein, rather they demanded of the tzibbur to honor the kohein in this manner. The concept of paying 10 zehuvim is only when one steals a mitzvah that their friend is entitled to, it doesn't apply when one merely fails to fulfill their obligation to that person. Tosafos perhaps understands that had the Torah been referring specifically and directly to giving a kohein the first aliya, it would be understood not just as an obligation of the tzibbur but an inherent right of the kohein granted to him by the Torah, and if stolen from him he would be owed 10 zehuvim. But, since the specifics were only introduced by the Rabbonon, it is not an inherent right, rather they placed an obligation on the tzibbur. Therefore, even when the tzibbur fails to fulfill their obligation, no one would owe money to the kohein.

Chulin 86a - Difference Between the Mitzvah of Covering Blood and Shechting Mother and Child On Same Day

The simple reading of the mishna implies that both R. Meir and Chachamim agree that the shechita of a child is invalid so that there is no requirement to cover the blood, yet in the end of the mishna the Chachamim hold that if a חרש שוטה וקטן shechts the mother, one cannot shecht the child on the same day because we are concerned that the shechita is actually valid. The gemara discusses why the Chachamim would be more strict to forbid shechting the child on the same day than with the mitzvah of covering the blood, and ultimately cannot come up with any rationale. This forces the gemara to conclude that the Chachamim would indeed argue by the mitzvah of covering the blood as well, and would require the blood to be covered after the shechita of a חרש שוטה וקטן. Tosafos raises a very interesting question. There seems to be a very obvious distinction between the mitzvah of covering the blood and the prohibition of shechting mother and child on the same day. It is typical for the Rabbonon to uproot and be passively be mevatel an aseh, a positive mitzvah, in order to preserve a negative commandment and prevent it's violation as they did with shofar on shabbos. Therefore, it is perfectly logical to absolve the shechita of the child from the mitzvah of covering the blood (note: the mitzvah couldn't be on the child, rather on those watching as rashi writes), in order to preserve the prohibition of neveila because if they would require the covering of the blood it would mislead people to thinking that the meat was kosher. However, in the context of אותו ואת בנו, it wouldn't make any sense for the Rabbonon to absolve from the prohibition of אותו ואת בנו and permit the slaughtering of the child in order to preserve the prohibition of neveila. Why would they be more lenient about one negative commandment in order to preserve another? Tosafos suggests that in truth the assumption is that the animal is a neveila and there is no mitzvah of covering the blood and no prohibition to shecht the child. However, being that there is a small chance that their shechita is valid, it would have been worthwhile to cover the blood on the off chance that the shechita was valid. Yet, the Rabbonon didn't want this done because it would mislead to the eating of the animal. Similarly, the gemara asks they should have been concerned that being machmir for not shechting the child (which is not technically a concern since we assume their shechita was invalid), would lead to the eating of the animal (which is really assumed to be assur). That is why the gemara understands that there shouldn't be any distinction between the reisha and seifa of the mishna. It seems to me that Rashi would not be able to use Tosafos answer. Tosafos answer is predicated on the premise that the animal shechted by a חרש שוטה וקטן is really a neveila, not just a safeik and therefore a more real concern than אותו ואת בנו. But, Rashi (ד"ה מאי שנא, וד"ה לחומרא) seems to view it as a regular safeik according to the Rabbonon whether the shechita is valid. Therefore, Tosafos question comes back. It seems to me that the rationale as to why the gemara felt it would make sense to be more concerned with the safeik of neveila, than with the safeik of אותו ואת בנו, is because if we were to do something that would indicate the neveila was permitted to eat (such as cover the blood or abstain from shechting the child that day), one would definitely eat the neveila. There would be no question that one would not want to waste meat that seemed permitted and would definitely use it, therefore by permitting neveila it would unquestionably lead to the issur. Whereas saying that one may shecht the child on the same day will not definitely lead to an issur, since the owner would only shecht it if he actually needs it. Therefore, it would make sense for chazal to ignore the issur of אותו ואת בנו if by being concerned for it would lead to the violation of eating neveila.

Chulin 85a - CARRYING SHOFAR FOR WOMEN

The gemara uses shofar as a pircha to the kal v'chomer of rav yossi. The logic is that shofar is an example of something which doesnt push off shabbos even if it is a definite obligation, yet the safeik mitzvah such as a tumtum who is a safeik woman, can blow on yom tov. The point of the gemara is to show that yom tov is less severe than shabbos. However, the gemara never clarifies what actual prohibition we are speakingmes to shofar on yom tov. Tosafos offers 2 suggestions: 1. The prohibition being discussed is the issur of carrying. Since women aren't obligated in shofar it should be prohibited to carry for them. Yet, a tumtum who may be a man and may be fully obligated, can carry a shofar. 2. The issue being discussed is merely an ussur d'rabonon of carrying on yom tov. According to the first approach, the shares aryeh 106 proves that a shofar cannot be carried to the public domain on yt for the sake of a woman. This is also the.implication of tosafos at the end of the sugya who implies that similar to semicha, only an issur d'rabonon can be done, not carrying which is doraysa. Rav Moshe (oc 3:94) has a very long and complicated teshuva arguing on the shaagas aryeh and proving that a shofar or lulav can even be carried on yt where there is no eiruv to enable a woman to do the mitzvah.

Chulin 82a - Hazmana Milsa

R. Akiva Eiger writes in a Teshuva (3) that the issue of whether by something that actually has kedusha i.e. the klaf of a sefer Torah, we say that setting aside is significant and makes it assur even before it is used, is dependent on a machlokes in our gemara. According to Rav Yanai who says that sending down the eglah arufa to nachal eisan makes it assur, the same would be true with anything that is inherently an item of kedusha - הזמנה מילתא היא. But, according to those who say that it would only be assur by the shechita, they would have to hold that even by something which is an actual גוף הקדושה (not just תשמישי קדושה), the הזמנה would not be significant enough to create an issur.

The gemara says that according to the opinion who says that by eglah arufa the sending it down to nachal eisan makes it assur, by the birds of the metzorah the purchasing of the birds for the use of the metzorah would make it assur. Rashi explains how we can compare the purchasing of the birds to the sending of the calf to nachal eisan, we should compare the purchasing of the birds or initial taking for metzorah purposes with the purchasing or initial taking of the calf. Rashi explains that by egla arufa where there is a later act prior to shechita to be considered the designation of it and create the issur, we assume that act is what creates the issur. But by the birds where there is no later act, the purchasing or taking is considered the act that creates the issur. The difficulty with this in light of R. Akiva Eiger is that if we are really dealing with an issur of הזמנה מילתא היא, we should consider the very first act of designation to be hazmana, not the very last act before shechita such as the sending down to nachal eisan.

Chulin 81a - Nituk L'aseh

The gemara says that the la'av of לא ירצה which says that you can't be makriv an animal with a mum and the gemara darshened that it should include anything which is not fit to be makriv, wouldn't include a מחוסר זמן. Meaning, an animal that is premature such as before 8 days old, or אותו ואת בנו which is also considered premature, the torah is menatek l'aseh. Tosafos understands simply that the gemara means that the aseh pulls it out of the category of the la'av entirely so that one cannot be in violation of לא ירצה by being makriv an animal that is מחוסר זמן. However, Rashi seems to understand that the language of נתקו לעשה is using the standard mechanics of a לאו שניתק לעשה where the halacha is that you certainly violated the la'av but there is no malkus. The difference between rashi and tosafos is when one is makriv an animal that is מחוסר זמן, did he violate the la'av of  לא ירצה - according to rashi he did, but according to tosafos he didn't. Tosafos asks on Rashi that this doesn't seem to follow the normal setup of a לאו שניתק לעשה. Normally it means that one can do something to fix up the la'av after violating the aseh such as returning the stolen goods or sending away the mother bird. Here, once you are makriv the animal prematurely (or on the same day as it's mother), there is nothing to do to fix it up. The aseh is something that should have been done instead of violating the la'av but doesn't help to "fix" the la'av. To explain Rashi's position it seems that rashi holds that a לאו הניתק לעשה doesn't have to be something active, rather it is a technicality of how the Torah presents the la'av. Rashi understands that when the Torah presents the la'av as something that can only be done after the aseh, it is a לאו שקדמו עשה and doesn't qualify as a לאו שניתק לעשה, therefore you would get malkus. But, whenever the aseh only exists after the la'av even though it doesn't fix the la'av (because once the la'av is violated, there is no ability to do the aseh), the Torah is indicating that there is no malkus for the violation of the la'av. This approach works in Rashi in our sugya and would answer the question that Tosafos has, but doesn't work in the sugya in makos of בטלו ולא בטלו  and קיימו ולא קיימו which focus very much on the ability or inability to fulfill the aseh after the violation of the la'av.

Chulin 79b - Equating Simanim of a Mule to that of a Lost Object

The gemara says that R. Abba demanded that when two mules are tied to a wagon, they must both have a mother who is a horse and father who is a donkey, or the reverse. But if one would have a mother who is a donkey and the other a mother who is a horse it would be an issur of kelaim since we are machmir for the opinion of R. Yehuda who holds that we disregard the father and consider the child to be the species of the mother. However, R. Abba allowed them to figure out the species of the mother using the simanim of a short tale and long ears being indicative of a mother who is a donkey, and the opposite being indicative of a mother who is a horse. The gemara comments that his willingness to rely on these simanin indicate that he holds simanim are d'oraysa because otherwise he couldn't rely on them for kelayim which is essentially an issur d'oraysa. Rashi comments that whether simanim are indeed d'oraysa is a discussion in baba metziah and R. Abba would be holding that they are d'oraysa.

The Ramban asks that Rashi's connection to the gemara in Baba Metzia regarding identification of either an object or a dead husband, doesn't seem to be at all related to simanim in this context. The issue of using simanim of identification and questioning whether they are "d'oraysa" is because they aren't 100% conclusive since it is possible that another object may possess these simanim as well (whereas a siman muvhak that is conclusive is certainly d'oraysa). However, in our context chazal seemed to have a tradition that every child born from a mother donkey will have a short tail and long ears, and every child born from a mother horse will have a long tail and short ears. To rely on simanim in our context because they are d'oraysa, meaning a tradition from moshe m'sinai that they can be relied on for kelayim, wouldn't be any indication of simanim being d'oraysa when used as identification of an object or person.

It seems that the connection of Rashi forces us to say that the simanim used to identify whether the mother is a donkey or a horse are not a tradition from Moshe Mi'Sinai. Rather, Chazal must have noticed that statistically speaking one could safely assume that when the mule possesses simanim in the ears and tail of a donkey, it's mother is a donkey, and if it possesses simanim of a horse, it's mother is a horse. These aren't absolute, rather statistically correct. Therefore, Rashi holds that the simanim in our context are also identification type simanim rather than being absolute indicators of the species of the mother.

Chulin 78a - Aseh Pushing Off Lo Ta'aseh and Aseh

The gemara has a rule in many places that although a positive mitzvah (aseh) can push off a negative mitzvah (lo ta'aseh), anytime a mitzvah has a lo ta'aseh and an aseh we don't allow another aseh to push off both the negative and positive mitzvah. The example is the mitzvah of covering the blood of a bird when it's shechted where there is an aseh to cover the blood, but if done on yom tov it would violate an aseh and lo ta'aseh, so we don't allow one to do the mitzvah of covering the blood on yom tov.

However, the question is raised whenever we have a situation of aseh trying to push off aseh and lo ta'aseh, whether we allow the aseh to push off the lo ta'aseh just not the supporting aseh, or do we say that since the aseh can't push off the opposing aseh, it also can't push off the opposing lo ta'aseh. The Riva quoted by Tosafos in Chulin 141a holds that in a situation where there is an aseh opposing a lo ta'aseh and and aseh, if one would fulfill the aseh thereby violating the lo ta'aseh and aseh, they would not get lashes for the violation of the lo ta'aseh because the aseh effectively pushed off the lo ta'aseh, just isn't powerful enough to push off the opposing aseh. In my sefer, Nasiach B'chukecha (page 214) I discussed this issue and showed how it is a machlokes rishonim. In the additions to my sefer, I pointed out that Tosafos on today's daf seems to disagree with the Riva and holds that when we have an aseh up against a lo ta'aseh and an aseh, it would not even push off the lo ta'aseh so that if it is violated there would even be malkus for the violation.

Tosafos D.H. Minayin, asks why do we need a source to teach that the prohibition of shechting a mother and child on the same day would apply to kodshim, the fact that it would be written without any qualification would automatically make it apply to kodshim? Tosafos suggests that perhaps we need the pasuk to say that even if there is a mitzvah that must be done with this animal such as korban pesach, you cannot shecht it if the mother has been shechted earlier that day. Meaning, without a special source we would allow the mitzvah of Korban Pesach to push off the prohibition, but now that we have a source that it applies to kodshim we wouldn't allow the mechanics of aseh pushing off a lo ta'aseh to take place. Tosafos rejects this answer because shechting a child the same day as the mother would be a violation of both an aseh and a lo ta'aseh so even without a special source we would never have allowed the aseh of korban pesach to push off both an aseh and a lo ta'aseh that forbids shechting the mother and child on the same day. Tosafos seems to understand that whether we had a special pasuk declaring that one cannot shecht the child on the same day as the mother to fulfill the mitzvah of korban pesach, or didn't have a special pasuk, the result would be the same since the rule of אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה ועשה wouldn't allow the violation. Now, if the Riva is correct that when we have a situation of אין עשה דוחה ל"ת ועשה we wouldn't give lashes for the violation because the aseh would indeed push off the lo ta'aseh, just not the supporting aseh, then we would still require a pasuk to say that the issur of אותו ואת בנו doesn't apply to kodshim. Without a special pasuk, if one were to shecht the child the same day as the mother, he wouldn't get malkus. Now that we have a special pasuk teaching that even by kodshim animals that are needed for a korban the prohibition applies, there would be malkus for the violation. The fact that Tosafos maintains that the rule of אין עשה דוחה ל"ת ועשה is sufficient even without a special pasuk, implies that the rule of אין עשה דוחה ל"ת ועשה alone would also allow us to give lashes to one who violates, which is against the Rivah.

Chulin 74a - Dangling Limb

The Gemara concludes that when one shechts an animal with a dangling limb, the shechita is effective on the limb on a Torah level both to prevent it from having an issur status of neveila (or eiver min ha'chai) and to prevent a tu'mah status of neveila. The Rabbonon imposed a rabbinic prohibition against eating it, but didn't impose any tu'mah status. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 5:6) in codifying this halacha writes that the status of a dangling limb on an animal that was shechted is that it is assur but there is no malkus (if it died by itself, it has a status of eiver min ha'chai both for issur and for tu'mah). It is unclear from the language of the Rambam אסור ואין לוקין עליו whether he means to say that it is an issur d'rabonon or an issur d'oraysa just that there is no malkus. The Pri Chadash (Y.D. 62) explains that according to the Rambam it is an issur d'oraysa but since ultimately included in the לאו שבכללות of בשר בשדה טרפה (as the gemara says 73b), there is no malkus. The Maharatz Chiyus quotes that the Pri Chadash proves this from the Tosefta that says that a dangling limb is assur for Goyim. Generally speaking we don't find Rabbinic prohibitions on Goyim, therefore the fact that it is considered אבר מן החי even for a Goy implies that it is an issur d'oraysa.

Chulin 73a - Long Handles on Keilim

The gemara explains the position of R. Meir who holds that vessels with long handles only require tevila up until the point that the handle serves a function but not beyond that point. The rationale is that since it will be cut off, we view it as if it were already cut off and therefore isn't part of the vessel. The Rosh and Rash in Keilim develop from this mishna an interesting principle. Normally, areas that qualify as beis ha'starim on a person we don't require water to actually touch so long as there is no chatzitza rendering the area fit for water to enter. However, if that were the halacha by keilim as well it wouldn't make sense to simply be tovel the vessel until the point where the handle will be cut, because the point at which it is cut is not fit for bi'as mayim - to touch the water. Clearly, the halacha of beis has'tarim of vessels is that it doesn't even need to be fit for water to touch. However, the Mishna Acrhona (one of the commentaries in taharos) disagrees. He holds that even by keilim there is a requirement that the beis hastarim be ראוי לביאת מים, yet we don't consider the area that would be exposed when it is cut to be a problem because it is the minority of the vessel and people aren't makpid about the handle being there, therefore it isn't a chatzitzah. In truth, Tosafos (d.h. matbil) also considers the handle prior to being cut off to be a problem of chatzitza at the point that it will be cut and therefore makes the case where water can permeate the handle so that it isn't a chatzitzah. See Mayim Rabim pg. 236.

Chulin 66a - Shechting Grasshoppers

Rashi writes that the kosher chagavim (grasshoppers) don't need shechita because they are mentioned in the pasuk after fish which don't need shechita. The Rashba (chulin 27a) when the gemara talks about fish not requiring shechita explains that the default is that nothing requires shechita unless the Torah says it does. The only reason that the gemara 27a searches for a source that fish don't require shechita is because of the pasuk of הצאן ובקר ישחט להם אם את כל דגי הים יאסף להם, which implies that fish require some positive act of "asifa" in place of shechita. The gemara concludes that asifa- gathering is actually to the exclusion of shechita. In short, Rashi and the Rashba seem to argue whether we need a source that grasshoppers don't require shechita or whether without any source the default is that no shechita is required.

The language of the gemara באסיפה בעלמא סגי להו in the context of fish, is somewhat ambiguous. Do fish require a positive act of "asifa" which would demand that they be gathered from the sea by a person while they are still alive, or is it just a way of saying that they don't require any act and can be eaten even when found dead? The Kesef Mishna (Hil. Shechita 1:3) cites the opinion of Rav Sadya Gaon who says that fish require "asifa" and if they are found dead they are forbidden to be eaten (this would be similar to nechira prior to the requirement of shechita, which required the animal to be killed but would not permit a neveila). Rav Hai Gaon disagrees and says they can even be eaten when found dead. The Kesef Mishna understands that the Rambam holds like Rav Hai Gaon, not Rav Sadya Gaon, but in truth the language of the Rambam is very cryptic. The Rambam begins by implying that fish require a positive act of "asifa", but in the end says that even if they die in the water they can be eaten.

רמב"ם - דגים וחגבים אינן צריכין שחיטה אלא אסיפתן היא המתרת אותן, הרי הוא אומר הצאן ובקר ישחט להם ומצא להם אם את כל דגי הים יאסף להם ומצא להם, אסיפת דגים כשחיטת בקר וצאן, ובחגבים נאמר אוסף החסיל, באסיפה לבדה. לפיכך אם מתו מאליהן בתוך המים מותרין, ומותר לאכלן חיים

The Rambam doesn't say that fish and grasshoppers don't have a "matir", rather he says that the gathering of them is the matir in place of shechita. This would imply that they would need to be gathered from the sea while still alive, yet the Rambam concludes "therefore if they die by themselves in the water, they are permitted". Aside from the first statement seemingly contradicting the second, the Rambam connects them using the term "therefore"! Although the kesef mishna tries to explain that once shechita isn't necessary, there is no longer any method demanded to kill the fish, thereby permitting even fish that are found dead; if this were the Rambam's intention his language should have been that there is no matir necessary for fish and grasshoppers?

Chulin 61a - All Birds That are דורס Aren't Kosher

The Mishna has a rule that birds which are do'reis aren't kosher (What does it mean to be do'reis? Rashi explains that it lifts it's prey with it's nails, Tosafos argues that even a chicken does that [rashash says he never saw a chicken do that], and therefore explains that it begins to eat prior to the prey being fully killed.

Tosafos wonders where this rule comes from. There are two possibilities. Either Chazal were zoologists and spent time searching all birds which are do'reis and found that every bird that is do'reis is tamei. It is doubtful that they would have invested so much time into doing the research to determine that there is no kosher bird at all that is do'reis. Another possibility is that they weren't disclosing a fact, rather a halacha that they had from Moshe - הלכה למשה מסיני, that any bird which is do'reis isn't kosher. The problem with the approach of being a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai is that it makes the pasuk of פרס or עזניה superfluous since one of the two is do'reis and therefore not kosher due to the halacha l'moshe misinai. See Maharatz Chiyus who discusses the possibility of something being a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai and supported by a pasuk as an אסמכת בעלמא. Tosafos concludes that it is not a halacha but rather a tradition from Noach who did all the research when he was gathering the birds for the teiva.

The Maharatz Chiyus raises and interesting point. Although we don't generally learn things from before matan torah, natural facts can be learned from before matan torah. Therefore, if we had a tradition from Noach that all do'reis birds are tamei, we would be able to use that as a source making any passuk unnecessary. Just as Tosafos assumes that if we had a halacha l'moshe misinai testifying that all do'reis birds are tamei, it would make the pasuk of peres or azniya extra, so too when we have a tradition from Noach to that fact, it should make the pasuk of peres or azniya extra?

Chulin 59a - Checking Simanim before eating

The mishna teaches what the qualifications are for a kosher animal, bird, fish and chagav. The Rambam in sefer hamitzvos (149-152) counts each of them as a separate positive mitzvah. Although the Ramban in his comments on the mitzvos doesn't write anything, in the sherashim of sefer hamitzvos (shoresh 6) he articulates his opinion that none of these deserve to be counted as a מצות עשה. The rationale of the Ramban is quite logical. There is no obligation to eat these items at all, and therefore the mitzvah to check the simanim is essentially teaching what is allowed and not allowed to be eaten, without any command. The Ramban does consider the positive mitzvah to be an additional violation for one who would eat a non-kosher animal in which these simanim are absent, but does not consider it a mitzvas aseh to actually check the simanim. The Ramban and Behag (quoted by ramban) seem to differ whether the eating of a non-kosher animal should even be counted as a separate aseh, but they both agree that the checking for simanim isn't worthy of being counted as an aseh.

By looking more carefully at the language of the Rambam in sefer hamitzvos (149) we get a better appreciation as to how the Rambam considers these to be positive mitzvos. The Rambam writes

והענין במצוה זו מה שזכרתי לך, והוא שאנו מצווין לבדוק אלו הסימנים בכל בהמה וחיה ואז מותר לאכלן, והדין הזה הוא המצוה

The Rambam seems to understand that the nature of this mitzvah is not an obligation to check the simanim. Rather, the Rambam seems to hold that the very nature of the din which distinguished between kosher and non-kosher, is worthy of counting as an independent mitzvah. This doesn't mean that by checking for simanim one fulfills a mitzvah aseh, but rather the existence of dinim that are necessary to abide by in order to achieve a desired result, qualifies as a mitzvah. A similar logic would have to be applied to explain why the Rambam counts shechita (146) as a mitzvas aseh - although there is no obligation to eat meat, the dinim of shechita that one must abide by to render the animal kosher, qualifies as a mitzvas aseh. The mitzvah of writing a gett would be similar, not an obligation, rather a set of dinim that one must abide by if they want to achieve a particular result. However, the Megilas Esther and Kin'as Sofrim (two classic commentaries on sefer hamitzvos - shoresh 6) both seem to take the approach that the act of checking according to the Rambam is a fulfillment of a positive mitzvah. The Kinas Sofrim explains that if one were to eat an animal without determining that it is kosher and only after consumption realizing that it was indeed kosher, they would be in violation of this mitzvah aseh. The same should be true if one were to eat in a restaurant without verifying that it is kosher and only afterward finding out that it was indeed kosher - the laxity in failing to examine prior to eating is a violation of the mitzvas aseh. According to this approach, the failure to pre-examine the kashrus status prior to consumption is very different than other issurim. If one were lax about other prohibitions and not pay close attention to whether it is actually permitted, and then find out it was permitted, it would fall under the category of מכוין לאכול בשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה, which requires teshuva but is not a violation. However, according to the Rambam even the laxity in determining the kashrus status of an item would be a specific violation of a mitzvas aseh. The statement of chazal that one needs to do teshuva when they try to eat pork and end up eating kosher meat, is actually a strong question to undermine the kin'as sofrim's approach to the Rambam. Why would chazal just say that you need teshuva for the intent of the aveira, you should need teshuva for violating the aseh and not inspecting the food before consumption? It therefore seems to me that the Rambam considers even a din of inspecting to be counted as a mitzvah even though there is no obligation to do so.

As an aside, the language of the Rambam at the beginning of ma'achalos ha'asuros contradicts his language in sefer ha'mitzvos. In the mishne torah the rambam uses the term לידע, implying that the nature of the mitzvah is to learn and be knowledgeable to be able to discern between kosher and treif, whereas in sefer hamitzvos he uses the term לבדוק implying that the nature of the mitzvah is to actually examine?

Chulin 54b - Defining the word "רשאי'

The Node B'Yehuda has a famous teshuva where he explains why the halacha requiring one to greet their rebbi on the 3 regalim (pesach, shavuos and succos) isn't codified in Shulchan Aruch. The Nodeh B'Yehuda explains based on the gemara in kiddushin 33b that one is not allowed to stand up for their rebbi more than twice a day so that the honor being shown to a rebbi shouldn't exceed the honor being shown to Hashem through the acceptance of Him as king in the reading of Shema which is only twice a day. Similarly, when there was a beis hamikdash, there couldn't be a halacha requiring one to visit their rebbi more than 3 times a year (even though it is technically appropriate every shabbos and rosh chodesh - as the gemara cites לא חודש היום ולא שבת היום). Now that there is no beis hamikdash and there is no mitzvah to be oleh regel on yom tovim, the halacha of visiting a rebbi is completely inapplicable for the same reason so that the honor shown to a rebbi shouldn't exceed the honor shown to Hashem.

The Node B'yehuda certainly assumes that the definition of the term רשאי in the context of אין אדם רשאי לעמוד בפני רבו אלא שחרית וערבית שלא יהא כבודו מרובה משל שמים, has to mean - NOT PERMITTED, as it would be simply translated. However, Tosafos says that in hour gemara when it cites the phrase אין בעלי אומניות רשאין לעמוד מפני ת"ח בשעה שעסוקין במלאכתם, can even be speaking about when they are doing their own work so there is no issur to stand, but the term רשאי means obligated. Meaning, workers aren't obligated to lose money and stand for Talmidei chachamim while they are busy with their own work. Tosafos says that the term in the gemara kiddushin can be translated the same way, one is not obligated to stand for a rebbi more than twice a day, but would certainly be allowed to. But, in truth this may work even better for the Nodeh B'yehuda because there is no halacha that nowadays one is not allowed to visit their rebbi on regel, just that it can't be an obligation. It would work well since it is based on the source of one not being "obligated" to stand up for their rebbi more than twice a day - they are allowed just not obligated.

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On another note, the gemara concludes that we can't prove from our gemara that honor shown to those going to do a mitzvah should supersede the honor shown to talmidei chachamim, because it could be that the requirement to stand for those who bring bikurim is simply שלא תהא נמצא מכשילן לעתיד לבא - meaning that they must be shown extra honor in order to encourage them to invest the energy and time to come again. From here we see that there is an obligation on everyone not only to do mitzvos, and not only to abstain from preventing the doing of mitzvos, but to actively do things that encourage others to do mitzvos.

Chulin 48b - Treifos are halacha l'moshe m'sinai

A few weeks ago I was in Sha'arei Tzedek with R. Moishele Weissberg (who i am training by to become a mohel) and an older guy walked over dressed in shorts and sandals (not looking very well put together). He said that he had a question, but not about milah, rather about a chicken (Moishele spent over 25 years as a shochet). The question was that he has a chicken who is missing a leg at the knee and he wants to know if the chicken is kosher, because he wants to keep it alive and eat the eggs. Moishele didn't know the answer, so he called another shochet who said that it depends on the tzomet ha'gidin, whether or not they are in tact.

I didn't fully grasp the importance of the tzomet ha'gidin at that point. However, the gemara says that in treifos one cannot compare one thing to another based on the assumption that the rules should always be consistent and logical. The gemara says

אין אומרין בטריפות זו דומה לזו, שהרי חותכה מכאן ומתה חותכה מכאן וחיה

Rashi (unlike tosafos in baba basra 130b who says this is referring to a hole in the spleen) says that so long as no bones are broken, if the meat of the chicken is cut off the bones, if it is above the tzomes ha'gidin it is kasher, but on the tzomes ha'gidin it is a treifa. This proves that the laws of treifos aren't intuitive because it could be a treifa when less is missing, and kasher when more is missing.

Rashi at the beginning of the perek 42a also made this point by saying that there is no rationale when it comes to treifos because it is all a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai. It is for this reason that the chazon ish explains that the ability to keep a treifa alive would not change it's status as being a treifa since the list of 18 treifos are halacha l'moshe misinai.

Chulin 46b - 47a - Sircha/Hole in Lungs

The gemara discusses the common problem of sirchas (strands that attach lobes of the lung to one another or to the rib cage) being an indication of a treifa. The gemara distinguishes between כסדרן and שלא כסדרן. Simply speaking כסדרן refers to an attachment of the lobes of the lungs that are adjacent to one another, which the gemara says is kosher because היינו רביתייהו, whereas an attachment between lobes that aren't adjacent -שלא כסדרן, renders that animal a treifa.

For background purposes, the lung has 4 lobes on the right side and 3 on the left. The very large lobe on the right and the left is called an אומא, and the upper ones (3 on the right and 2 on the left) are called אונא. Rashi and Tosafos both quote a major machlokes whether a sircha between two adjacent lobes are considered acceptable only in the אוני or even when there is an attachment between the אונא and the אומא. Additionally, there is a lobe in the center of the lung that is referred to as the עינוניתא דוורדא for it's rose like appearance - any sircha between that and another lobe of the lung is considered to be a problem.

Rashi in his explanation of this sugya clearly chooses the former of the two approaches that i mentioned in the previous blog. Rashi writes that the problem with a sircha is that it is indicative of a hole which is then filled up by the forming of a sircha. Rashi continues that even though it successfully covers the hole so that no air can penetrate, we pasken קרום שעלה מחמת מכה בריאה אינו כרום שסופו ליסתר. The last two words of Rashi - שסופו ליסתר, clearly indicate that the problem is that the closure will not hold, implying that if it were to hold such as surgical stitching, it would remove the problem of treifa. Regarding the distinction between כסדרן ושלא כסדרן which the gemara attributes to כסדרן being רביתייהו, rashi explains that adjacent lobes protect one another so that the sircha can strengthen rather than weaken. The entire approach of Rashi clearly implies that any fix that will actually hold is sufficient to remove the concern of treifa, even though the fix only came later and wasn't present from the beginning. Tosafos asks on Rashi, why would כסדרן be kasher, it should be no better than a krum that develops on an injury which doesn't fix the problem. Tosafos suggests that it could be that a sircha which attaches itself to another place (such as an adjacent lobe) has a tendency to strengthen and closes the hole better than a "krum" that is not attached to any other place. This further compliments the approach that a hole that renders that animal a treifa can be fixed, so long as it is strong enough to be maintained. Based on this, the Rashi 43a that we discussed in the previous blog would hold that if it is a permanent fix, the animal is no longer a treifa even if it develops later. But, rashi explains that even when the hole isn't truly plugged up, and is just being blocked by another organ, since it was there from the very beginning, this also allows that animal to be considered kasher and not a treifa.

Tosafos quotes Rabbeinu Chananel who takes the exact opposite approach to explain why a sircha is a problem. Rather than the sircha being an indicative of a preexisting hole, it is an indication that a hole is about to form. Tosafos points out that both the approach of rashi and rabbeinu chananel fail to explain why a hole can be tested by blowing into the lung while in a bucket of water. According to Rabbeinu chananel it will not bubble because the hole has not yet formed, and according to rashi it will not bubble because the sircha is blocking it from bubbling but is prone to fall off and therefore doesn't truly fix the hole.

Chulin 43a - Bloat in Cattle

This is from wiki:

In cattle, bloating is most often caused by the animal eating young and lush pasture, usually if the pasture has a high proportion of legumes(medicks, clover or lucerne (alfalfa)).^[23] Legumes contain foaming agents which trap air bubbles in the ruminant's rumen and prevent them from belching to relieve the pressure. This causes a build up of pressure in the rumen which manifests as an obvious swelling on the left side. Signs of bloat in cattle are distended left abdomen, stopping of grazing, lethargy, appearing distressed, difficulty in urinating or defecating, rapid breathing and staggering. In mild and moderate cases an antibloating agent will be administered orally or through a stomach tube and the ruminant should be exercised. In severe cases a wide bore trochar and cannula can be inserted into the rumen on the left flank to release the gas and liquid. In emergency cases of frothy bloat, this may not be enough and a 10–20 cm incision may need to be made in the animal’s side and the froth manually removed. Veterinary care is then needed to clean and stitch the wound and administer an antibiotic to the animal.

To treat this problem, there is often an incision made in the keiva of the cow and then stitched up. Is found a very interesting discussion about this issue in the new picture book on chulin by rabbi lach (page 146). The question is whether a hole that renders the animal a treifa can be fixed so that the animal is no longer a treifa. If once a treifa, always a treifa, any animal that undergoes such a surgery, even after it heals is a treifa rendering all it's milk to be non-kosher. The issue is based on an apparent contradiction in Rashi when he explains the gemara which says a "krum" - membrane that grows over a wound in the esophagus doesn't fix the hole and the animal remains a treifa. Rashi at first writes that even if it is thick membrane, it will not last, therefore it is as if the hole remains and the animal is a treifa - אפילו עלתה בו סתימה עבה אינה מתקיימת. According to this rationale, the problem is that the hole cannot fix itself properly, but when the hole is stitched up and heals properly, the animal will no longer be considered a treifa. However, Rashi continues by creating a rule that any holes that render the animal a treifa cannot be fixed even if it heals afterward, unlike a hole in the lung that if closed by the wall of the inside of the animal is kasher, because that seal was there originally. The implication of the second statement of Rashi is that once it is a treifa, it remains a treifa and even if repaired properly remains a treifa. The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav - 33:4) understands from rashi that if the closure of a hole isn't present at the time the hole forms, it cannot be fixed by a membrane or healing afterward. The Pri Megadim explains that the fact that the closure or membrane will allow the animal to live, doesn't in anyway change it from being a treifa. The concept of a treifa not living 12 months is to be used as a siman to determine whether a safeik treifa is a treifa. But, when it is known that the animal is a treifa, even if it lives for many years, it remains a treifa. The pri megadim doens't explain how he would read the beginning of Rashi. Perhaps he understands that the statement of rashi - אפילו עלתה בו סתימה עבה אינה מתקיימת, is referring to the beginning of the healing process. Meaning, even if it begins to scab originally, that seal will not remain forever, therefore we give the animal a status of treifa. Once we give the animal a status of treifa, even once the hole fully heals, it no longer loses it's status since that is considered a closure that occurs later. This approach would seemingly invalidate even a hole in the stomach (since rashi asks from the lung and liver, and doesn't answer that this is a special din of the esophagus, it implies that the principle applies to holes in any organ).

Rav Belsky wrote an article available here being matir all milk. He explains that even if the procedure would render the animal a treifa, it would be mutar, and the suggests that one of the procedures doesn't render the animal a treifa based on many different rationales for this: 1. There are 3 linings to the stomach and the piercing of the needle is not at the same point through each lining. 2. Even if this hole could kill the animal, it would have a din misukenes but not treifa and since the hole is made to heal the animal it doesn't even qualify as a misukenes. There is another procedure which stitches the stomach of the animal to it's side. In this type of stitching there is definitely a how made straight through the stomach. Rav Belsky understands that the correct reading of Rashi is the first approach, that any closure which isn't a permanent fix doesn't work, implying that if it is indeed מתקיימת, it works to remove the status of treifa. The reason why rashi had to come up with the alternate explanation - דטרפות לא מהניא להו סתימה דסלקא בהו לאחר זמן is because it isn't obvious that these closures are permanent, but since they are there from the very beginning and remain there, they are considered closures. He then suggests that even if we take the stricter approach, the type of stitching called toggle bolt, would qualify as the hole being fixed immediately and not as something that only occurs later. He therefore concludes that the process done to milk cows qualifies as a סתימה המתקיימת and as a סתימה מעיקרא. He also elaborates to argue with the concept that a treifa cannot be fixed, that it is a rule that is contradicted from the gemara 68b. The gemara on 68b actually uses the term כיון שנטרפה שוב אין לה היתר, but Rav Belsky explains that it doesn't mean to say that every treifa, once it is assur can never be fixed. The gemara on 54 explains that any problem that can be fixed with medicine isn't part of the list of 18 treifos - this clearly implies that treifos can be fixed. Therefore, the gemara on 68b also means to say that the definition of treifa is a problem that can't be fixed. If it is possible to fix the problem, it no longer qualifies as a treifa. Even though the ability to keep an animal that has one of the 18 treifos alive wouldn't remove the status of treifa, the ability to fix the actual problem so that the hole is no longer present, Rav Belsky holds would help to remove the status of treifa.

Chulin 39b - Shlichus for a Goy

The gemara tells of arabs who gave money to purchase a part of an animal that was to be shechted by a jew and questions whether there is concern that the arabs intent to have his share shechted for avoda zara would invalidate the entire animal. The gemara says that if the arab is strong in the sense that the Jew cannot break away from him, then the animal is assur, but if the Jew is able to break away from him it is mutar. Rashi explains that if the Jew is able to break away from the arab then - אינו נעשה שלוחו על כרחו, the Jew doesn't become an automatic agent of the goy to assur the animal, but if the Jew is is unable to break away, he serves as an agent for the goy to assur the animal. Rashi seems to understand that the concept raised by the gemara of זה מחשב וזה עובד works as shlichus meaning that the shochet serves as the shliach of the owner as if the owner himself were actually shechting for avoda zara. The Maharatz Chiyus raises a question that the concept of "shlichus" between a jew and a goy doesn't exist. The gemara in Baba Metzia 71b derives from a pasuk that there cannot be any shlichus between a Jew and a Goy in either direction. Based on this, how can we apply the concept of shlichus to make the animal assur?

Rashi in Baba Metzia concludes that we do consider their to be shlichus between a Jew and a Goy l'chumra. This helps to explain Rashi in Shabbos 153a. Rashi explains the gemara's question as to how a Jew could give his money to a goy to carry as shabbos is beginning, that it should be assur because the goy is serving as his shaliach. Rashi seems to understand that the concept of amira l'nachri is based on the goy serving as the shaliach of the Jew. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav articulates this point clearly:

הגר"ז בס' רמג ס"א וז"ל אסרו חכמים לומר לנכרי לעשות לנו מלאכה בשבת וכו' שכשהנכרי עושה בשבת הוא עושה בשליחות הישראל ואע"פ שאין אומרים שלוחו של אדם כמותו מה"ת אלא בישראל הנעשה שליח לישראל וכו' אבל הנכרי אינו בתורת שליחות מה"ת, מ"מ מדברי סופרים יש שליחות לנכרי לחומרא עכ"ל

Therefore, it is possible that in our context also, Rashi will hold that m'drabonon we are machmir to consider the Jew a shliach of the goy, whenever the Jew doesn't have the ability to break away from the goy. In truth, Tosafos also writes that the issur on the animal when the Jew can't get away from the goy would only be m'drabonon (but Tosafos seems to say that it is only d'rabonon because there is something lacking in the s'michas da'as). It seems that Rashi would hold that the entire issur on an animal shechted by a Jew when the Non-Jewish owner had intent for avoda zara would work through shelichus and would only be assur m'drabonon. Another possibility is that when money exchanges hands we could consider a goy to be a shliach of the Jew or a Jew to be a shliach of the goy. This is the sevara of the machaneh ephraim in the context of a goy building a ma'akeh for a Jew and allowing a Jew to make a bracha - יד פועל כיד בעל הבית דמי. Therefore, in our case where the Jew accepted money from the goy and cannot break away, even m'doraysa he may be his shaliach.

The Rashash explains the concept of an איניש אלמא who the Jew cannot break away from based on the Rambam in Hilchos Chometz U'matza (4:4) that when the Goy will be able to force the Jew to take responsibility for the chometz, the Jew is obligated to be destroy it before pesach as if he willfully accepted responsibility. Here too, since the goy can force the Jew to maintain the partnership in the animal and prevent the Jew from breaking away, the machshava of the goy qualifies to assur the animal.

Chulin 39a - Pigul: Machshava or Dibur?

The Rosh (Hilchos sefer Torah 3) quotes Rabbeinu Baruch as holding that pigul can only be violated if it is done with dibur, meaning that one articulates the pigul, but machshava alone doesn't create pigul. The Rambam (Pesulei Hamukdashin 18:1) disagrees and holds that pigul can be violated by the mere thought of chutz l'zmano. In our gemara we are trying to find a case where something would be a violation of pigul by kodshim but not a violation of a machshava of avoda zara by chulin. The gemara says that if machshava of avoda zara wouldn't invalidate the animal by chulin, then what would be a case where one does shechita for avoda zara. Tosafos says that if pigul can b e violated through machshava (Rambam), then we have a simple case where pigul is a problem by kodshim but machshava for avoda zara wouldn't be a problem by chulin - because machshava for avoda zara without dibur wouldn't invalidate the animal, but with dibur it would. Tosafos seems to be uncertain whether pigul requires machshava or dibur.

In Baba Metzia 43b Tosafos seems to assume like the Rosh that pigul needs dibur, whereas the gemara in gittin 53a seems to hold that one does require dibur by comparing pigul to hezek sh'eino nikar, yet distinguishes between hezek sh'eino nikar and pesulim of machshava.

The Rashash on 39b writes that if we require dibur for pigul, then we should also require dibur when one shechts chulin for avoda zara, otherwise the kal v'chomer of R. Yossi doesn't make sense because there would be a pircha that pigul is only violated with dibur. The Rashash points out that the gemara seems to understand that shechita for avoda zara wouldn't require dibur because we apply the concept of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו, meaning that machshava afterward reflects on the shechita. This would only make sense if it is a p'sul of machshava but doesn't make sense if it is a p'sul of dibur. Therefore, it should follow that pigul can be violated even with machshava.

To be explain the opinion of the Rosh, it seems that the concept of dibur by pigul isn't a din of dibur similar to kriash shema and kiddush, rather it is a din to have a machshava with a gemiras da'as that is only achieved through dibur. The function of the dibur is to be me'galeh that there was a clear machshava. Therefore, even according to the Rosh that dibur is necessary, the concept of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו would still make sense since the core p'sul is a p'sul of machshava, and the dibur is only a verification of that machshava. A similar sevara can be used to explain the function of dibur in sefiras ha'omer and when making a neder.

Chulin 37b - Eating From What a Chacham Was Matir

The gemara says that one of the chumros that Yechezkel kept was that he never ate from an animal that a chacham was matir. This is paskened in the Rama 116:7 that an animal that a chacham was matir based on sevara but the din is not explicit that it is permitted, a ba'al nefesh should be machmir not to eat it. The difficulty with the Rama is that the gemara is trying to find chumros that were kept by Yechezkel but weren't necessary to be kept by others. The gemara even proves from the fact that Yechezkel didn't eat an animal that was a misukenes, that it must be permitted for everyone else. It is possible that the Rama is encouraging anyone who wants to be a ba'al nefesh to keep the chumros of Yechezkel, but it still seems strange that a ba'al nefesh should have to keep the chumros of Yechezkel.

The Pischei Teshuva (10) quotes a chumra of not relying on bitul in 60 times as much, and asks that the Rama clearly says that such a chumra can only exist if a chacham is matir something with sevara, but wouldn't apply to an explicit din. The Pischei Teshuva explains that even bitul in 60x is not required that a ba'al nefesh be machmir but if he wants to it would be considered a mitzvah. He then quotes in the name of the Toras Ha'asham that one who wants to be machmir on something that we don't find the amora'im were machmir about is considered an apikores and his loss outweighs his gain.

According to the Rama it seems clear that even Yechezkel wasn't machmir about a din that is explicit. The Rama seems to understand that the case where Yechezkel was machmir is when a chacham had to be meikel based on sevara, and therefore suggests that every ba'al nefesh do the same. However, Rashi writes that Yechezkel didn't eat from any animal that was ever brought as a question to a chacham. This implies that even if the din was explicit, since the chacham had to be asked about it, he wouldn't eat from it. It seems to me that according to Rashi the only room for such a chumra is a form of ma'aras ayin. Since people saw that a shayla was asked on this animal, Yechezkel didn't want to give even the slightest impression that he was eating from something that wasn't 100% kosher. But it doesn't seem that there should be an inherent advantage to abstain from something that a chacham who is fit to pasken, was matir. The Torah gave the authority to the chachamim to pasken even using their shikul hada'as.

Chulin 33a - Chatzi shiur for a goy

The gemara raises the concept of מי איכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעכו"ם אסור, meaning that goyim can't be frummer than jew - if it's assur for a goy, it has to be assur for a jew. Tosafos raises various questions and exceptions to this rule. Tosafos writes that anything which is a mitzvah for a Jew can be an issur for a goy, such as shabbos and studying Torah are assur for a goy. The rationale is that since the entire concept of it being assur to a goy stems from the fact that it is a mitzvah unique to Jews, it doesn't break the rule of מי איכא מידי וכו. At the end of Tosafos, they write:

אע"ג דעובד כוכבים אסור במשהו בשר וגידים ועצם, וישראל לא מיתסר אלא בכזית בשר, הא אמר ריו"ח דחצי שיעור אסור מה"ת

Tosafos seems to imply that there is no concept of a shiur when it comes to a goy, so whether they eat more than a kezayis or less than a kezayis, it is all the same issur (even though by Jews it is more chamur to eat a kezayis, but since there is an issur of chatzi shiur it doesn't violate the מי איכא מידי concept). This seems to support the idea that shiurim are a halacha l'moshe misinai that was said to Jews and not to goyim. However, the Pri Megadin understands from Tosafos that by goyim even the gidim and bones combine with the meat to create a shiur of a kezayis, but the requirement of a kezayis to violate applies to a goy as well. The language of Tosafos where he contrasts that a Jew is forbidden to eat a kezayis of meat, implies that by a goy the bones combine to create a kezayis. However, the Rambam (9:10) writes explicietly that shiurim were only given to Jews, but Goyim are in violation for even eating the smallest amount of eiver min ha'chai.

Chulin 30b - P'sul of Chalada

The gemara Chulin 20b says that the p'sul of חלדה is similar to a weasel that lives in the holes of houses which is often hidden. There seems to be a machlokes in the gemara there whether it is necessary for the beis ha'shechita to be opened so that the part of the knife that is cutting is visible, or whether it is sufficient for part of the knife to be visible as it is cutting (see rashi d.h. הא מיגליא). Nevertheless, there is a din that the knife cannot be hidden underneath something at the time of the shechita. The gemara asks a series of questions according to Rav who says that even if the knife is hidden underneath the skin of the animal it is a problem, what is the din if it is under a cloth, or under the tangled wool. Rashi explains that even if the skin of the animal creates a problem, that is because it is at least part of the animal, but a foreign object such as a cloth may not be a problem. According to Rashi it isn't clear what the question would be regarding the tangled wool - shouldn't that be exactly like the skin of the animal? the Ran explains that the tangled wool isn't part of the animal, therefore even if a cloth would be a problem, the tangled wool would be less connected to the animal and may not be a problem. However, the Rosh seems to understand that the tangled wool is part of the animal that is going to be sheared - the question is that if skin is a problem, maybe the tangled wool is not a problem, and if the tangled wool is also a problem, the cloth which is a completely foreign object may not be a problem. Either way, the sevara of the Rosh, Ran and Rashi is that the more foreign the object the less likely it is to be a problem of chalada. The Ran and Rosh also seem to agree that even according to the maskana of the gemara leaving with a תיקו that the cloth and wool are indeed a problem, it is only because they are attached or tied onto the animal. However, a cloth that is draped over the animal isn't a problem of chalada.

The Rambam (3:10) concludes from the gemara that even if one spreads a cloth over the knife and the animals neck it is considered chalada - הואיל ואין הסכין גלויה הרי זו ספק נבלה. The Rambam seems to hold that chalada is a din that during the act of shechita the knife must be visible so that anything blocking the knife, even if not attached to the animal could constitute a problem of chalada.

The Mishna L'melech references Rashi in Bechoros 24b. The mishna that says when one is shechting a b'chor they are allowed to detach hair to make a place for the knife and it isn't considered a violation of shearing a b'chor. Rashi explains that the reason it is necessary to make a space for the knife is to avoid chalada. Tosafos asks on Rashi that it can't be for a halachic reason, rather a practical one, because the gemara leaves with a תיקו whether tangled hair creates a problem of chalada - if Rashi is correct that the mishna requires cutting the hair to avoid chalada, the gemara should have proven from the mishna in bechoros that it is a problem. Perhaps Rashi would say that the proof from the mishna isn't muchrach since the peshat could be like tosafos that it was cleared for practical reasons. However, since we pasken that we have to be machmir about chalada by tangled hair due to the teiku that the gemara leaves with, rashi explains the mishna by bechor that one would actually be required to cut the hair to avoid chalada.

Chulin 24b - נשיאת כפים

The gemara says that a kohein can only go up to du'chan when he is old enough to have a beard. Tosafos asks from the gemara in megila which implies that as soon has one is no longer a katan he can du'chan, and from a gemara in succah which implies that even a katan can duchan. Tosafos concludes that there are 3 distinctions. When he is only enough to have a beard he can duchan alone even b'kvius. When he has 2 sa'aros and is no longer a katan he can du'chan alone but not b'kvius. But as a katan he cannot duchan alone. These 3 categories are paskened in Shulchan Aruch 128:34.

It isn't clear whether a katan can du'chan with others even b'kvius. The Biur Halacha cites the O'las Tamid that so long as he is duchaning with other kohanim, a katan can even do so b'kvius, and deduces this from the language of the Shulchan Aruch. The Biur Halacha also writes that in the absence of another kohein, one can appoint a person who is a gadol but isn't old enough to have a beard, even as the established kohein. The rationale would be that technically once he is a gadol he is old enough to du'chan, just that we don't allow him to do it b'kvius due to kavod tzibur, so when there is no other kohein we assume that the tzibur is mochel.

It would seem that a katan is not able to du'chan even m'doraysa just like avoda where the gemara learns out from pesukim that a katan is pasul for avodah. If this is true it would make sense why even if the tzibur is mochel, it would not help to have a katan duchan alone. The only purpose of a katan duchaning would be chinuch as the Shulchan Aruch seems to say. However, Rashi in Megila 24a which is quoted in M.B. 122 writes that the reason a katan can't duchan alone is due to kavod hatzibur. This implies that m'doraysa even a katan can duchan. Therefore it is hard to understand why the olas tamid is only matir a gadol who doesn't have a beard to duchan in the absence of another kohein since we assume the tzibur is mochel, but wouldn't allow a katan to duchan. Since both one who is not ממלא זקנו and a kattan are only not allowed to duchan due to kavod tzibur, we should assume that the tzibbur is mochel when there is no one else?

Perhaps the peshat is that a kattan's ducaning is invalid m'doraysa just like he is pasul for avoda. However, for the purpose of being mechaneich him we should allow him to du'chan as we are mechaneich children for everything. Rashi just means to say that for the kavod tzibur we aren't mechaneich children to duchan. But ultimately, even if a katan would duchan, it would not count. Therefore, the mechila of the tzibbur only helps for a gadol who isn't ממלא זקנו but doesn't help for a katan.

Tosafos (here and more so in succah 42a) implies that ta'aniyos are considered k'vius. Therefore it should come out that one who is not ממלא זקנו cannot duchan alone on taniyos and on yom kippur. The Biur Halacha doesn't understand why the poskim don't mention this.

Chulin 22b - Excluding a safeik

Apologies for not blogging for almost 2 weeks. I am in Jerusalem training to be a mohel by Moishele Weissberg and have been very busy.

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The gemara says that there in the development of birds there is a stage where the feathers begin begin to get yellow but aren't yet golden which is excluded by the pasuk because it is too old to qualify as bnei yona, but too young to qualify as torim. The gemara asks whether we consider the birds at that stage to have a separate status and would therefore not qualify as being part of either group, or whether it is a safeik so it cannot be sacrificed as torim because it may be too young, and cannnot be sacrificed as b'nei yona because it may be too old. According to this second approach that it is actually one or the other, just that we have no way to determine, Tosafos points out that if the kohein would sacrifice both, it would certainly be effective to fulfill the persons neder (although the other would be a violation of chulin b'azara). The gemara responds that this second option is not possible because if it is a safeik, "would we need a pasuk to exclude a safeik!" The Turei Even in Chagiga points out that it would seem that this is a proof to the concept that safeik d'oraysa is l'kula on a Torah level, because if the Torah would demand being machmir for a safeik, it would make sense that we would need a pasuk to exclude the safeik. However, this proof can be easily pushed off based on the interpretation of what the gemara means to say that we don't need a pasuk to exclude a safeik. Tosafos explains that in our gemara, the explanation could simply be that it wouldn't make sense that the Torah would exclude it mi'safeik. Meaning, that it is entirely possible that we would need a pasuk to exclude a safeik case and say that it is definitely not included, but here the gemara is suggesting that even after it is excluded by the pasuk it remains a safeik. Therefore, the gemara responds that we never find that a pasuk would exclude something and have it remain a safeik even after being excluded.

Tosafos points out that this approach although it would work in our sugya, wouldn't work in various other places where the gemara uses the same phrase. Therefore, Tosafos suggests that there are different types of sfei'kos. When the safeik is based on the metzius of the object, such as a tumtum where we don't know if he is male or female, but each one is different, the pasuk could exclude a safeik. However, when the safeik is a safeik in din such as an androginus where they are all the same, just that we don't know what the din is on such a person, the pasuk wouldn't exlcude a safeik. The rationale for this distinction is that the pasuk may come and tell me what to do in a situation that I can't clarify the facts, but when there is a safeik in din, the Torah wouldn't ever deal with that as a safeik since the Torah doesn't have a safeik in din - קמי שמיא גליא אם הם קטנים או גדולים וכו הלכך לא אתא גרא למעוטי מטעם שהם ספק שאינו ספקא קמי שמיא

According to both of these approaches, there would be no proof at all to the concept of safeik d'oraysa because the gemara is not saying that we don't need a pasuk to exclude a safeik d'oraysa, Rather, the gemara is saying that although we may need a pasuk to exclude a safeik d'oraysa, that cannot be what the Torah is doing. However, Rashi seems to use the language of Tosafos - מי איכא ספקא קמי קודשא בריך הוא, but ends with a strange phrase - וכיון דלא פשיטא לן לא הא ולא הא, מהיכא תיסק אדעתין לאכשורינהו. This seems to indicate that since the Torah isn't dealing with the safeik and isn't including them into either category, we are forced to exclude them from both categories mi'safeik. This would seem to imply the opposite of the Turei Even's suggestion and that since the Torah doesn't include them, we are forced to exclude them mi'safeik, which would indicate ספק דאורייתא לחומרא.

Chulin 11b - Relying on Rov for Treifa

The gemara goes through a lengthy discussion to prove that we rely on rov (majority), ultimately trying to prove this from shechita itself where we aren't concerned that there was a hole in the esophagus on the exact spot that the shechting took place. The gemara rejects this proof (and the other proofs) by suggesting that wherever possible we don't rely on rov, but when there is no choice we do rely on it. It then proves this from Rebbi Meir who would be concerned even for a minority, so how was he able to eat any meat - clearly when impossible he relied on rov and wasn't concerned for the minority, we too rely on rov when there is no alternative. According to the simple conclusion of the gemara it should be necessary to examine every animal for all 18 possible treifos, since wherever possible we cannot rely on rov. However, Rashi twists the gemara at the very end to have an opposite conclusion. Since following the sources suggested in the gemara for relying on rov we would not be able to rely on rov when it is possible to check, rashi says that it must be that the source for relying on rov is a הלכה למשה מסיני (or from the simple reading of the pasuk - אחרי רבים להטות without exception), and would apply under all circumstances. Therefore, even when it is possible to check, one would not need to check. Although the simple reading of the gemara doesn't yield this conclusion, it seems that the practice of eating meat without checking for all treifos led rashi to interpret the gemara differently and say that one would never need to check for treifos (except for the lungs where they are very common).

Tosafos holds that Rebbi Meir's opinion of being concerned for the minority is only a stringency of the Rabbonon. On a Torah level even R. Meir would follow majority, just that m'drabonon he is concerned for the minority (there is a Mordechai who argues on this Tosafos). According to this approach, Tosafos explains that we are proving from R. Meir that since following the minority is only d'rabonon, they were only go'zer when possible, therefore the Rabbonon who hold that we don't follow majority when possible to check, would also agree that since it is only a chumra m'drabonon, when checking isn't possible we rely on the Rov. According to this approach, on a Torah level one can rely on the Rov even when possible to check, and the requirement to check would only be rabbinic. Therefore, the gemara cannot conclude as Rashi suggests that we have a halacha l'moshe misinai allowing us to rely on rov even when possible to check, because the entire obligation to check when possible is rabbinic. Therefore, according to Tosafos the conclusion of the gemara should be that m'drabonon one is responsible to check after all 18 treifos and not rely on the majority.

Chulin 10b - Eid Echad Ne'eman B'issurin

Rashi says that the source for eid echad being trusted for issurim is the pasuk that speaks of an individual shechting a korban, and all the kohanim eating from the shechita. Since we don't find that the pasuk requires there to be witnesses watching the shechita, we see that the shochet himself who is the eid echad is believed. Tosafos in Gittin 2b writes that the source of an eid echad being believed is the pasuk of וספרה לה by a woman who is a zava - she checks herself and her husband trusts her.

Rashi in Yevamos 88a writes that if an individual says that he knows that a piece of meat is שומן and not חלב he is trusted - דאי לאו הכי, אין לך אדם אוכל משל חברו, ואיןלך אדם סומך על בני ביתו. If we didn't allow the concept of eid echad, no person would be able to eat in their own home. This Rashi is usually quoted to be arguing on Tosafos and holding that the source of eid echad is merely a sevara, since otherwise it would be impossible to function normally. However, in light of Rashi in chulin who also cites a pasuk in the context of shechita, it seems that rashi in Yevamos isn't claiming to cite a source, rather proving that it must be true that we rely on an eid echad.

There is a very interesting Hagahos Ashri (Rosh 14) who writes that an eid echad isn't believed when there is a chezkas issur, but this is only if he is the class of people who are אנשים ריקים ופוחזים. Meaning, the same level of witnesses who the Torah believes if they are two, which includes even empty people who aren't at all learned, are not believed as individuals when there is a chezkas issur. But one who is kasher is believed even against a chazaka. According to the hagahos ashri, in a situation of chezkas issur, there are two classes of Jews, the lower of which isn't trusted unless they testify as a group of 2 witnesses.

Chulin 9a - Talmid Chacham Must be an expert in practical matters

R. Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a T.C. is obligated to learn 3 things, writing, shechita and milah. Rashi explains that writing simply means that he must be able to sign his name for an eidus. Shechita means that he must know how to maneuver his hand to shecht properly and not just know the halachos (and the same for tying the knot of the tefillin). The Maharsha explains that a person has an obligation to learn and know the entire Torah, so Rashi is trying to emphasize the practical aspect of it - knowing the halachos of shechita isn't sufficient, rather one must be able to be מאמן ידו and do the shechita.

R. Chanina Bar Shalmei adds the knot of the tefillin, birchas chasanim and tzitzis. The gemara asks why the first opinion doesn't list those three and says - הני שכיחן. Rashi explains that since tefillin, birchas chasanim and tzitzis are common, everyone will automatically become an expert in them by osmosis without having to invest effort into learning how to do them. Rabbeinu Gershom offers a slightly different approach - since they are so common it is easy to find others who can do them. According to Rabbeinu Gershom, we have a justification nowadays for why we aren't obligated to become an expert in any of the 6 items. Since it is common to find people who are able to do these things (even the first 3), it is no longer necessary to make such an effort to be able to do them.

Tosafos seems to understand the gemara's comment of הני שכיחן like Rabbeinu Gershom. Tosafos equates this with what the gemara says that tefillin in the house of bar chavu are משכח שכיחי. Tosafos understands from here that since there are experts around who can do it, it is not essential that everyone else learn how to do it. The implication is that not everyone will know how to tie the knot of tefillin, but when needed one will be able to find someone to do it. From this Tosafos proves that the knot of the tefillin doesn't need to be retied every day as suggested by Rabbeinu Eliyahu, rather the requirement of וקשרתם just means that we must tighten it on our heads as Rabbeinu Tam explains. From the understanding of Rabbeinu Tam that the definition of וקשרתם is to tighten the strap around the head, it is imperative that it be tight and not loose since that is the definition of the mitzvah.

To respond to the proof of Tosafos, Rabbeinu Eliyahu may interpret the gemara of הני שכיחן like Rashi, which would mean that everyone will automatically become an expert since it is necessary to do every single day. According to Rabbeinu Eliyahu one wouldn't need to learn to be an expert in something that is routine and he would be doing every single day from the time he is 13.