Shabbos 16b - Tovelling Glass

The gemara has two approaches as to why the Rabbonon were gozer tu'mah on glass vessels. One approach is that they are comparable to metal vessels since they can be melted down and reformed, just that chazal intentionally implemented some distinctions so that it will be clear that it is only d'rbaonon (so that one is not misled to burn teruma and kodshim after coming into contact with them). The second approach (Rav Ashi) is that they are comparable to earthenware vessels since they are made from sand, just that chazal were slightly more machmir by glass allowing the vessel to become tamei from the outside (since they are transparent, even the outside qualifies as the inside).

Tosafos 16b (d.h. rav ashi) points out that the gemara in Avoda Zara 75b (citing Rav Ashi) compares glass vessels to metal and imposes on them a requirement of tevillah when they are purchased from a goy. Why in the context of tevillah for new vessels does Rav Ashi compare glass to metal to require tevillah, whereas in the context of tu'mah he compares them to metal?

The Ritva writes that really it is similar to both, but in the context of being go'zer on tu'mah, the rabbonon didn't want to spread tu'mah more than necessary so they compared it to earthenware in order to limit the spread of tu'mah. But in the context of the mitzvah of tevilas keilim they were machmir to consider it like metal vessels.

However, Tosafos 16a d.h. ela, writes that even when the gemara compares glass to metal, it isn't completely retracting from it's initial approach to compare them to earthenware. The logic of being able to be melted down and reformed making it similar to metal, isn't sufficient by itself to compel a gezeira of tu'mah. They considered glass similar to earthenware in the primary gezeira, but then made it a little more machmir to receive tu'mah even from the outside since it has some property of metal (able to be melted down). According to this Tosafos, the gemara in Avoda Zara that requires tevila for glass since it has the property of metal in that it can be melted down and reformed, is very difficult. Why is that logic enough to compel a mitzvah of tevillah, and not enough to compel susceptibility to tu'mah?

Shabbos 15 - Decree of Tu'mah Outside of Eretz Yisroel

The gemara concludes that there were 3 gezeiros made on ארץ העמים, all lands outside of E.Y. Originally the יוסי בן יועזר ויוסי בין יוחנן made a gezeira that any Teruma that comes into contact with the land of eretz ha'amim is safeik tamie, the Rabbonon of 80 years prior to churban widened the gezeira that even teruma that is in air space of eretz ha'amim is safeik tamei, and when the Sanhedrin went into exile and were in Usha they decreed that the land itself is m'tamei vadai even to burn teruma, and the air remains safeik.

How are Kohanim lenient nowadays to live outside of E.Y. and not be concerned with tu'mah of eretz ha'amim?

The Shach (hil. aveilus) writes that since nowadays there is just as much tu'mah in E.Y., there is no advantage to E.Y. over eretz ha'amim. However, R. Akiva Eiger cites the Rikash who says that the reason people are lenient nowadays is either because they need to for parnasa or since we are all assumed to be tamei meisim anyway, it doesn't matter. The second approach seems to suggest that for a tu'mah d'rabonon such as eretz ha'amim we can rely on the Ra'avad who says that once someone is already tamei, there is not issur to make themselves tamei again. On the other hand, Pischei Teshuva (5) citing Shevus Ya'acov seems to uphold the gezeira of eretz ha'amim even nowadays.

Shabbos 14a - Showering after the Mikva

The gemara says that two of the 18 gezeiros that were made by Chananya ben Chizkiya, were that one who immerses rosho v'rubo in drawn water after going to the mikva, and even one who has drawn water poured on them (even without going to the mikva), they become tamei. The rationale for this gezeira was that since people were bathing and showering after using the mikva, people began to think that it was the bath and shower that worked to make them tahor and stopped using the smelly mikva. Therefore, chazal had to forbid bathing and showering to prevent people from using a bath and shower as the mikvah.

Based on this concept, the Rama in the end of Hilchos Mikvaos (101), writes that some hold that after going to the mikvah, a woman shouldn't bathe or shower. The source of this Rama is the Ra'vya cited by the Mordechai in the second perek of Shavuos. The actual concern should apply equally to a tamei person and a Nidah to be permitted to her husband. Perhaps if a woman bathes after using the mikvah she will be misled into believing that it was the bath or shower that helped remove her tu'mah status. However, Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe Y.D. 2:96) points out that this opinion who forbids bathing for a Nida is only a da'as yachid. Technically, the gemara's gezeira only applied to Teruma because the entire nature of the gezeira was not that the bath or shower retroactively invalidates the immersion. Rather the nature of the gezeira was that it imposes a new tu'mah status on the person to make them passul from eating Teruma, as Rashi explains. Furthermore, the very fact that they extended this gezeira to one who has 3 lug of drawn water poured on them, which is not an act of tevila, clearly indicates that the nature of the gezeira was to impose a new status of Tumah on the person that was caused by the drawn water, not to invalidate the tevila in any way. Furthermore, even if it were to invalidate the tevilah, it was only said in the context of tu'mah, whereas the prohibition of a Nidah to be with her husband is a second consequence of becoming a Nida but not at all an outgrowth of her tu'mah status.

Therefore, Rav Moshe is confident that even those who extend this gemara to include a Nidah and say that if she bathes it somehow impacts the tevila and would prevent her from being with her husband, that is only if it is done immediately after the tevilah, or at least on the same day. But if a woman bathes 24 hours after immersion in a mikvah, there is no issue at all. Although in the gemara we find this gezeira extended even to a tahor person who is not going through a tevila process, that is because we are only invalidating him for teruma, but we couldn't possibly say that for a Nida, because if that would be the case it would always be forbidden for her to bathe. Even in the case in the gemara, Rashi 13b says that they only were gozer on one who bathed on the same day as the tevilah. Therefore, Rav Moshe assumes that the minhag would only apply for the duration of the day of tevilah, meaning the first 24 hours. For a woman who is very particular about not going 24hrs without a shower, he permits her to bathe or shower even on the same day as going to the mikvah since this opinion is only a da'as yachid and only a minhag which was accepted in situations that wouldn't cause serious discomfort.

Shabbos 13a - Hugging and Kissing Daughters and Grand Daughters - Is is halachically permissible?

The gemara says that Ulah would kiss his sister, and then says that he contradicted his own opinion that any expression of intimacy is forbidden for the arayos based on the concept of לך לך אמרין נזירא, meaning that we build a fence to prevent violations. Tosafos explains that for Ulah it wasn't an inherent contradiction. U'lah held that for arayos such as a sister for which there is no natural attraction, the nature of the issur is only preventative, therefore since he knew about himself that this behavior wouldn't lead to improper thoughts it was permitted.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Dibros, Hearah 78) asks, how does the gemara know that there is any contradiction, perhaps it is permitted to kiss those arayos for which one doesn't have any desire for, and the statement of Ulah which forbids is speaking about the other arayos? Rav Moshe explains that for other arayos for which there is a desire, it is an inherent prohibition to kiss and hug (either d'oraysa according to rambam or d'rabonon according to ramban), and wouldn't be referred to as a issur due to לך לך אמרין נזירא, which implies it is a lower level, preventative type issur. Since Ulah only forbade it based on לך לך אמרין נזירא, it must be speaking about a sister and other arayos such as a mothers sister for which one has no desire.

The Rambam (Issurei Biah 21:6) writes:

המחבק אחת מן העריות שאין לבו של אדם נוקפו עליהן או שנשק לאחת מהן כגון אחותו הגדולה ואחות אמו וכיוצ"ב אע"פ שאין שם תאוה ולא הנאה כלל, הרי זה מגונה ביותר ודבר אסור הוא ומעשה טפשים, שאין קרבין לערוה כלל בין גדולה בין קטנה חוץ מהאם לבנה והאב לבתו

The Magid Mishna explains that the source of this Rambam is our gemara, where for U'lah it was permitted but for others is a violation of לך לך אמרין נזירא. Rav Moshe explains that the language of the Rambam implies that is isn't really an issur therefore he uses the language of issur only after using the language of meguneh, to indicate it is a לך לך אמרין נזירא level issur. A real issur d'rabonon could never be called a ma'aseh tipshus and meguneh.

The Rambam makes an exception for a father/daughter and mother/son. The Beis Shmuel (21:14) extends this heter to בת בתו as well (which is against the Ran who says that a father can only kiss his daughter but not his granddaughter). In the next halacha the Rambam says that although when they are young a father may kiss his daughter and sleep in the same bed as her, after she matures (same with mother and son), it is forbidden. The Rambam also writes that if they are married, it also becomes an issur. However, it is not clear from the Rambam whether after they mature physically it is forbidden only to sleep in the same bed with, or also forbidden to hug and kiss. The Beis Shmuel (15) cites the Prisha that a father may hug and kiss a daughter (and mother a son) even after they reach physical maturity. Rav Moshe (Dibros) assumes that the heter to hug and kiss a granddaughter would also apply after she reaches physical maturity. However, in the Igros Moshe (E.H. 1:60) Rav Moshe writes that there is a rationale to distinguish between a son's daughter and a daughter's daughter. Perhaps the Beis Shmuel only permits בת בתו because it won't lead to any hirhurim since one has not desire for בתו, but בת בנו may remind one of his daughter in law for which there is a desire and therefore forbidden. Rav Moshe holds that this is an area which the poskim weren't machriah in, therefore if one wants to be lenient to hug and kiss בת בנו, there is grounds to be lenient, but there is also reason to be machmir.

Rav Moshe seems to contradict himself between the Igros and Dibros as to whether one may hug and kiss a daugher and grand daughter (בת בתו) after she is married. In the Dibros Moshe he writes that marriage makes her like a gedolah, but not worse than a gedolah, so it is still permitted to hug and kiss her, and only forbidden to put her in your lap which is like sleeping in the same bed. However, in the Igros Moshe, he seems to hold that once she is married, it is forbidden to hug and kiss a daughter and grand daughter. Rav Moshe explains that once they are married and intimate with their husband, there is a greater concern of any physical contact leading to hirhurim.

In short - Hugging and kissing a daughter is permitted. A daughter's daughter is also permitted according to Beis Shmuel (which we pasken like, against the Ran). Rav Moshe has some reservations about a son's daughter and says that a ba'al nefesh should be machmir. This even applies when they are adults, but Rav Moshe seems to contradict himself regarding a married daughter and grand daughter whether hugging and kissing is permitted (it seems more logical to permit, since the chiddush is that a married girl is like a gedolah even when she is a ketana, but we don't see a source for her being worse than a gedolah).

Shabbos 12a - Nichum Aveilim on Shabbos

The gemara cites a machlokes beis shamai and beis hillel about activities that are violations of ממצוא חפצך such as making shidduchim and teaching a profession and therefore may not be able to be done on shabbos. R. Moshe (Hea'ros in Dibros) explains that really everyone holds that חפציך are forbidden, but חפצי שמים - mitzvah type activities are permitted. However, these activities are types of things that one would do even if there was no mitzvah element to them at all. Everyone wants to marry off their children and give them an education despite the mitzvah element. It is different than other mitzvah type of activities that one is really doing for the mitzvah, just that they sometimes need a שלא לשמה motivation to do the mitzvah. Therefore, Beis Shamai holds that these activities are considered חפצך which is assur, and Beis Hillel considers them חפצי שמים and are permitted. Based on this approach, both visiting the sick and comforting mourners qualify as חפצי שמים and should be permitted. That is why Rashi needs to create another rationale to forbid those activities, due to the fact that they cause pain to the visitor on shabbos.

Why doesn't Beis Shamai agree that one can visit the sick and comfort those mourning on shabbos, and just tell them to overcome the pain that they will feel? Just as we find in the gemara in brachos and succah that one who's ship is sinking is not considered a טרדא to exempt them from Shema because it is a טרדא דרשות so they are obligated to work on overcoming it. Here too, we should consider the feeling of pain with the mourner or sick to be a tza'ar of reshus and tell him to get over it? Rashi seems to understand that the nature of the mitzvah to visit the sick and comfort the mourning is to be מצטער אם המצטערים, to join in the pain and suffering of those who are suffering. Human nature is to get solace and be comforted by seeing others sharing in their pain. Mitzvos where the very nature and obligation of the mitzvah is to be משתתף in the tza'ar, would certainly qualify as a mitzvah. Therefore, Beis Shamai could not say get over it since the would undermine the very nature of these mitzvos. Beis Hillel who holds that one can do these things on shabbos is because we consider them to be important acts of chessed so that יצא הפסדו בשכרו, the loss of minor violations of shabbos will be compensated by the gain of the chessed that is done. That is the implication of the gemara 12b בקושי התירו לנחם אבלים ולבקר חולים בשבת. Based on this we learn that one who visits the sick or comforts the mourning and doesn't show that they are mitz'taer with the one suffering, hasn't really fulfilled the mitzvah.

Shabbos 10a - Toraso U'mnaso

The gemara says that one who is studying Torah must stop for Krias Shema, but for davening one must only stop if he is not "toraso u'mnaso" - meaning that he stops learning to work, to the exclusion of R. Shimon Bar Yochai who was toraso u'mnaso would not stop learning for davening. Rashi explains that the difference between shema and davening is that shema is d'oraysa to be read within certain times whereas the times for tefillah are only d'rabonon [Rashi implies that he holds like the Rambam that davening everyday is d'oraysa, just that the z'man tefila is what R. Shimon Bar Yochai was allowed to miss since it is only d'rabonon]. The Ran points out that although in the context of the beginning of the mishna regarding work, one must stop before missing the z'man tefillah, in the context of studying Torah the אין מפסיקין means that you don't need to stop even if you are going to miss the time. The Ran proves this from the fact that we only allow this for one who is torasa u'mnaso and not for others. If we were speaking about stopping Torah study even when there is time to daven later, even one who is not toraso u'mnaso can continue studying and doesn't need to stop - ואי בדאיכא שהות, כגון אנו למה מפסיקין, וכי אסור לעסוק בתורה קודם שיתפלל. The Ran takes for granted that there is no prohibition to learn before davening. However, in Brachos 5b, Rashi seems to say that there is a prohibition to learn before davening, and Tosafos there takes issue with that and assumes like the Ran.

What is the rationale to distinguish between those who are תורתן אומנתן and those who are not torasan u'mnasan? Rashi writes that those who stop for other activities such as work, must also stop for davening. This can be explained in two ways: 1. The Chofetz Chaim in Shemiras Halashon in a note writes that just as when it comes to issurim we find a concept of achashevei, which means that something inedible that you eat and give chashivus to, is considered food, here too. Those who refuse to stop learning to earn a living and are achshevei their Torah study to give it such value, it truly has more value and becomes more important than tefillah. But for those who don't give their Torah that level of chashivus, it is considered to be worth less than tefilla so they must stop to daven. 2. I would like to suggest another approach based on the gemara 10a that considers tefillah to be chayei sha'ah since one is praying for physical needs on this world, to the exclusion of Torah which is chayei olam since it is purely spiritual. Those who are involved only in chayei olam i.e. Torah, have the right to ignore chayei sha'ah i.e. tefillah. But those who break from their chayei olam to work and earn a living, since they take very physical and mundane steps to worry about their chayei sha'ah, they are obligated to also take spiritual steps to worry about chayei sha'ah. Since they stop learning to work for chayei sha'ah, they must daven for chayei sha'ah also to put things in perspective and recognize that their parnasah is from Hashem.

Shabbos 9b - 10a - Preparing for Davening "Hakon Likras Elokecha"

The gemara says that according to the opinion that ma'ariv is only a "reshus" and not an obligation, once someone removed their belt to begin eating, we don't require them to put it back on to daven ma'ariv before eating. The gemara asks on that two questions: 1. Is it such a difficulty to put the belt back on that we would allow him to continue his meal without davening? 2. If putting back on the belt is so difficult, let him daven without a belt? Tosafos explains that the gemara ignores the first question (apparently acknowledging that it is too much of a tircha to put back on the belt), but answers the second question by saying that for tefillah we require - הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל - which means that one is obligated to dress themselves up for davening. Therefore, he couldn't daven without the belt.

There seems to be a machlokes between Rashi and Tosafos regarding what exactly we would have allowed if ma'ariv is just a reshus. Rashi says that we allow him to continue his meal "and daven afterward", implying that even if ma'ariv is a reshus, the tircha of putting the belt on wouldn't exempt him from ma'ariv. We merely allow him to continue his meal provided that he finish in time to daven ma'ariv. However, Tosafos (d.h. l'man d'amar) seems to hold that for a "tzorech" such as retying the belt we would allow him to skip ma'ariv altogether according to the opinion that it is just a reshus (although tosafos would agree that for no reason at all, we wouldn't let him miss ma'ariv). This machlokes seems to influence the question and answer of the gemara. According to Rashi that we are only speaking about delaying ma'ariv until after the meal, the gemara was asking why not just daven in middle of the meal without putting the belt back on? To which the gemara answers that we prefer that he daven later when he can dress properly and fulfill the idea of הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל. However, Tosafos holds that if ma'ariv is merely a reshus, we would allow him to skip it in order to continue his meal and not have to bother him to get dressed again. According to Tosafos the question is, why not just daven during the meal without wearing the belt? To which the gemara answers, he must fulfill the הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל. This seems very difficult. According to Rashi the gemara is simply saying that we prefer that he daven after redressing and looking presentable as opposed to davening during the meal. But according to Tosafos the gemara seems to be saying that we would allow him to skip ma'ariv altogether since he can't fulfill the aspect of הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל. Isn't it better to daven without the fulfillment of הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל, rather than not davening at all?

Clearly, Tosafos holds that הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל is not just a method of beautifying the davening by looking more presentable. Rather Tosafos holds that if one is going to daven they are essentially placing themselves before G-d and have an absolute obligation to appear presentable - הכון לקראת אלקיך ישראל. Therefore, it is better to forgo the davening altogether than to stand before Hashem without dressing properly. In other words, הכון is not just a detail in adorning the davening, to which we would say it is better to daven without that adornment than not to daven at all. Tosafos holds that it is the only way one can choose to stand before Hashem, even if it will be at the expense of skipping the entire davening.

The concept can be better illustrated based on the last Brisker Rav in his sefer on parshas breishis. The Brisker Rav takes note of the fact that Adam and Chava tried to hide from Hashem after eating from the eitz ha'da'as. Although Hashem expresses anger at them for being eating, He never accuses them of being so foolish as to think that they can hide from G-d. This implies that the hiding was actually an appropriate behavior under the circumstances. The Brisker Rav explains this based on a Rashi in BRachos 24a that one can read shema with a cloth wrapped around their waste (when the upper part of their body isn't covered), but cannot daven that way. Rashi explains:

דלתפלה צריך הוא להראות את עצמו כעומד לפני המלך ולעמוד באימה, אבל ק"ש אינו מדבר לפני המלך.
Davening is essentially standing before Hashem, and when one does that they need a greater level of tznius and covering. When Adam and Chava ate from the tree and realized their nakedness, they at first were able to just cover the bottom half of their bodies. But when they heard Hashem's sound passing through the garden, they were obligated to hide themselves before G-d's presence to cover the top of their body as well, just as one would when davening to Hashem. This is the same point that Tosafos seems to hold in regard to הכון. It isn't a stipulation of davening, it is a stipulation of standing before Hashem, and therefore worth forgoing the entire davening rather than violating standing befoer Hashem in a disrespectful fashion.

Shabbos 4a - Listening to Chachamim to Violate an Issur

The gemara on 3b has a discussion whether the Rabbonon would make a gezeira or k'nas to prevent someone from doing an action that will save them from a Torah violation. The two examples are when one sticks out their hand holding an object from reshus hayachid to reshus harabim - would chachamim forbid him from drawing his hand back into reshus hayachid? By preventing him from drawing his hand back, he is likely to let go of the object as the hours of shabbos pass, thereby violate an issur d'oraysa. Similarly, if one stuck bread to the side of an oven on shabbos, would the chachamim prevent him from removing it (which is generally a rabbinic prohibition), or would they be lax since by preventing the removal of the bread, he will violate a Torah prohibition. The issue that is being discussed is whether the Rabbonon would impose a restriction that will cause a torah violation. One possibility is that they wouldn't, but another possibility is that they would look at the bigger picture and by imposing an issur, although in this case they will be causing a chilul shabbos, in general they will be preventing chilul shabbos. Although by the removal of the bread we conclude that one is allowed to remove it, by the hand that one stuck out on shabbos, many rishonim pasken that if done b'meizid we forbid him from drawing his hand back in.

However, Tosafos d.h. kodem, asks a very interesting question. Regardless of whether chazal would or would not impose the prohibition, who would listen to them? Tosafos asks that if by listening to them one would receive capital punishment, one would certainly not listen. But even if one wouldn't actually receive capital punishment, when faced with the possibility of a Torah violation or a Rabbinic one, wouldn't it make more sense to violate the Rabbinic prohibition? Tosafos answers that by the chachamim preventing you from pulling your hand back or from removing the bread, they are actually making it so that the violation was purely b'ones, and one is not liable for that. Meaning, by imposing their restriction they are essentially reducing the violation by making it so that the individual is אנוס בתקנת חכמים, and therefore not liable for the initial violation. According to this it makes more sense why chazal would consider imposing the restriction since even for the individual case, they are not making things worse for the person, they are actually making things better for him because even if decides not to fix the problem, he won't be chayev for his violation. However, if they don't impose the prohibition and one decides not to fix the problem (such as by removing the bread or withdrawing his hand) he will be chayev for the violation.

Shabbos 3a - Assisting in an Issur

The Mishna speaks about a case where the Ba'al Habayis is holding something in his hand from which the Ani takes, pulls out, and places down. The Ani is chayev a chatas for carrying out, and the ba'al habayis is patur. The gemara explains that it is patur u'mutar, meaning that the ba'al habayis didn't do any violation at all. Tosafos (top of 3a) asks why don't we consider the ba'al habayis to be in violation of lifnei iver, by providing the Ani with the possibility to carry out? Tosafos explains that even if it were a situation where the Ani were capable of picking it up without the Ba'al habayis lifting it up for him to take, it should still qualify as מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה - assisting someone in doing an aveira which is an issur d'rabonon? Tosafos answers that we must be speaking about a goy in a way where there is no ma'aris ayin because the object being carried out belongs to the goy. The Rosh disagrees and says simply that the gemara just means that no issur shabbos was violated, but there was certainly another issur d'rabonon violated. R. Akiva Eiger points out that if an issur shabbos were violated even accidentally the person would assume a status of מחלל שבת בפרהסיא even for the violation of a d'rabonon, whereas if an issur of מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה were violated, they wouldn't have such a status.

Regarding the exact nature of the violation to be מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה  is a discussion itself. The Rosh writes that since we find a discussion about whether one must stop a child from doing an issur, the implication is that one must certainly stop an adult. Since one is obligated to stop an adult from doing an issur, they are certainly not allowed to assist in the violation. However, the Maharatz Chiyus cites the Rambam in sefer hamitzvos who says that the source for the issur to assist someone in doing an issur is the mitzvah of tochacha. Perhaps a difference between the two approaches is whether מסייע ידי עוברי עבירה can be considered an issur d'oraysa. According to the Rambam that it's based on the obligation to rebuke it would be d'oraysa, but according to the Rosh it would seem to only be d'rabonon. Another possible distinction is whether it would apply to assisting someone in not doing a positive mitzvah that is incumbent upon them. If the source is tochacha, it would apply to positive mitzvos as well, but if the source is an obligation to prevent people from doing issurim, it may only apply to negative violations and not positive mitzvos.

Brachos 53a - Havdola Candle

The gemara says that you only make a bracha on a candle when the purpose is for light, but not on something that is lit for utility purposes such as cooking or if it is lit to provide honor to someone (this is how rashi understands, but rabbeinu chananel holds that a candle lit for an adam choshuv is considered for the purpose of light). However, it isn't entirely clear whether one would make a bracha on a light which is lit for a dual purpose such as to provide light and for some type of use.

Rashi (d.h. ha v'ha) writes that if a light is lit to honor an adam choshuv (which he holds you don't make a bracha on) and also to provide light for the chazan who will be eating in the beis hakneses, one does make a bracha on it. So long as it is also there for the purpose of light, a bracha can be made. This seems to fit well with the gemara earlier that said that one cannot make a bracha on the candle of a goy since it didn't rest on shabbos, yet technically after some time passes and the fire is considered to have "new" fire mixed with the original fire, a bracha can be made. We see that we don't require the entire flame to be worthy of a bracha in order to make a bracha on the fire. So long as it has mixed into it a form of fire worthy of a bracha, we can make a bracha on it.

However, the gemara that says a fire that is lit sometimes by day, even if it is being lit on motzei shabbos, no bracha can be made. Rabbeinu Yona writes that even though it is sometimes also lit for the purpose of light and not just for the purpose of honor, we see from here that a candle that is lit for a dual purpose, light and kavod, is not worthy of a bracha.

It seems that Rashi and Rabbeinu Yona argue on a fundamental point. Rashi holds that the halacha is that on a candle that provides light one can make a bracha, therefore even if it also serves another function it doesn't detract from the fact that it is also there for light. Rabbeinu Yona holds that the halacha is that a candle which is there for honor isn't worthy of a bracha, therefore even if it also has a component of providing light, the fact that it is there for honor ruins the ability to make a bracha. The rationale of Rabbeinu Yona would seem to be that since the bracha is to express appreciation to Hashem for creating fire which provides light, we can only make this bracha when it is clear from the fire in front of you that it's purpose is for light. Whenever there is a dual purpose, it isn't clear that the function of this candle is to provide light and therefore doesn't warrant a bracha.

Brachos 51b - Order of Brachos in Kiddush

The Mishna cites a machlokes Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel whether the bracha of borei pri hagafen is made before or after the bracha of kiddush. Beis Hillel says that we first make a borei pri hagafen, and Beis Shamai says that we first make the bracha of kiddush.

In the Braisa, Beis Hillel offers to reasons for the bracha of hagafen to come before the bracha of kiddush. 1. The wine is the cause to make the bracha of kiddush - if there would be no wine the bracha of kiddush wouldn't be said. 2. The bracha on the wine is considered tadir, more common, than the bracha of kiddush.

The Tzlach points out that both rationales of Beis Hillel are problematic. The first approach assumes that without wine or bread, one wouldn't make kiddush. Although Tosafos in Pesachim 106a questions whether m'doraysa kiddush requires a cup of wine, most rishonim understand that m'doraysa one doesn't require anything for kiddush, just to be mekadesh the day with words. How then can Beis Hillel say that the wine causes the kiddush to be said, since one would actually make kiddush even if they had nothing to make kiddush on? The second approach of Beis Hillel is also problematic. It is fair to assume that a mitzvah d'oraysa is considered mekudash when compared to a d'rabonon. The gemara in zevachim 90 concludes that between tadir and mekudash, we don't know which should be first, so we assume they are equal. Therefore, although hagafen may have the tadir advantage, kiddush has the mekudash advantage so the logic of Beis Hillel that tadir demands that hagafen come first, is not accurate.

The Tzlach explains that we are clearly assuming that the person had already davened and fulfilled the d'oraysa obligation in their tefilla, and the kiddush on the wine is only d'rabonon. In such a circumstance, both arguments of beis hillel are valid. Based on this the Tzlach concludes that women who don't daven ma'ariv or someone who didn't yet daven and is making kiddush on wine, should say the bracha of mekadesh hashabos before the bracha on the wine since in that cas e both arguments of Beis Hillel don't apply. The hagahos of the shoel umeishiv disagrees with this conclusion and explains that the rationale offered by the braisa is what the chachamim used to organize the order of the brachos. But, once they say that hagafen comes first (since they are assuming most people who are making kiddush have already davened and fulfilled their d'oraysa obligation), it will always come first, even for people who have not yet said kiddush in davening.

Brachos 50 - Intending not to make a zimun

Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe 1:56) has a teshuva about people who are attending a wedding and don't want to stay around until the end for the sheva brachos. The question is that all the attendees have both an obligation of sheva brachos and an obligation of zimun, so how is anyone allowed to leave a wedding early? Rav Moshe explains that even if people sit together so that there is a kevius in their eating, if they are not intending to create a kevius for the bracha because they don't plan to bentch together, they are not obligated in zimun. His source is from the Rama (193:3) who says that when a group eats together in the house of a goy, the assumption is that they intend not to join for birchas hamazon (because skipping the harachaman for the ba'al habayis will be noticed and cause animosity). The Magen Avrohom in Hilchos Tisha B'av (552:9) uses this Rama to explain why one doesn't make a zimun for the seudah hamafsekes even when 3 people ate together. Since their intention when eating together is not to join for the bracha, they are not obligated in zimun. Rav Moshe explains that when there is no kevius for the bracha to obligate zimun, there is also no obligation to stay for sheva brachos.

At the end of the teshuva, Rav Moshe explains that with this yesod we can offer a better peshat in our gemara. Rava says that when they ate at the home of the Reish Gelusa they would make a zimun of groups of 3 quietly, and not wait for the Reish Gelusa. The gemara explains that due to the large crowd they wouldn't be able to hear the bentching from the reish gelusa, and to form groups of 10 would be obvious and anger the Reish Gelusa, so they formed groups of 3. The question is, how were they entitled to forfeit the obligation to make zimun with 10 people, just to avoid angering the Reish Gelusa. The Magen Avrohom writes that it would be disrespectful to the Reish Gelusa not to wait for him, so we allow kavod habriyos to override the obligation to bentch with a zimun of 10. However, in light of Rav Moshe's chiddush that when one never intends to be part of the zimun there is no obligation, he explains that we don't need to say that the kavod habriyos overrides the obligation of zimun. Rather, since initially the fully planned on breaking into smaller groups of 3 and not joining to be part of groups of 10, there never was an obligation of zimun on them to be mezamein with 10. Rav Moshe points out that since there is another explanation as to why they were able to avoid the zimun of 10 (kavod habriyos), there is no proof to the opinion of the Rama that intent to not join enables one to avoid the zimun. But in light of the Rama, we have a better explanation for the gemara.

Brachos 45 - Obligation to make a Zimun

The Mishna says that when 3 people eat together they are obligated to make a zimun for birchas hamazon and are not allowed to bentch individually. The gemara discusses whether 2 people are not obligated in zimun but may still do zimun if they wish, or whether the entire concept of zimun was only instituted for a group of 3. We pasken that with less than 3 people zimun cannot be done, as the gemara proves from R. Yochanan who says that with 2 people eating together one can be yotzei with the bracha of the other. Rashi explains that the concept of one being yotzei with the others bracha implies that we are not using the concept of zimun, because with zimun we view it as if each person is making their own bracha. The gemara also explains that this bidieved approach of one person being motzi another in birchas hamazon only applies when the listener is a boor and unable to make birchas hamazon himself, but if he is able to make birchas hamazon himself, he is obligated to do so. Even when the listener is a boor, the M.B. (193:5) cites two opinions whether the listener can be yotzei in lashon hakodesh when he doesn't understand lashon hakodesh.

Why is it that the Rabbonon were so much more stringent about birchas hamazon than they were about hamotzi? When it comes to the bracha of hamotzi one person is able to make a bracha for another even lichatchila (so long as they are koveia themselves together, as we do every shabbos), but for birchas hamazon, unless there are 3 and an obligation to make a mezuman, ideally each must bentch themself. Why?

Tosafos (d.h. im ratzu) explains that when it comes to bracha rishona they are coming together as a group to do things together, but when it comes to a bracha achrona when their intention is to break as a group and depart from one another, one cannot be motzi another unless there is a zimun. Tosafos offers another approach that birchas hamazon which is d'oraysa they were more machmir for than bracha rishona which is only d'rabonon. The difference between these two approaches is for one to be motzi another in a regular bracha achrona such as borei nefashos or bracha achas me'ein shalosh. According to the first approach of Tosafos, one cannot be motzi another in any bracha achrona unless the listener is unable to make a bracha himself, whereas according to the second approach, since bracha achas me'ein shalosh according to most opinions is only d'rabonon (not like rabban gamliel), one can be motzi another. The Pri Megadim understands that another difference would be when one at less than a כדי שביעה of bread. According to the first opinion someone else cannot be motzi him, but according to the second opinion someone else can be motzi him since he is only obligated m'drabonon.

Regarding an obligation to make a zimun when there are 3 people, the Bach writes that even on shivas haminin there may be an obligation for zimun, therefore 3 people should not eat together any of the shivas haminin since it will be questionable whether they require zimun. The M.B. (193:6) cites the Birkei Yosef who disagrees and says that only on bread is there an obligation of zimun.

Brachos 41b - 42a - Defining Pas Ha'ba B'kisnin

The Shulchan Aruch 168:6 writes that on פת הבאה בכסנין one makes a mezonos before and a bracha achas me'ein shalosh after. In Si'if 7 the Shulchan Aruch offers 3 possibilities as to the definition of פת הבאה בכסנין.

1. Bread with a sweet filling. 2. Bread where sweet items are kneaded into the dough (the Rama holds that unless a very large amount is kneaded in, it would maintain the status of bread, whereas the shulchan aruch considers is to leave the status of bread so long as one can taste the sweetness). 3. Bread made into thin, cracker-like wafers. The Shulchan Aruch paskens that the halacha is like all of the opinions. Meaning that if it meets any of the requirements it is considered pas ha'bah b'kisnin. The Biur Halacha (8) explains that the Shulchan Aruch paskened to make mezonos out of safeik, meaning that since it may qualify as פת הבאה בכסנין, we assume that it does and we don't make hamotzi and bentch. However, when it comes to considering something to be פת הבאה בכסנין that would require a bracha in middle of a meal, unless it meets all 3 requirements (such as a pie with a sweet crust), one would be lenient and not make a bracha out of safeik.

However, there is another school of thought cited in the previous Biur Halacha (v'halacha) in the name of the ma'mar mordechai that perhaps these are just different examples of פת הבאה בכסנין, but they all truly qualify. The Biur halacha says that based on this school of thought, any cake-like item that meets even one of the three requirements should need a bracha during the meal. The Biur Halacha himself assumes that most opinions agree to the first definition that when it contains a sweet filling it qualifies even if the bread is not sweet, but most don't agree to the second definition so standard cakes would still be at best a safeik and not require a bracha during the meal.

Hagaon Rav Yaakov Mi'Lisa, the Ba'al Chavos Da'as and Nesivos HaMishpat and derech hachaim, printed a small kunteros in the back of his hagaddah (ma'aseh nissim) on halachos of brachos. SEE HERE. He raises an amazing question. Birchas HaMazon is d'oraysa. How can we say that if one eats a filling amount of פת הבאה בכסנין that he should not say birchas hamazon, rather just make an על המחיה, since there is a safeik d'oraysa that he must bentch? The Ohr Sameiach suggests that perhaps the requirement to say the full birchas hamazon is not d'oraysa, therefore he can fulfill the d'oraysa with a ברכה אחת מעין שלש as well. This question compels R. Yaakov mi'lisa to take an approach similar to the ma'mar mordechai. The different opinions about what is פת הבאה בכסנין, are merely different examples of what can be considered פת הבאה בכסנין. The definition of פת הבאה בכסנין he derives from Rashi 41b d.h. pas. Rashi says that it is the type of bread that is made into shapes, mixed with spices and one generally eats only a modest amount of it. The definition of פת הבאה בכסנין is the type of bread that it is not the type of bread that one typically is ko'veiah their seudah on. Therefore, any bread which is used for some other function and not for קביעת סעודה would qualify as פת הבאה בכסנין and be mezonos. Based on this approach, any cake that one eats during a meal should require mezonos. Also, this enables us to include things like soft pretzels (superpretzel) which doesn't fit any specific category of פת הבאה בכסנין, into the realm of פת הבאה בכסנין and allow one to just make mezonos and ברכה אחת מעין שלש. Surely, even for פת הבאה בכסנין one would need to wash and bentch if they ate an amount that one typically is koveiah seudah on (furthermore, many poskim, including Rav Moshe (o.c. 3:32, 4:41) hold that other things that one eats combine to even a small amount of פת הבאה בכסנין to require one to bentch). However, so long as one eats a modest amount, they can consider even a soft pretzel as פת הבאה בכסנין based on r. ya'akov m'lisa.

Brachos 40b - Bracha on Ma'aser

The gemara uses the pesukim in parshas ki tavo, in the context of viduy ma'aser as a source for making a bracha. לא עברתי ממצותך ולא שכחתי - לא עברתי מלברכך ולא שכחתי מלהזכיר שמך עליו. Rashi on chumash quotes this and implies that the requirement to make a bracha is d'oraysa. The meforshim on Rashi starting with the mizrachi are very troubled with this since we know that the requirement to make brachos on the performance of mitzvos such as teruma and ma'aser are only d'rabonon. Therefore, the Mizrachi explains that the bracha being referred to is not the technical birchas hamitzvah, rather it is the appreciation we show Hashem for giving us the produce from which we can separate teruma and ma'aser. The problem with the Mizrachi is that Rashi on our daf writes explicitly that the gemara is really referring to the Bracha of אשר קדשנו במצותיו וצוונו להפריש תרומה ומעשר. The problem is that we always assume that birchos ha'mitzvos are d'rabonon so how can the pasuk be referring to this bracha?

The Tzlach has an approach where he says that there are two sources, a mishna and a braisa. The mishna is listing things that are d'oraysa which is what rashi quotes in chumash, therefore in that context the bracha refers to showing hakaras ha'tov, however, in our gemara we are citing a braisa which uses the pasuk as an esmachta, therefore can refer to the specific birchas hamitzvah..

It seems to me that the pasuk is teaching us that we have a Torah obligation to show appreciation for what Hashem has given us. Hakaras HaTov is d'oraysa. However, this appreciation can be fulfilled through the specific birchas hamitzah on teruma and ma'aser that was instituted by chazal. Therefore, it is correct to say that birchos hamitzvos are only d'rabonon, yet we can still use this pasuk as a source for the requirement to make a birchas hamitzah because by doing so we fulfill the d'oraysa obligation to express appreciation to Hashem in some form.

Brachos 39a -- Shiurim for Brachos

The gemara makes it clear that without kezayis there wouldn't be any bracha made. Tosafos qualifies the gemara to be referring to the bracha achrona, but when it comes to bracha rishona, Tosafos writes that we make it even on less than a shiur. The rationale of Tosafos is that the source for bracha rishona is אסור ליהנות בעוה"ז בלא ברכה, therefore, one must make a bracha rishona even on a tiny amount.

This approach seems difficult because the gemara on 35a was discussing both bracha rishona AND bracha achrona, yet according to Tosafos we reject the kal v'chomer and rely on the sevara of אסור ליהנות בעוה"ז בלא ברכה for both bracha rishona and bracha achrona. If this sevara is mechayev both bracha rishona and bracha achrona, why should bracha achrona be bound to a shiur kezayis and not bracha achrona? It seems that even if we use the sevara as the source for bracha achrona, chazal still modeled the bracha achrona after the din d'oraysa which is that we require an achila of kezayis. Although it is not exactly modeled after the bracha achrona d'oraysa because they instituted that bracha should be said even on a kezayis, even without se'viah. That is because se'viah is very subjective so they couldn't be magdir bracha achrona practically based on seviah. Instead they said that whenever one eats a kezayis they must make bracha achrona and if they happened to be satisfied from that eating, the bracha achrona they were making would actually be d'oraysa. But if they didn't allow you to make bracha achrona unless you reached שביעה, it would be impossible for people to figure out whether they met this requirement.

Bracha Rishona is made even on the smallest amount, provided that it is enough to provide a person pleasure. If one were to eat a crumb and could barely taste anything, they wouldn't make a bracha rishona, but if they at enough to receive some enjoyment, they would make a bracha. Tosafos doesn't say what bracha rishona is made, which implies that when one eats less than a shiur they make the standard bracha rishona appropriate for that food. However, Rabbeinu Yona writes that since what compels the bracha rishona on less than a shiur is not the nature of the food, rather avoiding benefiting without making a bracha, whenever one eats less than a shiur the bracha is shehakol. The Beis Yosef is medayek from the Rosh that on less than a shiur one should make the appropriate bracha for that food because when speaking about the bracha achrona, the rosh assumes that if one can't make the bracha appropriate for that food, there would be no other bracha to make. Similarly with bracha rishona, if one wouldn't make the appropriate bracha, there would be no other bracha to make. There is one opinion cited in Beis Yosef (kol bo) that even bracha rishona requires a shiur.

Regarding bracha achrona on less than a shiur, Tosafos cites the R"I who suggests making borei nefashos. Tosafos disagrees since the bracha on fruits is modeled after the ברכה אחת מעין שלש, therefore it should also require a shiur. The rationale of the R"I would be that only brachos which contain the term "achila" require a shiur of kezayis because that is the definition of achila. Borei Nefashos which doesn't use the term achila wouldn't require a kezayis.

Another issue is the shiur for bracha achrona on drinks. Tosafos assumes that the shiur is מלא לוגמיו   and therefore encourages one to always drink at least a מלא לוגמיו from a כוס של ברכה so that they can make a bracha achrona. R. Akiva Eiger in the Gilyon HaShas references Tosafos 49b who also cites the R"I and says that one should be machmir to make a bracha achrona on drinking even less than a מלא לוגמיו (presumably they me an a kezayis would be the shiur for drinking as well). Aside from the Gilyon HaShas pointing out that being machmir in brachos is against the standard rule (see Tosafos 12a citing the R"I who says there also we go l'chumra to make brachos out of safeik), R. Akiva Eiger is also pointing out that the R"I in our Tosafos seems to make borei nefashos on less than a מלא לוגמיו, whereas on 49b sounds like you would make the standard bracha.

The Tzlach finds this entire shiur of מלא לוגמיו to be strange. Tosafos in Yoma 79a offers possibilities as to what the shiur is for drinking. Either kezayis, or k'beitzah, or Revi'is, but not ma'lei lugmav. It seems to me that Tosafos wasn't sure if kezayis is sufficient but he was sure that the shiur couldn't exceed malei lugmav. On Y.K. the shiur of eating is a large date which is larger than the shiur for bracha, so the R"I understands that for drinking the shiur for bracha may be the same as Y.K. but it couldn't be larger than Y.K. which is malei lugmav. This is clear from Tosafos 49b citing the R"I to make a bracha on less than malei lugmav since we see that the shiurim for bracha are smaller than y.k. Therefore, even if in our Tosafos there is a possibility that the shiur should be like Y.K., it would be impossible for the shiur for drinking to be larger than Y.K. since the shiur for eating is smaller.

Brachos 39a - Seviah without Achila

The pasuk requires one to say birchas ha'mazon (see Ohr sameiach who questions whether m'doraysa one needs to make all 3 brachos or perhaps just give some type of bracha to hashem for the food) after meeting the requirements of ואכלת ושבעת וברכת. The gemara 20b refers to a kezayis as a shiur d'rabonon because the torah doesn't require you to bentch until you eat a shiur of se'viah.

Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe O.C. 1:76) cites a pri megadim who says that a person who eats enough to fill himself up, but does so by spreading the eating over time so that he never ate a kezayis within a shiur of כדי אכילת פרס would still need to bentch. Essentially, he meets the requirement of שביעה but never met the requirement of אכילה, yet the pri megadim says that he is required to bentch m'doraysa. Rav Moshe disagrees and says that achila is also a d'oraysa condition and without an achila, one is not required to bentch on seviah alone. His proof is from a sick person who is satisfied after eating a half kezayis, and the halacha is that he doesn't bentch. He further proves this from a Radvaz cited by the Sha'arei Teshuva 197:8  who says that a sick or elderly person who eats a kezayis and is satisfied can make birchas hamazon to be motzi those who are chayev m'doraysa. The implication is that because they ate a kezayis they can be motzi others, but if they wouldn't have eaten a kezayis, they can't even bentch themselves. Therefore, Rav Moshe concludes that one must be careful to at least eat one kezayis within a כדי אכילת פרס in order to be chayev to bentch. If one has a safeik, he leans toward saying they shouldn't bentch and this doesn't qualify as a safeik d'oraysa l'chumra because he thinks that the halacha is not like the pri megadim.

Rashi on our daf seems to support Rav Moshe's approach. The gemara says that by removing the pit from the olive the shiur is reduced. Rashi comments that by birchas ha'peiros the Torah says אכילה, which means a kezayis. Rashi seems to be following the approach of Rabbeinu Yona at the beginning of the perek (24b and 25a on bottom) that the bracha achrona on 7 species of E.Y. is d'oraysa. But aside from that he seems to say clearly that the Torah insists on an achila as a condition for bracha achrona. If the only d'oraysa requirement were שביעה, rashi shouldn't be citing a pasuk and interpreting it as requiring a kezayis. Therefore, the Torah requires 2 conditions for Birchas HaMazon, אכילה which requires a kezayis within k'dei achilas pras and שביעה. 

Brachos 38a - Bracha on Medicine

The Shulchan Aruch 204:8 writes that any food or drink that one eats for medicinal purposes and has a good flavor requires a bracha before and after (if they eat a shiur). However, in si'if 11 the Rama writes that we don't make the appropriate bracha, rather we always make the bracha of shehakol. The M.B. explains the rationale is that since it is a medicine only eaten by sick people, even though there is benefit, the primary benefit is the medicinal purpose. We only make the appropriate bracha when the primary benefit is for the food, because the bracha is designed to be food specific, but when the primary benefit is medicinal, the bracha is the general bracha. The M.B. cites many achronim who disagree with the Rama and hold that one always makes the appropriate bracha. The M.B. and Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe 1:?) rule that the appropriate bracha for that food should be recited.

The source of this discussion is the gemara regarding shesisa which is made thick for eating purposes, since it contains grain the bracha is mezonos, but when it is made thin and liquidy for the purpose of refuah the bracha is shehakol. It isn't clear whether the primary distinction of the gemara is how it is prepared, or what purpose one is using it for. 

Rabbeinu Yona explains that the gemara doesn't mean to say that it loses its normal bracha because it is being used for medicinal purposes. The fact that one uses it for medicine is not a reason for the bracha to change. Rather, the gemara is saying that when it is made so thin and liquidy, the grain is not a primary ingredient (maybe it is only there to give some consistency - לדבק), therefore even if eaten for enjoyment and not for medicine one makes a shehakol. According to Rabbeinu Yona, this gemara is not mechadesh that for medicines the bracha is always shehakol, rather we always make the proper bracha on the medicine based on its ingredients.

The source of the ruling of the Rama is the Rosh (13) who writes very simply that when the purpose of the eating is for "achila" the bracha on the shesisa is mezonos, when the purpose is "refuah" the bracha is shehakol. The Rosh seems to understand that regardless of whether it is made from grains that should be mezonos or other vegetables that should be ha'adoma, if eaten for refuah it is always shehakol, as the Rama writes. The Divrei Chamudos explains that it is different than anigron which contains a lot of oil and is eaten for refuah, yet the gemara says we make ha'eitz, because that is something that even healthy people drink. But, something which is really a medicine and eaten primarily by sick people always gets a shehakol.

It seems to me that Tosafos has an opinion somewhere in between Rabbeinu Yona and the Rosh. Tosafos writes that the bracha on shesisa when made thin for refuah purposes is shehakol - 

ומ"מ לא יברך אלא שהכל כיון שאינו עשוי לסעוד כי אם לשתות, וא"כ כל דבר שיש בו מחמשת המינין ואינו עשוי לסעוד כי אם לשתות כגון שכר וכיוצ"ב מברך שהכל

Tosafos seems to understand that the rationale behind shehakol has nothing to do with the consistency being thin, and nothing to do with the intent to use it for refuah. Rather, the rule of Rav and Shmuel that grains are always considered a primary ingredient even when they are a minority is because they are meant to be סועד - to satisfy and fill one up. Tosafos understands that whenever one is eating something that contains grains and their intent is not to be סועד, rather they are intending to use it as a refuah i.e. shesisa, or meant to be a drink i.e. beer, we don't apply the rule of כל שיש בו מחמשת המינין מברכין עליו בורא מיני מזונות, therefore the bracha is shehakol. According to this approach, Tosafos is saying a chiddush in the halacha of כל שיש בו מחמשת המינין וכו, not a chiddush in the halacha of making brachos on medicine. Therefore, if for example the medicine will contain a majority of grain so that even without this din of כל שיש בו the bracha would be mezonos, one would make mezonos even if it is for refuah. Similarly, if it is made from vegetables the bracha will be ho'adama. Only when it is made from grain and the grain is a minority ingredient will Tosafos say that the bracha is shehakol since the chiddusho of Rav and Shmuel that when something contains grain it is always mezonos, only applies if it is functioning to be סועד.

Based on this, it seems to me that even if we pasken like the other achronim who hold that the appropriate bracha is always made, nevertheless, if it is made from grain and that grain is a minority, the bracha should be shehakol when eaten for refuah. We would reject the ruling of the Rama when the appropriate bracha based on the majority ingredient is mezonos or ho'adama, and make the appropriate bracha. But, we would accept the Rama when the mezonos is a minority ingredient, based on Tosafos.

According to my approach, the language of the M.B. in the sha'ar hatziyun 204:45 that the Rama rules that you make a shehakol "even when made from the 5 grains" is not so accurate. Perhaps only when it is an issue of being made from the 5 grains and they are a minority ingredient would we make shehakol, but if made from a vegetables we would make ho'adama when it is the majority ingredient.

Brachos 38a - Dividing Challah

There is a statement of Rav Yochanan in Maseches Challah Yerushalmi that is paskened in Shulchan Aruch 326:2 that if one makes enough dough that is beyond the shiur challah, but intends to "divide it", they are not obligated in the mitzvah of hafrashas challah. It is not clear what exactly the case is that this halacha is referring to. The achronim try to reconcile this with the practice that women have to make many small challas from the dough which has the shiur challah and make a bracha on their hafrashas challah. Why doesn't this qualify as העושה עיסה לחלקה בבצק פטורה? The Shach (5) and Taz (2) write that this halacha is limited to a case where it is being made for the purpose of dividing among many people AND that it will be distributed while still in the dough state. However, if one is baking many loaves of challah to be distributed among a group of people, but will be distributed after baking it is obligated in hafrashas challah. Certainly if one is baking it with the intention to divide it into smaller loaves that they will be keeping for themself, it is also obligated in the mitzvah of hafrashas challah.

However, both the Pischei Teshuva in citing the Beis Ephraim and the Tzlach in our sugya point out that from Tosafos quoting Rabbeinu Yechiel, this doesn't seem to be true. Tosafos implies that anytime the dough which has a shiur challah is going to be divided up and then baked as separate loaves, even if it will all belong to one person, he questions whether there is a mitzvah of hafrashas challah (so that no bracha should be made). According to Tosafos, whenever a woman bakes challah for shabbos and makes multiple loaves so that there will be lechem mishna, there is no bracha made on the hafrashas challah. The Tzlach struggles trying to justify the minhag that women have to make a bracha, with this approach of Tosafos.

The Madanei Yom Tov (also cited by Pischei Teshuva) suggests that if she is dividing it to bake a little now and a little at some later point (for example she is freezing some of the dough), she may not be obligated in hafrashas challah. But, if her intent is to bake everything now, she is obligated in this mitzvah. The Tzlach says that this also doesn't read well into Tosafos because Tosafos should have mentioned that the safeik of whether it is obligated in hafrashas challah is because sometimes it isn't all baked at one time.

The Tzlach understands Tosafos simply that if the loaves are divided while they are dough there is no mitzvah of hafrashas challah. But offers two approaches to justify the minhag to be mafrish challah with a bracha. 

1. There is a machlokes rishonim whether we pasken like Rav Yochanan to exempt from challah when dough is divided. The Rambam paskens like R. Yochanan, but the Ra'avad doesn't. There is also a machlokes as to whether the oven can combine the loaves to create an obligation. Therefore, we have a s'feik s'feikia obligating in the mitzvah of challah, and are entitled to make a bracha on the hafrasha. Although one is being mafrish with a bracha in the state of dough before they even enter the oven, the fact that one intends to put them in the oven in a way that they may combine, makes it that they are not considered דעתו לחלק and is obligated in the mitzvah of hafrashas challah.

2. The nature of this exemption of דעתו לחלק is that when one divides the dough and intends to distribute it among many people, it is unlikely to ever come back together and therefore exempt. It doesn't really matter whether it is being given out to others or kept for oneself. So long as the chances of it coming back as one unit is very slim, it is patur from hafrashas challah. Normally, when one doesn't distribute to others we are concerned that they different loaves will come back together in one basket and be obligated in challah, therefore even now the separating into separate loaves doesn't exempt. Tosafos is speaking about a type of bread that is going to be sufganin in the end (meaning it will be made in a way that there is excessive oil and shouldn't be subject to challah). The only reason to subject them to challah is because now they are all in one dough and we pasken תחילתו עיסה וסופה סופגנין חייבין. Therefore, if one intends to separate them into separate loaves, it is now exempt and later will never become obligated because later it will be sufganin which are exempt from challah.

Brachos 36b - Bracha on pits

Tosafos proves from the fact that the gemara considers pits to be included in the issur of orlah that they are considered part of the fruit. Therefore if one eats eatable pits, the bracha is בורא פרי העץ. However, the Rashba disagrees and says that just as we include the shell for orlah based on the extra word את פריו, to include even the shomer of the fruit, we include pits for orlah from the same source, but they are not actually part of the fruit and therefore the bracha is בורא פרי האדמה. Although the Shulchan Aruch 202:3 paskens like Tosafos (and the Rosh), the Tzlach says that he thinks that the halacha should be like the Rashba to make ho'adoma on fruit pits. He proves this from a mishna in Orlah 1:8 that says that although they are included in orlah, they are exempt from revai. This would only make sense if they are not really part of the fruit, but if they would be part of the fruit they should be included in revai as well. Although the tzlach himself rules in accordance with the Rashbah, he offers an answer for Tosafos. The tzlach suggests that there is the outer shell over the eatable part of the pit which is exempt from revai, but the inner eatable pit is part of the fruit and ha'eitz.

Brachos 36a - Eating to save one's life

The gemara says that if one is sick and needs to eat something for medicinal purposes, since he benefits from it, he makes a bracha. Rashi explains that whenever one receives a benefit of enjoying what they are eating, aside from the medicinal benefit, they must make a bracha. This is also the approach of Tosafos, however, the Rambam seems to say that as long as the person receives benefit from this eating such as for medicinal purposes where the food heals him, even if there is no enjoyment from the actual eating, a bracha would be made. The Shulchan Aruch 204:8 paskens like Rashi that one would only make a bracha if they receive some enjoyment from the food or medicine they are eating.

The Rama adds that if one were threatened at gun point and forced to eat something that they weren't interested in eating, no bracha would be made. However, in si'if 9 the Shulchan Aruch writes that if one had to eat things that are forbidden due to pikuach nefesh, they would make a bracha on it. The question is, why would one need to make a bracha on medicine or food that they need for pikuach nefesh, so long as they are receiving enjoyment from the eating, yet they wouldn't make a bracha on food when they are being forced to eat it at gun point? There are some achronim cited by M.B. 45 who equate these two halachos and say that just as one would not make a bracha when they are forced to eat at gun point, they would also not make a bracha on foods that they are eating for pikuach nefesh (see sha'ar hatziyun 40 - this is clearly the opinion of the re'ah). However, most achronim cited by the M.B. make a distinction between the two cases. When one is being forced to eat either physically forced by the food being stuffed down their throat, or forced by gun point, they are not making a decision to eat at all. Since the entire act of eating is forced upon them, there is no bracha. But, when one is dying and needs to eat for pikuach nefesh, they are not being forced to do the act of eating, rather they are making a decision to eat due to the dire circumstances. Since they are eating as a result of a decision that they are making, they must make a bracha.

There is a similar distinction made between one who violates an issur that they should have given their lives for i.e. avoda zara, but the violation was to save their life. Do we say that the person is given capital punishment for violating avoda zara or do we consider them an o'nes? The Rambam (Yesodei HaTorah 5:4) says that if they were forced to bow down to avoda zara at gun point we consider them an o'nes (even though they should have given their life) and there is no capital punishment, whereas when one uses the avoda zara for medicinal purpose to save their life, the are considered to be willfully violating avoda zara and are given capital punishment (Yesodei HaTorah 5:6). In the first case they are being forced to do the avoda zara and are considered an o'nes on the act of avoda zara so there is no capital punishment, but in the second they are deciding to use the avoda zara due to their dire circumstance, so they are punished for making a decision to use avoda zara.

The Sha'ar Hatziyun (38) asks that the gemara says one can fulfill the mitzvah of matzah that they are eating by force - כפאוהו ואכל מצה יצא. Why is a mitzvah different than a bracha? The Sha'ar Ha'tziyun offers two approaches. 1. Eating by force qualifies as eating so that the mitzvah is fulfilled, but we can't make someone give thanks on an act that they don't want to do. 2. We don't regard forced eating to be eating at all, but when there is an element of mitzvah such as by matzah, we assume that he later is happy that he ate it and it therefore qualifies as eating. According to the second answer, if one were forced to eat matzah, not only would they fulfill the mitzvah, but would also have to make birchas hamazon since in a mitzvah situation we regard it as eating.

Brachos 35a - Status of Brachos: D'oraysa or D'rabonon

The gemara at first tries to learn brachos from pesukim, implying that they are d'oraysa. There seems to be two opposite approaches being used by the gemara regarding the bracha rishona vs. the bracha achrona. On one hand the gemara implies that had we only had one source for bracha, we would assume it referred to bracha achrona, indicating that bracha achrona is more compelling. Yet, the gemara also introduces a kal v'chomer that if we make a bracha achrona, we should certainly be making a bracha rishona, implying that bracha rishona is more compelling. Rashi seems to be bothered by this question and explains that although the gemara assumes the rationale to require a bracha rishona is stronger than for a bracha achrona (therefore is able to make a kal v'chomer from bracha achrona to bracha rishona), nevertheless, had we only had one source for bracha we would assume that the bracha achrona was d'oraysa because we find a precedent for bracha achrona being d'oraysa on bread - ואכלת ושבעת וברכת.

At the conclusion of the gemara it seems to use pesukim as a source for bracha achrona on all 7 species, but is unable to find a source for bracha achrona for other foods and is forced to conclude that it is just logic - סברא הוא, אסור לו לאדם שיהנה מן העוה"ז בלא ברכה. According to this it should come out that bracha achrona on all 7 species, not just bread is d'oraysa. This is actually the opinion of Rabbeinu Yona (although the chidushei anshei sheim points out that Rabbeinu Yona at the end of the perek 32a in dafei ha'rif writes that the ברכה אחת מעין שלש is only d'rabonon), however, the Rosh implies that at the conclusion of the gemara our only source for bracha (other than birchas hamazon on bread) is just logic, implying that even on the 7 species it is only d'rabonon. I also found that the Rabbeinu Chananel (on the page in some printings) writes explicitly that according to the opinon who holds kerem r'vai the gemara concludes that ואכלת ושבעת וברכת is going on all 7 species, so the bracha achrona will be d'oraysa. And the opinion who holds of neta revai will hold that bracha achrona on all trees that are subject to revai is going to be d'oraysa. The sevara is only needed to fill in for other items and for bracha rishona.

The gemara also seems to conclude that on whatever the bracha achrona would be d'oraysa, the bracha rishona on that item would also be d'oraysa based on the kal v'chomer. Meaning, that according to most rishonim who consider bracha achrona on everything except bread to be d'rabonon, the bracha rishona on bread my still be d'oraysa based on the kal v'chomer. And according to Rabbeinu Yona that the bracha achrona on all 7 species is d'oraysa, we could use the kal v'chomer to say that the bracha rishona on all 7 species is also d'oraysa. However, Tosafos and Rabbeinu Yona both point out that the gemara 21a seems to reject this logic because it considers bracha rishona d'rabonon even on bread where bracha achrona is certainly d'roraysa. We see that ultimately the gemara doesn't accept this kal v'chomer (for an explanation as to why we don't accept the kal v'chomer, see Meshech Chochma on the pasuk in parshas eikev ואכלת ושבעת וברכת). The Tzlach proves that even bracha rishona on bread is only d'rabonon from the mishna 42a where we allow one to make a bracha rishona for others. If bracha rishona were learned from bracha achrona using a kal v'chomer it would only be d'oraysa when eating a shiur of שביעה, so how can we simply say that one can make a bracha rishona for others - perhaps the me'vareich is not eating a shiur so his bracha is only d'rabonon whereas the others are eating a shiur and are required m'doraysa (there is no arvus for bracha rishona). Clearly, we always assume bracha rishona is only d'rabonon.

Another point raised by the Pnei Yehoshua is that elsewhere we find that a sevara can be in place of a verse in the Torah. The gemara in kesubos says that the source of פה שאסור הוא הפה שהתיר, of believing someone to be telling the truth because they created the doubt to begin with, and the concept of המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה, which are both Torah concepts are learned from sevara. Therefore, although the gemara concludes that the source is sevara, bracha rishona may still be d'oraysa. The Tzlach disagrees and says that this is not possible. Although sevara can replace a pasuk to teach a din, it cannot be a source of a mitzvah or an obligation. If sevara were able to be a source of a mitzvah, we wouldn't need the Torah to write any מצות שכליות (logical mitzvos such as stealing and killing) since we can learn them out from sevara. Furthermore, if the sevara can introduce a mitzvah, it should apply even to goyim, yet the requirement to make brachos is only for Jews. Since the gemara concludes that bracha rishona is derived from sevara, we assume that all bracha rishona are only d'rabonon.

Brachos 33b - Compassion on the Birds Nest

The Mishna says that one who davens asking for mercy because על קן צפור יגיע רחמיך, we shut him up. The gemara offers 2 approaches as to why this is inappropriate. 1. It causes jealousy between the animals. 2. It turn the middos of Hashem into acts of compassion when in truth they are gezeiros.

The first approach seems to assume that in truth, this mitzvah is a mitzvah to have compassion on birds. The halacha in the mishna is just that one shouldn't use this in davening because to verbalize it in a way that singles out birds from other animals will cause "jealousy" between Hashem creatures. This is what Rashi seems to say - לומר על אלה חס ולא על שאר הבריות. One shouldn't say in their tefillah that Hashem only has compassion on birds. According to this approach, the halacha if משתקין אותו is only because it is being used in tefillah, but not that it is actually wrong.

Rashi explains the second approach of the gemara to be that we have to view ALL the mitzvos of Hashem as gezeiros that we do whether we understand or don't understand. The moment we start giving rationale for mitzvos, it may lead one to discriminate between what they consider more rationale and less rationale, which is obviously wrong. According to this approach, which also seems to be the approach of the Rambam, mitzvos cannot be considered acts of compassion, rather decrees of Hashem that we fulfill simply because we are his servants.

However, the Raman (ki seitzei) elaborates and disagrees. The Ramban explains that the point of this mishna and other midrashim is to say that we shouldn't reduce Hashem's mitzvos to being minor acts of compassion on birds and animals. True, the nature of this mitzvah and many others is compassion, but it is not to display compassion on the birds, rather it is to teach us to be compassionate people. Hashem wants these mitzvos to be used to be מצרף the human beings and turn them into compassionate people rather than a display of compassion on the birds.

R. Akiva Eiger in the gilyon ha'shas points to a midrash rabba at the beginning of ki seitzei that seems to disagree. It seems to consider the mitzvah of mila a form of compassion on the child and the mitzvah of sending away the mother a form of compassion on the birds. This seems to contradict our mishna? One of the commentaries on the midrash (pirush maharzu) explains that compassion on the birds is certainly one element or aspect in this mitzvah, but we cannot limit the entire mitzvah to just a mere act of compassion.

Brachos 30b - 31a - Simcha in this world

The gemara says on 31a - אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולם הזה. Rabbeinu Yona interprets it very literally. He writes that some say this has to do with the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, but if that were the case it would say so explicitly. Rather it is because simcha leads one to get drawn after physical indulgences and forget about doing mitzvos. Based on this he doesn't interpret the gemara which says וגילו ברעדה, במקום גילה שם תהא רעדה, to just mean that simcha should be balanced and controlled. Rabbeinu Yona writes that in the physical world fear and joy are opposites. However, in the service of Hashem, when a person ponders G-d's greatness and develops a fear for  G-d, he develops a joy for appreciating the fear he has for Hashem since that fear will ultimately be an inspiration to fulfill mitzvos. This is the type of simcha referred to in the pasuk of עבדו את השם בשמחה, it really means to serve Hashem out of fear, but to develop an appreciation for that fear that brings him simcha. He also considers this to be the peshat in the pasuk of תחת אשר לא עבדת את השם אלקיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב, but direct simcha is not considered positive. However, when the gemara speaks about davening out of simcha, Rabbeinu Yona (22a close to bottom) writes that if one finds himself unable to concentrate due to worries or anxiety, he is allowed to feel simcha for the purpose of inspiring himself to serving Hashem. In short, Rabbeinu Yona considers simcha to be a dangerous emotion, unless it is a result of the service of Hashem, or used as an inspiration to serve Hashem. On the flip side he warns that עצב, sadness or depression is also a dangerous emotion because it leads to physical illness that prevents proper service of Hashem.

Based on Rabbeinu Yona's approach, he explains the response of the amoraim אנא תפילין מנחנא, to mean that when they were challenged for feeling a simcha that is not associated with a mitzvah, they immediately explained that it was associated with a mitzvah and their joy was merely a result of appreciating the mitzvah that they were performing.

Rashi on the other hand doesn't seem to view simcha as something which is inherently bad. The challenge to the amoraim for expressing simcha was that it gave the impression that they were being פורק עול and throwing off the yoke of heaven. To that they respond that the tefillin that they are wearing is a clear sign that they still maintain the yoke of heaven and are not פורק עול. The difference between Rashi and Rabbeinu Yona is that Rashi seems to be concerned with the public display of joy, but the inner emotion is not negative, whereas Rabbeinu Yona is concerned even with the inner feeling of joy.

According to Rabbeinu Yona, nothing changes pre and post destruction of the beis hamikdash. However, the Meiri writes that pre the destruction of the beis hamikdash, simcha shel mitzvah was allowed. Whereas post destruction of the Beis HaMikdash things are intensified so that אסור לאדם שימלא שחוק פיו בעולה הזה even if it for the sake of a mitzvah.

Brachos 30a - Davening While Seated

The gemara discusses a situation where one has to take a trip early in the morning before the z'man krias shema. Their choice is to either stand while davening but forfeit being סומך גאולה לתפלה or to daven while travelling. The Shulchan Aruch (99:8) rules that it is better to daven before leaving one's home while standing, rather than davening on the road walking, even though it will be at the expense of being סומך גאולה לתפלה. M.B. cites Magen Avrohom who seems to hold that it is better to daven on the road when one can be סומך גאולה לתפלה.

The beginning of the sugya seems to refer to the virtue of "standing" to the exclusion of walking, not to the exclusion of sitting. This is actually very meduyak in Rashi. Rashi throughout the sugya comments that the advantage of davening while standing is for the purpose of intent. This makes a lot of sense a tthe beginning of the sugya when we are contrasting "standing" to walking.

ד"ה תפלה מעומד - שיכול לכוין את לבו לפיכך היו מקדימין להתפלל מעומד בביתם שלא יצטרכו להתפלל בדרך במהלך

However, as the sugya progresses we are told that R. Ashi would daven during his shiur from his seat, implying that the issue due to the fact that he is sitting rather than standing. Yet, Rashi continues his approach to explain the advantage of "standing" to be one of intent.

ד"ה בהדי צבורא - כמו שהיה יושב בתוך הצבור, כלומר, שאינו יוצא, וכי הוה אתי לביתיה חוזר ומתפלל מעומד לכוין את לבו

ד"ה לא חזינן - לפיכך מתפלל מיושב במקומו ולפי שאין דעתו מיושבת עליו כ"כ צריך לחזור ולהתפלל בביתו

It seems that Rashi understands that this sugya does not address the virtue of standing over sitting, rather it discusses the issue of davening in a situation where one won't be as focused. Both when one is travelling and when Rav Ashi was delivering his lecture, they were unable to properly focus on the tefillah. Rashi understands that the reason Rav Ashi davened again at home was not because the first time he sat through his davening (actually Rashi interprets רב אשי מצלי בהדי צבורא מיושב doesn't necessarily mean he was sitting, rather it means he davened in his place without walking out of the shiur where he could concentrate better). According to Rashi's approach in the sugya, we have no source for the advantage of davening while standing vs. sitting.

Tosafos in the name of Rabbeinu Meir learns from Rav Ashi that if one did not daven while standing, they must repeat the shemoneh esrei when they get home while standing. However, from Tosafos as well we don't see that the issue was the fact that one sat instead of standing, rather the issue is that if one davened in a situation where they couldn't concentrate, they are required to repeat when they can concentrate. Furthermore, see Rabbeinu Yona who explains the sugya also to be one of concentration and therefore writes that the issue is for one to be walking or riding, but sitting on an animal would be no worse than standing.

Yet, the Shulchan Aruch 94 speaks about the importance of davening while standing, not leaning or sitting. In si'if 9 he writes that if one is forced to sit for shemone esrei, they must repeat the shemoneh esrei later while standing. The Beis Yosef points to Tosafos as the source of this halacha. However, a careful reading of Tosafos doesn't compel any advantage to standing over sitting, and certainly doesn't require repeating shemone esrei. The Shulchan Aruch seems to be taking the Rambam's approach that the issue being discussed in our sugya is standing vs. sitting, and rules like Tosafos that if one didn't do what they were supposed to, they must daven again (but tosafos themselves will say that the issue is about concentration, not sitting).

The Mishna Berura (94:27) writes that the prevalent minhag is that if one had to daven while seated they don't daven again later, against the ruling of Shulchan Aruch. In light of what we explained that most Rishonim understand the issue in the sugya to be a lack of concentration rather than physical position, and in light of the Rambam who explicitly says that if one davened while sitting they would not need to repeat, the minhag is to rely on the tefillah one davened while seated. Therefore, if one davened on an airplane while seated, they don't need to daven again when they get off the plane. 

Brachos 28b - We Run And They Run

The Rambam in the Pirush HaMishna writes that the tefillah of Rav Nechunia Ben Hakana upon entering and exiting the beis midrash is an obligation, not just a story about what he used to do. The proof is that the gemara doesn't ask בכניסתו מה היה אומר, rather מהו אומר, implying that it should be said by all. The tefilla when exiting contains the line:

אני עמל והם עמלים, אני עמל ומקבל שכר והם עמלים ואינם מקבלים שכר, אני רץ והם רצים, אני רץ לחיי העוה"ב והם רצים לבאר שחת

The statement of אני עמל ומקבל שכר והם עמלים ואינם מקבלים שכר means that when studying torah one receives reward not just for what they accomplished, but for their effort and work invested in it. The statement of אני רץ לחיי עוה"ב, Rabbeinu Yona explains that he views himself as if he is always running and the time is passing quickly, he therefore is constantly preparing his way for olam ha'ba. Whereas they don't realize that the end is approaching until it actually arrives, therefore they make no preparations and end up in a be'er shachas.

Brachos 27 - Kabbalas Shabbos Early

The gemara says that Rav davened ma'ariv for shabbos on erev shabbos. However, the gemara justifies this by using the opinion of R. Yehuda that after plag hamincha it is already considered to be night. We only find that R. Yehuda says this in regard to tefillah, not for anything else. Tosafos and the Rosh cite Rabbeinu Tam (beginning of masechta) use this to justify saying shema early as well. However, the Rosh takes issue with this Rabbeinu Tam that for krias shema, plag hamincha won't help. In short, it is only clear that one can rely on this leniency of davening early on erev shabbos for tefillah, not for anything else. It is clear from the gemara that there would also be an issur melacha (unless the kabala was by mistake), but it isn't clear if the issur melacha would be d'oraysa. Rabbeinu Yona seems to be mesu'pak whether the issur melacha during the time of tosefes would be d'oraysa.

But, the gemara then goes on to day that Rav even made kiddush early on Friday night. Kiddush is a mitzvah d'oraysa that must be done on shabbos. How is it possible to make kiddush early? The fact that even kiddush can be made early (shulchan aruch 267:2) implies that one can actually transform the day into shabbos by being me'kabel shabbos early. Although the M.B. (5) cites two opinions as to whether one should make sure to eat some of the seuda when it is actually shabbos, that is because the pasuk that is used as the source for the 3 seudos uses the term "yom" - day. But for kiddush it seems that one can certainly be yotzei during the z'man of tosefes. It would seem that even if we assume that Tosefes shabbos is only d'rabonon regarding the issur melacha, as Rabbeinu Yona suggests, the z'man would still have kedushas shabbos on a Torah level to enable you to fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush.

Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe O.C. 3:38 - end of teshuva) raises a very interesting point. There is a well known halacha (O.C. 263:12) that when there is only one shul in town that is mekabel shabbos early, the entire community must begin shabbos with the tzibbur and one cannot continue doing melacha after that time. Rav Moshe says that he isn't sure if this din applies nowadays when the shul is mekabel shabbos early only for convenience. He suggests that perhaps the din of the tzibbur being pulled after the shul being mekabel shabbos is only when they are intending to fulfill a mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, not when it is purely for convenience. Therefore, when it is only done in the summer and not the winter, it is a clear indication that the intent is not for the mitzvah and may not bind the entire community to an early shabbos.

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It has been troubling me where Rav Moshe gets this notion from. Why would he think to make a distinction based on the intent of the shul being mekabel shabbos? I found that Rabbeinu Yona in explaining Rav davening early assumes that he would say shemoneh esrei early, but say shema with it's brachos after tzeis hakochavim. He asks, what about סמיכת גאולה לתפלה? To which he answers that since Rav was intending to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, he was willing to forfeit the advantage of being סומך גאולה לתפלה. Now the question is, how did Rabbeinu Yona know that Rav was intending to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, perhaps he too was doing it only out of convenience? The gemara says that Rav had a practice of davening early from which we see he held like Rav Yehuda, but Rav Huna didn't have this practice so we see he doesn't hold like Rav Yehuda. The Tzlach asks that we don't see anything from Rav Huna. Perhaps Rav Huna also agrees that one can be mekabel shabbos and daven after plag hamincha but didn't do this because he didn't want to! The Tzlach answers that since there is a mitzvah of tosefes shabbos, the assumption of the gemara is that if Rav Huna held it can be done, he would have done so. We see based on the approach of the tzlach that the gemara itself assumes that the compelling reason to be מצלי של שבת בערב שבת was to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos. This is perhaps why Rabbeinu Yona assumes that Rav "intended" to fulfill the mitzvah of tosefes shabbos.

Based on this we can explain Rav Moshe's suggestion. The source of everyone in the community being drawn after the shul is found in the Mordechai (Shabbos perek 2, 297). Since the only precedent we find in the gemara for accepting shabbos early is when one is intending for the mitzvah, it is fair to assume that only in that case the Mordechai citing the Riva"m would consider the individuals in the community to be drawn after the tzibbur.

Another interesting point is that the Mordechai is assuming that the majority of the community were in shul, just that there were some individuals not in shul. Perhaps in a situation where there were more observant Jews who weren't yet mekabel shabbos, not in shul, they would not be bound to the kabalas shabbos of the shul.

Brachos 23a - Going to the Bathroom During Tefillah

One who needs to use the facilities to a point where he is unable to hold himself in for an extended period of time, is not allowed to daven. If one davened when they had to go to the bathroom and couldn't contain themselves for a significant amount of time, the halacha is that they must daven again (siman 92).

The gemara cites a machlokes about one who urinated during their tefillah and concludes that if they delayed כדי לגמור את כולה, they must start from the beginning, but if the time delay was minor, we pasken like the more lenient opinion that one can simply continue from where they left off.

What is the halacha if one took a break in middle of shemone esrei to use the bathroom? If they couldn't contain themselves it is clear that the tefillah would be a toeiva anyway, so they would have to daven again. But what if they can contain themselves when they began but in the middle got a sudden urge to use the bathroom and did so, can they continue from where they left off or must they start again from the beginning?

Surprisingly, the Shulchan Aruch doesn't deal directly with this question. The Biur Halacha (92:2, yoser tov) suggests that this would be dependent on the way the rishonim learn our gemara. The gemara considers one who urinates during his shemone esrei to be גברא חזיא ותפלתו תפלה - the person is fit and therefore the tefillah is valid. This is the opinion that we follow l'halacha. However, depending on how we understand the term גברא חזי it may or may not apply to one who defecates. The Rosh says that when one urinates they are technically fit to daven even while they are urinating (on a torah level), therefore it isn't considered a hefsek. Since defecating is definitely not allowed m'doraysa while one is davening, and would turn the tefillah into a to'eiva, it would constitute a hefsek even without a significant time lapse. However, the Biur Halacha points out that Rashi interprets the phrase גברא חזי not to refer to the ability to daven while urinating, rather to refer to the state of being of the individual prior to urinating. Meaning, until he began urinating he was fit to daven so all the tefillah that was recited prior to urinating should be acceptable therefore we allow him to continue from where he left off. This applies equally to one who defecates during davening. Since until that point he was fit to daven (assuming that at the start of the davening he didn't have to go that badly), he can continue from where he left off.

Brachos 22b - 23a - Davening in Front of Tzoah

The gemara says that if one davens and then finds excrement in the place he davened, it would invalidate his tefilla. However, the gemara considers this to be a violation of זבח רשעים תועבה, indicating that he did something wrong. Therefore, Tosafos explains that the halacha of תפלתו תועבה only applies if he was negligent because it was a place that he should have expected there to be tzoah, but if it was a complete accident - אונס, this halacha would not apply. It comes out that we only consider his tefillah to be a תועבה if 2 conditions are met. 1. He actually found tzoah afterward (this is clear from the gemara which says ומצא צואה במקומו). The M.B. discusses whether it would include a place that there is almost always tzoah there, but would certainly not include a place that may or may not of had tzoah. The implication is that even if he were negligent, chazal don't render his tefillah to be a to'eiva, unless there was actual tzoah present. 2. He had to have been negligent by davening or saying shema (shulchan aruch brings this halacha in hilchos krias shema (end of siman 76). If he wasn't negligent, even though he found tzoah afterward, his tefillah wouldn't be considered a to'eiva. It comes out that the status of תועבה is a combination of factors, his negligence AND the metzius of davening in the presence of tzoah.

What does it mean to be תפלתו תועבה? Tosafos cites two approaches. Both approaches agree that the tefillah is invalid. The first approach is that he hasn't been yotzei tefillah and there is nothing he can do about it. The second approach is that he must daven again. The first approach of Tosafos is very difficult to understand. Since he wasn't yotzei tefillah, he should certainly daven again. What rationale is there to say that he doesn't daven again? It seems to me that what forces Tosafos to say this is that Tosafos understands that davening in the presence of tzoah invalidates the tefillah. Therefore, even if one were not negligent, but later found that they davened in front of tzoah, they must daven again. If so, what does the aspect of being negligent contribute to creating the status of תפלתו תועבה? Tosafos understands that regardless of him being negligent, he wasn't yotzei tefillah since the fact is that he davened in the presence of tzoah. However, if he were negligent we penalize him by no allowing him to make it up, whereas if he was a complete אנוס, we would allow him to make it up by davening again.

The second approach of Tosafos (which is the one brought l'halacha in shulchan aruch) that even when we say תפלתו תועבה we allow him to daven again to make it up, would have to hold that when he was not negligent we don't regard the tefillah to be a to'eiva, and he is actually yotzei with that tefillah. According to this approach, davening in the presence of tzoah may be an issur d'oraysa, but it is not an automatic invalidation of the tefillah (Biur Halacha 76 d.h. tzarich takes this approach that m'doraysa it is forbidden to daven, but the invalidation of the tefilla is only d'rabonon). Therefore, when he is negligent and actually davened in the presence of tzoah we penalize him by invalidating his tefillah, but if he is not negligent, we don't invalidate the tefillah.

Brachos 22a - Making Brachos Like Hilchos Derech Eretz

The gemara cites a braisa with many different opinions regarding the type of learning a ba'al keri is allowed to do. The concept seems to be that if the learning is too involved or based on pesukim, it is not allowed. Whereas superficial type learning is allowed, but they argue where exactly to draw the line. The opinion of R. Yehuda is that a ba'al keri can study hilchos derech eretz which is halachos about appropriate conduct for a Talmid Chacham. The simple reading of the gemara is that the reason R. Yehuda allows the ba'al keri to read shema with brachos, is because he considers it like hilchos derech eretz.

However, the Tzlach is meda'yek from Rashi עשאן רבי יהודה - לברכת המזון, that this concept of being like hilchos derech eretz doesn't apply to krias shema and birchas krias shema, and doesn't even apply to the birchas hamazon after the meal. What does it mean that R. Yehuda considers the saying of these things to be like hilchos derech eretz? The Tzlach explains that this can only apply to the bracha rishona that one makes on food which is learned from a sevara that one cannot benefit without thanking Hashem. When Rashi says Birchas HaMazon, he means bracha rishona. A bracha before eating is exactly like hilchos derech eretz. Therefore it comes out that for d'oraysa things such as shema and birchas hamazon after eating, R. Yehuda will say that one can even say them since he holds that hirhur is not like speaking. When it comes to bracha rishona, one is allowed to actually say it since it is like hilchos derech eretz. And for birchas krias shema one is only allowed to be meharher.