Moed Kattan 19a - Eating Matzah All 7 Days

There seems to be a strong proof from Tosafos to the opinion of the Gr"a that although there is no chiyuv to eat matzah every day of the 7 days, there is a mitzvah. Tosafos says that Chol Hamoed is considered an "os" and we do not put on Tefillin even acc. to the opinion that the issur melacha is only derabonon, bec. the mitzvah of matzah and succah make it an "os". Clearly Tosafos holds that there is at least a kiyum mitzvah to eat matzah and sit in the succah all 7 days. By Succos it is clear that it is a kiyum mitzvah bec. we even make a bracha, but the chiddush is that eating matzah on every day of the 7 days is also a kiyum mitzvah. See also B'al Hameor at the end of Pesachim who asks why we don't make a bracha on eating matzah all 7 days. His question is also a strong proof to the Gr"a.

Moed Kattan 17a - Using a Razor for a Moustache

Rabbeinu Chananel (brought in Nimukei Yosef Makos 4b b'dafei harif and Tur Y.D. 181) says that the 2 sides of the moustache are (2 out of 5 of the) areas that one is not allowed to shave with a razor. This is also brought in the Taz (181:3). L'ma'aseh we are choshesh for all the various shitos mentioned in Nimukei Yosef in Makos.

Rashi's peshat in our gemara is clearly against Rabbeinu Chananel. Rashi explains the story of the pair who came from 'chamsan', had they asked about shaving the moustache he would have been matir. Rashi explains that he would have been matir as far as the issur of "b'al Taschis p'as zikanecha". The Chasam Sofer is medayek from Rashi that he must hold like the Mordechai in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, that during aveilus it is only mutar with a shinuy (like tosafos), but he adds that this means specifically a knife rather than scissors (he seems to assume that a knife would not be a normal way to trim) and that is why there is a concern of hashchasa. The gemara says that the heter to cut the moustache is from corner to corner, which would certainly include the area mentioned by Rabbeinu Chananel. We see clearly that acc. to Rashi and other rishonim who would require the use of a knife rather than scissors, the ends of the moustache are not considered pe'os hazakan.

שמא יקדמנו אחר

בפשטות הגמרא קשה להבין, דקודם אמרינן דיש חשש שמא יקדמנו אחר ומהמעשה בגמרא משמע שרבא סבר דל"ש שיועיל בתפילה וכן בהמשך הגמרא מה' אשה לאיש משמע שבמזל תלוי ולא שייך לשנות בתפילה (עיין בעין יעקב). ובפשטות הביאור שהגמרא אומרת שצריך להיות תלוי במזל אך אם תפילה ושינוי מעשים שייך לשנות הזיווג (עיין שיטמ"ק ור"ן ותוס' הרא"ש ומהרש"א) ורק שאין זה עיצה טובה להרבות כ"כ בתפילה על פלונית מסויימת דדילמא היא לא ראויה לא וינשא לה כיוון דפעמים ה' שומע תפילתו אף לדבר שלא טוב בשבילו ולבסוף ישנאה. ואגב ביארו שמה שמבואר פה ברש"י בפשוטו זה וודאי טעות ואינו מפרש"י (ועיין רש"י ברי"ף). וכל זה שייך אף בזיווג ראשון ומתורץ קושית התוספות

אך מתוספות נראה שסובר שבזיווג ראשון ל"ש שישתנה כלל וידוע דהרבה סוברים דזיווג ראשון ושני אין הכוונה אשה הראשונה אלא שתלוי בדרגת הזכויות של האדם ומהאר"י אומרים שזיווג ראשון שייך רק בגלגול ראשון ורובם ככולם בגלגול שני ועוד שבד"כ אין הנשים מתגלגות אלא האנשים

ולגבי רמת ההשתלות המחוייבת בשידוכים היה נראה שאין נפ"מ בכל זה אלא תמים תהיה וצריך השתדלות כמו בכל דבר מצוה וכל א' כפי מדריגתו .

Moed Kattan 17b - Issur to Take Haircut during Regel

My post is a bit long and slightly involved so i am posting it in a comment. The issue is a discussion about the prohibition to shave during the regel when one was an avel before the regel, is it an issur bec. of regel or an issur aveilus bec. of sheloshim?

SEE COMMENT.

אילמלי אתה שאול והוא דוד

משיח בן דוד and משיח בן יוסף have different roots. Yosef was the one who resisted temptation where as Yehuda was the one who admitted his wrong doing. Dovid too sinned to teach תשובה as Rashi points out.

This is perhaps what the Gemara means, besides for the judgment on the actual sin there is a much greater judgment as to whether a person is doing his תפקיד in life. This concept is learned from a medrash that when a person goes to the heavenly court 3 מלאכים greed him 1 to judge his positive actions 1 to judge his negative ones and the 3rd to see "where he is holding". this 3rd מלאך is checking to see if he did his job (see גר"א משלי ו' ל"ג). Shaul's essence was not to sin - at all! so even few sins caused his demise, Dovid on the other hand is suppose to reveal T'shuva and as such "get's a brake

this has a little to do with the last discussion, for there is a story of a Yeshiva boy who was stomped with not knowing a simple Tosfos over lunch. He got so upset about it and left lunch with out bentching and went straight to the bais medrash and went on to become a great masmid and a gadol. The question is will he get punished for not bentching or do we say that since he fealt this surge of energy will get him going to complete his תפקיד he is a sort of an אונס and may bend the rules. i heard 2nd hand that one of the famous American poskim in erets yisroel justified this boy's actions. to me that is strange.

when do we bend the rules??

The age old question.
The 1st ט"ז in hilchos נידוי is a shocking one!
the rema there says that if one is חייב בנידוי we do so even if we suspect that he will be "יצא לתרבות רעה" the Gr"a there seems to agree and sites a Gemara in Kidushin 72b as a source. The Ta"z on the other hand disagrees sharply and brings a proof from the Gemara that we must redeem a jew who has been serving as a כומר לע"ז so surely he argues we should בשב ואל תעשה prevent him from going that way. I am not elobarting on the gemaros because you'lle can look it up.
My point being is that according to the Ta"z where does one draw the line, as some בחור asked me, would the Ta"z say the same by מלקות?.

Moed Kattan 16a - Rechilus

The Chofetz Chaim (10:5) proves from our gemara that rechilus is assur even if one is repeating to a gadol b'yisroel a degrading comment made by a "nobody". The gemara proves that the shliach beis din was allowed to report back to the beis din the degrading comments made by one being summoned about the beis din (Acc. to the girsa of Rosh that it was Rechilus, not loshon hora). This was a special dispensation given to a shliach beis din, which implies that otherwise it would be assur even in the situation of dasan and avirum degrading moshe Rabbeinu. It would seem clear then that R' Shimon who reported back to his father the comment made by bar kafra, was certainly loshon horah. Rashi defends R' Shimon by saying that it was "l'fi tumo".

Does Rashi mean to justify what R' Shimon did, or is Rashi simply stating that R' Shimon slipped by accidentally saying over rechilus?

Kefiyas Hamita

The gemara on 27a states that it is not sufficient for the avel to turn his bed over, but all of the beds in the house need to be turned over. The clear implication of the gemara is that kefiyas hamita is not a din in the avel, but in the beis ha'avel. The rishonim debate whether the beds of guests should be turned over (see Rosh #78). Furthermore, the Rosh holds that one who did not turn his bed over but did not sleep on it either (he slept on the floor) has violated this halacha, further implying that this is a din in the house and not in the avel himself. If he did kefiyas hamita and did not sleep on it , he has fulfilled his obligation. The Rosh continues to discuss why we don't do this anymore (see also Beis Yosef who suggests that we should at least turn over our blankets and pillows). This, of course, is not the only example of a din in the beis ha'avel rather than in the avel himself. There seems to be two dinim in talmud torah - an issur ont he avel to learn and an issur in the beis ha'avel (see שולחן ערוך סימן שמד שאין אומרים שמועה ואגדה בבית האבל וכן נקטינן דלא כרבי חנינא בן גמליאל - ועיין ברש"ש לקמן למה לא אמרינן הלכה כדברי המיקל באבל).
The Chasam Sofer famously suggested that our minhag to cover the mirrors is based in kefiyas hamita because the mirrors are where we find the expression of our tzelem elokim. Along similar lines, Rav Hershel Schachter shlit"a has suggested that photographs should also be covered in the beis ha'avel because they also represent the tzelem elokim. (I heard he did this during his recent shiva - when I visited on Shushan Purim his pictures were exposed)

Moed Kattan 15a - Mourner Wearing Tefillin

The gemara says that an avel does not wear tefillin. We pasken like R' Yehoshua on 21a that he only abstains from Tefillin on the first day. This is paskened in Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 388 and O.C. 38:5. It is not clear from the gemara and Shulchan Aruch if this exemption only applies when the day of burial is the day of death (which is d'oraysa aveilus acc. to behag and rif), or even if the burial is a day or 2 later we still exempt the avel from tefillin on the day of the burial. The Pischei Teshuva in Y.D. brings 2 opinions about this, and the M.B. is machria that we always exempt the avel on the day of burial from wearing tefillin even if it is not the day of death. This is clear from the Rosh. The Behag and the Rif are of the opinion that aveilus is d'oraysa on the first day, when the burial and death occur on the same day. Based on this it could be that the exemption of tefillin would only apply on the first day if it is "d'oraysa" meaning the yom hamisa and yom hakevura. However, the Rosh writes (end of siman 3) that the exemption from tefillin is even for aveilus d'rabonon. The Rabbonon felt that it was inappropriate to wear the crown of Tefillin while in a state of depression, therefore they uprooted the mitzvas aseh of tefillin on the day of the kevurah. It is for this reason that until the burial the avel does not put on tefillin (or do any positive mitzvah) bec. he is an onen, but even after the burial he does not put on tefillin later that day.

Moed Kattan 14a - Exemptions to Take Haircuts

The Mishna gives a list of people who couldn't take haircuts before regel and are therefore allowed to do in on regel. The reason for the issur on others to take haircuts is not bec. it is a melacha [Tosafos is mesupak if a full haircut is a melacha and the gemara may only be addressing a trim], but rather to prevent people from coming into the regel "menuval". So, What is the peshat in the heter for the people listed in the mishna: Was the issur only said as a prevention to coming into moed menuval, so one who could not take a haircut before is not included in the issur; or the issur was made across the board for concern of people coming into yom tov menuval, just that in a situation of o'nes there is a special leniency to allow them to take a haircut?

It seems to me that this is really the shaila of the gemara about one who lost an object. If the heter is just that a case where one could not do it before, is not included in the issur, then certainly one who looses an object would also qualify. But if the heter is an exemption for o'nes then chazal made a blanket issur and were only matir for a case that is clear to all that it is an o'nes, to the exclusion of one who lost an object. V'DOK.

Moed Kattan 12b - Setting Aside Work for Moed

Rashi and Tosafos seem to argue what the case of kivein milachto b'moed ye'avdu is. Rashi says it is talking where he left it for moed and already did it; ye'avdu means it is assur b'hana'ah. Tosafos (and Nimukei Yosef) seem to understand that it is speaking where you pushed it off for chol hamoed but did not yet do it so the mishna says he can't do it relying that it is now davar ha'aveid; yeavdu means you have to let the melacha go to waste and not do it. Obviously Rashi is more machmir then Tosafos by introducing an issur hana'ah.

The gemara's question about penalizing the son. Acc. to rashi, if the father did the work and the outcome is assur b'hana'ah, is it also assur b'hana'ah to the son. Tosafos learns that the father did not do the work and the question is whether the son can do it.

Tosafos would never hold that there is an issur hana'ah for the father or the son. But, we can still ask that even acc. to the conclusion of the gemara that there is no penalty of issur hana'ah for the son (acc. to rashi), if the melacha was not yet done would we allow the son to do it. Rashi may be more lenient than Tosafos acc. the maskanah whether we would let the son do a melacha left by the father, even though he is more machmir regarding the bidieved to create an issur hana'ah on the outcome of the melacha for the father.

Moed Kattan - Issur Melacha on Chol Hamoed

I was having a discussion last night with R' Menachem Spira regarding what types of melacha are assur on chol hamoed. We discussed 2 issues:

1. The Gemara on 10b gives a list of things such as digging, letting water in the field, cutting branches from a palm... and says that if done in a certain way that shows that you need if for yom tov it is mutar, but if not it is assur. R' Spira asked that even if done in a way where your intent is not for the melacha, it should still be assur bec. of psik reisha? At first I thought that the nature of issur melacha on chol hamoed which is tircha rather than melacha would not include psik reisha, but rather all davar she'eino miskavein, even a psik reisha would be mutar. However, Tosafos 4b says in the context of shevi'is that psik reisha would be assur even on shevi'is. But, we learn from tosafos that if it is done with a shinuy, meaning if it is done differently than the melacha is normally done, it is mutar. Therefore, the heter for these cases on chol hamoed is perhaps not davar sh'eino miskavein, but rather shinuy?

2. How do the 39 melachos of shabbos relate to chol hamoed? Do we assume they are all assur unless there is a special heter for tzorech yom tov, davar ha'aveid, ein lo ma yochal e.t.c. or do we assume that they are all mutar unless they involve either tircha and ma'aseh uman? Tosafos 12b seems to be misupak whether tircha that is not a melacha is assur (such as pragmatia which is not a real melacha), or must the tircha be associated with melacha to be assur. The gemara about building the amah 4b implies that chol hamoed it is an issur tircha even if not associated with a melacha (like choresh), it is only to explain why it is assur by shevi'is does the gemara have to make the comparison to choresh. It seems clear that tircha is assur on chol hamoed even if it is not a melacha, bec. it is like uvda d'chol (similarly, the rosh also points out from the fixers of the reish gelusa 12a, that even when the melacha is b'etzem mutar bec. it is not a real melacha, the receiving of payment creates an issur bec. it is uvda d'chol). But, I don't think that there is any place where we see melacha is assur even if not a tircha. We actually find the hagdara of the issur melacha is "tircha" as the gemara distinguishes between chol hamoed and shevi'is on 2b and also implies this on 13a.

Moed Kattan 12b - Adam Chashuv

The gemara uses the concept of adam chashuv a few times to say that even something which is mutar m'ikar hadin, should not be done by an adam chashuv. It is not clear if the reason is b'geder "ba'al nefesh yachmir" or if the reason is that even though it is totally mutar, people will be midameh it to something assur and come to be matir an issur. Rashi in Shabbos 51 explains that an adam chashuv should be more machmir bec. someone will see that he is lenient and come to be more lenient.
The sho'el in Igros Moshe O.C. 1:96 challenged R' Moshe about riding in a car to the Yeshiva after candle lighting bec. it was mar'as ayin. R' Moshe responds by explaining that mar'as ayin is when you do something that is mutar that people will confuse with something that is actually assur, but here the people are making a mistake in thinking that it is assur when it is mutar. That is called "am ha'ratzus" not "mar'as ayin" (That phrase is my own, not R' Moshe's!). Perhaps our gemara is a source that the sho'el is correct, in that an adam chashuv should not do something that is mutar if people will think that it is assur. Perhaps this is why R' Moshe refrained from driving to the Yeshiva from then on (as he writes about himself) and just argues the point that it is not an actual issur of ma'aris ayin. Also, if one reads the Teshuva carefully it seems that he rejects the notion that a few people who see would make a mistake and think that it is assur, would make it assur, since it is known to almost everyone that it is mutar. But in a case where many people may think that it is assur, even though it is mutar, an adam chashuv should refrain from doing it.

Moed Kattan 11b - Chol Hamoed vs. Aveilus

The gemara seems to assume that chol hamoed is an issur melacha d'oraysa as rashi implies (although tosafos chagiga 18a and the rosh at the beginning of the meseches learns the gemara to be lav davka) and aveilus is only d'rabonon (or at least melacha during aveilus is only d'rabonon as tosafos points out 14b). The machlokes in the gemara seems to be that R' Ashi holds that it is more mistaver to be machmir by chol hamoed which is d'oraysa (since we are meikil on chol hamoed certainly we are meikil for aveilus) than aveilus d'rabonon. R Shisha seems to hold that it is more mistaver to be machmir by aveilus which is d'rabonon than chol hamoed which is d'oraysa. This seems a bit strange. Are they arguing in general whether we are concerned to be mechazek drabonon's more than Torah laws?

Moed Kattan 10b - What is a Davar Ha'aveid?

The Rosh writes that although an opportunity to sell merchandise on chol hamoed for a high profit and after yom tov the profit will be minimal, is not considered davar ha'aveid. We see from the yerushalmi that a merchant who has an opportunity to buy merchandise on chol hamoed for a cheap price, and the opportunity will be lost after yom tov, [and certainly the opportunity to sell on chol hamoed for a high price which will be lost after yom tov] is considered davar ha'aveid and it is mutar. The language of the Rosh is "Loosing an opportunity to profit is considered a loss since it is not common". Shulchan Aruch paskens like this Rosh 639:5. The question is, why is this considered "davar ha'aveid"? Isn't davar ha'aveid only a loss of principal that you already have in your hands i.e. produce rotting?

I thought that perhaps we are speaking about the capital that one has invested in their business and is designated for buying and selling. That cash is not considered cash since its whole purpose it to invest in merchandise. The cash is considered a commodity like the merchandise who's value is determined by the amount of goods that it can be traded for. Therefore, just as one can offload merchandise on chol hamoed if it will loose its value by the time yom tov is over, one can also offload their "cash goods" on chol hamoed since it will loose its value in relation to the amount of merchandise that can be purchased with it by the time yom tov is over. Based on this, the heter of the Rosh would only apply to capital invested in the business, but would not necessarily allow for new cash to be invested in the merchandise.

But, someone in my shiur [Stan Sussman] pointed out that the simple understanding is that a lost opportunity to profit is deemed by halacha as a loss bec. the nature of business is to survive and prosper by taking advantage of these opportunities.

Moed Kattan 9b - Torah vs. Mitzvah

The gemara makes a distinction between mitzvos that can be done by others for which one does not stop their learning and mitzvos that cannot be done by anyone else for which one must stop learning. We find a similar distinction made if one is conflicted with a mitzvah vs. kibud av; the shulchan aruch 240:12 says that if the mitzvah can be done by others one should choose kibud av, but if it can't be done by others one should forfeit kibud av and do the mitzvah. Normally when conflicted with 2 mitzvos to do, one should weigh and choose the "greater" mitzvah, but Torah is an exception that even though it is greater you stop learning to do the mitzvah that cannot be done by others (there is not even a p'tur of osek b'mitzvah). The halacha indicates that kibud av is like Talmud Torah in that you don't choose the greater mitzvah, rather you do the mitzvah that cannot be done by others. The question is, if we consider Talmud Torah and Kibud Av to be the greatest mitzvos which is why they override any mitzvah that can be done by others, why do we forfeit them for "smaller" mitzvos that can't be done by others. Why is it that kibud av is different than other mitzvos?

It seems the source is the gemara in megillah at the end of the 1st perek that Gadol Talmud Torah than kibud av. We learn from this that if one has to forfeit Talmud Torah for a mitzvah, then certainly one must forfeit kibud av for a mitzvah, bec. Talmud Torah is greater.

Just as by Torah one is required to stop learning and do the mitzvah, bec. the advantage of learning is only 'al m'nas la'asos', but at the expense of a mitzvah the learning is not considered to be a significant. The same holds true with kibud av, since the concept is bases on the "3 parteners in man" idea, one cannot forfeit their responsibility for avihem shebashamaim to fulfill kibud av.

Moed Kattan 8b - Ein Mearvin

R' Nota Greenblatt was in Palo Alto and we were busy doing gittin all day, so i didn't have time to post.

Quick point: Re: The source for not making wedding on chol hamoed, what is the difference whether it is bec. of ein mearvin simcha b'simcha or bec. of v'samchata b'chagecha and not your wife? It may be true that ein mearvin is more general in that it applies to other situations and also other forms of mitzvah conflicts like bris and pidyon as tosafos points out. The question is doesn't the other opinion also agree in concept to ein mearvin, why would they need a special pasuk to exclude ishticha (your wife)?

Moed Kattan 7b - Pushing off Mitzvos

I once saw a fabulous ma'areh makom on this gemara quoted by R' Schachter (from YU).

The gemara implies that we need a special pasuk to give the kohen a heter not to see negaim on yom tov and during the sheva brachos. The Chazon Ish (Negaim 13:17 - last one in Negaim) discusses whether one is allowed to push off a positive mitzvah that does not have any time limit and do it later. Is the pushing off the mitzvah tantamount to being mevatel the mitzvah? The Chazon Ish explains that the gemara implies we need a special pasuk to give a heter to the kohain to push off seeing the negah (acc. to one opinion we even need a special pasuk for a heter to push it off for a d'var mitzvah), which indicates that without a pasuk the torah recognizes this procrastination (acc. to one opinion even if it is for a mitzvah) to be a violation of the mitzvas aseh. The Chazon Ish then pushes this off by saying maybe Negaim are more chamur or maybe there is just a ma'alah of zrizin to do it immediately and we need a pasuk to teach that in this case one should wait and there is no advantage of zrizin. He brings a proof from moshe Rabbeinu who settled into the hotel before doing milah to his son and was punished bec. it was inappropriate for moshe to do that, but clearly moshe would not have done an issur. It must be that delaying a mitzvah does not constitue a violation of the mitzvah in any way.

Moed Kattan 5b - Minhag to Wash Meisim - Rashi

Rashi writes about the sadeh bochim, that it was a place where the niftar was transfered from one group to another and "they would bathe him there". As far as I know, this is one of the earlier sources for the minhag of the chevra kadisha to wash the meisim. The Rambam also mentions this (Avel 4:1) and it is recorded in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch 352:4. The Kol Bo brought in Beis Yosef explains that the purpose is to wash him so that he doesn't smell so that the people carrying him won't be disgusted by the smell. However, the Darkei Moshe (also in Rama) quote the Binyomin Z'ev who adds that we are meticulous to wash between the hands, feet, ears, and even comb his hair.... "so that he comes b'tahara to his resting place like one is accustomed to doing every shabbos before going to shul".

It seems that the source for washing found in Rashi and the Rambam was for practical purposes of the living, but our minhag is more mystical to prepare the meis for where he is going.