Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Baba Basra 159a - Witnesses in Contracts who become Passul

The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 36:34-35) points out that if a person is signed in a contract and later becomes passul for eidus, there is a distinction between becoming passul as a gazlan or becoming passul as a relative. If Reuven is signed in a contract and later becomes a gazlan, he can no longer confirm his own signature since he is no longer kasher for eidus, but others can confirm his signature. However, the two witnesses who are confirming his signature must know that he signed prior to becoming a gazlan because otherwise we are concerned that the contract was forged and only signed after he was already passul. The source of this is Tosafos in our sugya who explains the requirement of כגון שהוחזק כזת ידו בבית דין to mean that the beis din has to know that he signed the contract before becoming a gazlan (not a henpek, which is a kiyum written beneath the signatures as the Rashbam explains). But, if reuven signs a contract as a witness and later becomes a relative of the person who he signed for (such as becoming a son in law by marrying his daughter), he cannot confirm his own signature as a relative. However, if there are two witnesses who can confirm his signature, they don't have to know that he signed prior to becoming a relative, because we are not concerned that he forged the contract or signed b'issur. The source of this distinction is clear in the gemara which says that for becoming a relative the contract is valid אע"פ שלא הוחזק כתב ידו בבית דין. The gemara explains that since the p'sul of a relative isn't a concern of lying, rather a geziras hakasuv, there is no concern that the contract was forged.
What about if a witness who signed in a contract later becomes no'geiah, meaning that they have monetary gain by the contract. Must the witnesses who are confirming his signature be sure that the contract was signed prior to him becoming a no'geiah? Are we concerned that a no'geiah would forge the contract just as a gazlan would, or is he more similar to a relative where we don't have such a concern? The Pischei Teshuva (46:11) quotes from Teshuvos Na'os Desheh that this is explicit in our gemara. The gemara speaks of a case where Reuven signed in a shtar on something that later falls to him as inheritance so that he becomes a no'geiah. The gemara insists that when witnesses confirm his signature that it be הוחזק כתב ידו בבית דין. Since a no'geiah is also a concern of being me'shaker, we consider him like a gazlan who would forge the contract and therefore require that they know he signed it before becoming a no'geiah.
Based on this approach that a no'geiah is a concern of being me'shaker like a gazlan, the gemara is difficult. How can the gemara prove that the p'sul of a relative is a gezeiras hakasuv - דאי לא תימא הכי משה ואהרן לחותנם משום דלא מהימני הוא - meaning that by moshe and aharon there is certainly no concern of being me'shaker, so it must be a gezeiras hakasuv. Since no'geiah b'eidus is a concern of being me'shaker rather than a gezeiras hakasuv, it should come out that there is no p'sul of no'geiah by people like moshe and aharon since they would certainly not have a chashash me'shaker? If we assume that no'geiah would invalidate moshe and aharon because it is a gezeiras hakasuv to treat them as if they would lie (even though we aren't really concerned that they would lie), we can say the same thing for the p'sul of being a relative and require the eidim who confirm the signature of a relative to know that he signed the contract prior to becoming a relative? B'kitzur, since no'geiah is a concern that he is not telling the truth, this p'sul shouldn't apply to people who we know are honest such as moshe and aharon?

Sunday, January 24, 2010

Baba Basra 157a - Forcing Yesomim to Pay Debts

Tosafos explains that the concept of their being a mitzvah on inheritors to pay their fathers debts, depends on a few variables: a. whether the father left them property from which to collect. b. whether a debt without a contract is collectible from the yesomim. c. whether the yesomim inherited anything from their father.
1. If the father leaves over property on which there is a loan with a contract - the orphans have a mitzvah to pay and we force them in beis din to pay.
2. If the father doesn't leave over property - the orphans have a mitzvah to pay, but we don't force them to pay [Rashash points out that the shulchan aruch (107) paskens like the hagahos ashri that if the father doesn't leave over anything, they don't even have a mitzvah to pay at all].
3. If the father leaves them property on which their is a verbal loan, it depends: One opinion holds that a verbal loan is collected from orphans, so we force them to pay. But according to Rav and Shmuel that a verbal loan isn't collected from orphans, they have a mitzvah to pay but we don't force.
We discussed this issue in Kesubos, see here:
I suggested that the concept of forcing the yesomim to pay is under the rubric of forcing for positive mitzvos. This seems to be supported clearly by Tosafos who quotes this gemara not only for the reason that one must repay their own debt, but to justify why we force yesomim to pay their fathers debt (when it is a contractual debt and he leaves over property). The difficulty is, if we force for mitzvah aseh, why don't we force in all situations where they have a mitzvah to pay, even when he doesn't leave over property on which there is a shi'bud? See what I wrote in kesubos.

Friday, January 22, 2010

Baba Basra 156a - Being Machzik as a Gadol in Retrospect

R. Akiva Eiger (Teshuvos 7) discusses a sofer who had his son who was just about 16 assist him in the writing tefillin. Being that the son was never checked by witnesses to verify that he was physically an adult, R. Akiva Eiger wrote that the assumption of Rava in Nida 46 to assume he is an adult based on age would not work for a d'oraysa issue such as tefillin and Mezuzah.
However, R. Akiva Eiger writes that if they would check him today and find that he indeed has halachically reached physical maturity, all the tefillin that he wrote from when he was 13 would be kasher. The source of this ruling is Tosafos (d.h. bodkin) who writes at the end that if we would check a girl a few weeks or months after her 12th birthday and found simanim, even if beforehand she had accepted kiddushin from Reuven and then from Shimon, we are only concerend about the kiddushin of Reuven, not the kiddushin of Shimon. We don't have to be concerned that she got simanim in between the kiddushin of Reuven and Shimon, because "now she already reached gadlus, so we assume she was a gadola for a long time before". R. Akvia Eiger undertands that to mean that since now we know she is definitely a gadola, we can use the chazaka of Rava to tell us that he probably became a gadola from her 12the birthday. Therefore, this son of the sofer is also assumed to have been a gadol from his 13th birthday.
R. Akiva Eiger questions this pesak based on the Ramban that we mentioned yesterday who says that the story in b'nei berak is only if the boy died immediately after selling property, which implies that if he sold the property and then died 2 weeks later, even if we dig him up and find that he was a gadol when he died, we are concerned that he wasn't a gadol at the time of the sale (r. akiva eiger also points out that the rosh disagrees with the ramban). Clearly the Ramban holds that we don't say since he died as a gadol ,we are machzik him as a gadol from the moment he reached 13? But, R. Akiva Eiger explains that even the Ramban would agree in our case that we are machzik the son of the sofer as a gadol from when he was 13. The Ramban is only machmir in monetary issues, that we aren't entitled to take away money from the inheritors based on that assumption.

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Baba Basra 154a - How does simanim indidcate that he was an adult when he sold?

The gemara quotes a story in which there was a dispute between the inheritors and buyer whether they should dig up the deceased to see if he was an adult, which would verify that he had the right to sell (re: nivul hameis - see previous post). The assumption is that if they would find valid simanim, that would prove that he was an adult at the time that he sold. Why? Wouldn't it only prove that he was an adult at the time that he died, but perhaps at the time he sold he was still a kattan?
The Ketzos HaChoshen (235:5) quotes a machlokes rishonim. The Rosh in a teshuva (33) writes that if we would find that he is a gadol at the time that he died, we would be machzik him as a gadol from the time that he reached the age of gadlus (even the inheritors agree that he became 13 years old prior to the sale). But, the Ramban writes that we are speaking in a case where he died immediately after selling, therefore if he was a gadol at the time he died, he was a gadol at the time he sold.

Baba Basra 154b - Nivul HaMeis

The gemara says that the inheritors are not allowed to dig up the deceased in order to maintain the inheritance in their hands because it is a violation of nivul ha'meis. But, the buyers who claim that they purchased the property can demand that the meis be dug up in order to prove that they have purchased the property from a gadol. The gemara explains that their claim is: אנן זוזי יהבינן ליה, לינוול וליננול. The Rashbam explains that they have a right to claim that they aren't concerned with the embarrassment of the meis, and they are not obligated to be concerned because: שאינו קרובינו, והפסדנו מרובה. The Rashbam seems to hold that the concern for nivul ha'meis only applies either to a relative, or to others when they aren't suffering a loss, but buyers who are not relatives of the deceased and are suffering a loss have the right to demand that he be dug up. Where does the Rashbam get this notion that nivul ha'meis doesn't apply in a situation where there is a loss?
The gemara Sanhedrin 45a discusses whether a person is stoned in their clothing. The gemara concludes that all agree we try to fulfill ואהבת לרעך כמוך, but with clothes he will die slower, without clothes it will be more degrading. The machlokes is whether it is more ואהבת לרעך כמוך to kill him without pain, or to maintain his dignity. Based on this the issur of nivul ha'meis is a din in ואהבת לרעך כמוך. This is also the peshat in baba kama 51a where we raise the height of the place of sekilah to kill him quickly, but not too high so that he doesn't break up into limbs. Both the concern for raising it and the concern not to raise it too high are a requirement of ואהבת לרעך כמוך. Based on this, it seems that just as we have a rule in baba metzia חייך קודמין, meaning that ואהבת לרעך כמוך is only כמוך, but doesn't have to exceed himself, when it comes to the collection of a debt we don't obligate someone to suffer a monetary loss to fulfill the mitzvah of ואהבת לרעך כמוך. Therefore, the buyers are allowed to demand that the deceased be dug up to save themselves from a loss. The Rashbam is meduyak in his language that their demand is והפסדנו מרובה, meaning their loss exceeds the amount of nivul that he would suffer, which is really the hagdara of חייך קודמין. Meaning, if all things are equal or if I have more to lose, then we say חייך קודמין. But if the loss would be minimal and the nivul would be severe, there isn't any heter of חייך קודמין.
However, both the Rashbam and Tosafos seem to understand that relatives are obligated to suffer some level of loss to prevent nivul. Perhaps this is part of the din מבשרך אל תתעלם. Basically, the concept of מבשרך אל תתעלם places a greater demand of ואהבת לרעך כמוך on a relative than on a stranger.
This is all assuming that the hagdara of niuvl hameis isn't כי קללת אלקים תלוי, which would be a בין אדם למקום obligation for which there is not heter to save for a monetary loss (as we find in baba metzia - מי דחינן איסורא מקמי ממונא). Although the bizayon is because of קללת אלקים תלוי, the hagdara of the issur is considered to be bein adam l'chaveiro, for which we allow one to protect himself even at the expense of someone else.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Baba Basra 153a - Shechiv Mei'ra: If he is healed is it an automatic retraction of the gift?

The gemara said many times that one who gives a mat'nas shechiv meira (either gives all their possessions or they mention that they are dying at the time of the gift), if they are "a'mad" and recover from their illness that can retract the gift. Is the retraction automatic, or must they explicitly retract?
Tosafos is bothered about the dispute in the gemara between the receiver of the gift and the inheritors, whether it was a matnas shechiv mei'rah which allows for retraction, or a matnas ba'ri that is fully binding. Even if the inheritors claim is correct that it was a matnas shechiv meira that allows for retraction, and even if he actually recovered from his original illness, who said that he retracted from the gift before dying? Tosafos explains that אם עמד חוזר means that as long as he recovers we assume that he retracted, even though we have no evidence that he actually retracted. In analyzing Tosafos, they aren't saying that recovering is a chazara, rather that when we don't know whether he actually retracted or not, we make an assumption that if he recovered that he retracted. If we would somehow know for sure that even though he recovered, he definitely didn't retract, the matana would be binding.
However, the Rambam (Hil. Zechiya 8:14) seems to hold that when he recovers the matana is automatically void because it was only meant to be given after he died:
שאומדן דעת הוא שלא נתן זה הכל אלא ונתכוון שלא יקנו כלום אלא לאחר מותו
The Rambam holds that the default is that the matana is not binding until he dies. The language of אם עמד חוזר isn't accurate because the default is that until he dies there is no gift at all. The gift only goes into effect when he dies. The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 250:2) writes explicitly that the gift is automatically void - אם עמד ונתרפא לגמרי המתנה בטלה ממילא, by adding the word "me'meila" it implies clearly that he doesn't need to actually retract. This is very different from Tosafos who assumes that the default is that the gift is binding, just that he has the right to retract if he recovers. The GR"A (5) seems to point out that Tosafos doesn't agree with the Shulchan Aruch.
The Nesivos (250:2) raises a chakira whether a shechiv mei'rah who is still sick maintains the right to retract. Although the ketzos assumes that he isn't able to retract, the Nesivos points to the sm"a who indicates that even in his illness he has the right to retract. This should be dependent on the machlokes Rambam and Tosafos. If we assume that the matana is binding but he has a right to retract if he recovers, then until he recovers he doesn't have that right. But, if the gift was only meant to be binding at the time of his death (Rambam), until then he can retract even if he doesn't recover from the illness.
The Rashbam 146b seems to have a third approach. The Rashbam writes:
שנראין הדברים שמחמת מיתה נתן ועל מנת שאם לא ימות לא יתקיים המתנה
This implies that we view it as a gift that is given immediately but their is a condition that it is only effective if he dies. Therefore, the Rashbam will agree with the Rambam that if he recovers he doesn't actually have to retract, it happens automatically because the condition wasn't fulfilled. But, so long as he is still ill, the rashbam would agree with Tosafos that he doesn't have the right to retract.

Sunday, January 17, 2010

Baba Basra 149a - Rava with the Money of Issur Giyura

The gemara says that Rava was trying to get out of returning the money of Issur the ger, so that when he dies, Rava is able to acquire the money from hefker and therefore didn't want to give it to R' Mari (who was the biological, but not halachic son of Issur).
Some of the daf learners found Rava's actions to be not so typical for a person of his stature. I think that Tosafos here and in kiddushin shed some light on this issue.
The gemara in kiddushin says that when one borrows from a goy who later converts, sometimes returning the money to the biological (but not halachic) son of the ger is considered - רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו, meaning that chazal are happy with his actions, and sometimes it is not considered to be רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו. In a situation where the son was conceived prior to the father's conversion, but his birth was after the fathers conversion then it is recommended to return it, but if the birth was also prior to the conversion then the chachamim are completely indifferent as to whether or not it is returned (rashi). Rashi explains that when the birth was after the conversion of the father, he is easily confused with a halachic child of the father, therefore we return the money to him so as not to make people think that even to a halachic child the money doesn't have to be returned.
Tosafos points out that if we return the money to any child who was born after the father's conversion, Rava should have returned the money to Rav Mari, the biological son of Issur (who was born after his father's conversion)? Rabbeinu Tam answers that the idea of returning the money is to show hakaras ha'tov to the goy for lending you the money and he would surely want the money to be paid back to his son. But, in Rava's case, Issur wasn't doing him a favor because it wasn't a loan, rather it was a pikadon on which Rava was doing a favor for Issur so there was no reason to return the money. The difficulty with the distinction of Tosafos is that it shouldn't matter whether or not the child was born after the father's conversion, because even if he was born before the father would want the money to be paid back to his son? Why does the gemara seem to hold that even by a loan where there is an issue of hakaras ha'tov, it is only recommended to pay it back to a child who was born after the father's conversion?
Alternatively, Tosafos in kiddushin offers a completely different approach than Rashi. A child who is born after the father's conversion is easily confused with being a biological son of the father, which can cause confusion in the realm of yibum. Therefore, the chachamim suggest to avoid returning loans to him so that he will not be confused with a regular halachic son. According to this approach, it is very understandable why Rava didn't return the money. He wanted to make it clear that Rav Mari was not a halachic child of Issur. The difficulty with this peshat is that Rava expressed dismay - קא מגמרי טענתא לאינשי ומפסדי לי, which sounds like he wasn't concerned with confusion in Rav Mari's relationship to his biological father, but rather concerned over the loss of money?

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Baba Basra 147b -Being Mochel a Chov After Selling (3 points)

The gemara quotes the famous statement of Shmuel that if reuven sells to shimon a shtar chov that says that levi owes him money, the sale is binding, but reuven has the right to be mochel the debt. There are 2 issues to discuss: 1. Why does Reuven have the right of mechilah even after selling it? 2. Does Reuven owe Shimon any compensation? 3. Does garmi require refund of the $ payed, or does it demand compensation for the value of the shtar?

1. The Ri"f and Tosaof hold that the entire concept of selling a shtar chov is only m'drabonon, but on a d'oraysa level Reuven remains the owner since he has no ability to actually sell the shtar. Why can't the shtar be sold on a torah level? Tosafos 77a (top) writes that since the property is not in the jurisdiction of Reuven, he has no ability to sell it, just as he has no ability to be makdish it. Tosafos seems to understand that there is no concept of selling the "right of collection", because it is not a tangible item. The only thing which can actually be sold is the property which is not yet owned by Reuven, therefore it is not a binding sale m'doraysa. R' Elchonon (B"B 513) points out that the difficulty with this approach is that our gemara says that through a matnas shehciv mei'rah the Reuven can transfer ownership to Shimon. But if the problem is that Reuven doesn't have the property and the "right of collection" isn't transferable, how can he transfer this through a matnas shechiv mei'rah? We must say that a shechiv mei'rah works like yerusha, where shimon steps into reuven's shoes, rather than transfering ownership like r' papa says on 148a.
An alternative approach as to why the seller retains the right of mechila is offered by the Ran in kesubos quoting Rabbeinu Tam but also seems to be the approach of the Rashbam here (although he doesn't use the lomdushe terms of shi'bud haguf and shi'bud nechasim, like the ran does). The only part of the debt that is transferable is the shi'bud or "right of collection" that Reuven has on Levi's property, but the shi'bud ha'guf that reuven has on levi cannot be sold to shimon. Since the shi'bud on the property is dependent on the shi'bud ha'guf which remains in the hands of reuven, he has the ability to be mochel.

2. The Rashbam writes that if Reuven is mochel, he must compensate Shimon by reimbursing the money he spent because of dina d'garmi, as if Reuven burned the shtaros that shimon had which would allow him to collect from levi. R' Elchonon (519) asks, when reuven burns the shtaros of shimon he is damaging him by destroying his evidence against levi, but is not impacting the actual rights of collection so he must compensate only as garmi for the damages of destroying the evidence. But when reuven is mochel he is actually exempting levi from having to pay at all, the damage is much more severe because he is not just taking away the evidence, but being maf'kiah the actual debt? R' Elchonon suggests that according to Rabbeinu Tam where he is being mochel what he actually owns i.e. shi'bud ha'guf, just that it is me'meila causing a loss of shimon's shi'bud nechasim, it makes sense that we consider it only garmi. But according to Tosafos that he is directly taking away from shimon the d'rabonon ownership of the debt, it should be regarded as an actual damage, not just garmi. Based on this, the Rashbam who seems to hold like Rabbeinu Tam, would be li'shitaso by equating this with burning the shtar of shimon.

3. R' Elchonon asks that according to Tosafos that garmi only requires Reuven to reimburse shimon what he payed, if reueven gave the shtar to shimon as a gift he shouldn't have to reimburse him at all. This makes sense if dina d'garmi is only rabbinic (tosafos 22b), but if it is d'oraysa then why shouldn't reuven have to reimburse shimon the true value of the shtar? I am not sure why R' Elchonon assumes that if reuven gave it as a gift, he wouldn't have to compensate shimon. It would seem more logical that he would have to compensate shimon the market value of the shtar which would normally be what shimon would pay for it, not the dollar amount of the contract. The major question is whether the dina d'garmi is mechayev Reuven to refund shimon what he spent because we consider him to have damaged shimon by taking that money from him (in which case he wouldn't have to compensate at all for a gift), or whether he has to compensate him by paying him the market value of what people would pay to buy this shtar from reuven?

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Baba Basra 146b - Planning for Divorce

The Rashbam learns the story of the "totranis" (woman who can't smell) to be a case where she is already fully married, and he is testing to see if he should give her a gett. The gemara concludes that since his intention was to divorce her if he finds her to have this problem, he loses the rights to inherit her. From this the Rashbam paskens that any time a wife dies while they are seriously fighting and he has already decided to divorce her, the husband doesn't inherit her. Tosafos and the Rosh both reject this approach and learn the gemara to speak specifically about a case of an arusa, who as it is he has no rights to inherit her. The Rama (E.H. 90:5) paskens like the Rosh and Tosafos who reject the Rashbam, therefore if she is safeik divorced he doesn't inherit, but if she is still married even though he intends to divorce, he still inherits. The Pischei Teshuva (7) quotes from the chasam sofer that perhaps the Rashbam only applies when it is completely in his control to divorce her, so when he intends to divorce her, it is considered a done deal. But, nowadays where there is a cherem against divorcing her against her will, since she must consent, his desire to divorce her isn't sufficient to make him lose the inheritance.
Although we don't pasken like the Rashbam regarding inheritance, the Maharshal in Gittin (perek 2) writes that for aveilus we always follow the lenient opinion, therefore if a wife would die while they are in the middle of divorce negotiations, even before she receives a gett, the husband would not have to sit shivah for her. The maharshal writes that the chachmei Eretz Yisroel agreed, and the Pischei Teshuva quotes the Yeshuas Yacov where he relied l'ma'aseh on this maharshal. However, R' Shlomo Kluger points out that based on what we quoted from the Chasam Sofer that even the Rashbam only said his din in a case where you can divorce her against her will, it would not apply nowadays even to exempt the husband from sitting shivah.

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Baba Basra 145b - Shevi'is Being Meshamet a post-dated check

The gemara says that shemita nullifies loans, but doesn't nullify shushbinus. Tosafos assumes that shushbinus is really the same as stipulating that the borrower doesn't have to pay back for 10 years, which the gemara in makos 3b quotes 2 versions as to whether shemitah nullifies it. There is a machlokes rishonim which version we pasken like. Tosafos, as well as the Rosh in makos hold that we pasken that shevi'is doesn't nullify such a loan. Why would we pasken like the more lenient approach? Tosafos says that this gemara supports the more lenient approach that there isn't any prohibition against collecting the loan after shevi'is, just as shushbinus can be collected after shevi'is.
The Rosh in Makos says that the rationale for the lenient p'sak is that shemitas kesafim nowadays is only d'rabonon and we have a rule that safeik d'rabonon l'kula, which entitles the lender to collect. The difficulty with the Rosh is, why do we view it from the perspective of the lender where it is a leniency that he may collect, we should look at it from the perspective of the borrower who is muchzak in the money and be lenient with him by exempting him from paying it back?
The Sha'ar HaMishpat in Choshen Mishpat suggests that the Rosh holds like the sefer yerei'im that shemita isn't an automatic annulment of the loan. Rather it is a mitzvah on the lender to say he is me'shamet, and that declaration annuls the loan. Therefore, it is not a monetary issue where in a case of safeik we are lenient on the muchzak by exempting him from paying, rather it is an issur issue where we are lenient on the lender from making the declaration so that the borrower must pay back. However, all rishonim reject the approach of the sefer yerei'im and hold that the loan is annulled automatically. Therefore, the Rosh must be holding that Shemitas kesafim is regarded as an issur v'heter issue, just that it impacts monetarily. We follow the rules of safeik l'kula, meaning that there is no issur on the lender to collect, and as a result allow him to collect the loan by forcing the borrower to pay.
What is the halacha if the borrower gives the lender a post dated check that is dated for after shemitah? Certainly according to the opinions that when the date of payment is for after shevi'is the lender would be able to cash the check after shevi'is passes because it is as if the lender stipulated that the loan is only due after shemitah. Furthermore, R' Moshe (c.m. 2:15) holds that if the borrower would give the lender a post dated check, dated for after shemittah, the lender would have the right to cash it even if a 10 year loan, would be nullified by shemitah. His rationale is that a post dated check is equivalent to paying back right away, even though it isn't regarded as money, since it is illegal for the borrower to bounce the check. Therefore, if the borrower gives the lender a post-dated check for after shemitah, even if he would bounce the check when the lender tries to cash it after shemitah, it would be as if a new loan was created by the bouncing of the check so the lender would be able to collect.

Monday, January 11, 2010

Baba Basra 144a - Talmid Chacham Like R' Safra

The mishna says that whenever one of the brothers does business causing the estate to appreciate, we assume that he is doing it for all the brothers unless he stipulates otherwise, or invests his own money to cause the appreciation (gemara). However, R' Safra invested and kept the profits for himself. The gemara justifies this by saying that R' Safra was a great person who would not leave his learning to do business for others, therefore even though he didn't explicitly state that he was expecting to keep all profits, it should have been understood that this was his intent.
The Rambam (Hil. Nachalos 9:5) paskens:
אחד מן האחין שלקח מעות ועשה בהן סחורה אם היה תלמיד חכם גדול שאינו מניח תורתו שעה אחת הרי השכר שלו, שאין זה מניח תורתו ומתעסק לאחיו
The Rambam holds that this halacha should apply today, so long as the brother is the type of person that the younger brothers should assume would only leave his Torah to profit for himself. However, the Nimukei Yosef writes that this halacha isn't applicable nowadays because we don't have people that are of the stature of R' Safra, therefore talmidei chachamim are no different than everyone else since they aren't that deeply involved in their Torah study. He supports this approach with the meforshim in brachos 16a who say that a chasan nowadays isn't exempt from she'ma since the level of kavana deteriorated, the chasan will not be different than others in terms of his ability to concentrate.
The application of the Nimukei Yosef is difficult to understand because this din is not dependent on the objective level of talmidei chachamim. This din is really dependent on the perception of the other brother. If the other brother perceive the one who invested the money to be one who never leaves his studies, then they should have assumed that the was doing it to profit only for himself despite the fact that he has not reached the level of R' Safra?

Wednesday, January 06, 2010

Baba Basra 139b - Mezonos for Daughters

The gemara mishna says that when a father dies, depending on how much assets he leaves behind, the sons may lose their inheritance to provide for the daughters mezonos. The basic rule is that when there are נכסים מרובין the sons inherit and the daughters are fed until they reach 12 and a half (bogeres), but when there are נכסים מועטין the daughters receive mezonos and the sons get nothing. The gemara quotes 2 opinions to define נכסים מרובין. Rav says that it is when there is enough to provide mezonos to both sons and daughters for 12 months, less than that is considered מועטין. But the Chachamim say that it is when there is enough to provide mezonos to both sons and daughters until they become the age of bogeres, less than that is מועטין. The gemara then asks on the chachamim, do we mean to say that if there is less than enough to provide mezonos until bogeres, the daughters just get everything (even more than their mezonos until they reach bogeres)? To which the gemara responds that they only get what they need for mezonos until bogeres, but the remainder will go to the sons.
The Ma'areh Kohen (r' betzalel hakohen, Rav of vilna) points out that the gemara didn't ask this question on Rav, only on the chachamim. This implies that according to Rav, when there are only מועטין, the daughters will actually get everything. The gemara isn't troubled by this since it is likely that even if they get everything (amount to supply mezonos to sons and daughters for just under 12 months), it is likely that they will still be getting less than the t'nai kesuba of נכסים מרובין which would likely entitle them to a lot more than 12 months of mezonos (depending on their ages). But, according to the chachamim when there is less than enough to provide mezonos to sons and daughters until they reach bogeres, it will come out that the daughters will be getting much more in when there are נכסים מועטין than the t'nai kesuba entitles them to when there are נכסים מרובין. Therefore, the gemara has to say that anything beyond what they need for mezonos will go to the sons.
The question that still remains is according to the chachamim, what is the difference whether their are נכסים מרובין or נכסים מועטין since in both scenarios the daughters will get all the mezonos they need until bogeres, and the sons will get the rest? It seems the only difference will be in the cases that the gemara discusses next, such as the price of food increases. When there are נכסים מרובין we allow the sons to inherit, so if the price of food gets more expensive afterward, the daughters lose out. But when there are נכסים מועטין, the daughters have a claim on everything to ensure that they get the amount of mezonos they need, and only the remainder is inherited by the sons. Therefore, even if food gets more expensive the sons will lose, not the daughters.

Tuesday, January 05, 2010

Baba Basra 138b - Concerned for Beis Din Making Mistakes

The gemara discusses whether or not we are concerned that a beis din will make a mistake. The type of mistake that the gemara is referring to is that a later beis din may make an assumption based on the ruling of a previous beis din. Therefore, we can't allow a beis din to do chalitzah without first checking in to make sure that he is the yaveim and she is the yevama, because a later beis din may marry her off assuming that the earlier beis din had already looked into it, when in actuality the halacha requires the later beis din who marries her off to look into it, not the earlier beis din. Even by that type of mistake, the gemara concludes that a beis din will not assume that eidim who signed a contract looked into the matter, rather the beis din themselves will look into it.
This gemara seems to undermine a halacha in Shulchan Aruch (c.m. 33:4). The Rama writes that 2 witnesses who are related but are technically kasher to testify together, shouldn't sign a contract together because we are afraid that the beis din who reviews the contract will not know the halacha and passul the contract based on their relationship to one another. The Gr"a on that halacha points to our gemara which says clearly that the only kind of mistake a beis din will make is to rely on an assumption that an earlier beis din looked into the people before doing a chalitzah, but we never are concerned that a beis din will make an outright mistake and not know the halacha of "sheini b'sheini" with 2 ba'al k'ishto being kasher?
It seems that the Rama will hold that although we wouldn't make a takana (such as demanding of the beis din doing a chalitzah to check into the yaveim and yevama) out of fear that a beis din will make an outright mistake, we are able to advise 2 witnesses who are distant relatives not to sign together because they are unnecessarily jeopardizing the lenders ability to collect with this contract on the slight chance that a beis din will make such a mistake.

Baba Basra 138a - Zachin She'lo B'fanav

The gemara says that if Reuven tries to give a gift to Shimon directly, and Shimon starts screaming that he doesn't want it, he doesn't acquire it against his will. The Rashbam explains:
לא קנה שאין מזכין לו לאדם בעל כרחו דחוב הוא לו דכתיב שונא מתנות יחיה
The Rashash points out that the Rashbam is difficult to understand. Why does he have to justify and give a rationale to explains Shimon's refusal to accept? Even if we had no understanding as to why Shimon would refuse the gift, his refusal would still prevent him from acquiring since a person cannot acquire against his will? I would suggest that the Rashbam is saying this in order to explain the next case where Reuven gifts it to Shimon through someone else being zocheh in it for Shimon. There too we say that if Shimon is screaming that he doesn't want it, then no one can be zocheh it for him. The Rashbam is bothered why don't we say "זכין לאדם שלא בפניו", and receiving a gift is a zechus. He answers that it is not an absolute zechus, rather just an assumed zechus. Therefore, if Shimon is quiet the assumption is that he want this person to be zocheh for him, but if he protests then he reveals to us that it is chov for him, and we cannot apply the concept of זכין לאדם שלא בפניו. The Rashbam would seem to hold that Shimon can't do a ma'aseh kinyan against his will, but if someone else is doing it for him, even if Shimon is protesting we should apply the concept of זכין לאדם שלא בפניו. That is why the Rashbam is compelled to say that by protesting he is revealing to us that it is not a zechus for him, rather a chov, so the concept doesn't apply. The difficulty with this approach is that if we assume that זכיה works through the mechanism of shlichus, which most rishonim (tosafos kesubos 11a) hold, even if it were an absolute zechus, Shimon should be able to prevent the person being zocheh from serving as his shliach by protesting. Even if we couldn't justify why it may be a chov for Shimon, he should be able to prevent the zocheh from being his shli'ach. Why then does the Rashbam have to say the sevara of שונא מתנות יחיה to explain why it may really be a chov for Shimon?
It is possible that the Rashbam is coming to explain that even in a case where Shimon wouldn't be there at the time that the person is zocheh it for him [although the rashbam writes explicitly that we are speaking about when someone else is zocheh in it for Shimon "בפניו", that is to explain the continuation of the gemara that makes this dependent on the machlokes tanna kama and rashbag], and we would assume that it is a zechus, but when shimon finds out he immediately starts to scream, he would retroactively not be zocheh because he revealed that it is a chov for him. The Ramban (quoted in magid mishna hilchos zechiya perek 4) says exactly this. Even something which is technically a zechus, but the receiver protests when he hears about it, he is not zocheh against his will.
The Machaneh Ephraim (Zechiya U'matana #6) explains that the logic of this Ramban would be that a gift is not an absolute zechus since some people don't want gifts, as the Rashbam writes - שונא מתנות יחיה. Clearly, the Machaneh Ephraim is using this Rashbam to explain why Shimon would even be able to protest after the person is zocheh in the gift for him (so long as it is as soon as Shimon finds out about it).
The Machaneh Ephraim then goes on to explain that this ability to protest only applies to something which has a tzad chov, but something which chazal decide is an absolute zechus, the receiver would have no ability to back out of when he finds out. He deduces this from the Ran in Kiddushin (2nd perek) that something which is a "zechus gamur" would be binding even if the receiver would protest when he finds out [he points out that Tosafos in kesubos 11a seems to contradict this and holds that one can protest even a zechus gamur].

Monday, January 04, 2010

Baba Basra 137b - Is an Esrog Owned by Partners Called "lachem"?

The gemara says that when brothers inherit an esrog from their father, they cannot use it for a mitzvah unless they are not makpid on one another so that it can belong to the one who is taking it for the mitzvah entirely. But, if they would remain partners in the esrog, it would not qualify as "lachem" and they cannot fulfill their mitzvah with it. The Rashbam explains that "lachem" requires that the person using it for the mitzvah have complete and total ownership over it, to the exclusion of an esrog which two people are partners in, that is only partially owned by the person using it. Based on this the Rashbam says that when the community purchases an esrog together and each member of the community is going to use the esrog on the first day of succos for his mitzvah, it is understood to be using the mechanics of a מתנה על מנת להחזיר so that at the time each of them uses it for the mitzvah, it is theirs entirely.
There is an interesting opinion of Rabbeinu Avigdor quoted in the teshuvos HaRosh, cited by the kapos temarim in succah 41a. He understands that the term "lachem" rather than "li'cha" would include even an esrog that their are multiple partners in, provided that the esrog was purchased jointly for the purpose of them fulfilling the mitzvah. The reason our gemara understands that the brothers couldn't use the esrog of tefusas habayis is because it wasn't purchased for the purpose of being used for the mitzvah. The kapos temarim struggles with trying to understand the distinction between an esrog purchased by partners for the mitzvah which can be used vs. an esrog purchased by partners for business which cannot be used. Rabbeinu Avigdor is not assuming that when purchased for the purpose of the mitzvah, there is an automatic מתנה על מנת להחזיר, rather he is holding that even though the person using it doesn't own it entirely, it would qualify as "la'chem".
In truth, this issue whether an esrog that is shared by two owner is considered "la'chem" seems to be a machlokes Rashi and Tosafos in succah 27b. Tosafos holds like the rashbam, but rashi implies that it would be "la'chem". The shulchan aruch (658:7-9) paskens like Tosafos. Although the Rama seems to make the distinction of Rabbeinu Avigdor, that if it was bought together for the purpose of mitzvah it qualifies as "la'chem", it is really just based on the assumption that they will then have in mind to give it to each other as a matana when it is time to be yotzei with it.
The minhag for many generations was to collect money from the entire tzibur to purchase one esrog for everyone. Although the intent of the ka'hal is that everyone should be able to be yotzei with this esrog, the m.b. (38) quotes from the Chayei Adam that anyone who can afford to contribute and refuses to contribute cannot be yotzei with it because the tzibur would not give over their portion to him.

Sunday, January 03, 2010

Baba Basra 136b - Kinyan Guf and Kinyan Peiros

We once again have the machlokes between R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether a kinyan peiros qualifies as a kinyan ha'guf. The gemara has 2 applications of this argument. One is that if a father gifts the guf of property to his son, retaining for himself the fruits for the duration of his lifetime, and the son would sell what he owns, if the father would out live the son then the question becomes whether the father's retention of peiros would entitle him to take the property back from the buyer. The second application is in the context of bikurim, whether one is able to read the parsha when they only have a kinyan peiros.
The Rashbam explains that according to Reish Lakish that kinyan peiros wouldn't entitle someone to read the parsha is because they couldn't say האדמה אשר נתתה לי, but they would be obligated to bring the fruits even m'doraysa because they are included in אשר תביא מארצך. Tosafos rejects the rashbam because if they aren't included in the pasuk of "nasata li", they shouldn't be included in "artzecha" either? Tosafos concludes that the entire obligation to bring the fruits according to this opinion is only rabbinic.
The Ketzos HaChoshen (257:3) answers a major question and with it explains the rashbam. The gemara in Yevamos says that unless we accept R' Yochanan that kinyan peiros is like kinyan haguf, no one would ever be able to read the parsha of bikurim unless they come from a chain of only sons (because if there are multiple sons, we view their inheritance as purchasing from one another so they only own kinyan peiros). How then can we hold like reish lakish? Tosafos in Yevamos raises this question and says that we only hold like reish lakish in the context of the father gifting property to the son because a father will be mochel to the son and leave over a very weak share of kinyan peiros, but in general we follow r' yochanan that a standard kinyan peiros would be like a kinyan haguf.
The ketzos offers another approach. Kinyan peiros can sometimes refer to a weak ownership but sometimes can refer to a standard ownership which expires with time. A kinyan l'zman is a very powerful kinyan peiros because the "owner" can do whatever he wants, even ruin the field, just that his ownership will expire, whereas a true kinyan peiros cannot ruin the field. One who owns a field until yovel is considered to have a "kinyan peiros", but it is a very strong kinyan peiros which would enable him to even read the bikurim because it is like a kinyan haguf until it expires. But, when one only has a kinyan peiros, they cannot read the parsha of bikurim.
The Rosh in a teshuva quotes Rabbeinu Avigdor who says that one who has a lulav for kinyan peiros, namely only to fulfill the mitzvah, cannot fulfill the mitzvah since it doesn't qualify as לכם. But if they have a matana al m'nas l'hachzir it is like a kinyan haguf that expires and they can fulfill their obligation with it. Therefore, one who has a kinyan haguf on a field that will expire such as a purchased field that will return with yovel, qualifies as אשר תביא מארצך because for the time being when he brings the bikurim he "owns" the land [similar to the requirement of לכם, which is fulfilled by a kinyan haguf that will expire]. But, the requirement for reading the parsha is האדמה אשר נתתה לי which means it is his forever, which is not the case, so he cannot read the parsha.
It seems based on the ketzos that the distinction between the two pesukim is that one can consider a land which he is now an owner but his ownership will expire, to be "your land" since it is not his. But, from the perspective of the giver, it is not a "land that Hashem gave me", because it was only given temporarily.

Thursday, December 31, 2009

Baba Basra 133b - Writing Children Out of the Will

The Tana Kama and R' Shimon Ben Gamliel argue whether a father is allowed to take away his inheritance from his sons who would be inheriting him, when his motivation for doing say is that they aren't behaving properly. The conclusion of the gemara is that the tana kama holds that this is forbidden, and the rashbam points out that we pasken like the Rabbonon, against rsb"g.
However, it is unclear from the gemara if this halacha only applies when there are sons who should be inheriting, but not to other inheritors, or would it even apply to taking away the inheritance from whoever is in line to inherit? The question can be broken down into 2 parts. Is there a violation to take away from daughters when there are no sons? Even if there is a violation to take away from all his offspring even daughters, perhaps it would not apply when his father or brother are the inheritors?
The Aruch Hashulchan (282) raises the question. He points out that the gemara seems to imply that it is specifically a din when there are sons who should be inheriting. However, the Rambam uses the term "inheritors" implying that it would apply to all inheritors. He concludes by compromising. One should not remove ALL the inheritance from any inheritor, but as long as he is leaving some behind he is allowed to give some to others as well. However, when he has sons he is not allowed to take away any of the inheritance to give to someone else, but is allowed to give what he wants to tzedaka - דזהו ודאי שראוי לעשיר לעשות כן וכן מנהג העולם. But, the primary bulk of the estate should be given to his children.
The Chasam Sofer (cited in pischei teshuva 282) holds that the gemara which says that inheritance shouldn't be manipulated isn't limited to sons but applies to all relatives. Also, even if he is going to be doing a mitzvah such as tzedaka with the money, it shouldn't be taken away from any relative who would be inheriting. Furthermore, even if he is not going to be giving it all, just some of it to tzedaka, he shouldn't do that.
On the other hand, the Tashbetz holds that the severe violation is only if he takes away from sons and leaves nothing behind, but even for other inheritors and even if he leaves something behind the ruach of chachamim isn't content with him. BUT, if he doesn't have children then he should use the money for a mitzvah even though he will be taking away from the inheritors. The rationale is that when he doesn't leave sons he needs a zechus to be saved from geihenom and he has a right to protect himself before other relatives.
The Tashbetz also suggests that these restrictions may apply only to a person who is giving a gift of a shechiv mei'rah where the gift goes into effect only with his death. But if he gives a regular gift in his lifetime, he can do whatever he chooses. Although the gemara in kesubos seems to hold that the issur would apply even to a regular gift, so long as he leaves his children with a significant portion it is permitted.

Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Baba Basra (yeish nochalin) - Taking Away the Portion of the Bechor

The gemara 130a said that the source of R' Yochanan Ben Broka that you are allowed to increase to one brother and decrease from the others, is from the pasuk of לא יוכל לבכר את בן האהובה על פני בן השנואה הבכור. The pasuk implies that it is only the portion of the b'chor that cannot be manipulated by the father, but the pashut portions can be manipulated (at least to a son among sons, or a daughter among daughters).
The Ramban holds that לא יוכל doesn't mean that you are "unable" to do so, rather it is an azhara, that you are in violation of a prohibition by doing so. He learns this from Unkelos who translates the pasuk to mean לית לך רשו. It is a method that the Torah uses to exaggerate the issur. However, the Ramban admits that aside from the violation of a positive and negative mitzvah for violating, it is not effective [In his additions to sefer hamitzvos he explains that since the Torah prohibits the father from doing this, if he does it he is stipulating against the Torah so his stipulation is void and the bechor receives what he deserves]. He also understands that these prohibitions would be violated if the father would try to cover up which one is in fact the b'chor. That is actually the simple reading of the pasuk - You are not allowed to give bechor writes to another child, כי את הבכור בן השנואה יכיר לתת לו פני שנים, but rather you are obligated to use the rights that the torah granted the father of "yakir" to identify the bechor and ensure that he gets the double portion he deserves [The ketzos hachoshen (281:1) points out that the gemara 127b which struggles with what the Rabbonon use the word "yakir for, implies that it is not an obligation on the father to reveal the b'chor, from the fact that the gemara doesn't say that].
But, the Ramban understands that if the bechor dies, even though the children of the bechor can inherit the double portion from their grandfather, if the grandfather would take away the b'chor portion and distribute it to his other children, it would be binding and there wouldn't be any obligation because the torah states - על פני בן השנואה הבכור, which implies that the issur is only in the presence of the bechor.
Based on the opinion of the Ramban (which the Rambam would seem to disagree with), the Ketzos HaChoshen (281:1) asks how the gemara 130a can deduce from the fact that the portion of the bechor cannot be manipulated, that the other portions can be. Maybe even the regular portions cannot be manipulated, yet the Torah isolates the portion of the bechor to say that by attempting to manipulate it he would be in violation of a l'av, but for the other portions he wouldn't be in violation of a l'av? The Ketzos answers that the extra word of יוכל, by saying לא יוכל לבכר comes to indicate that aside from the prohibition, it isn't binding, implying that for the other portions there wouldn't be a prohibition and it would be binding [The Rabbonon who disagree with R' Yochanan don't hold of this diyuk, therefore the pasuk wouldn't imply anything about the other portions. The Ohr HaChaim points out that this answers Tosafos question on how the Rabbonon would deal with this pasuk]. Therefore, if the father attempts to manipulate the b'chor portion, the rationale for it not being binding isn't just that he is מתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה, rather that the pasuk itself adds a word to indicate that it isn't binding.
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Ian Brody (one of our daf yomi learners) asked, how was yacov able to violate this issur by giving yosef the b'chor privileges (which the gemara says on 129a clearly that is what he did, as the rashbam there explains the pasuk in divrei hayamim). Even if we suggest that Yakov wasn't bound to keep every mitzvah in the torah when he had a reason to do otherwise so that he wasn't considered to be in violation, the question can still be asked why was it binding since aside from the violation the father doesn't have the ability to make it happen?
According to the Ramban in sefer hamitzvos (cited above) that the pasuk is saying an issur, just that if the father violates the issur he is stipulating against the torah, therefore not binding, then the question can be answered. Since the inability to make it effective stems from the issur, yakov who lived prior to matan torah and didn't have the issur, was able to make it effective. But, according to the ketzos where the wording of the pasuk itself is indicative of 2 points, one that it is assur to attempt to take away the portion of the b'chor, and secondly that it isn't binding; even though Yakov lived prior to matan torah, the inability to take away from the b'chor should have existed?
The S'forno asks this question and answers that if this is done because the b'chor is a rasha or did an aveira, it is permitted. Yakov's justification for doing it was that Reuven did an aveira by moving the bed, so he was able to give the b'chor portion to Yosef. The da'as zekainim says something very close to this. The s'forno learns it out from the pasuk which indicates that you can't favor the son of the wife you love just because you love her, but you can do it for a valid reason such as the b'chor is a rasha.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Baba Basra 130a - Following Piskei Halacha

After I finished learning Hilchos Nida, I visited MTJ to meet with the Rosh Yeshiva, R' Dovid Feinstein. Rather than it being a farher, which is what I was hoping for, he allowed me the time to ask him some of the questions that I had in Hilchos Nida. I took the opportunity to focus on those related to the pesakim of his father, Rav Moshe, that were printed in the Igros Moshe (he has some difficult assumptions in his teshuvos regarding bedikos at the time of vestos, and some chiddushim in harchakos). When I asked him one particular question, claiming that the Shulchan Aruch seems to say against what R' Moshe assumes, R' Dovid responded, "if you don't agree with a pesak in the Igros Moshe, then don't pasken like it". Later, I realized that rather than explaining the position of his father on the particular issue that I was asking about, he was actually living and breathing the position and approach of his father in halacha.
The premise of his response emanates from our gemara. Rava said that when a pesak din of his comes before R' Papa and R' Huna brei d'rav Yehoshua and they have a strong question on it, they shouldn't discard it until they bring it to his attention because he may have an answer. But, after his death they should not tear it up because if he was there he may have been able to answer, but should not pasken based on it because אין לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות. Rava was teaching that piskei halacha are good for one who is unfamiliar with the sugya. Without having enough knowledge to deal with the sugya, it is safe to follow the p'sakim of the chayei adam, shulchan aruch ha'rav, and kitzur. But, if one learns through a sugya, and understands it differently, they are obligated to pasken against the seforim that just offer the pesak halacha without justification. Similarly, one is obligated to pasken against seforim that offer the reason, when they have a question on the reason that has been offered.
In the hakdama to the Igros, R' Moshe actually says this straight out:
הנני רק כמלמד ההלכה שהשואל יעיין בעצמו ויבדוק ויבחור, שאיני כלל כפוסק ומורה וכו' ולכן מצאתי גם לנכון להדפיסם מאחר שאיני בזה אלא כמברר ההלכה שכל ת"ח ומורה הוראה יעיין בהדברים ויבחון בעצמו אם להורות כן, וכאשר יראה שאני לא סמכתי כסומא בארובה אף על חבורי רבותינו אלא בדקתי בכל כחי להבין שהם נכונים וכו' וכן אני מבקש לכל מעיין בספרי שיבדוק אחרי דברי ואז יורה למעשה
Furthermore, the braisa warns that one cannot act on a sevara that is said in the context of learning or a ma'aseh that he witnessed, until the ruling is given "halacha l'ma'aseh". Relying on something that was said in the context of learning is not allowed because the teacher may not have explored all sides of the issue since it wasn't relevant at the time. Relying on a situation that occurred where there was a p'sak issued isn't allowed because there may have been factors that made that case special. Therefore, one may only rely on a p'sak that is issued for the purpose of a real situation that arose. For this reason, many of the pesakim found in sifrei likutim that gather various teshuvos from across the spectrum becomes completely useless in the realm of p'sak halacha. These type of seforim can be more dangerous than simple piskei halacha, because they enable the reader to sound like he did research and due diligence by name dropping, when in fact the reader is completely unfamiliar with the issue and unfamiliar with the sources he is quoting. In essence these seforim are a violation of paskening from a "ma'aseh" because the reader is unaware of the other tzirufim and tzedadim that helped form the p'sak, thereby misleading the person he is paskening for.

Saturday, December 26, 2009

Baba Basra 128a - Pesulei Eidus

An Overview of Halachos of p'sulei eidus

Often people are mesader kiddushin and aren't sure who is passul to sign together on a kesubah, or be witnesses under the chupah. These are the halachos from Choshen Mishpat (33) in a nutshell:
A rishon b'rishon includes all immediate relatives in all directions such as a father/mother, son/daughter, brother/sister and even a wife.
A rishon b'sheini is one level removed such as a man to his brother's son (nephew), or man to his uncle.
A sheini b'sheini is one level removed on both sides such as first cousins (parents are brothers so they are rishon b'rishon, their children are sheini b'shein).
A rishon b'shlishi would refer to two levels removed such as a man to his brother's grandson, or to his great uncle (father is rishon, grandfather is sheini, grandfather's brother is shlishi).
Therefore: Father to son is rishon b'rishon. Grandfather to grandson is rishon b'sheini. Great grandfather to great grandson is rishon b'shlishi.
In terms of when we also invalidate a spouse: For a rishon b'rishon we apply בעל כאשתו (husband and wife are the same) even two times so that the husbands of two sisters are considered rishon b'rishon. For rishon b'sheini we definitly apply בעל כאשתו once, but there is a machlokes whether we apply it twice. For a sheini b'sheini we definitely apply ba'al k'ishto, but only once. For a rishon b'shlishi there is a machlokes rishonim (rashbam and tosafos 129a) whether it is passul at all. Even those who say that it is passul (rabbeinu tam and b'hag both hold that it is passul but argue if it is d'oraysa or d'rabonon) would agree that we don't say בעל כאשתו at all. The Rama holds that we only apply בעל כאשתו twice for a rishon b'rishon, we apply it once for a rishon b'sheini and a sheini b'sheini (but two people who are sheini b'sheini even with two בעל כאשתו such as the husbands of two first cousins, shouldn't sign a contract together because we are worried about a beis din mistakingly invalidating the contract), but for a rishon b'shlishi even those who are machmir (Rabbeinu Tam), admit that we don't apply בעל כאשתו at all.
It is important to point out that the concept of בעל כאשתו only applies to make the wife invalid to be testified about by the husband's relative, and make the husband invalid to be testified about by the wife's relatives (machlokes rishonim whether we apply this in both direction m'doraysa or only m'drabonon - see aruch hashulchan 33:1). But, בעל כאשתו does not create a relationship to make the wife's relatives assur to testify for the husbands relatives. The halacha is clear in shulchan aruch that the father of the husband can testify for the father of the wife (we don't even count it as a sheini b'sheini as a result of viewing the husband and wife as a rishon b'rishon, certainly we don't view it as a rishon b'rishon by viewing the husband and wife as one entity).
Now, Mar Bar Rav Ashi says that a grandfather can testify for a grandson and visa versa, but the gemara says we don't pasken like him. Rashbam explains that a grandfather to a grandson is a rishon b'shlishi. The maharsha already points out that this is inaccurate, because a father to a son is a rishon b'rishon, so that a grandfather to grandson is a rishon b'sheini! The maharsha explains that the rashbam is trying to justify the position of mar bar rav ashi. The fact that there is a large generation gap "איתפלג דרא", causes mar bar rav ashi to regard it as a rishon b'shlishi to permit one to testify for the other. Tosafos uses this logic to explain how mar bar rav ashi would justify saying that two first cousins cannot testify for one another (sheini b'sheini), but a grandson can testify for a grandfathter - איתפלג דרא make is permissible.
The Sm"a (33:15) writes that since a husband and wife is considered a rishon b'rishon, according to Rashbam and Rambam that a rishon b'shlishi is permitted, a husband may testify for his wife's grandfather because it is a rishon b'shlishi. The Taz argues with the Sm"a because the grandfather to his son would be rishon b'rishon, to his grandaughter would be rishon b'sheini, so to the husband would be a rishon b'sheini with one בעל כאשתו which would be assur according to everyone. See the nesivos who quotes the machlokes. Why does the sm"a consider this to be a rishon b'shlishi, rather than a rishon b'sheini with a בעל כאשתו? The Gr"a answers based on Tosafos. Although we don't pasken like mar bar rav ashi, we learn from him an important lesson. The larger the generation gap, the more likely we are to be matir based on איתפלג דרא, even if it should technically be assur. Therefore, since a wife is 2 generations removed from her grandfather, we don't consider the husband with the wife's grandfather to be a rishon b'sheini with a בעל כאשתו, rather we consider it a rishon b'shlishi. Just as mar bar rav ashi considers a grandfather and grandson to be a rishon b'shlishi, we reject that, but if we add a בעל כאשתו, then we also consider it a rishon b'shlishi.