Eiruvin 69 - Mechalel Shabbos On A Drabonon

The gemara makes a distinction between one who violates shabbos privately vs. one who violates publicly for the purpose of being able to be mevatel reshus. At first the gemara thinks that shabbos is no different than any other violation where according to R. Meir one who is chashud for one is chashud for all, and according to the Rabbonon one is only chashud for what they are known to violate. However, Rav Ashi concludes that a mumar to violate shabbos publicly is considered a mumar for the entire Torah just as a mumar for avoda zara is. We also see clearly from Rav Yehuda Nesia in our sugya that if one is embarrassed to be mechalel shabbos in the presence of an adam gadol, even though they are mechalel shabbos publicly, they don't have a status of a בפרהסיא מחלל שבת. Rashi explains the sugya on the top of 69a regarding the person who carried into the chatzer on shabbos to be an issue of mumar (unlike tosafos who says that the issue is whether after carrying to the chatzer on that shabbos one can be mevatel reshus). Tosafos d.h. ka'an, points out that according to rashi even a mumar to violate shabbos on a drabonon is considered a mumar. R. Akiva Eiger (Y.D. Shulchan Aruch 2,5) has a long discussion about this issue. Regarding why we consider a mumar to be mechalel shabbos publicly to be a mumar for everything, Rashi explains in Chulin 5a that a mechalel shabbos publicly is kofer in ma'aseh breishis - ה במעשה בראשית"הקב והמחלל שבת כופר במעשיו ומעיד שקר שלא שבת. Based on this we can understand why Rashi would hold that even a d'rabonon violation of shabbos can consider a person a full fledged mumar. It is not the severity that Shabbos has over other issurim that makes it worse, rather it is what Shabbos represents. Therefore, even a d'rabonon violation of Shabbos, when done publicly is essentially making a statement that one is kofer in ma'aseh b'reishis. On the other hand, it would seem that according to Rashi, the concept of shabbos is what makes it different, not the severity. Therefore, one who would me mechalel yom tov or even yom kippur publicly would not assume a status of mumar since their is no association with being kofer in ma'aseh breishis. Had the issue been just one of severity, it would be possible to argue that Yom Kippur and maybe even yom tov are severe enough for this purpose to be like shabbos. But, since the issue is not one of severity, it should only apply to shabbos. There is a teshuva of the Maharam Mi'Rottenberg who says that even yom tov and yom kippur are considered like shabbos for this purpose that one who violates publicly would be considered a mumar for everything. Another point that evolves from Rashi is that Tosafos asks why should a tzidoki and kusi be better than a mumar, they also violate at least the d'rabonons of shabbos even publicly. To which Tosafos answers that although they have a theology of rejecting d'rabonons, practically speaking they keep the d'rabonon so as not to upset the prushim. This implies that the underlying difference between the tzedokim and the prushim was not in their actions, rather in their theology. Therefore, one who doesn't believe in Torah min Hashamayim as the Rambam describes, even if they keep mitzvos meticulously, they would at least be no better than the tzedokim.

Eiruvin 82a - Making an Eiruv Only For a Mitzvah

Rav Yosef makes a statement that is somewhat meduyak in the mishna, that one can only make an eiruv techumin for a d'var mitzvah. Both the Rambam and Rashba (avodas hakodesh) pasken like Rav Yosef that one can only make an eiruv for a d'var hareshus. However, the Rambam (6:6) holds that although one is only allowed to make an eiruv for a d'var mitzvah, if they were to be me'areiv for a d'var ha'rshus it would be binding. The Rashba disagrees and holds that even bidieved, if done for a dvar harshus, it is not binding. The Rashba then qualifies and says that this is only if he were to be me'areiv with bread, but one who is me'areiv b'raglav by being at the edge of the techum when shabbos begins, that can be done even for a d'var ha'rshus. The Gaon Yaacov rejects the approach of the Rashba (and Rabbeinu Yehonasan) who say that one can be me'areiv b'raglav for a d'var ha'rshus even lichatchila. The rationale to be more lenient by being me'areiv b'raglav is because they consider that to be the "ikar eiruv". Therefore, it should follow that according to R. Meir 49b who says that ikar eiruv is with bread, one can be me'areiv with bread even for d'var harshus, which is against our mishnah. Therefore, the Gaon Yaakov concludes that there is not distinction between being me'areiv b'raglav and using bread, it can only be done for a d'var mitzvah.

There is another major machlokes Rishonim. Rashi comments on the statement of only being me'areiv for d'var ha'rshus that it is not merely a din in what one is making the eiruv for. Rather, Rashi writes that one cannot use an eiruv for anything other than a d'var mitzvah. Rashi implies that even if one made an eiruv for a d'var mitzvah, they cannot use the eiruv once it is made for a d'var harshus. The Tur (415) disagrees and writes that once the eiruv is made for a d'var mitzvah, it can be used for a d'var ha'rshus. The machlokes between Rashi and the Tur is whether the din of אין מערבין אלא לדבר מצוה is a din in the making of an eiruv (Tur) or the use of an eiruv (Rashi). The Gaon Yaacov explains that Rashi must hold like the Rashba that if one would make an eiruv for a d'var harshus it wouldn't be binding even bidieved, because if making an eiruv for d'var ha'rshus works bidieved, when it is done for a dvar mitzvah it should certainly be usable for a d'var ha'rshus since it is already bidieved. In other words, if we are going to say like the Rambam that bidieved it works if done l'dvar ha'rshus, we would surely permit one to use the eiruv l'dvar ha'rshus when it was done for a d'var mitzvah.

Tosafos (d.h. kattan) asks that since we only allow an eiruv l'dvar ha'rshus, how can we talk about using the eiruv for a young child, what mitzvah can be possibly do? Tosafos answers: 1. the child is so connected to the mother that she can't go without him, therefore bringing the child with her is part of the d'var mitzvah. 2. since there is a mitzvah of chinuch to train a child to do mitzvos, it qualifies as a d'var mitzvah when the child is being taken to do nichum aveilim or another mitzvah.

Had Tosafos held like the Tur that the din of an eiruv l'dvar mitzvah was only in the making of an eiruv, Tosafos should have no question. Once the mother makes an eiruv l'dvar mitzvah, it is usable even for a d'var ha'rshus, therefore there is no need to associate a mitzvah with the child going. The fact that Tosafos needs to associate a mitzvah with the child, or make the mothers ability to do the mitzvah dependent on the child being able to go, implies that they hold like rashi; even after an eiruv is made l'dvar mitzvah, it cannot be used for a d'var ha'rshus, only for a d'var mitzvah.

The Rama (415) paskens like the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch (in line with the Rama) paskens like the Rambam. Therefore, they hold that if one made an eiruv l'dvar mitzvah, they can travel for a d'var ha'rshus, AND that if one made an eiruv for a d'var ha'rshus, it is binding bidieved. The Sha'ar Hatziyun (11) explains that by the Shulchan Aruch paskening like the Rambam that even when done for a d'var r'shus it works bidieved, he is automatically incorporating the opinion of the Tur that certainly when done for a d'var mitzvah it can be used for a d'var ha'rshus. It would seem based on this that the opinion of the Tur that when done l'dvar mitzvah it can be used for d'var ha'rshus would disagree with the Rambam and hold that if done originally for d'var ha'rshus, it would not work (otherwise the Tur should say a bigger chiddush). Therefore, it should follow that by the Rama citing the Tur, he is rejecting the Rambam and would hold that if one made an eiruv for a d'var ha'rshus it wouldn't even be binding bidieved. However, it is possible that the Tur and Rama really agree with the Rambam, and they are coming to say that one may lichatchila make an eiruv when they know that they will need it both for a d'var mitzvah and a d'var ha'rshus. v'dok!

Eiruvin 81 - Fixing the Bread with a Toothpick

The gemara talks about using a broken loaf for an eiruv. The gemara says that if it is missing the shiur challah which is 1/24 for a ba'al habayis and 1/48 for a baker it is still considered whole. The Gaon Yaakov explains that the gemara is not allowing the loaf to be missing up to 1/24, rather the gemara is saying that if it was taken for the mitzvah of hafroshas challah, then it is allowed to be missing up to 1/24 for a ba'al habayis and up to 1/48 for a baker. Another halacha that the gemara mentions is that one can reattach the missing piece using a toothpick provided that he does a good job and it isn't obvious that it has been broken.

Do these halachos also apply to lechem mishna on shabbos?

The Sha'arei Teshuva 274:1 cites the chacham tzvi 62 who says that if the lechem mishna is missing a piece it is dependent on a machlokes R"I and Rosh. The R"I cited in Tosafos holds that even missing the smallest amount doesn't qualify as a shaleim for eiruv unless the missing piece was taken for the mitzvah of challah, and the chacham tzvi assumes that the same applies to lechem mishna. Whereas the Rosh holds that so long as it is missing less than the shiur challah, even if not taken for the mitzvah of challah, it still qualifies as a shaleim for eiruv (so long as it is missing less than challas nachtom which is 1/48) and the chacham tzvi assumes that the same would apply to lechem mishnah.

According to the approach of the Chacham Tzvi that we can learn halachos of shaleim by lechem mishna from eiruv, it would seem that fixing with a toothpick can also be learned from the halacha of eiruv. However, the Maharatz Chiyus writes that by eiruv the reason why it is repairable is that the problem with using a perusah is that it causes eivah, therefore so long as it isn't recognizable that it has been broken because the toothpick repair makes it look like a shaleim, there won't be any eiva. Based on this approach, lechem mishnah which requires shaleim because of chashivus, not just because of eivah, we can't learn from eiruv that fixing with a toothpick is adequate. In truth, even the chacham tzvi ends his teshuva by pointing out that by eiruv the issue is eivah and says that he is being medayek from the mishna that refers to it as a shaleim. Since it qualifies as a shaleim, it should still be a shaleim for lechem mishna also. However, regarding  din of fixing with a toothpick, we don't see that the mishna refers to that as a shaleim, therefore perhaps even the chacham tzvi would agree with the maharatz chiyus that we can't learn that din from eiruv.

Eiruvin 63a - Giving All One's Tzedaka to One Poor Person

The gemara says that one who gives all his gifts to one kohein will bring famine into the world. The implication clearly is that one must distribute the matnos kehuna among multiple people. The Maharsha asks that throughout shas we find a concept of מכירי כהונה which means a kohein who is accustomed to always receiving the gifts from a particular person, clearly implying that this was an accepted system. The Maharsha suggests that perhaps the prohibition of giving all gifts to one kohein is only for a king like Dovid who presumably had enough to distribute to many kohanim. But for a regular person who generally has enough for only one kohein, he can always give everything to that kohein. However, the Maharsha points out that our gemara certainly doesn't seem to hold that because it makes a rule for everyone and not just for kings.

The Rashash points out that this halacha is not codified in the Rambam and suggests that perhaps it is because the concept of מכירי כהונה that we see throughout shas contradicts this gemara and overrides it. Based on the Rashash it would seem that lma'aseh it is fine to give all one's matnos kehuna to one kohein.

Would we apply this concept to tzedaka as well? Is there an issue with one who wants to give all his tzedaka to one particular poor person?

The Nodeh Beyehuda (kama, y.d. 81) uses this gemara as a source to not give sandakaos to the same person twice because there is a concept to distribute wealth and zechuyos to multiple people. If we would stretch this concept to sandakaos, it should certainly apply to tzedaka. The Nodeh Beyehuda seems to understand that we would pasken like this gemara and therefore we should say the same thing by tzedaka. Whereas, the Rashash seems to hold that we don't pasken like this gemara and therefore one can choose a poor person to whom he gives all his tzedaka.

The Magen Avrohom (Hil. Purim 695:12) writes that the reason that one must give matanos la'evyonim to two people as opposed to mishloach manos which is only to one person is because by aniyim there is a mitzvah to distribute to multiple aniyim rather than giving all the tzedaka to one individual. Presumably, the Magen Avrohom would draw his principal from our gemara, understanding that we do pasken like this, not like the Rashash. To elaborate on this point, the machatzis hashekel cites that Bach who says that if one has 100 gold coins, it's better to give 1 to 100 aniyim, rather than giving 100 to one because by giving to 100 aniyim you give life to 100 souls. The rationale that is offered by the Bach only makes sense if one would be giving a significant amount to each ani and enough to tend to their needs. However, if one has $100 which may be a significant give for 1 ani but not for 100, it would seem that even the bach and magen avrohom may agree that it is better to give it all to one person rather than distribute it to 100 poor people. The Pri Megadim seems to disagree with the magen avrohom and says that it is merely a technical diyuk from the pasuk which says matanos la'evyonim, implying multiple aniyim, but would not be a rule for tzedaka in general.
However, in Hilchos Tzedaka 257:9 the shulchan aruch writes that one should not give all his tzedaka to one poor person and the Be'er HaGola cites our gemara as the source. Clearly, the Shulchan Aruch holds that we do pasken like our gemara and doesn't consider the din of makirei kehuna to contradict it. Perhaps it is because makirei kehuna is assuming that one barely has enough matanos for one kohen, but if the has enough to provide many with a significant amount, he should be distributing his matanos and his tzedaka.

Eiruvin 59a - Levels of Trust

The Mishna says that a shifcha is believed to testify about the border of the techum shabbos since it is only d'rabonon. Tosafos d.h. afilu, explains based on a gemara in kesubos 28a that a child is believed only after he becomes a gadol to testify about what he witnessed as a child regarding the edge of the techum (Tosafos has two opinions whether he is believed alone or only with another adult). It is clear from Tosafos that although a woman is believed, and even a shifcha, a child is not.

Tosafos d.h. u'techumin, asks why the mishna allows us to believe a woman only because the entire prohibition is d'rabonon, implying that on a d'oraysa a woman isn't believed. Why is this any different that trusting a woman for shechita, nikur and teruma? Tosafos answers that on a d'oraysa a woman is only believed when it is בידה, meaning she is in control of doing a proper shechita, but she is not believed to testify about facts that are out of her control (such as techum, had it been d'oraysa). The rationale seems to be that a woman is not believed to testify about facts because we are concerned that she may not have been meticulous to notice all the details, but when she actually does something and has control of a situation, she is believed to say it was done properly. However, Tosafos points out that the gemara in Pesachim 4b implies that women are only trusted to do bedikas chometz because it is d'rabonon, implying that even though it is בידה she would not be believed if it were d'oraysa (such as a case where there will be bedika without bitul). Tosafos explains that an act like searching for chometz which demands extra diligence and attention, and is a great tircha, a woman is not believed because she will be moreh heter to make assumptions (such as if there is no chometz in one place, there is probably no chometz in another without properly checking). Yet, since it is only d'rabonon, she is believed. In short, on a d'oraysa a woman is believed if its בידה, not if it is out of her control. Even if it is בידה she is only believed if it doesn't demand meticulous attention and isn't a great tircha. However, on a drabonon, if it is בידו even a child is believed (such as bedikas chometz, even though it requires attention), but if it's not בידו such as techum, a woman is believed but not a child.

Eiruvin 49a - Is an Eiruv a Kinyan or Dirah?

First we must qualify the machlokes. The gemara just finished establishing that the one who houses the eiruv doesn't need to contribute to it because כולהו הכא דיירי, clearly implying that eiruv works משום דירה, as if everyone lived in the house that houses the eiruv. Yet, one line later the gemara develops a machlokes whether eiruv is משום קנין or משום דירה. Furthermore, the gemara 48b says אם אמרו דיורין להקל יאמרו דיורין להחמיר, implying once again that to be meikel we consider eiruv to be "dirah", not a kinyan.

The Gaon Yaacov approaches the sugya (according to Rashi) that all agree in concept that the result of the eiruv is to consider everyone living in the place that houses the eiruv. The machlokes in the gemara is the method to achieve that result, kinyan or dirah. Shmuel holds that a kinyan must be done so that the place which is housing the eiruv is מקנה his reshus to the others in the chatzer to consider it as if they are all living together in this house, whereas Rabba holds that without the method of kinyan, by simply placing their bread in this house it is considered to be as if they are all living in this house. Therefore, all agree that whatever method is used, the result is כולהו הכא דיירי, it is as if all are living in this house.

The Gaon Yaacov points out (in his cryptic style) a fascinating and fundamental difference between Rashi and Tosafos. A careful reading of Tosafos d.h. Eiruv, implies that the "kinyan" we are speaking about does NOT mean that the owner of the house sells rights by the receiving of the bread from the others in the chatzer (rashi). Rather, they are all makneh their reshuyos to each other to create a partnership in all the houses of the chatzer. According to this approach, there is a big conceptual difference as to how eiruv works whether it is kinyan or dirah. Shmuel who holds that it is kinyan is saying that they must have joint ownership in the entire chatzer, whereas Rabba who holds that it is dirah would still consider it as if all the people of the chatzer were living in one house.

The gemara makes it clear that even if the eiruv works as a kinyan, and money should be the ideal thing to use for a kinyan, the Rabbonon didn't want to allow it to be used even bidieved because they were afraid that people would think that money is the primary, forget that bread can be used, and since money isn't always readily available the concept of eiruv would be forgotten. Yet, in the very next line the gemara says that according to Shmuel who holds that an eiruv is משום קנין, a vessel can be used to create the kinyan. Apparently the gemara holds that although money cannot be used since it isn't as common, a vessel can be used since everyone has some kind of kli which can be used for a kinyan.

Tosafos asks that according to Shmuel that Eiruv works as a kinyan, why when using bread do we insist on enough food for two seudos; as long as there is a שוה פרוטה worth in the bread, it should be sufficient? Tosafos supports this question by saying that even a kli is usable for an eiruv according to this opinion, even though it is not eatable. Therefore, bread worth a peruta but less than 2 meals worth should also be usable? It seems to me that in this question Tosafos is arguing with Rashi. Rashi assumed that the use of a kli was serving as a kinyan sudar, not as a kinyan kesef. Rashi seems to understand that when we disallow the use of money for eiruv, we are essentially saying that we don't allow anything to be used בתורת דמים, except for bread. Therefore, when the gemara permits a kli, it must be permitting the use of a kli as a kinyan sudar, not בתורת דמים. According to this approach, it wouldn't make sense to prove that bread that is worth a peruta should work even when it doesn't contain 2 seudos from the fact that a kli an work. When a kli is working it is not at all working בתורת דמים, rather בתורת קנין סודר, and food cannot work as a sudar. Therefore, Tosafos seems to understand that when we permit the use of a kli, we are permitting a kli to be used even בתורת דמים, therefore food should also work b'toras damim even when it doesn't contain 2 seudos worth.

Tosafos answer to this question is difficult to understand. Tosafos writes that when you specify that the eiruv is being done as a kinyan, you don't need two seudos worth, only שוה פרוטה. But when it is done סתם without any specification it requires חשיבות אוכל which essentially means that it must contain two seudos worth. Does Tosafos mean to say that even Shmuel who holds that eiruv can work as a kinyan would hold that it can also work as a dirah? That doesn't seem to be the case because the gemara insists that according to Shmuel the bread be worth a peruta, and less wouldn't work even if it is not being done explicitly b'toras kinyan. So what does Tosafos mean to say?

Eiruvin 45a - Hatzola Returning Home

There is a well known machlokes between Rav Moshe and Rav Shlomo Zalman which they both have elaborate teshuvos on, regarding paramedics and EMT's who went on an emergency call whether they can drive back home on Shabbos. Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe, O.C. 4:80) permits them to return home based on Tosafos understanding of the end of the Mishna 44b. The Mishna says - כל היוצאים להציל חוזרין למקומן. Based on the context of the Mishna we are speaking about those who left home with the "permission" of the Rabbonon so that they can tend to a pikuach nefesh type situation, and returning home would violate techum and also violate carrying their weapons. The gemara permits them to even carry their weapons home. Tosafos explains that the nature of this heter is התירו סופן משום תחילתן. We need to permit them to return home, otherwise they are not going to go at all. Tosafos says that only reason that this isn't listed among the other התירו סופן משום תחילתן in Beitzah 11b is because in each of those cases there is some other justification to permit it and it's not clearly permitted due to התירו סופן משום תחילתן, whereas over here it is obviously only permitted for that purpose and isn't considered much of a chiddush. Based on this approach, Rav Moshe understands that although all the cases in Beitza of התירו סופן משום תחילתן, only violate a Rabbinic prohibition, we learn from our sugya that we apply the concept even to permit the violation of a Torah prohibition since by not doing so there is a risk that one will not go to save lives.

Rav Shlomo Zalman (Minchas Shlomo 8) after asking permission from Rav Moshe to publish his disagreement (which is a great tzidkus on his part) has an elaborate teshuva where he shows from the gemara that Rav Moshe is taking the Tosafos too literally. The gemara explains that the last line in the mishna - כל היוצאים להציל חוזרין למקומן is actually not permitting one to travel further than the 2000 amos (at least in a case where the Jews have the upper hand). The Mishna is only permitting one to bring their weapons with them wherever they go, because by leaving their weapons behind, they wouldn't be prepared to ward off a counter attack. The gemara implies that there is no heter סופן משום תחילתן, rather the heter is for the סופן itself which is a case of pikuach nefesh. Rashi writes explicitly that when the gemara answers שחוזרין בכלי זיין למקומן, it means to say that they are stuck in the 2000 Amah radius of where they end up, just that they are entitled to take their weapons with them and don't need to leave it there. Therefore, there is no source from which to draw that we can apply the concept of התירו סופן משום תחילתן to even permit an issur d'oraysa.

Eiruvin 42b - Intentionally Leaving Techum and Ending Up in Enclosed Area

The Mishna 41b speaks about one who was chased by goyim out of his techum and ends up in an enclosed area, Rabban Gamliel and R. Elazar Ben Azarya consider the entire enclosure to be like 4 amos and permit him to walk anywhere within. Although R. Yehoshua and R. Akiva disagree and limit him to 4 amos, the gemara 42b paskens in accordance with Rabban Gamliel. In truth, that itself is a dispute between Rav and Shmuel whether we pasken like Rabban Gamliel only in regard to a boat that sets sail on Shabbos since the person began Shabbos in those mechitzos, but not when he was placed in an enclosed area on Shabbos, Tosafos 43a writes that we follow the opinion of Rav who rules like Rabban Gamliel even by דיר וסוהר. Based on this, Tosafos rejects the opinion of the Rashbam who writes that if one entered a boat on Shabbos that then set sail he would be bound to his 4 amos. That would be true if we differentiate between the case of the boat and דיר וסוהר (and only permit it by a boat when he began shabbos in that enclosure), but being that even by דיר וסוהר we pasken like Rabban Gamliel that one can walk throughout the entire enclosure, the same would be true for one who enters a boat on shabbos (Rabbeinu Chananel paskens like Shmuel, but the Rif also paskens like Rav).

It is not clear what the halacha is if one were to intentionally leave their techum and find himself in an enclosure, are we stricter in that case to limit him to his 4 amos? The Shulchan Aruch (405:6) writes that we are only lenient to consider the enclosure to be 4 amos if he were transported there by goyim, or some other level of accident, but not if he went there on his own. - אבל אם יצא חוץ לתחומו לדעת, אע"פ שהוא בתוך אחד מאלו אין לו אלא ד' אמות. Apparently, when one intentionally violates the issur of techum, we impose a penalty on him and don't allow him to consider an enclosed area to be like within his 4 amos. The Biur Halacha writes that this is the opinion of the Rambam and many other Rishonim. However, Tosafos 29a (last answer) and the Rashba and Ritva all hold that even if one leaves his techum intentionally and ends up in an enclosed area, he can consider the entire enclosure to be within his 4 amos.

It seems to me that there is a contradiction between Rashi on 42a and 42b regarding this point. Rashi in both places is trying to justify the statement of Rav Nachman 42a that if one begins shabbos in an empty field and on Shabbos there is a wall built around him, he is still bound to his original 2000 Amah techum and cannot walk throughout the enclosure. Why is this different than the case of Rabban Gamliel where one is airlifted and dropped in a דיר וסוהר where we allow him to walk throughout the enclosure? Rashi 42a answers that in the דיר וסוהר case where otherwise we would only allow him to have 4 amos, we are lenient on him to consider the entire enclosure like 4 amos. But in the case where one begins shabbos in an empty field, he is not stuck, he has a techum of 2000 amos, so we have no reason to be especially lenient and give the area a status of 4 amos. Rashi makes no mention of the nature of how he ended up in that situation, implying that it doesn't matter. However, Rashi 42b d.h. lo gazrinan, answer the question differently, by saying that when goyim transport him against his will or some other type of o'nes, we are easy on him to consider the entire area like 4 amos, but if nothing is done against his will, we don't. According to Rashi on 42a we should apply the leniency even if he willfully leaves his techum, but according to Rashi on 42b we only are lenient to consider the entire enclosure to be 4 amos if he ends up there due to some sort of o'nes.

As an aside, we also learn from Rashi 42b that the restriction of not considering the enclosure to be like his 4 amos, is not a penalty for violating techum, rather it is a leniency that we only provide in a situation of o'nes. Therefore, if he wasn't o'nes, even though he wasn't מזיד, we also don't allow him to walk within the entire enclosure.

Eiruvin 40b - Drinking the Cup After Making HaGafen

The gemara is trying to figure out how one can make shehechiyanu on a cup of wine on Yom Kippur. The gemara suggests making shehechiyanu immediately before the start of Y.K., to which the gemara says that the bracha is an acceptance of the day and one could not drink after making the bracha. The gemara suggests the option of making shehechiyanu and leaving the cup without drinking, to which it responds - המברך צריך שיטעום. The gemara finally suggest giving to a child, to which it says that it will train him to drink on Y.K. and he may continue to do so as an adult. Rashi points out that the implication of the gemara is that giving the wine to a child would not violate the המברך צריך שיטעום, from the fact that the gemara needs to find another problem with the suggestion to give it to a child, rather than repeat the point of המברך צריך שיטעום. Rashi writes that the halacha of drinking from the cup is simply that someone must drink, but it doesn't need to be the one who made the bracha. The purpose of drinking from the cup is that if one would make borei pri hagafen without drinking, it would be degrading to the כוס של ברכה. The Rashash points out that Rashi seems strange because he seems to confuse the cause and effect. The reason that one must make a borei pri hagafen is because המברך צריך שיטעום, therefore he must make a bracha to drink. Rashi presents it as if the reason one must drink is because making a בורא פרי הגפן without drinking would be degrading to the cup. Another way to express the issue is that rather than focusing on degrading the cup which at worst would be a d'rabonon problem, Rashi should focus on the borei pri hagafen being l'vatala which is certainly more severe and according to the Rambam even a d'oraysa problem?

There are achronim who deduce from Rashi that even if there was not a halacha demanding that one drink from the cup, they would still make a בורא פרי הגפן. The rationale is that the bracha of borei pri hagafen in the context of a kos shel bracha, doesn't merely serve the function of a ברכת הנהנין. Rather it becomes part and parcel of the brichas hamitzvah. Just as on shabbos morning when the kiddush consists of nothing but a borei pri hagafen, one can be motzi others even if the me'vareich already made hagafen because it is a birchas hamitzvah. The same would be true for the bore pri hagafen made in the context of any kos shel bracha. Therefore, the bore pri hagafen is essential to the kos shel bracha, not just a prerequisite to enable one to drink from the wine. Rashi just comments that once hagafen is made on the cup, it is a bizayon to leave the cup without someone drinking from it.

Eiruvin 38-39 - One Kedusha Or Two

The Mishna 38a cited a machlokes between R. Eliezer and the Rabbonon regarding Yom Tov and Shabbos that are back to back, whether they are regarded as one kedusha (one long 48hr day), or two. In that context there is no safeik, both days are kodesh. The machlokes is only whether the two kedushas remain independent or whether they merge together to be one. It is also not clear whether they are arguing on a d'oraysa level, or a d'rabonon level. It is possible that m'doraysa everyone views it as two separate days, but the Rabbonon consider the kedusha to be merged into one for the purpose of eiruv. The Rabbonon hold that we consider it a safeik and one would need to be machmir that it is one kedusha for the purpose of not making an eiruv in an opposite direction each day, and be machmir that it is two kedushos to require that the eriuv be in tact during the bein hashmashos of y.t. ending going into shabbos to permit travel on shabbos.

The Mishna on 39a has a discussion regarding Rosh Hashana whether we view it as one kedusha or two. The term two kedushos in that context means something different than it does by y.t. and shabbos that are back to back. There are no 2 kedushos regarding R.H., it is a one day yom tov. The concept of 2 kedushos essentially means to view the two days as a safeik where one day is Y.T. and the other is not, whereas the concept of one kedusha means to view it as one long day of kedusha m'drabonon. The rationale to view it as one long kedusha is explained by the gemara in Beitza and R.H. (and rashi here). Due to the mess up of the shir of the afternoon korban tamid, chazal instituted that they would not accept eidim after mincha time. Therefore, those who weren't close enough to know what was going on the the Beis din would have only 2 possibilities, 1. Eidim came the first day early enough to make it R.H. so that the first day was Y.T. and not the second. 2. Eidim didn't show up by the allotted time thereby forcing chazal to make R.H. on the second day, yet maintaining the remainder of the first day with the status of Yom Tov regarding melacha. Being that the second possibility is essentially a Rabbinic institution to stretch the kedusha of the second day back into the first, it is viewed as one kedusha.

We pasken like R. Yossi who is the לא הודו לו חכמים of the mishna that hold it is one kedusha. This is evident from the Shulchan Aruch (600, 1) who paskens that by Rosh Hashana if an egg is laid on day one it cannot be used on day two, similarly if a deer is trapped on day one it cannot be shechted on day two. That is because we consider the kedusha to be one kedusha and not a safeik. However, it is not clear whether only we pasken like R. Yossi to be machmir for one kedusha and not allow eiruvei techumin in separate directions for the two days, or whether we are even meikel for one kedusha thereby permitting one to travel the second day of R.H. even if the eiruv were eaten prior to the bein hashmashos going into that day. It would seem more logical that we are only machmir for one kedusha, but even R. Yossi should conclusively consider it one kedusha since in the time of the mikdash there was also the possibility that eidim would have come on time thereby making the first day yom tov. However, the Rashba (avodas hakodesh, eiruv techumin 18) states explicitly that if the eiruv is eaten before the bein hashmashos of the end of day way and start of day two, one can still rely on it on day two. The Rambam (Hil. Eiruvin 8, 8) also seems to hold that by R.H. the eiruv only needs to be there the first bein hashmashos, not the second.

If it is indeed true that the Rambam and Rashba hold that the two days are considered one kedusha even to be lenient, it should not only impact eiruv techumin but even impact the ability to cook and do other melacha on one day of R.H. for the next. Yet, in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 103, 1) the mechaber paskens that it is forbidden to cook from one day of Y.T. for the next, even by two days of Rosh Hashana. Why? The Gaon Yaacov in explaining the opinion of the Rambam and Rashba writes that their opinion only makes a difference in the context of eiruv. The only two possibilities are either that it is one kedusha, or that the first day is Y.T. and not the second. There is no possibility after the takana not to accept eidim that the second day has a kedusha that is separate from the first. Therefore, it is sufficient to leave an eiruv by the bein hashmashos of the first day, even if it isn't there by the bein hashmashos of the second day, one can travel since there is no possibility that the second day has kedusha and not the first. But, in the context of cooking and baking from one day to the next, regardless there remains the possibility that the first day is Yom Tov and one is essentially cooking on Y.T. for the next day. Nowadays when we have a fixed calendar and the first day is definitely Y.T. from which we count Yom Kippur, it is certainly forbidden to cook on the first day for the second. The Biur Halacha (103, d.h. v'afilu) cites the Magen Avrohom who says exactly that - the issur to cook on day one for day two goes even according to the Rambam. However, the Gr"a seems to say that this issue is dependent on the machlokes between the Rambam and other Rishonim. The Biur Halacha doesn't understand the approach of the Gr"a based on a similar logic to the Gaon Yacov - the first day is definitely Y.T. on a Torah level, so how can one possibly cook on Y.T. for after Y.T.? Perhaps the Gr"a holds that since הואיל can be used to permit cooking from yom tov for a weekday, as the gemara in pesachim 46a uses it, on a d'rabonon level we can rely on the kedusha achas concept to allow cooking from one day to the next. Based on this approach, even the Rambam will only permit cooking relying on הואיל and therefore insist that the food be ready to be eaten before nightfall, and not just rely on the kedusha achas to permit an issur d'oraysa.

Regarding the bracha of shehechiyanu, the Shulchan Aruch (600, 2) holds that even in the absence of a fruit on which to make shehechiyanu, one would make shehechiyanu on the second day of Rosh Hashana. The difficulty with this is that since we pasken that it is a kedusha achas, at least to be machmir as we find by the beitzah and by the trapping, we shouldn't be making shehechiyanu either? The M.B. deals with this by simply saying that although it is considered one kedusha, it is still two separate days and therefore fit for a new shehechiyanu. I would like to suggest another approach as to why we make shehechiyanu even if it is technically kedusha achas. On the side of kedusha achas, the primary day of Yom Tov will still be the second, not the first. Meaning, the second day will be the Y.T. on a Torah level from which we count Yom Kippur, and the first day is only a Rabbinic implemented kedusha כי היכי דלא לזלזולי ביה. Therefore, it makes sense that chazal tell us to make shehechiyanu on the first out of safeik that maybe that day is Y.T. and on the second because that may be the primary day of Y.T.

Eiruvin 32b - Sinning To Save Someone Else

The Gemara interprets the machlokes between Rebbi and his father R. Shimon Ben Gamliel to be whether one should violate a lower level sin, to prevent someone else from the violation of a more severe sin. The exact circumstance that the gemara talks about is whether a talmid chochom should violate the prohibition of separating Teruma and Ma'aser שלא מן המוקף (Rashi Gittin 30b implies it's only d'rabonon. Tosafos holds that for Teruma it is d'oraysa, but it is considered a lower level violation presumably because it doesn't prevent the Teruma from going into effect), or whether he should not separate which would cause the am ha'aretz to end up eating tevel. R. Shimon Ben Gamliel holds that a person must worry about himself, and not sin to protect others from a more severe violation. Rebbi holds that one should violate the less severe prohibition to prevent the am ha'aretz from eating tevel which is more severe. The Rambam (Ma'asros 10:10) paskens like Rebbi.

Tosafos raises an interesting question. The gemara says in Shabbos 4a that one should not commit a "minor" sin in order to prevent someone else from violation a "major" sin. The example given is that one should not remove bread from the wall of an oven violating the Rabbinic prohibition against רדיית הפת, to prevent the person who put the bread in the oven from violating the melacha of baking on shabbos. How then does Rebbi permit the violation of שלא מן המוקף to prevent the am ha'aretz from eating tevel? Tosafos answers that in Rebbi's case, the talmid chochom who permitted the am ha'aretz to take from his fruits was somewhat negligent in causing the am ha'aretz to violate this prohibition. When one is the cause of someone else's violation, they are better off violating a minor violation to prevent someone else from violating a more major violation. Tosafos continues to prove that in a case where the person who would be violating the more major violation was a complete o'nes and not negligent at all, then one should violate a minor prohibition to prevent that person from violating a more serious violation.

In short, the concept of not allowing one to sin to save someone else, only applies when the person who would be violating the more minor violation is in no way responsible for causing the other to violate the major violation AND the one violating the major violation is someone negligent as well. However, if either the one who would be violating the minor violation caused the other to violate the more serious violation (even though he himself was also negligent), OR the one violating the more major violation did nothing wrong and is a complete o'nes, in both those cases we say חטא בשביל שיזכה חבירך - sin to save your friend.

The Maharatz Chiyus asks a question from the opinion of the Aguda who is brought in the Taz Y.D. 334 who proves from a gemara in kiddushin 72a that Beis Din is required to put someone in cheirem even if it will cause him to go off the derech and completely reject Judaism. Why don't we say that beis din should ignore, violating a more minor prohibition, to save that person from complete rejection of Judaism which is obviously a more serious violation? It seems to me that the answer is simple. When it comes to a situation where one should be put in cheirem, ignoring it is not considered a minor violation. The Beis Din has the responsibility to prevent this individual from influencing others. By ignoring his actions they may be causing more harm to others who will learn from his actions than they would be causing to him by putting him in cheirem. Therefore, this case doesn't qualify as doing something minor to prevent someone else from violating something major.

Eiruvin 32a - Does Eiruv Techumim Follow Rules As If It Were D'oraysa

The gemara 31b says a cheiresh, shoteh, and child cannot be used to establish an eiruv techumin. Rashi explains that to establish an eiruv techumin one has to be able to make an acquisition since the concept of eiruv techumin is to be ko'neh shevisa. Therefore, all those who cannot create kinyanim cannot be ko'neh shevisa. Tosafos disagrees and holds that eiruv techumin is like eiruv chatzeiros in the sense that no acquisition needs to be made. By simply having the food placed at that location with the intent of the owner to serve as an eiruv, it automatically goes into effect. The problem with the cheiresh, shoteh v'katan is simply that they don't have a sufficient level of trust to believe that it was done. The reason why we demand a higher level of trust for eiruv techumin than for eiruv chatzeiros is that eiruv techumin is based on an esmachta, raising its status to be similar to a d'oraysa.

The gemara on 32a has  discussion whether one can trust that a shliach fulfilled his commitment without him returning to verify that it was done. All agree that Eiruv Techumin which although an esmachta is only d'rabonon, therefore we can rely that the agent fulfilled his commitment, but on something which is d'oraysa (meaning that if it were not done, it would be a d'oraysa violation) we have a machlokes Rav Nachman and Rav Sheisheis whether or not we can trust that it was done. In the context of the gemara the gemara tries to prove from a case of separating ma'aser on figs which is only d'rabonon (not from the dagan, tirosh, v'yitzhar), implying that it is considered d'oraysa. Tosafos asks this question and explains that although it is not d'oraysa, it is treated like a d'oraysa in that we don't trust that the shliach fulfilled his commitment since it is "עיקרו דאורייתא" and sourced in the Torah.

Techumin is considered like a d'oraysa in the context of not trusting a child, but is considered a d'rabonon in the context of being able to rely on a shliach, yet, ma'aser on fruits which is only d'rabonon is considered a d'oraysa even for the purpose of trusting a shliach.

Eiruvin 14a - Relying on 3 for Pi

The Mishna says that the circumference of a circle is 3 times its diameter. The gemara asks how we know that and learns it out from the Yam Shel Shlomo which was a very large mikvah that contained the amount of 150 mikvaos of 40 se'ah. When the pesukim describe the yam shel shlomo, it describes its circumference to be 3 times its diameter.
Rav Shlomo Vilna (Cheishek Shlomo) in the back of the gemara asks, why does the gemara need to figure out the mathematical ratio of circumference to diameter using the yam shel shlomo. This is something that can be easily measured and figured out?

He explains that in truth this number is not precise. As Tosafos points out the mathematicians assume that the circumference is slightly more than 3 times the diameter. The Rambam in the pirush hamishna also says that the circumference is 3 and 1/7 of the diameter (3.14285) recognizing that the number is imprecise.
Actual number is 3.14159265359.
Based on this, the R. Shlomo Vilna explains that the gemara is looking for a source that it is sufficient to use imprecise measurements of pie in calculating the diameter (at least in reference to a korah on a mavuy). From the fact that the pesukim themselves assume the inaccurate ratio of diameter to circumference to be 1:3, we can surely rely on that l'halacha and not have to over compensate for the extra 1/7.

Eiruvin 9b - Mechitzos Visible Only From Outside

Below I am attaching a copy of Rav Hershel Schachters sefer, bikvei hatzon where he develops a very mechudash approach to the concept of siluk mechitzos. Simply, all it means in the gemara 92b is that when mechitzos are hidden by other mechitzos such as the pink line in tziyur 2 that extend the walls of the chatzer ketana hiding the gefufei (extension walls) of the larger court yard, it would be forbidden to carry even in the larger courtyard. Similarly in tziyur 1, without the side walls of the house, the front wall of the house could have been considered a mechitza to allow carrying in the driveway, but the construction of these walls blocks off the wall of the house.

After re-reading Rav Hershel's shtikel and discussing it with my chavrusa, I think I understand his point. Rav Hershel says that in a tziyur like the one below, we don't allow the outer walls of the house A-B-C to be the wall of the eiruv.

Eiruvin 7a - Chumros of Both - כסיל בחשך הולך

The gemara explains that the braisa that considers grabbing the stringent opinions to be foolish - כסיל בחשך הולך, only applies when there is an inherent contradiction between them. The example given is the halachos of tu'mah and treifa that result from the machlokes whether a spine missing a vertebrae is considered complete. The opinion who considers it complete is a stringency of tu'mah but a leniency of treifa, the opinion  who considers it incomplete is a stringency of treifa and a leniency of tu'mah. To be lenient in both would be a רשע and to be strict in both would be a fool. Although the gemara says that R. Akiva was machmir for both opinions regarding when the new year begins for ma'aser, that is because he was trying to follow Beis Hillel, just he wasn't sure what B"H held.

Perhaps a practical example of this would be the famous argument between R. Chaim Na'eh and the Chazon Ish regarding shiurei torah. The CI was notorious for having large shiurim, whereas RCN has smaller shiurim. In the context of creating a wall, the CI would be the stringent opinion, but in the context of a breach in the wall the CI would be the lenient opinion by holding of a very large amah. An eiruv that is constructed based on the shiurim of the CI for walls and machmir for RCN by breaches would seemingly be a prime example of כסיל בחשך הולך. It would seem that this is even worse than the case of the gemara. In the case of the gemara, at the time he is being machmir by treifa, he isn't being machmir by tu'mah, and days or weeks later when he is machmir by tu'mah he isn't being machmir by treifa, so that each even independently is acceptable. Yet, the gemara considers him to be a כסיל בחשך הולך. Certainly in a circumstance where the entire eiruv is built on the two stringent opinions being used simultaneously, it would be considered a כסיל בחשך הולך.

One of the members of our kollel suggested that the case of an eiruv might be different because it is being built to be used by a community. Although for an individual to be machmir for both opinions and certainly to construct an eiruv based on both opinions, would be a foolish practice, but a community may be different. Within the community there are those who hold like RCN and those who hold like the CI, therefore it would seem acceptable to construct an eiruv so that both those who hold like RCN and those who hold like the CI are able to carry. However, someone else pointed out that the case in the gemara where they were machmir by the mavuy akum for both rav and shmuel was also a case of a public eiruv for a mavuy, yet the implication is that only because there isn't an inherent contradiction between the two opinions was it acceptable. The gemara implies that had the opinion of Rav been an inherent contradiction to Shmuel, the eiruv would not have been constructed in that way. But in truth, there is no proof from the gemara. In the case of the gemara, had there been a contradiction between the opinions, it would not be possible for one to hold that the bent part needs to be fixed and say that it needs a door. Therefore, those who hold like Rav would hold that it doesn't need a door (just a tzuras hapesach) and those who hold like shmuel would hold that it doesn't need anything.

It seems to me that the entire concept of כסיל בחשך הולך only applies when one is trying to be machmir for both of the two opinions. However, if one would have their own halachic opinion, but be unsure as to the precise size of an amah thereby leading to a gray area in which they need to be machmir, that would no qualify as a כסיל בחשך הולך. For example, if one would be machmir for the opinion who says כדי אכילת פרס is 3 minutes for matzah, but on Y.K. be machmir for the opinion who says 9 minutes, he would be a fool. But if the reason he is machmir is because he himself is me'supak about the shiur and the entire span from 3 to 9 minutes is a safeik to him, he would be entitled to be machmir and not be considered a fool.

Eiruvin 6a - Entry Way in a Corner

The gemara says that although we allow a breach in the side wall (or even front wall) of a mavuy to be as large as 10 amos without having to fix it, it must be in the actual wall, not in the corner. The language that the gemara uses is פתחא בקרן זוית לא עבדי אינשי. It isn't normal for one to make an entry way in a corner, therefore we don't automatically consider an entry way in the corner to be a pe'sach just because it is 10 amos or less. However, Tosafos says that if one constructs a Tzuras HaPesach which indicates that he does intend to use it as a pe'sach, that is sufficient. Tosafos holds that we don't automatically validate the type of breach that catty corners a square area, but a tzuras hapesach is a valid indication that one intends to use it as a pe'sach. The Rashba, although he agrees with Tosafos, cites that both the Rif in the name of Rabbeinu Hai and the Rambam disagree. They maintain that even a tzuras hapesach would not work if it is in a corner. Furthermore, the Rambam (Hil. Shabbos 16:20) holds that even if it doesn't quite catty corner the square area on the diagonal, rather it is a pe'sach that is made near the corner (i.e. the pesach is made in the North-West corner but is fully on the western side without eating up any of the northern wall), it is considered a פתח בקרן זוית and would not be valid, even with a tzuras hapesach. The halacha is like Tosafos, not like the Rambam. Another point is that when the breach is in the front of a mavuy, such as picture 1 below, and people use that opening to enter and exit, it is considered בקעי בה רבים and therefore must be less than 4 tefachim wide. The M.B. 365:10 discusses that idea that we may need to be machmir for city eriuvin that they have the stringencies of a מבוי. Therefore, picture 1 would be a problem even if we don't consider it to be a פתח בקרן זוית.

Shabbos 156a - Summary of Laws of Lisha (kneading)

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Shabbos 133b - Stitching a Wound on Shabbos

It is fairly obvious that stitching a wound on shabbos is an issur d'oraysa. Although the melacha of tofer may not apply to human skin, but there is definitely an issur of chavala because each stitch makes a minor needle hole. Rav Shlomo Zalman (Minchas Shlomo 2:34:32) suggests that it may even be a Torah violation of Sewing. Being that we find in Rashi by bursting a pimple to make a pesach would be considered bo'neh (107a), it is also plausible that tofer applies to human skin. His reservation is that since the two parts of the skin are still alive and will ultimately grow together, it isn't considered detached so that the attaching through stitching would constitute a melacha of tofer.
R. Menachem Levine pointed out to me that the Nishmas Avrohom cites Rav Shlomo Zalman who a physician to stitch more than is necessary to close the wound, simply for the purpose of obtaining a more aesthetically pleasing result (the use of more stitches will make it heal nicer). The source of this ruling is based on the braisa that says that one who is doing a bris may cut the tzitzin that are not essential, so long as they haven't been פירש, meaning that they are still involved in the act of stitching. Just as by a bris, we allow one to cut more than is necessary for the bris to be kasher, and the rationale is as rashi explains דכולא חדא מילתא היא, so too when one needs to stitch for pikuach nefesh, they can stitch more than is absolutely necessary based on the same rationale. The license to cut ציצין שאינן מעכבין so long as one is still involved in the act, has nothing to do with הידור מצוה, rather it is because once he begins he has a right to do more than is absolutely necessary. The Nishmas Avrohom seemed to have misunderstood Rav Shlomo Zalman because he writes something about hidur mitzvah. The concept of hidur mitzvah is only necessary to explain why it may be even permitted to go back and cut once one has completed what they intended to do - פירש. Had this been the heter for cutting tzitzin even before one was פירש, it would certainly not be a source applicable to stitching a wound on shabbos.
I found that this approach of Rav Shlomo Zalman is printed in Minchas Shlomo 2:34:32,33. In the subcategory 32 (end of teshuva) he simply refers to the gemara by milah and draws a parallel to stitching more than necessary. In subcategory 33 he writes that the advantage of going back to cut ציצין שאינן מעכבין is for hidur, but he doesn't mean to say what the Nishmas Avrohom understood. The reason why it isn't considered a chilul shabbos to cut more than absolutely necessary is because it is all being done within the same act, not because one can be mechalel shabbos for hidur. But the reason we consider there to be an advantage to cut more tzitzin is because of hidur. Similarly for stitching, the heter is that it is all being done in the same act, but the reason we consider it to advantageous is because it will save him from lifelong embarrassment. In short, the heter is only based on it all being one act, but there needs to be a sevara why the extra stitches are considered one act and that is because just as for mila the hidur makes it considered the completion of the mitzvah, so too here the fact that there is a purpose in stitching more allows it to be considered the completion of what was started. That is why one would not be able to do extra stitches that would not accomplish anything, even if they haven't been פירש.

However, the assumption that stitching is necessary for pikuach nefesh seems very strange. Unless we're dealing with a gunshot wound or something extremely major, it is almost always possible to stop the bleeding without stitching by either pressure, or other forms of chemicals that help coagulate the blood. If so, it would not be permitted for someone who is capable of stopping the bleeding at home to travel to drive to a hospital on shabbos in order to stitch a wound. The aesthetic advantage to stitching would certainly not justify a chilul shabbos of a Jew (for a Jew to be driven by a goy would certainly be okay to help a child who is injured, and perhaps even for an adult who is injured). Furthermore, it should be forbidden for a Jewish physician to stitch an open wound on Shabbos if he has the ability to stop the bleeding without violating Shabbos. Actually, Rav Shlomo Zalman addresses this as well and says that the aesthetic consideration would only justify chilul of a goy, not of a Jew (subcategory 33).

Shabbos 128b - Squeezing Water Out of Hair

The gemara says that for a woman to transport oil using her hair would be better than carrying it in a jar because it would be a carrying with a shinuy thereby reducing the severity of the issur. The gemara asks that by carrying the oil absorbed in her hair, she will need to squeeze it out for the woman in labor to use thereby violating the prohibition of sechita so there is nothing gained by transporting the oil using her hair? The gemara answers אין סחיטה בשער meaning that there is no violation by squeezing the oil out of hair. Rashi seems to indicate that the question of the gemara is that squeezing the oil out of her hair would be a Torah violation. She would be avoiding the Torah violation of carrying but transgressing the Torah violation of squeezing so that nothing is gained! The gemara answers that since hair is hard and doesn't absorb (rashi), it would not be a Torah violation to squeeze the oil out of her hair.

It isn't clear from the gemara whether squeezing the oil out of the hair would still be a Rabbinic violation. It is possible that the gemara is saying that it is better to violate the issur d'rabonon of carrying with a shinuy and the issur d'rabonon of squeezing hair, rather than the Torah violation of carrying without a shinuy. But it is also possible that the gemara is saying that hair doesn't absorb so there is no issur at all to squeeze oil out of hair.

The Ran (Chiddushei Ha'Ran) proves from our gemara that it must at least be an issur d'rabonon. Being that carrying oil in hair is a greater shinuy than carrying on one's hand, why does the braisa prefer carrying the oil on one's hand over hair? It must be because carrying in the hair would require a second issur d'rabonon of squeezing. The Ran therefore holds that although there is no issur d'oraysa to squeeze hair, it is still assur d'rabonon because of מחזי כסחיטה therefore they were go'zer that if it is allowed one will come to squeeze.

The type of sechita that we are speaking about in this gemara is presumably the type of sechita that is related to מפרק which is a toldah of דש. The purpose of the sechita is to squeeze the oil for it's use, similar to the squeezing of a fruit for it's juice. It doesn't seem to be related to the sechita of מלבן since hair is not a garment for which there would be an issur of cleansing. When it comes to the type of sechita that is related to דש, we find a leniency when the liquid being squeezed out is ruined and wasted as it is squeezed out. The rationale is that when the liquid is wasted it is a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה and only assur m'drabonon (Shulchan Aruch 320:7). Based on this, the Shemiras Shabbos KiHilchasa (page 151) in footnote 64 cites Rav Shlomo Zalman as permiting on who's hair was wet to dry it with a towel. The rationale is that squeezing hair is only d'rabonon (and the fact that there is even an issur d'rabonon is not explicit in the gemara), and squeezing in a way where the liquid is wasted is only d'rabonon, therefore it is a double d'rabonon. Furthermore, he says that since the liquid is never ever realized or seen, it is immediately absorbed in the towel, it is not at all similar to the sechita that would be a tolda of דש.

However, the Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos (9:11) writes in the context of מלבן which is cleansing - 

שהסחיטה מצרכי כיבוס הוא כמו שההגסה מצרכי הבישול, ואין סחיטה בשער וה"ה לעור שאין חייבין על סחיטתו

The language of the Rambam seems to imply that sechita on hair would be related to cleansing and one could deduce from the Rambam that it would be an issur d'rabonon. The Biur Halacha 302:9 d.h. assur seems to assume that the issur is a melabein related issur and is assur m'drabonon. If this were the case, there would be no leniency for being הולך לאיבוד, but the shemiras shabbos cites poskim who reject this assumption. Furthermore, the language of the Rambam actually implies that on skin there is sechita d'rabonon but on hair there is no sechita at all.

Shabbos 124a - Moving A Kli That Is Designated For Issur

Based on Rava's approach 123b, we pasken that a כלי שמלאכתן להיתר can be moved for a permitted function, for the use of it's place, and even to protect the kli itself. But a כלי שמלאכתן לאיסור can only be moved for a permitted function such as breaking nutshells with hammer (as in the mishna 122b), and for the use of it's place, but not to protect the kli itself.

We usually assume that since a כלי שמלאכתן לאיסור can be moved לצורך גופו, meaning for a permitted use, it can be moved without thinking twice. Even if one would be able to accomplish the same thing with a כלי שמלאכתן להיתר, they can move a כלי שמלאכתן לאיסור for a permitted use. However, it is clear from the gemara that this is not correct. The gemara says that even כלים שמלאכתן להיתר cannot be moved for a very minor use such as the sticks that separate the breads on the shulchan since even if they aren't put there for shabbos, the bread will not get moldy. The gemara also says that they cannot be moved if there is a substitute that doesn't require moving any kli such as the case where they were able to skin the korban pesach as it was suspended on their arms.

The M.B. 308:12 writes that one can only move a כלי שמלאכתן לאיסור for a צורך גופו when there is no other kli that has a permitted use that can be moved for this purpose. In the Sha'ar Hatziyun 13 he cites the source for this directly from our gemara (it sounds like it is his chiddush and not found in other achronim). However, in our gemara we find that these limitations apply even to a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר, not just by a כלי שמלאכתו לאיסור. The M.B. seems to recognize this point and says that if we find these limitation by כלי שמלאכתן להיתר, that they can't be moved if the use isn't that necessary, or if there is a legitimate substitute to do the same thing without a kli, we should certainly apply these limitation to כלים שמלאכתן לאיסור. The problem is that by כלים שמלאכתן להיתר we don't find any limitation at all. The Shulchan Aruch 308:4 says that a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר can be moved for any purpose, but not for no need at all. How then can the M.B. cite our gemara as a source to limit כלי שמלאכתן לאיסור when the Shulchan Aruch for whatever reason doesn't apply these limitations to what the gemara is actually speaking about, namely a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר?

This can be explained based on the Ritva. The Ritva points out that our gemara indicates that not all purposes are considered צורך גופו, only very important uses for which there is no better substitute qualifies. He then asks, how can it be that we can move a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר even to protect the item itself, as Rava says on 123b, but cannot move it for a minor use. Wouldn't a minor צורך גופו use still be more permitted than the moving to protect the muktza item? The Ritva answers that this sugya is clearly going with the approach of Abaye 123b who explains the braisa to forbid moving a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר to protect the item itself. According to Abaye it would be forbidden to move it מחמה לצל and would only be permitted to move it for a significant צורך גופו not just a minor צורך גופו. But according to Rava who permits moving a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר even to protect the item, it is certainly permitted to move it for a minor צורך גופו.

But, even if we reject the limitations of the gemara by כלים שמלאכתן להיתר because of paskening like Rava and permitting things to be moved מחמה לצל, we are only compelled to reject it by כלים שמלאכתן להיתר, not by כלים שמלאכתן לאיסור. By a כלי שמלאכתו לאיסור, even we who follow Rava would apply the limitations and only permit the moving of it לצורך גופו when there is no alternative. Therefore, the M.B. is justified in learning from our gemara a limitation about moving a כלי שמלאכתו לאיסור for a minor צורך גופו even though these limitations are rejected by the Shulchan Aruch by a כלי שמלאכתו להיתר.