Zevachim 110b - Nisuch HaMayim D'oraysa

The gemara discusses whether the water that is poured on Succos (although the gemara implies that according to R. Akiva it is done even at other times of the year, but tosafos rejects this) is d'oraysa. The gemara concludes that it is in fact a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai. Tosafos (d.h. ishtamitsei) discusses whether there is any opinion who holds that it is merely d'rabonon. Tosafos says that according to the opinion that it is d'rabonon, it seems strange that chazal would institute a service done in the beis hamikdash with non-kodesh material. If the prohibition of bringing chulin into the azara is d'oraysa, they shouldn't have the ability to institute this, but even if it is only d'rabonon, Tosafos asks that it is awkward that they would institute bringing a service of pouring chulin water in the azara? Tosafos answers that since they were about to enter the rain season, they instituted this service as a means of mentioning the importance of rain from Hashem. It seems that this approach would only work to explain why they would do something so awkward as institute the bringing of chulin in the azara. But, according to the opinion that it is d'orasya, it would seem that chazal don't have the ability to institute nisuch hamayim, and that opinion would have to hold that it is d'oraysa.

Another point that comes out of this gemara is that although the Rambam writes that halacha l'moshe misinai cannot be debatable and there cannot be machlokes about it, here we have an example of halacha l'moshe mi'sinai on which there is a debate because there is an opinion who holds that it is not a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai and therefore only d'rabbonon.

Zevachim 104b - Ibur Tzurah for Kodshim that became passul m'safeik

The Rambam (pesulei hamukdashin 19:2) writes that any korban that is questionable whether it became passul, requires עבור צורה before burning it - meaning that it must sit overnight which renders it passul as no'sar, and then it can be burned. However, the gemara poses a series of questions whether the פרים הנשרפין would become passul such as whether their is a p'sul of sitting overnight, whether there is a p'sul of being taken out of the courtyard and when part of if was taken out together with the majority of one of the limbs. The Rambam paskens that since the gemara leaves with a תיקו in all these cases, we have to be machmir to assume that they became passul and are burned in the courtyard (which is where you burn kodshim that became passul). The Rambam then adds that although when there is a safeik whether it became passul it would normally require עיבור צורה which means to sit overnight, that is only by regular kodshim that is not supposed to be burned and is therefore considered degrading to burn it. But, the פרים ושעירים הנשרפים which are supposed to be burned even if they didn't become passul, the only issue is where to burn them, do not require עיבור צורה [since they are supposed to be burned anyway, the burning of them isn't considered a בזיון קדשים - kesef mishnah quoting maha'ri kurkos].

The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 143) raises an interesting question. Normally the function of עיבור צורה is that since until now it is only questionably passul, we can't burn it until עיבור צורה which makes it definitively passul. However, since one of the question in the gemara is whether sitting overnight would create a status of no'sar invalidating the פרים הנשרפין, the concept of עיבור צורה doesn't apply. The Rambam shouldn't need to give the answer that he gives, rather he should say that sitting overnight doesn't accomplish anything by these korbanos - why would it help to sit overnight since one way or the other it would only be questionable whether it became passul? The Minchas Chinuch answers that since there is another safeik whether it became passul, sitting overnight would be an additional safeik. There would be reason to wait another night so that there is a double safeik whether it became passul before burning it, and that is why the Rambam had to say that the reason it doesn't need עיבור צורה is because even if it is kasher it is meant to be burnt so that the burning isn't degrading for it. The difficulty with the answer of the Minchas Chinuch is that the Rambam seems to require the reason that he gives even for the case where it already sat overnight. In the case where it sat overnight, it certainly wouldn't accomplish anything to let it sit overnight again, yet the Rambam gives his reason as to why it would be burnt immediately.

Zevachim 102a - Moshe Rabbeinu a King

The gemara says that Elisheva the wife of Aharon had a husband who was kohein gadol and a brother in law who had the status of a king. The gemara questions whether Moshe had status of a Kohein Gadol also, and ends up with a machlokes tana'im, but all agree that he had the status of a king. Even Ulah who says that Moshe wanted to be king but was never granted rights to be king, concludes that he himself was king but it wasn't bequeathed to his children. The idea that Moshe had status of a king is also confirmed by the gemara in Shavuos that15a that to give kedusha to the mishkan there had to be a king and a navi - rashi explains that moshe had status of both a king and a navi. Rashi in Bamidbar (10:2) on the pasuk of making trumpets says that they should blow before Moshe "like a king, as it says ויהי בישרון מלך" (although Rashi in Devorim (33:5) doesn't explain that the pasuk refers to Moshe).

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Dibros Moshe, Kiddushin Hearos on daf 37, heara 57 - pg. 542) raises a question. Although the pasuk refers to Moshe as a king, he didn't seem to act as a king. A king cannot forgo on his honor, yet we find that Moshe was willing to go to Dasan and Aviram and forgo his kavod to stop the machlokes. Furthermore, we find in Yoma 3 that according to R. Yoshiah the trumpets had to be paid for by Moshe himself - why would something that is there to honor the king have to be paid for by the king?

Rav Moshe Feinstein explains that Moshe's status as king was very different than a regular king. He wasn't formally appointed as king by klal yisroel or by Hashem. Actually Moshe says in parshas ba'haloscha כי תאמר אלי שאהו בחיקך כאשר ישא האומן את היונק and Rashi comments that Moshe had to take responsibility over klal yisroel and tolerate their nasty comments with very thick skin. This behavior is very not king-like, rather very shepherd-like (although Rambam in Melachim 2:6) explains that a Jewish king is essentially a shepherd, that is only to do the actions of a shepherd but not to tolerate the lack of respect). Therefore, Moshe' status as king resulted from his mastery of Torah. As Chazal say מאן מלכי? רבנן. When one Torah scholar stands above the rest in his generation, he has status as king in the sense that all are subject to his p'sak. Since Moshe's status as king wasn't by appointment, rather from the fact that he was the greatest Torah scholar - משה רבינו, Hashem wanted trumpets blown to honor him, but didn't want him to receive benefit from his Torah and therefore insisted that Moshe pay for the trumpets himself.

With this Rav Moshe explains that gemara in Kiddushin 33b says that one must stand for a Nassi until he is no longer visible as we see that they stood for moshe until he reached his tent (parshas ki tisa) - Rashi comments: Moshe was a Nassi. The Mitzpeh Eisan asks that Moshe was more than a Nassi, he was a king. How can we learn from Moshe that this halacha even applies to a Nassi? Rav Moshe explains that Moshe's status as king came from his Torah. The greatest Torah scholar of the generation is the Nassi. Although Moshe was able to rise above the standard title of Nassi to be king because he was רבן של כל ישראל, the level of kavod owed to him was that of a Nassi since the source of his status of kavod is the same as a Nassi. That is why Moshe was able to be mochel on his kavod.

It seems to me that Rav Moshe Feinstein's approach is also found in the Ibn Ezra in Devorim (33:5) on the pasuk of ויהי בישרון מלך where he writes:

הוא משה, ששמעו ראשי עם התורה מפורשת מפיו, והטעם כי הוא היה כמלך והתאספו אליו ראשי השבטים

The Ibn Ezra understands that the king refers to Moshe because he taught Torah to klal yisroel. With the approach of Rav Moshe Feinstein that regarding kavod Moshe's status was limited to that of a Nassi and he was able to be mochel and forgo his honor, we can understand rashi in parshas yisro. Rashi explains the pasuk that says Aharon and the elders joined Yisro to eat bread - where was moshe? Moshe was standing and serving. How can Moshe be mochel on his kavod to serve Yisro since a king can't be mochel on his kavod? Clearly, regarding the kavod due to Moshe his status was that of a Nassi, not a king.

Zevachim 98b - Chatzitza

The gemara assumes that when a person is accustomed to doing something that causes stains, they aren't makpid about those stains and therefore they aren't considered a chatzitza. Therefore, blood isn't considered a chatzitza on the clothes of a butcher and wax isn't considered a chatzitza on the clothing of a wax merchant. But, the gemara is clear that wax would be a chatzitza on butcher and blood would be chatzitza on the clothes of a wax merchant, because only the exact item that they are involved in wouldn't be a chatzitza. The gemara then questions when one is a butcher and a wax merchant and has both blood and wax on his clothes, is it considered a chatzitzah. Perhaps each one independently isn't a chatzitza but the combination of the two at the same time is significantly degrading and qualifies as a chatzitza, or not? The gemara leaves with a teiku.

The Rama (Y.D. 198:17) writes that one who is a shochet or butcher who's hands are always bloody, blood would not be a chatzitza for them since most people of that type aren't makpid about blood. The Beis Hillel (gilyon of shulchan aruch) says that if a woman was a writer and dyer, and she has both ink and dye on her when she goes to the mikva, she must go again. The rationale is that the gemara remains with a teiku about a combination of two substances even when the person is involved in both occupations, and therefore it is necessary to be machmir. The Sidrei Tahara (Shiyurei Tahara 34) quotes this agrees with the Beis Hillel because the Rambam (Mikvaos perek 3) concludes that it is a safeik, and so does the magen avrohom (161:7). It seems that the poskim are machmir even though the chatzitza is only on part of her body or even a small amount on part of her hand, since we have a safeik whether she is makpid. Why don't we say that since it is only a mi'ut which is d'rabonon, and we have a safeik about whether she is makpid, it would be a safeik d'rabonon and we can be meikel to say that it doesn't qualify as a chatzitza?

Zevachim 97b - Aseh Doesn't Push off a Lo Ta'aseh in the Mikdash

In my sefer, Nasiach B'chukecha, I have a lot of discussion about this gemara from many different perspectives. The gemara asks that an aseh of eating kodshim should push off the lo ta'aseh not to eat the issur absorbed in it. This compels Rava to introduce a new concept that aseh doesn't push off lo ta'aseh in the mikdash and he supports this from the fact that the aseh to eat korban pesach (which includes the marrow in the bone) doesn't push off the lo ta'aseh to break the bone. Rav Ashi answers that the prohibition to eat the absorbed issur is actually an aseh in addition to the lo ta'aseh, and an aseh doesn't push off a lo ta'aseh.

1. Tosafos asks how can the mitzvah to eat korban pesach push off the lo ta'aseh not to break the bone since they aren't happening simultaneously. Piskei Tosafos answers that since the aseh can't be fulfilled any other way, it pushes off the lo ta'aseh even though it isn't simultaneous. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 224 for more discussion.

2. Just as we don't apply the concept of aseh pushing off a lo ta'aseh to allow one to eat matza that is made with tevel flour, we shouldn't allow the mitzvah of eating kodshim to push off the lo ta'aseh of eating the absorbed issur. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 237 for a discussion about this issue and a fascinating yesod from the ohr sameiach. Also, in my additions to the sefer I pointed out that the Keren Orah addresses this question and offers two approaches (See hebrew text below).

3. The mitzvah is to eat the kasher kodshim, the issur is not to eat what is absorbed in it. Even though the issur and mitzvah are not in the same item (they just happen to be mixed) we apply the concept of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 239.

4. Do Rava and Rav Ashi argue about the concept of an aseh not pushing off a lo ta'aseh in the mikdash? Also, is the rationale that a lo ta'aseh in the mikdash is too strong to be pushed off, or that an aseh in the mikdash is not strong enough to push off a lo ta'aeh. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 243. See also Keren Orah (first one on 97b).

Regarding the distinction between matzah of issur and kodshim that has issur absorbed in it, see below:

הבאתי בפנים חידושו של האור שמח דלעולם לא מצינו שיש מצות עשה על האדם לאכול דבר האסור לו, דכל שאכילתו נמנעת מחפץ השם לא שייך שיהיה עליו מצוה לאכלו. והביא דמיון לזה מהא דאיתא בזבחים צז ע"ב דקפריך ליתי עשה דאכילת קדשים וידחה ל"ת דאכילת הפסול הבלוע בו, דכיון שאין העשה על עיקרו של שומן הפסול אלא הבשר הכשר שהפסול נבלע בו, שפיר שייך עשה דוחה ל"ת. שוב מצאתי בקרן אורה (זבחים צז ע"ב) שהרגיש בזה דמאי פריך ליתי עשה דאכילת כשר ולידחי ל"ת דפסול הבלוע הא מצוה הבאה בעבירה היא כמבואר ברמב"ם דאין יוצאין ידי חובת מצה במצה של איסור, וא"כ מאי שנא קדשים ממצה. וכתב לחלק בב' אופנים. חדא כעין חילוקו של האו"ש דדוקא בדבר שאסור מצד עצמו כמו טבל כיון דהוא אכילת איסור אין עליו מצות עשה "כיון שאסרתו תורה באכילה היכי נאמר דמצוה לאוכלו" אבל הכא דלא נאסר רק מחמת הבלוע בו שפיר אמרינן דעשה דוחה ל"ת. ולפי"ז היה יוצא דמצה הבלוע בו דבר האסור אתי עשה ודחי ל"ת, וכתב הקרן אורה דזו לא שמענו. עוד כתב לחלק דעשה דמצה לא דמי לאכילת קדשים, דעשה דאכילת קדשים מוטל על גוף הזבח משא"כ מצות אכילת מצה הוא על הגברא ואינו מיוחד למצה שבלע איסור. ולכן במצה שהיא אסורה לו אף כשהאיסור רק מצד הבליעה אסור לאכלו כיון שאין המצוה לאכול מצה האסורה המוטלת לפניו. אבל באכילת זבח שאין המצוה על הגברא אלא שתהא הקרבן נאכלת אלימא העשה לדחות האיסור. ולפי"ז אף לפי מה דמסיק רבא דאין עשה דוחה ל"ת שבמקדש, וגם לפי מה דמסיק רב אשי שבאכילת הפסול הבלוע איכא לאו ועשה, מ"מ קדשים שנבלע איסור דעלמא שלא שייך למקדש ואין עליו אלא לאו גרידא, אתי עשה דאכילת קדשים ודחי לא תעשה של אכילת איסור הבלוע בו.

Zevachim 96b - Hag'ola with Liquids Other Than Water

The Rama in Hilchos Pesach (452:5) quotes the machlokes Ramban and Rashba whether hag'ola can be done using other liquids or whether it must be done specifically with water. The Rama writes that you cannot do hag'ola with any liquid other than water, but bidieved it works even if done with other liquids. The Gr"a points out that our gemara seems to contradict the Ramban because when the gemara tries to figure out the distinction between hag'ola and merika u'shetifa, Rava suggests that the difference is whether one must use water. By merika u'shetifa the Torah explicitly writes ואם בכלי נחושת בשלה ומורק ושטף במים (vayikra 6:26), insisting on water. But for hag'ola one can even use wine. Clearly we see that other liquids are acceptable for hag'ola? The Gr"a says that according to the Ramban we must say that only wine would be acceptable for hag'ola but no other liquid. Or perhaps we pasken like the other distinctions that the gemara makes between hag'ola and merika u'shetifa, not like the Rava. Although the Rama says that bidieved we can rely on kashering using other liquids, R. Akiva Eiger (Teshuvos 83) explains that once food has been cooked in a pot that has been kashered using another liquid the food can be eaten, however one cannot lichatchila cook in a pot that was kashered using another liquid. However, in situations where there is no possibility of kashering with water we can use other liquids since sha'as had'chak is like a bidieved. R. Moshe (Igros Moshe Y.D. 2:41) proves that the Rashba is correct and that other liquids can be used from the gemara in avoda zara 76a (which is also quoted in the gemara zevachim 97a) where each day of cooking a korban shelamim served as a hag'ola for the previous days korban that was cooked in that pot and prevents the absorbed food from becoming no'sar. The cooking of korban meat qualifies as "other liquids", not water, yet it seems to be an acceptable method of hag'ola. One example when it is necessary to kasher using other liquids is in a chocolate factory. Chocolate is very sensitive to water and can be ruined by even a small amount of moisture. Therefore, the only way to kasher from non-kosher (or non cholov yisroel) chocolate would be to do a run of kosher chocolate on the machine, and consider the first run to be non-kosher since it is used as the kashering run.

Raba Bar Ula says that the distinction between hag'ola and merika u'shetifa is that for merika u'shetifa the vessel must be rinsed in cold water after the hag'ola. Tosafos points out that when one kashers using hag'ola it isn't necessary to rinse the utensil in cold water after kashering, but concludes that the minhag is to do so. This is also recorded in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 452:7) that the custom is to rinse the vessels in cold water immediately after hag'ola. The rationale for this custom is to explain the gemara that merika u'shetifa requires an extra rinsing, implying that even hag'ola requires one rinsing (Tosafos in Avoda Zara 76 quoted by gr"a). Those who don't require a rinsing for hag'ola (Rashi and Tosafos) understand that the "extra rinsing" refers to the cold rinsing that is done after the hot one, and doesn't refer to an extra cold rinsing.

Zevachim 93 - 94 - Washing Blood Off Clothing

The gemara discusses the din of כבוס בגדים, meaning that if blood from the korban chatas gets onto the bigdei kehuna they must be washed. The mishna 93a says that the din of kibus must be done "b'makom kadosh" meaning inside the azara (courtyard) of the beis hamikdash, which is written clearly in the pasuk תכבס במקום קדוש (vayikra 6:20). The mishna on 94b says that a garment that had blood of a chatas on it that left the azara must be brought back in to be washed, but if it became tamei so that it can't be brought back in to be washed (because tu'mah can't be brought into the azara) it should be torn to remove the tu'mah status, then bring it in to wash it in the azara. R. Meir Simcha in Meshech Chochma quotes an interesting question from his son in law (R. Avrohom Loftiver who was married to his daughter for a short time, both R. Meir Simcha's son in law and daughter died in his lifetime leaving behind no descendants. The son in law of the Ohr Sameiach was very close with R. Menachem Ziemba and that is why R. Menachem Ziemba named one of his seform zerah avrohom after him because he died childless - see here). Since the Rambam (Beis HaBechira 6:8) paskens that the chambers which were built outside the azara but opened up to the azara had status of azara for eating kodshei kodshim, but not for schechting kodshim kalim and one who entered b'tuma was patur, there should be a solution for the garment. The garment should be brought into one of these chambers while it is tamei through a window to the outside even without tearing it first, then it should be cleaned in the azara?

The Meshech Chochma offers an answer to this question from a diyuk in the pesukim. The source that the chambers have status of azara for the purpose of eating kodshei kodshim is derived from the pasuk בחצר אוהל מועד יאכלוה - התורה ריבתא חצרות הרבה - זבחים נו ע"א. The reference to the azara as חצר אוהל מועד is the source to include the chambers. However, in the context of washing the clothes it refers to the ohel moed as במקום קדוש, which implies inside the actual azara itself, and doesn't include the chambers. As the Ohr Sameiach explains that the chambers don't qualify as the azara for the purpose of avodas ha'dam, and if the blood would be brought there it would be pasul as if it were brought out of the azara, those areas also don't qualify for the laundering במקום קדוש. The laundering must take place in the actual azara in a place that is fit for the sprinkling of the blood, to the exclusion of the chambers.

Zevachim 92a - Melacha She'ein Tzricha l'gufa

Tosafos in Shabbos 94a defines the concept of מלאכה הצריכה לגופה to be that a melacha must be done for the same purpose that it was done in the mishkan to qualify as a מלאכת מחשבת to be chayev. Other rishonim (Ritva, Ramban) don't mention the clause of doing it for the purpose that it was done in the mishkan, but rather require that one intends to benefit from the primary purpose of the melacha, not just as secondary outcome.

However, Rashi (zevachim 92a) seems to define it very differently. Rashi seems to say that since one would have preferred to never have been in a situation where they would need to do this melacha, such as extinguishing to avoid damage, it is considered a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה. Rashi's language is דהלואי שלא בא עליו. Rashi in Shabbos 63b takes a similar approach in defining the concept of מלאכה שא"צ לגופה and writes כל מלאכה שא"צ לגופה אלא לסלקה מעליו הוי מלאכה שא"צ לגופה דברצונו לא באה לו ולא היה צריך לה הלכך לאו מלאכת מחשבת היא לר

Rashi seems to hold that anytime one would have preferred to have never entered a situation where they would have to do the melacha, it would qualify as a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה. See Tosafos in Shabbos who raises this point and considers Rashi's definition to be quite strange.

Zevachim 91b - Sprinkling wine on the mizbeiach causing the fire to be extinguished

The gemara discusses whether wine can be sprinkled on the fire of the mizbeiach which will cause part of the fire to be extinguished. At first the gemara suggests that extinguishing part of the fire isn't a violation, but concludes that it would be a violation and is dependent on the machlokes R. Yehuda and R. Shimon about דבר שאינו מתכוין. R. Yehuda holds that even though he doesn't intend to extinguish the fire it would be forbidden to sprinkle the wine on the fire, and R. Shimon holds that since he doesn't intend to extinguish it is permitted. This gemara is one of the sources that prove that the machlokes regarding דבר שאינו מתכוין isn't limited to shabbos due to special מלאכת מחשבת requirements, but rather applies to all areas of halacha.

Tosafos in Kesubos 6a quotes the Aruch who proves from our gemara that פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה is mutar (we only forbid a p'sik reisha when he wants the result). How could R. Shimon allow sprinkling wine on the fire which inevitably results in extinguishing? It must be that since he has no interest in extinguishing the flame, even though it is a pesik reisha, it is permitted. Tosafos pushes off the proof by saying that even though it is לא ניחא ליה or לא איכפת ליה it would still be assur m'drabonon, and is only permitted by the fire of the mizbeiach because the Rabbonon never upheld their decree to prevent the mitzvah of burning the wine on the mizbeiach.

Rashi on the gemara seems to ask the same question, but answers something very strange. Rashi asks how can R. Shimon permit something which is a pesik reisha, and answers that since he can sprinkle in small drops which wouldn't extinguish the flame, it isn't considered a pesik reisha even when he sprinkles large drops which will definitely extinguish the flame. Normally, the something is not considered a pesik reisha when the result of one's actions is not going to inevitably violate an issur. The fact that one can choose to do something in a way that doesn't inevitably violate an issur, but chooses to do it in a way that does inevitably violate the issur doesn't avoid the pesik reisha problem. How can rashi say that since he can sprinkle small drops, the sprinkling of large drops isn't a pesik reisha? R. Shlomo Eiger (gilyon maharsha) quotes from the bartenura that sometimes the fire is large enough to immediately consume the large drops so that even the large drops don't extinguish the fire. This would be a good approach to explain why it isn't a pesik reisha, but rashi doesn't seem to say this!

Zevachim 91a - Ein Ma'avirin vs. Tadir

In my sefer Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 30 I pointed out that the Rama and Taz seem to argue when one violated the Tadir aspect and went to the less tadir item first, whether they should go back and do the tadir, or finish the eino tadir before starting the tadir

נחלקו הרמ"א והט"ז אם אין מעבירין נדחה מפני מעלת תדיר, או אם מעלת תדיר נדחה מפני אין מעבירין. דעת הרמ"א שצריך להפסיק בשל חנוכה לקרות של ר"ח תחלה, היינו משום שסובר דעובר על אין מעבירין כדי לקיים מעלת תדיר דראש חדש. אבל הט"ז סובר דכל שכבר התחיל בשל חנוכה אינו מפסיק לקרות בשל ר"ח תחילה משום דאין מעבירין על המצות כדי לקיים התדיר. נמצא שלדעת הרמ"א תדיר עדיפא מאין מעבירין, ולדעת הט"ז אין מעבירין עדיפא. שוב ראיתי בשו"ת נוב"י (מה"ת ס' י"א) שכתב דאף הרמ"א מודה דבדרך כלל לא דחינן הא דאין מעבירין כדי לקיים מעלה דתדיר, אלא העיקר כהט"ז וראיותיו דבשביל מעלת תדיר לא דחינן להך שאינו תדיר אם כבר הקדימו, מ"מ כתב הנוב"י וז"ל שבאמת לאו משום מעלת התדיר שיש לר"ח פסק האבודרהם שיפסיק משל חנוכה אפילו כבר התחיל, אלא מטעם דאין קריאת חנוכה חשובה למאומה נגד קריאת ר"ח דאין משגיחין בחנוכה כל עיקר כדמסיק במסכת מגילה כט ע"ב והלכתא אין משגיחין בחנוכה, ור"ח עיקר עכ"ל. לפיכך בדרך כלל מודה הרמ"א דאם כבר התחיל בשאינו תדיר, שאינו מפסיק כדי לקרות התדיר [בזבחים צא ע"א הוא בעיא דלא אפשיטא כשקדים ושחט לשאינו תדיר אי מעבירין ממנו לעשות התדיר ברישא. אבל קאמר בגמ' היכי דמי דשחטינהו לתרוייהו, ומבואר מזה דעד כאן לא קמבעיא רק כשעדיין לא שחט התדיר אם מניחים מלזרוק אותו שאינו תדיר כדי לשחוט התדיר אבל כששחט אותו שאינו תדיר ואח"כ שחט התדיר ושניהם עומדים ליזרק ודאי צריך להקדים התדיר לשאינו תדיר, והמקודש לשאינו מקודש. ומשמע מזה שאע"פ שעכשיו הוא עומד אצל אותו שאינו תדיר מעבירין על הדם שאינו תדיר ושאינו מקודש כדי לזרוק תחילה דם התדיר ודם המקודש. והרמב"ם (פ"ט מהל' תמידין ומוספין הל' ג') פסק כחילוק זה וז"ל עבר או שכח ושחט את שאינו תדיר או הפחות בקדושה תחלה, מקריבו ואח"כ שוחט את התדיר או את המקודש עכ"ל. הרי סובר הרמב"ם שגומר אותו שאינו תדיר קודם שיתחיל לשחוט התדיר. אבל כתב הרמב"ם (הל' ד') שאם כבר נשחטו שניהם כאחד יהיה זה ממרס בדם עד שיזרק דם הדתיר או דם המקודש. הרי משמע מדברי הרמב"ם שאם כבר נשחטו שניהם מעבירין על דם שאינו תדיר ואינו מקודש כדי ליזרק תחילה דם התדיר ודם המקודש. אמנם יש לדחות שזהו עיקר החילוק של הרמב"ם, כשכבר נשחטו שניהם ומוטלים לפניו ליזרק לא שייך אין מעבירין דשניהם לפניו וצריך להקדים התדיר והמקודש, אבל כשעדיין לא נשחט התדיר והמקודש ואותו שאינו תדיר ואינו מקודש מוכן ליזרק ומונח לפניו, אין מעבירין ממנו כדי לשחוט את התדיר אלא גומר זריקתו ואח"כ שוחטין התדיר]. על כן בנדון של הנוב"י שאירע בשבת של ר"ח אדר שטעה הקורא שהיה לו לקרות בסיימו הסדרא של השבוע בפרשת ר"ח ופתח בפרשת כי תשא בשביל פרשת שקלים, וכבר בירך העולה והתחילו לקרות, הורה שיסיים פרשת שקלים כיון שכבר התחיל עיי"ש.

Zevachim 90b - Tadir and Mekudash: Which comes first?

The first two mishnayos in the perek establish 2 rules: 1. Something which is more common (tadir) comes before something less common. 2. Something with a higher level of kedusha comes before something that has less kedusha. The gemara then raises the question whether the advantage of tadir is greater than mekudash or the opposite, and fails to prove one way or the other. As a result, the Rambam (Temidin U'musafin 9:2) paskens that one who has tadir and mekudash in front of him can choose to do whichever he would like to do first. The Taz (O.C. 681:1) writes that since the gemara doesn't reconcile which is better, we should assume that the tadir advantage is greater since it is a general Torah principle. The Taz means to say that the concept of tadir is learned from a pasuk 89a whereas the concept of mekudash seems to just be a sevara. However, the Sha'agas Aryeh (28) rejects the Taz because the concept of mekudash is also derived by the gemara in Horiyos 12b from the pasuk of vi'kidashto. Furthermore, the Sha'agas Aryeh says that the Taz seems to have missed the Rambam who considers tadir and mekudash equal to one another.

Based on this the Sha'gas Aryeh struggles with the Shulchan Aruch (Hilchos Tefillin 25:1) who says that after putting on a Talis with tzitzis one then puts on their tefillin because of מעלין בקודש. How can the Shulchan Aruch use the concept of ma'alin b'kodesh - that only applies within one mitzvah, but in terms of prioritizing two separate mitzvos the more mekudash thing comes first (his question is based on the premise that tzitzis which is not an obligation would only qualify as matzuy, and therefore doesn't have the advantage of Tadir to consider it equal to tefillin)?

The Sha'gas Aryeh approaches this by saying that tadir and mekudash are only rationales to prioritize one mitzvah over another, but when one thing is considered only a d'var ha'reshus, not a mitzvah, there are no rules about what has to come first. Since tzitzis isn't an obligation we regard it as a d'var ha'rshus and there is no requirement to do tefillin first.

Another approach to answer this question is offered by the yad ephraim in his commentary to Shulchan Aruch. He explains that the rationale of מעלין בקודש is only be used to be machriah between the two equals, tefillin which is mekudash and tzitzis which is tadir. The concept of מעלין בקודש is on the individual. Since there is no preference between the tefillin and tzitzis using the mekudash and tadir concepts, we apply the מעלין בקודש to say that he should move himself up from a lower kedusha (tzitzis) to a higher kedusha (tefillin).

Zevachim 86b - Torah give over power to chachamim to decide

I am trying to recall all places where we find a concept of מסרן הכתוב לחכמים to decide the parameters of a halacha on a Torah level. In general, the chachamim always have the ability to use methods of deduction to interpret the Torah or transmit a mesorah from earlier generations that dates back to Moshe mi'sinai. However, there are a handful of places where instead of the Torah indicating the parameters of a halacha, they give the power in the hands of the chachamim to draw the line, and decide what exactly should constitute a Torah violation.

1. The primary source for this concept is found in Chagiga 18a in the context of melacha on chol ha'moed. The gemara understands from the ambiguity of the pesukim as to whether all melacha is forbidden on chol ha'moed or not that - לא מסרכן הכתוב אלא לחכמים לומר לך איזה יום אסור ואיזה יום מותר, אי זו מלאכה אסורה ואי זו מלאכה מותרת. According to Tosafos that the prohibition of melacha on chol hamoed is d'oraysa, the Rabbonon are able to draw the line on their own as to which melachos should be a Torah violation.

2. In the context of the 5 inuyim that we refrain from on Yom Kippur, there is a big discussion in the Rishonim if those other than eating and drinking are d'oraysa or only d'rabonon. The Ran at the beginning of the 8th perek in Yoma writes that they are all d'oraysa just that since they aren't included in the torah's term "inuy", rather in the term "shabason" the Rabbonon have the control to set up the parameters for what should be assur and when it should be assur - ומסרן הכתוב לחכמים והן הקילו בהן כפי מה שראו והתירו כל שאינו נעשה לתענוג.

3. In our gemara Rashi understands that ideally the terumas hadeshen should be done no earlier than morning which would mean dawn. However, the pasuk indicates that sometimes there is a "boker" to the morning, and it can be done earlier. Rashi explains that since there is no specific time given by the Torah, it all depends on the needs of the day. Tosafos writes to explain rashi - ומסר המקום הדבר לחכמים להיות משכימין כל מה שירצולפי הצורך להם. Meaning, doing it earlier than dawn under normal circumstances would be a Torah violation, yet the Rabbonon have control to decide when it needs to be done earlier.

Zevachim 85b - Ba'al mum by birds

The gemara says that the p'sul of a ba'al mum applies only to animals but not to birds. Rashi explains that the pasuk that demans - תמים זכר בבקר בכשבים ובעזים implies specifically for animals, not for birds. But, if the bird is missing a limb it is pasul. Rashi attributes the p'sul of מחוסר אבר to be a violation of הקריבהו נא לפחתך which is the same pasuk that the gemara uses on amud alef to say that you can't sacrifice the intestines without cleaning out the excrement because it is improper. Rashi ends of by saying - וכן מום מגונה. Rashi seems to understand that any significant mum that would make the animal me'guneh, would be a violation of הקריבהו נא לפחתך. Rashi 68b writes that a bird who's eye is poked out is invalid because it is missing a limb which is a violation of הקריבהו נא לפחתך. Tosafos asks on rashi that the source to exclude a bird that is missing a limb the gemara says in kiddushin is from the drasha of מן העוף, ולא כל העוף פרט לשיבש גפה, not because of הקריבהו נא לפחתך. Similarly on 35b, Rashi says the p'sul is הקריבהו נא לפחתך and Tosafos argues. It seems that there would be a machlokes between rashi and tosafos regarding types of blemishes that are more severe than דוקין שבעין and are obvious so they would be "meguneh", but aren't quite מחוסר אבר. Tosafos 35b says explicitly that anything short of missing a limb would not be pasul m'doraysa, whereas rashi would seem to hold that anything which is מגונה and looks disgusting would be pasul m'doraysa based on הקריבהו נא לפחתך.

Zevachim 85a - Rinsing the excrement before burning on mizbeiach

The gemara says that a korban Olah that was being sacrificed on the top of the mizbeiach and a p'sul occured so that if it were to be taken down it couldn't be brought back up, we would still be required to take the eimurin down to be rinsed from the excrement. According to the opinion that the animal can be butchered at the top of the mizbeiach, this din could be by an animal that is fit to be burnt on the mizbeiach. According to this opinion it would make sense why we would take the eimurin down and rinse them, because they would then be brought back up to be burned (as the rambam paskens - pesulei hamukdashin 3,3). But, according to the opinion that the animal can't be butchered on the top of the mizbeiach unless a p'sul occurred so that when it is taken down it can't be brought back up, why would there be any requirement to rinse at all - it isn't going to be brought back up! The gemara explains that just in case a kohein who didn't know better would bring it back up, it could be burned. To this the gemara asks, does it make sense to rinse the insides which can cause misleading a kohein to bring the pasul korban back up on the mizbeiach? The gemara answersthat it is still worthwhile rinsing it and we would disregard the concern of misleading a kohein to bring it back up, so that kodshim isn't lying on the floor disrespectfully like a neveila - שלא יהו קדשי שמים מוטלים כנבילה. The gemara indicates that we rinse the excrement off the passul korban, to preserve the sanctity of the korban, even though by doing so we can mislead a kohein to bring it back up to the mizbeiach. From here we see that the obligation to treat kodshim respectfully is an active mitzvah- meaning, that it is not merely an issur to treat kodshim disrespectfully, but there is an active mitzvah to make sure that it is being treated respectfully.

Zevachim 79a - More on Ta'am K'ikar

The gemara seems to conclude that by min b'sheino mino we follow ta'am, meaning that so long as the issur taste is realized in the heter, the food is assur. Tosafos discusses whether this concept is d'oraysa. The fact that Rava doesn't pick a number such as 60x or 100x, rather makes it dependent on the taste, leads Tosafos to say that the issue of ta'am k'ikar is d'oraysa. Tosafos rejects the opinion of Rashi in Chulin 98b who holds that we pasken ta'am k'ikar is only d'rabonon. In the long discussion, Tosafos also cites the opinion of R. Yosef D'orleans who says that although ta'am k'ikar is d'oraysa, it is only an issur aseh, a violation of a positive mitzvah for which there is no malkus. Rabbeinu Tam rejects this and holds that there would be malkus. The fundamental point in their argument is whether we consider ta'am k'ikar to be a new prohibition (Rabbeinu Yosef) or merely a giluy that this also qualifies as eating the item which is assur.

R. Akiva Eiger 78a asks why the gemara concludes from Reish Lakish that ta'am k'ikar is not d'oraysa from the fact that there is no malkus when the pigul, no'sar and ta'mei are mevatel each other. According to Rabbeinu Yosef that ta'am k'ikar is d'oraysa but there is no malkus since it is merely an a'seh, we could simply say here too that ta'am k'ikar is d'oraysa but there is no malkus? This is a very strong question on Rabbeinu Yosef because the gemara does seem to imply that we can't separate ta'am k'ikar being d'oraysa from the malkus. It is also intriguing that R. Akiva Eiger asks this question from Rabbeinu Yosef in Tosafos Chulin 99, rather than asking it from Tosafos on the very next page of Zevachim!

To me it seems that there is a very strong diyuk in Rashi that would answer both R. akiva eiger's question and Tosafos question. Tosafos (d.h. ma'siv) asks why do we challenge the gemara's proof from reish lakish that ta'am k'ikar isn't d'oraysa from the mishna that one can fulfill their mitzvah of matzah by eating a kezayis of matzah made from mostly rice flour (and a little wheat flour that gives ta'am in it). Why didn't the gemara ask from the myriad of places where we have a concept of ta'am k'ikar?

A careful reading of Rashi indicates that the gemara never meant to prove from Reish Lakish that ta'am k'ikar is not d'oraysa. It could be that Reish Lakish would submit that ta'am k'ikar is d'oraysa. The gemara was simply saying that we don't regard the ta'am to be as substantial as the ikar so that by merely eating a kezayis of something that has taste of issur he would get malkus. Rashi writes:

ושמע מינה נותן טעם ברוב לאו דאורייתא- הא דאמור רבנן בכל דוכתי איסור הנותן טעם בהיתר אוסרו ואף על פי שההיתר ברוב, לאו דאורייתא הוא ללקות עליו

Rashi clearly focuses on the malkus. Meaning, that it could very well be d'oraysa but there is no malkus since eating a kezayis of taste of issur isn't tantamount to eating a kezayis of actual issur. Based on this approach, Tosafos question is answered. The only clear case we can ask from is the mishna in chalah that allows one to fulfill matzah by eating a kezayis that only has a taste of wheat flour and not an actual kezayis of wheat flour. This indicates that ta'am k'ikar affects even the shiur, and doesn't just make the item assur. Based on this, R. Akiva Eiger's question is also answered. The gemara wasn't simply trying to say that ta'am k'ikar isn't d'oraysa. The gemara understands that even according to Reish Lakish, ta'am k'ikar may be d'oraysa. The gemara is only trying to say that eating a kezayis of ta'am issur doesn't warrant malkus. Therefore, there is no question from Rabbeinu Yosef who says that it is d'oraysa but an issur aseh because that is essentially what the gemara is trying to say - issur but no malkus.

Zevachim 78a - Kezayis for Matzah

The gemara quotes a mishna in challah to prove that ta'am k'ikar is so powerful that on a Torah level it converts the entire mixture (even if it is a minority) to be like it both for an issur to be chayev malkus, and by a mitzvah to qualify as eating a kezayis. The Mishna says that if one would bake matzah with for example 20% wheat flour and 80% rice flour, they could fulfill their mitzvah of matzah with it. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 453:2) codifies this, but it is unclear how large of a piece must be eaten. The M.B. explains that there are various opinions regarding the nature of rice flour turning into chometz when mixed with wheat flour, and therefore even if there would be only a small quantity of wheat flour (less than kezayin in achilas p'ras) one could fulfill their mitzvah of matzah, but if the wheat flour were mixed with corn flour there would need to be at least a kezayis of wheat within an achilas p'ras. However, almost no opinion (except for the Ra'avad mentioned in sha'ar hatziyun) requires one to eat multiple kezaysim of the matzah to ensure that he will be eating a kezayis of wheat, rather it is sufficient to simply eat one kezayis. Even the strictest opinion mentioned in the M.B. would hold that if there is a majority of wheat flour to corn flour, we view it as if it were entirely wheat flour so that one can fulfill the mitzvah by eating just a kezayis.

Tosafos asks why the gemara says in Pesachim 115a that one shouldn't eat maztah with marror because the marror which is only d'rabonon will be mevatel the matzah which is d'oraysa. Being that our gemara merely requires the consumption of a kezayis which has the taste of matza, and not to eat a kezayis of matzah, one should certainly be able to fulfill their mitzvah when they eat marror with the matzah? Tosafos answers that specifically by marror which due to its sharpness ruins the taste of the matzah do we consider it to be a problem, whereas the rice flour doesn't ruin the taste of the wheat flour. Secondly, Tosafos answers that the marror ruins the taste of a "kezayis matzah", meaning that if you only eat a kezayis of matzah with the marror you end up tasting less than a kezayis, but if you ate a few kezaysim with the marror you would fulfill your mitzvah.

The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 6 - eating korban pesach) proves from the first answer of Tosafos that one can fulfill their mitzvah of matzah or korban pesach even if they were to eat something else together with the matzah, so long as it wasn't sharp like marror (so long as it is a different type of item, to the exclusion of eating regular meat together with korban pesach). However, the second answer of Tosafos would seem to reject this and hold that even eating an item together with the matzah that isn't sharp could prevent one from fulfilling their mitzvah of matzah - it would all depend on the quantity that they are eating. The M.C. points out that if this were true, the gemara doesn't make sense. The gemara asks on Reish Lakish who holds that one issur is mevatel another indicating that taste isn't d'oraysa to maintain the status of each issur, from the case of mixing wheat and rice flour indicating that taste is strong enough to consider the entire loaf to be matzah. Why doesn't the gemara answer that Reish Lakish is speaking when one one kezayis is eaten and the mishna is speaking when you eat multiple kezaysim? Therefore, the M.C. explains that Tosafos maintains there original position that only the sharpness of the marror can ruin the taste of the matzah, but adds a stipulation that even this is only when one kezayis of matzah is eaten - if multiple kezaysim were eaten, even marror wouldn't be mevatel the matzah. See Minchas Chinuch for a summary of these dinim.

Zevachim 77a - Bringing Sweets on the Mizbeiach

The gemara says that the prohibition of bringing שאור ודבש, yeast and honey, on the mizbeiach only applies when it is being done לריח ניחוח - as an offering. But, if it is being done for the sake of fire wood, meaning not as an offering, there is no prohibition. The Rambam as explained by kesef mishna (issurei mizbeiach 5:3) holds that this only works if it is brought independently but not together with an actual korban. See Minchas Chinuch 117. However, there is a machlokes between the Rabbonon and R. Eliezer in the Mishna if one can burn limbs of a chatas לשם עצים, to be like firewood or whether this is only a heter to bring up yeast and honey on the mizbeiach. We pasken like the Rabbonon that the idea of bringing up for the sake of firewood only works for yeast and honey, but not for other korbanos that don't belong on the mizbeiach. Nevertheless, Tosafos 77b d.h. b'dam suggests that even the Rabbonon would admit that only on kodshim such as a chatas which should be eaten, cannot be brought on the mizbeiach even לשם עצים but the intent "for the sake of firewood" would work for chulin items to be put on the mizbeiach. It is for this reason that we would allow the blood of a korban that gets mixed with non-korban blood to be sprinkled and wouldn't constitute a violation of bringing chulin on the mizbeiach. The rationale seems to be that when something is brought with a korban or is actually a korban, one's intention can't remove that status. Therefore, it would be a violation of burning the meat of a chatas on the mizbeiach. Similary, when one burns the yeast and honey with a korban, it assumes status of a korban so that intent cannot consider it to be merely wood. But when one places chulin on the mizbeiach, since it doesn't belong there, the intent can consider it to be merely wood.

The Minchas Chinuch writes that the sacrificing of yeast and honey לשם עצים only works if it is explicit intent, but if it is done without any intent, it is a violation. It is not clear when one would burn chulin on the mizbeiach without any intent whether we would consider "stam" to be לשם עצים or whether we would require explicit intent לשם עצים to be patur. Tosafos seems to hold that this would also require specific intent.

On an Aggadah note - Sefer HaChinuch suggests that the issur to bring yeast on the mizbeiach is to remind us of zrizus and doing things quickly. The issur to bring honey on the mizebeiach is to teach that a person shouldn't spend their lives running after sweets, rather a person should focus on foods that are healthy for his body and he needs to sustain himself.

ספר החנוך (מצוה קי"ז) - ובענין הרחקת הדבש נאמר אל הילדים רכים כדי לייסרם, שהוא סיבה לדמיון שימעט האדם מלרדוף אחר המאכלים המתוקים לחכו כמנהגג הזוללים והסובאים ימשכו לעולם אחר כל מתוק, ולא יתן לבו כי אם אל המאכלים המועילים לגופו וצריכים למחייתו ושומרים בריאות אבריו. ולזה ראוי לכל בעל שכל לכוין במזונו ושתייתו, לא לכוונת הנאת מישוש הגרון

Zevachim 72a - 73a - Kavua d'oraysa and d'rabonon

The gemara asks why we don't use bitul b'rov in the first case of the mishna when the animal that is assur b'hana'ah gets mixed with the others. The gemara answers that the animal is choshuv therefore too significant to be batul, either because the mishna holds that any davar sheb'minyan isn't batul, or because livestock is inherently significant and not batul. After the gemara establishes that the animal isn't batul b'rov, it continues to ask why we cant separate one by one from the group and bring them as korbanos. The gemara is understanding that after we establish that bitul b'rov doesn't apply to an important and significant item, we should still be permitted to separate one by one and bring them as korbanos each time relying on the statistical majority that the animal we are not sacrificing isn't the forbidden one. To that the gemara responds that it is considered "kavu'ah" so we aren't able to follow the rov. This seems to be a strange case of ka'vua! Normally kavuah applies to a situation where we have things that are established in their place such as kosher and non-kosher butcher shops, but it isn't clear how the concept of kavuah can apply here? The Chochmas Adam (binas adam, sha'ar kakavua 1) explains that the concept of kavuah on the torah level only applies to situations like stores where one buys meat from one of the stores and doesn't know if it was purchased from the 9 kosher or 1 treif. In that case the torah would consider it כמחצה על מחצה and we couldn't rely on rov. However, the kavua in our gemara is very different. In our gemara the gemara means to say that whenever chazal don't allow bitul to take place on an item due to it's significance, we treat the mixture as if it were kavuah. Meaning, not only do we disallow the concept of bitul b'rov on a significant item, but we treat the entire mixture as if is were kavuah and therefore don't even allow one to separate one by one and follow the statistical rov. The gemara continues to ask that we should be able to break the kavua status by sending the animals out and moving them from their established place, but even if we were to do that the Rabbonon were concerned that one may take an animal before moving them. It comes out that the Rabbonon create the concept of kavua on any mixture that contains an important issur on which we won't allow bitul. Once the Rabbonon consider it kavua, they make a second gezeira to be even more machmir than the kavua d'oraysa and we don't allow the kavuah to be broken by moving the animals around because they were concerned that one would take from it before doing that (Tosafos 73b d.h. ela, points out that from the fact that they make a gezeirah that you may come to take it before moving the animals while it is still kavuah, implies that if you were to take before moving the animals it would be d'oraysa. Tosafos rejects this and explains that even taking before moving them would only be d'raobonon). They weren't concerned about this by kavuah d'oryasa since the stores are recognizable in their place and there is no concern that if they permit the meat found in the street that one will come to permit meat that was bought from one of the stores.

Zevachim 71a - Following Rov against reality

The gilyon maharsha references the teshuvos yad eliyahu (eliyahu bar shmuel from lublin - 18th century) who discusses a very interesting question that is pertinent to splitting recovered losses when only part of the losses are recovered. For example in a situation like madoff where there were billions lost and millions recovered, how are those millions split. Is it split proportionately or is it split evenly? The situation that the Yad Eliyahu deals with is animal hides of Jews that were stolen and some of them were retrieved. Those who owned more claimed that they deserved a proportionate return, whereas those who owned less felt that it should be split evenly which could mean that the 10% owner will be fully compensated and the 50% owner would suffer an 80% loss on his investment.

The Mishna says that if a passul chatas gets mixed with kasher ones, they are all left to die. The gemara explains that they are presently kavua and we can't allow bitul b'rov, but discusses why there isn't a possibility of moving them so that we can allow bitul to take place. Tosafos at the end of d.h. afilu asks on the gemara in sanhedrin 79b that when we have someone who deserves a more lenient form of capital punishment who gets mixed up with those who deserve a stricter form, they are all given the more lenient form. Tosafos asks, why don't we say that the person who deserves the more lenient form is batul b'rov and everyone should get the stricter form? Tosafos answers a few different answers:

1. We don't follow rov to be machmir since we will anyway fulfill the mitzvah of carrying out capital punishment on everyone by giving them the lighter punishement.

2. We don't follow rov to do something that we know is not right. If we were to give everyone the stricter punishment, we would for sure be giving someone a stricter punishment that he deserves - דמשום רובא לא נעביד דבר שהוא שקר ודאי, דודאי יש אחד שאינו בר מיתה כלל לפי שלא נגמר דינו

3. At the moment they are considered kavuah and we can't force them to move so that we can follow rov to be machmir on them.

The Yad Eliyahu explains based on Tosafos second answer that we can't simply split proportionately. The rationale to split proportionately would be that we would follow a rov that says that these extra hides belong to Reuven since he owned more of the hides than Shimon. The only way we can follow rov is if the rov could tell us that ALL the hides belong to Reuven. However if Reuven lost 50 hides and 60 of them were retrieved, we couldn't use rov to say that they all belong to Reuven because that is simply not true. Therefore, we cant follow rov. Rather, on each and every hide we say that all the partners own equal shares in it, until the smaller partners are fully compensated and out of the picture so that the remaining hides would be split by the remaining partners. According to this approach, the smaller partners would suffer much less of a loss than the larger partners. But in truth, the Yad Eliyahu is not talking about partners. When there are partners then Reuven would own 60% of every hide retrieved whereas Shimon would only own 10% and they would split all the hides proportionately. The Yad Eliyahu is talking about a case when they aren't partners just that they all had hides stolen and it is unclear who the one's that were retrieved belong to. It is only in that case that we would say they split equally until the smaller partner is fully compensated and then the remaining partners would continue to split the remaining hides.

Zevachim 63a - Eating Kodshim in Heichal

The gemara says that if one would shecht a korban shlomim inside the heichal rather than in the courtyard, it would be valid. The gemara learns this out from the combination of the pasuk that says it should be shechted by the opening of the ohel mo'ed, implying that the ohel mo'ed would even be ideal, just that it can also be shechted by the opening of the ohel mo'ed, in conjunction with the logic of לא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר - since it can be shechted at the opening of the ohel mo'ed, it can certainly be shechted in the ohlem mo'ed. The gemara asks that based on this approach, it should be obvious that when one is unable to eat kodshim in the courtyard, it can be eaten in the hei'chal (as rashi explains that we have a pasuk saying "in the courtyard of the ohel mo'ed and the logic of לא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר indicating that the ohel mo'ed would be ideal). Why would R. Yochanan Ben Beseira require a pasuk to teach what seems obvious in sevara? The gemara answers that the logic of לא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר only works for the shechita which is an avoda and is normal to be done in front of one's master, so the closer the better. But, eating which is not normal to do in front of one's master, the logic would not apply. Rashi explains that no only would the logic "not apply", it would apply in the opposite direction - making it prohibited to eat kodshim in the hei'chal. It is therefore necessary to have a special pasuk to teach that when it is impossible to eat kodshei kodshim in the courtyard because the goyim are bombing it, it can be eaten in the hei'chal.

The obvious question on this gemara is that if the pasuk of פתח אוהל מועד and the logic of לא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר really apply, it should be ideal to shecht the korban in the ohel mo'ed. Why does R. Yochanan say that bidieved it is kasher, implying that it shouldn't be done lichat'chila? The Rambam (ma'aseh korbanos 5:4) also writes clearly that lichatchila it can be shechted anywhere in the courtyard, but shechting in the hei'chal is only bidieved. Why? It seems that the logic of לא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר is only on the kashrus of the korban, but not on the action of shechting the korban. Meaning, that the gemara understands that the ideal place for the korban is as the pasuk describes by the opening of the ohel mo'ed in the courtyard, but regarding the kashrus of the korban if shechted elsewhere, it should certainly be kasher if it is shechted in the hei'chal.

Regarding the second halacha that kodshei kodshim can be eaten inside the hei'chal and is learned from a special pasuk - The Rambam (ma'aseh korbanos 10:3) writes - ואם נאכלו בהיכל נאכלו. The Rambam's language is very strange. Clearly the Rambam holds that lichatchila it cannot be eaten in the hei'chal because the case where the gemara permits eating in the hei'chal is only for extenuating circumstances when it absolutely cannot be eaten in the courtyard. The Rambam understands from this that the heter to eat in the hei'chal is only bi'dieved. However, this doesn't seem to make sense because the entire requirement to eat the meat is only lichatchila, but bidieved isn't me'akev! The Even Ha'azel (miluim in the back of kodshim 2, pg. 129b) in responding to R. Tzvi Pesach Frank who asked exactly this question writes that the Rambam seems to disagree with Tosafos in Pesachim 59 and holds that the eating of the meat by the kohanim is me'akev the atonement. Therefore, the Rambam writes ואם נאכלו בהיכל נאכלו, meaning that bidieved the mitzvah of eating is fulfilled even if the kohanim eat it in the heichal and the ba'alim would receive atonement. This approach is also not so me'duayak in the Rambam because he should have written ואם נאכלו בהיכל נתכפרו - that the ba'alim get ATONEMENT. The language of ואם נאכלו נאכלו implies that they aren't fulfilling any mitzvah, just that it is considered "eaten". But it isn't clear what nafka minah this would make!