Menachos 40b - Tzitzis at Night

Rav Zeira says that the reason for the Rabbonon uprooting the mitzvah of tzitzis on a linen garment is because it would lead to a violation of shatnez on a כסות לילה. Rashi explains that the concern is that one will wear the linen garment with his wool ticheiles even at night when there is no mitzvah of tzitzis thereby violating the prohibition of wearing kelaim even in the absence of a mitzvah of tzitzis. Rashi seems to hold like the opinion of the Rambam that everything depends on actual day and night. All garments are obligated in tzitzis by day and are exempt at night. However, Tosafos (d.h. mi'shum) says in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that the issue isn't dependent on actual day and night, rather a day garment is obligated in tzitzis even at night, whereas a night garment is exempt from tzitzis even during the day. Tosafos explains that even according to Rabbeinu Tam we regard the mitzvah of tzitzis as a time bound mitzvah from which women are exempt because ultimately the time is responsible for determining whether this particular garment is obligated in tzitzis. According to Rabbeinu Tam who considers everything to be dependent on the garment, there is no concern that one will wear a day garment of linen and ticheiles even at night, because according to R"T a day garment at night is obligated in tzitzis. The concern has to be that if we allow one to put ticheiles on a linen day garment, they will also come to put it on a linen night time garment.

Tosafos (d.h. ticheiles) writes that a linen garment with ticheiles can be worn even at a time and even by a person that is not fulfilling a mitzvah (such as a woman). Tosafos here seems to understand that a daytime garment is exempt from tzitzis at night, like rashi and not rabbeinu tam, yet when worn at night there is no violation of kelayim (against rashi).

The Sha'agas Aryeh (siman 30) asks on Rabbeinu Tam from the gemara in brachos which says that in ma'arava they didn't say the entire parsha of tzitzis at night (only the beginning and end) because there is no mitzvah of tzitzis at night. The Sha'agas Aryeh asks that the mitzvah of tzitzis applies by night as it does by day so long as it is a day garment, so we should be saying the parsha of tzitzis at night? One of the commentaries (printed in the back of the gemara) answers that since night garments are exempt, there is a precedent for the parsha of tzitzis being skipped at night - similar to what rabbeinu tam himself says to justify how it is a time bound mitzvah.

Menachos 35b - Hesech HaDa'as in Tefillin

The gemara learns out that one is obligated to continuously touch their tefillin while wearing them to avoid a "hesech ha'da'as", from the tzitz. The gemara seems to make a real kal v'chomer and regards this as a din d'oraysa. The Shita (5) asks, how then is one allowed to daven or read shema while wearing tefillin, since by concentrating on the davening they will inevitably not be concentrating on the tefillin? He answers that in truth it is a violation of hesech ha'da'as from tefillin, but it is permitted based on the concept of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה. Since he is involved in the mitzvah of concentrating on the davening, he is exempt from the mitzvah to concentrate on the tefillin. The application of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה assumes that the prohibition of having a hesech ha'da'as from tefillin is an outgrowth of a positive mitzvah to concentrate on the tefillin, and is therefore regarded as a mitzvah rather than an issur. The concept of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה would only entitle one to forgo a mitzvah, but not to violate an issur.

The Biur Halacha (44:1) quotes the pri megadim who says that even during davening one's mind should be on the tefillin and not entirely focused on the davening. However, the biur halacha says that the Ari z"l always had his mind on his tefillin even during davening, except during shemoneh esrei and learning Torah, implying that during shemoneh esrei one doesn't need to have their mind on the tefillin. The Biur Halacha quotes a fascinating Ohr Zarua -

וצריך אדם כשהוא לבוש תפילין לזכור שתפילין עליו ולא להסיח דעתו מהם, שלא יישן בהם ולא יפיח בהם, כי מחמת שזוכר שנושא שם הנכבד עליו אינו בא לידי קלות ראש ותופס יראת שמים בלבו וכו' הלכך כשאדם מכוין לבו בתפלתו או בהלכה שלו אין זה היסח הדעת דכל שכן דאיכא יראת השם

The Ohr Zaruah holds that the ikar mitzvah is not to be focused on the tefillin but rather to be focused on yir'as hashem. So long as a person is involved in service of Hashem, such as learning and davening, it isn't considered a hesech ha'da'as even though his mind is not at all on the tefillin. Based on this we don't need the concept of עוסק במצוה to justify how one can concentrate on their davening while wearing tefillin.

In truth, the violation of hesech ha'da'as isn't just a lack of concentration, but would only be violated if one is actively involved in light headed behavior. The Shulchan Aruch (o.c. 44:1) paskens that one may sleep a temporary sleep in their tefillin. The Mishna Berura (3) struggles with the issue of hesech ha'da'as and explains that the violation of hesech ha'da'as is only if one is involved in frivolous or silly behavior, but the absence of concentration on the tefillin doesn't constitute a hesech hada'as. When one is sleeping and has nothing whatsoever on their mind, it isn't considered a hesech hada'as. This approach seems to contradict our gemara. Why would one have to constantly touch tefillin to avoid a hesech hada'as, if the issue of hesech hada'as cannot be violated by a passive unawareness of the tefillin? The M.B. himself deals with this question and explains that we learn from the tzitz that it is forbidden to have a hesech ha'da'as, but the Rabbonon instituted as an ideal to constantly touch their tefillin to avoid one's mind from wandering and leading to improper thoughts. However, the violation is only if one would be actively thinking about other thoughts.

Menachos 34b - Tefillin of Rabbeinu Tam (Rav Moshe's reservation)

The gemara discusses the proper order for the parshiyos of tefillin. Rashi interprets that the order is: קדש, והיה כי יביאך, שמע, והיה אם שמוע. But Rabbeinu Tam disagrees with rashi's reading of the gemara and says that it is קדש, והיה כי יביאך, והיה אם שמוע, שמע. It is interesting to note that even those who wear tefillin of Rabbeinu Tam aren't really fulfilling the mitzvah according to Rabbeinu Tam because Rabbeinu Tam brought in Tosafos 33a holds that the parshiyos have to be lying down in the tefillin, not standing upright, just like he holds by mezuza. It is clear from the gemara by mezuza that if it's placed upright according to Rabbeinu Tam, it is passul. Since Rabbeinu Tam assumes the same halacha should apply to tefillin, the placement of the parshiyos upright would invalidate the tefillin.

Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe O.C. 4:9) was asked by the Lubavitcher Rebbe why he doesn't wear Rabbeinu Tam tefillin. Rav Moshe responds very sharply that the minhag of sofrim in writing tefillin nowadays seems to be against the halacha in the way that they do the פתוחות and סתומות. Rav Moshe explains that when it comes to tefillin of Rashi who everyone agrees is the ikar, we have no choice but to wear what is available. But, regarding R"T, since it is only a chumra, he is only willing to wear it if it is done according to his standards.

To understand R. Moshe's reservation, it is necessary to understand the rules of פתוחות וסתומות. All agree that if the first paragraph would end in the middle of a line with space of 9 letters left and the next parsha begins at the start of the next line, it is a pesucha. All agree that if there is space of 9 letters left in the middle of a line separating between two parshiyos, that is a setuma. If the first parshah doesn't leave space of 9 letters and the second parsha begins at the start of a line but there is a blank line in between, the Rosh considers it a setuma and the Rambam considers it a pesucha. If the first parsha goes to the end of the line and the second begins with an indentation of 9 letters, that is setuma according to the rambam but pesucha according to the Rosh. The halacha is that the parsha of והיה אם שמוע needs to be a setuma. The Shulchan Aruch (32:36) explains that since we can't write them in the same paragraph, it is impossible to do a setuma according to everyone. Therefore, we have no choice but do pick the Rambam or the Rosh. We follow the Rambam and do a setuma by not leaving 9 letters of blank space after שמע and indenting with a space of 9 letters the parsha of והיה אם שמוע. The problem is that the sofrim leave 9 letters of blank space after the parsha of shema AND before והיה אם שמוע. Rav Moshe holds that leaving blank space at the end of the parsha preceeding והיה אם שמוע indicates an interest in making a pesucha, and then indenting at the beginning of והיה אם שמוע indicates a setuma which creates a תרתי דסתרי. He considers this to be a potential p'sul, and wasn't willing to wear Rabbeinu Tam tefillin unless they are makpid not to leave space of 9 letters at the end of the parsha that proceeds והיה אם שמוע (which according to Rabbeinu Tam is והיה כי יביאך).

R. Moshe writes that the source for this custom of leaving 9 letters both at the end of the previous parsha and before והיה אם שמוע comes from the kunteros acharon in shulchan aruch ha'rav where it says in parenthesis that the ba'al hatanya retracted from his original agreement to shulchan aruch and commanded the sofrim to leave space both at the end of the parsha proceeding והיה אם שמוע and at the beginning of והיה אם שמוע. Rav Moshe notes that there is no explanation for such an opinion and strongly rejects it. However, in the very first teshuva printed in the back of the shulchan aruch ha'rav he justifies this position by saying that according to the Rambam that indenting 9 letters in the parsha of והיה אם שמוע creates a setuma, it makes no difference whether in the previous parsha there was space of 9 letters left or not. Apparently, Rav Moshe didn't see this teshuva of the shulchan aruch ha'rav.

Menachos 33a - Halachos of Mezuza

I am posting a link to a kunteros that I plan on publishing one day on hilchos mezuza. In the meantime, click here.

Menachos 30a - Torah Min HaShamayim

The gemara quotes a machlokes whether the last eight pesukim in the sefer torah (from וימת שם משה עבד השם), were written by Yehoshua, or whether Moshe wrote them "in tears" [rashi explains the idea of writing in tears to mean that Moshe normally would repeat back the Torah as he transcribed it to avoid errors, but the last eight pesukim he was too distressed to repeat it and therefore wrote it without repeating it back]. The gemara concludes that this machlokes has very little bearing an anything we do practically because even the opinion who says that it was written by Moshe considers it to be distinct from the rest of the Torah and that it should be read by one person. Therefore, it would seem irrelevant to say that we "pasken" like one opinion rather than the other since there is not halachic debate between them. However, Rabbeinu Bachya (on the pasuk of moshe dying) argues on the Ibn Ezra who says that it was written by Yehoshua. Rabbeinu Bachya writes -

ואינו אמת, ואין פירושו נכון, אבל הנכון להאמין והקבלה האמתית שיש לנו, כי משה כתב התורה כולה מבראשית עד לעיני כל ישראל הכל מפי הגבורה, והנה משה כמעתיק מספר קדמון מתחלה ועד סוף אות באות, וזו היא דעת רבי מאיר (דלא כגירסא שלנו) שאמר אפשר ס"ת חסר אות אחת וכו' ונ"ל שאין לתמוה אם יכתוב משה "וימת שם משה וכו' שהודיע בזה מה שעתיד להיות וכו' שכל הנביאים נוהגים המנהג הזה בדבריהם לדבר עבר במקום עתיד

It seems strange for Rabbeinu Bachya to argue strongly about something which is an earlier Tamudic debate. Clearly, Rabbeiu Bachya understands that the "halacha" is like the latter opinion that we must believe that Moshe wrote the entire Torah beginning to end. Perhaps he understands this from the fact that the gemara tries to fit the statement of Rav with R. Shimon who says that Moshe wrote even the last eight pesukim. Nonetheless, Rabbeinu Bachya considers this opinion to be the prevailing opinion and calls it the קבלה האמתית - the true tradition.

A few months ago I gave a shiur on the topic of Torah Min HaShamayim where I discussed the yesod of the Rambam and what exactly we are obligated to believe - download here. Rav Moshe has a Teshuva where he considers an old sefer to be a forgery due to it's claim that parts of the Torah were inserted after Moshe Rabbeinu. Rav Moshe considers it an unequivocal violation of Torah min HaShamayim to claim that even a single letter in the Torah was written by somoene other than Moshe Rabbeinu (with the exception of the last 8 pesukim which is the discussion in the Talmud).

Menachos 29b - Understanding the Contribution of Rebbi Akiva

The gemara tells us an amazing story where Moshe Rabbeinu watched Rebbi Akiva lecture was "weakened" by Rebbi Akiva's ability and understanding of the Torah. Finally, when Moshe Rabbeinu heard that Rebbi Akiva attributed a halacha to הלכה למשה מסיני, he was comforted.

Throughout the Talmud we are given tidbits of information that can be pieced together like a puzzle to understand the personality of Rebbi Akiva, his accomplishement, and why Moshe Rabbeinu was initially "weakened" and then comforted.

Pesachim 49b - Rebbi Akiva originally had tremendous antagonism toward talmidei chachamim that he wanted to bite them as a donkey would bite crushing the bone.

Avos D'rabbi Nosson (6:2) - Famous story with Rebbi Akiva being inspired by a drop of water that was capable of penetrating a rock through it's continuity.

Nedarim 50a - Rebbi Akiva is sent by his wife to study Torah and returns with 24,000 pair of disciples.

Yevamos 16a - Rebbi Akiva earned a world renowned reputation and impressed Chanina Ben Hurkenos.

Chagiga 14b - Of all the great scholars who were נכנסו לפרדס, Rebbi Akiva is the only one to go out in peace.

Yevamos 62b - Rebbi Akiva's disciples all die for not showing proper respect for one another, he then chooses five of the greatest minds and teaches them Torah. Rebbi Akiva becomes an essential link on the chain of the mesorah.

Makos 23b - Rebbi Akiva has an outlook where he is able to provide hope for the Jewish people by showing that since the bad prophecies have come true, the good one's are also going to come to fruition. The hope he provides is another essential aspect in the survival of klal yisroel.

Brachos 61b - Rebbi Akiva becomes so attached to the Torah that he can't fathom separating from it, and draws the parallel of a fish being taken from water.

Sotah 49a - When Rebbi Akiva dies, "kavod ha'torah" is gone. This refers to his ability referenced in Menachos to be able to darshen every letter and every "crown" of the letter, displaying the depth and greatness of the Torah.

Sanhedrin 86a - Stam mishna, tosefta, sifra and sifri are all אליבא דרבי עקיבא. Rebbi Akiva is responsible for the existence of Torah sh'bal peh.

In a nutshell, Rebbi Akiva begins from nothing with tremendous animosity toward Torah scholars. He is inspired by water being able to penetrate a rock, that it could also penetrate him. He is sent by his wife to study and spends double the time alloted studying Torah until he returns with 24,000 students. Aside from earning a world renowned reputation, he becomes so attached to the Torah that he compares himself to a fish being removed from water and proudly sacrifices his life for Torah. His ultimate accomplishment is being responsible for the continuation of klal yisroel by providing hope, and being a major link in the chain of Torah sh'bal peh and showing the depth of Torah in that there is much to learn from even the crowns on the letters.

The Shita Mikubetzes (kesubos 40a) says that the disciples of Rebbi Akiva who follow his opinion are called the praiseworthy of the scholars - ורבי עקיבא היה להם במקום משה רבינו אדון הנביאים לפי שהיה כבר נשתכח תורה שבעל פה עד שבא הוא ושנאה.

What specifically was Rebbi Akiva's contribution to Torah?

Ohr HaChaim (Vayikra 13:37) explains that although Moshe Rabbeinu had the tradition of how to interpret Torah She'biksav, such as the understanding of what G-d means by a פרי עץ הדר and correctly being able to identify it as an esrog (as the Rambam writes in his preface to his commentary on mishna), Moshe Rabbeinu didn't merit being able to bridge and connect the Torah Sh'bal peh with Torah She'biksav. Both were given to Moshe mi'sinai, but each as a separate corpus. The person who would be able to connect them had to be someone who was built from nothing and attached himself to the Torah so that he was inseparable. Rebbi Akiva was exactly that, therefore he merited to be the first to connect Torah shebiksav and Torah she'bal peh and show how much of the oral torah is hinted to within the written Torah. This is why Moshe Rabbeinu feels so "weak" upon seeing Rebbi Akiva able to darshen the crowns.

When Moshe Rabbeinu sees that his entire accomplishment which was the transmission of the oral torah became unnecessary because Rebbi Akiva was able to draw it all from the written torah directly, he had tremendous חלישות הדעת to the point where he felt that the Torah should have been given by Rebbi Akiva instead of himself. It is only upon hearing that even Rebbi Akiva had to answer something by saying it is a הלכה למשה מסיני and cannot be extracted from Torah she'biksav does Moshe Rabbeinu realize that he himself is the most important link in the chain of the mesorah being the one who brought down Torah sh'bal peh from heaven. It was only through the הלכה למשה מסיני being transmitted initially by Moshe, that Rebbi Akiva had the tools to show how many of them are hinted to within the written Torah itself.

Menachos 28a - Menorah

The gemara identifies 4 features of the menorah, and explains that none of them are essential (under certain circumstances). 1. Gold. 2. Kikar (quantity) of metal. 3. gevi'im, kaftorim and perachim 4. Hammered from a solid piece. The gemara says that the last three requirements are all dependent on the first. If made of gold, it must contain a kikar, must have gevi'im kaftorim and perachim, and must be hammered from a solid piece. But, if made from other metals, none of these requirements are necessary.

The Mishna L'melech (Beis HaBechira 3:4) in explaining the Rambam writes that the latter 3 requirements are contingent on it being gold, but when not of gold we treat each of these requirements slightly differently. The requirement of a kikar doesn't apply at all when made out of other metals. One can choose to use a kikar of silver, or more or less. The requirement of gevi'im kaftorim and perachim doesn't apply and is actually forbidden. One is not allowed to make these designs on any menorah made from materials other than gold (unlike rashi d.h. eina, who says that one doesn't need to put these designs into the menorah but is allowed to). Finally, the requirement of being hammered out from a solid piece, is preferable even when made from other materials but not essential. All these points are deduced from the language of the Rambam. On the first point of not requiring a kikar he derives from the language אין מקפידין על משקלה that it makes no difference. On the second point of gevi'im kaftorim and perachim he derives from the language אין עושין בה גביעים כפתורים ופרחים that one is not allowed to make them on a menorah of another material. The third point that it should be hammered out but doesn't need to be, is derived from the Rambam who says ואם היתה חלולה כשרה. The Kesef Mishneh explains that the Rambam means to say that it can be hollow, meaning that it need not be hammered out, but the Mishneh L'melech understands that ideally it should be hammered out even when made from other materials.

After all these halachos, the Rambam writes in halacha 5 - ואין עושין אותה לעולם מן הגרוטאות בין שהיתה של זהב בין שהיתה של שאר מיני מתכות. The mishneh l'melech understands that this is only lichatchila because the requirement of being hammered out is tantamount to the requirement of not being made from small pieces of metal. The source of not using גרוטאות is the word "miksha" which requires it to be hammered out. Since the Rambam holds that the requirement to hammer out is only lichatchila, so the problem with using small pieces of metal is only lichatchila. The approach of the mishna l'melech doesn't fit into the language of the Rambam. The Rambam seems to write clearly that even a menorah constructed of other material is passul if made from small pieces of metal. The Rambam seems to understand that the term מקשה has a double implication - 1. hammered, 2. not using multiple pieces. Although the gemara says that the din of מקשה only applies to gold, the Rambam understands that to refer to the requirement to hammer and therefore allows it to be hollow (which cannot be hammered). BUT the problem with making it from גרוטאות, small pieces of metal, which is derived from the term miksha, the Rambam considers to apply even to a menorah made from other metals.

The gemara 28b says that the menorah of chashmonaim was made of שפודים. Tosafos says that they weren't actually poles, probably because that would be a violation of making it out of multiple pieces of metal, just that they didn't have the gevi'im kaftorim and perachim since it wasn't from gold. The Ben Aryeh (back of gemara) says that the pesikta (2) impli8es that it was actually made of poles of metal. He explains that according to the Mishnah L'melech's understanding of the Rambam that using pieces of metal is only a problem lichatchila, the menorah of the chashmonaim may literally have been made from poles. However, according to my understanding of the Rambam that גרוטאות are passul, the Rambam would have to agree with Tosafos that the menorah of the chashmonaim wasn't actually made from שפודים. It was made from one piece just that it didn't have the gevi'im kaftorim and perachim.

Menachos 27a - Taking all 4 species at once

The gemara learns from the pasuk ולקחתם that one can only fulfill the mitzvah of taking the 4 species if it is "complete", meaning that he must have them all. However, the gemara qualifies this by saying that so long as he has all 4, the taking need not be "complete". Tosafos quotes a machlokes between the Be'hag and Rabbeinu Tam about what this means. The Be'hag says that one can fulfill the mitzvah even by picking up one after another, whereas Rabbeinu Tam says that they must all be picked up together just that they don't need to be bound together. Tosafos writes that according to all opinions it is still considered a beautification of the mitzvah to bind them together (as the gemara writes explicitly), but not necessary to fulfill the obligation (since we don't pasken like R. Yehuda). Rashi seems to hold like Rabbeinu Tam because he says that as long as you have all 4 "even if they aren't bound togehter" you are yotzei, implying that they must be lifted up together.

In Shulchan Aruch (651:12) the mechaber paskens like the be'hag that they don't need to be picked up together, not like rashi and rabbeinu tam. The Rama comments on this ובלבד שיהיו כולם לפניו (from the Rosh). The Sha'ar Hatziyun (67) cites a machlokes between the pri megadim and the gr"a why the Rama requires all four to be on the table in front of him. The Pri Megadim holds that one can fulfill his obligation so long as he owns all four at the time he picks up the first. The advantage of being all on the table in front of him is only in regard to the bracha so that he won't have to interrupt. However, the Gr"a explains that it isn't merely a consideration for the bracha but rather part of the requirement of לקיחה תמה that all 4 minim be in front of him and ready to be picked up at the time he picks up the first. According to the gr"a if one one a lulav here and an esrog in a different place he wouldn't be yotzei by picking up one and then the other, even according to the be'hag.

Menachos 24a - Tziruf Keli

The gemara asks whether a keli combines the two half עשרון that are in it even though they aren't touching. The gemara then questions whether one can take a kemitza from one half עשרון that is in a keli with the other half but isn't touching - the gemara understands that this question is fundamentally whether the concept of tziruf keli is d'oraysa or d'rabonon. The Rambam (Hil. Pesulei HaMukdashin 11:23) paskens that it is a safeik whether one can take the kemitzah on a half עשרון and have it count for the other half. The Steipler (kehilas ya'acov 16) asks, why does the Rambam consider this a safeik? The gemara makes it very clear that the only possibility of the kemitzah on one half working for the other is if tziruk keli would be d'oraysa, but the problem is that the Rambam himself paskens (sha'ar avos ha'tuma 12:7) that tziruf keli is only d'rabonon. Therefore, the Rambam should have paskened that a kemitza on one half definitely doesn't work for the other?

The steipler explains that the concept of tziruf keli in the world of tu'mah is very different from the concept of tziruk keli to allow kemitzah from one half on the other. To allow kemitzah the tziruf keli wouldn't have to consider the two halves to be one unit, because kemtiza is always done from flour that is not really one "gush" or unit. The concept of tziruf keli for kemitza would only require that we consider the two parts to be together, but the concept of tziruk keli for tu'mah would literally have to consider them as one unit. Therefore, the rambam can pasken in hilchos tu'mah that tziruk keli is only d'rabonon, yet have a safeik whether kemitzah on one half עשרון works for the other since for this purpose the tizruf keli may be d'oraysa.

Menachos 20a - Salting Korbanos

Apologies for the long break.....

The gemara says that both according to R. Yehuda and R. Shimon it is essential to salt korbanos, but discusses the opinion of the tana of our mishna. Rav Yosef says that according to the mishna 18a the salting of korbanos is the proper method of sacrificing a korban, but the korban is kasher even without it. Abaye argues and says that the mishna only allows the salting to be done by a zar (non-kohen), but must be done. To that R. Yosef responds וכי תעלה על דעתך שזר קרב לגבי מזבח. The implication of Rav Yosef's statement is that a zar can never do melicha because the melicha must be done on the top of the mizbeiach and a zar cannot approach the mizbeiach to salt the korban.

The simple understanding of the gemara is that the only place that the salting can be done is at the top of the mizbeiach. If melicha could be done before the korban is brought up on the mizbeiach it would certainly be possible for a zar to do the melicha and the tana of our mishna could be saying that if done by a zar it is kasher. This would undermine Rav Yosef's entire response to Abaye! The conclusion we must draw from Rav Yosef's response is that the only place that melicha is kasher is on top of the mizbeiach.

The Minchas Chinuch (119) says that although the Rambam writes that melicha is done at the top of the mizbeiach, if it would be done elsewhere it would be sufficient. There is no particular mitzvah to salt it while it is on the mizbeiach, rather the mitzvah is to salt it right before it is burnt, but if done earlier it is also sufficient. The Minchas Chinuch's approach seems to undermine the entire response of Rav Yosef. If it were possible to do melicha prior to bringing up the korban, it would certainly be possible for a non-kohein to do it, and the tana of the mishna would be saying that it is kasher when done by a zar prior to being brought up?

The Shita Mikubetzes (1) asks a different question, but based on his approach we can explain the minchas chinuch's assumption. Although it is forbidden for a zar to go up on the mizbeiach, the tana of the mishna may still be saying that if a zar would ascend the mizbeiach and do the melicha, it is kasher. Why does Rav Yosef assume that the inability of the zar to ascend would invalidate the melicha if a zar does ascend to salt the korban? The Shita Mikubetzes explains that the real problem with the zar doing the salting is that the salting must be done after the kemitzah, and any avodah that comes after the kemitza MUST be done by a kohein. The phrase of "is it possible that a zar would ascend the mizbeiach" is inaccurately focusing on ascending the mizbeiach, but is rather an expression to say that at this stage it is impossible for a zar to be able to do the melicha. Therefore, Rav Yosef argues that the mishna could not possibly be permitting melicha to be done by a zar since it comes after the kemitzah. According to this approach, we cannot prove that melicha must be done on the top of the mizbeiach because that was just an expression to say that the zar cannot be kasher to do melicha.

In conclusion, Abaye and Rav Yosef argue whether the tanna of our mishna is saying that melicha isn't me'akev, or that it is me'akev but can be done by a zar. However, according to R. Yehuda and R. Shimon it is certainly me'akev. The Rambam (Hil. Issurei Mizbeiach 5:12) paskens that melicha isn't me'akeiv any korban except for the kometz of the mincha where it is me'akeiv. Regarding the issue of melicha being done by a zar, the Minchas Chinuch cites a contradiction between the Rambam (Pesulei Hamukdashin 11:7) where he says that melicha is kasher by a zar, and the Ramabam (Bias Mikdash 9:5) where he says that it would be pasul if done by a zar. The Shita Mikubetzes that we quoted above clearly holds that it is pasul since it is after the kemitzah, but the Ramban (vayikra 2:12) holds that it is kasher.

Menachos 8a - Tafel more Chamur than Ikar

The gemara says that if one does the kemitza of a korban mincha inside the heichal, it is kasher because we learn from the bazichin removed from the shulchan every week which is similar to kemitzah of a mincha that it can be done in the heichal. Tosafos asks, why does the gemara have to learn from bazichin rather than just using the same logic used to permit eating kodshim inside the heichal (when goyim surround the azara and make it unaccessible) which is שלא יהא הטפל חמור מן העיקר. Tosafos explains that the sevara of the tafel (courtyard) not be better than the ikar (heichal) only applies to cases where the pasuk explicitly says that it should be eaten פתח אוהל מועד or בחצר אוהל מועד, implying that the right to eat it there is connected to the ohel mo'ed. But when there is no indication that there is a connection to the ohel mo'ed, we don't use that concept.

The gemara 8b asks why we require a special passuk to permit the eating of kodshei kodshim in the heichal when the courtyard is unaccessible - why don't we just use the sevara of שלא יהא הטפל חמור מן העיקר? The gemara answers that this logic would only apply to an avoda but not to eating since eating is inappropriate to do in the presence of the shechina. Rashi explains that when the gemara asked the question it thought that the pasuk is necessary to teach that the p'sul of יוצא would only apply if the kodshei kodshim was transported further out, not closer in to the heichal. The gemara asked that this idea can certainly be derived from the logic of שלא יהא הטפל חמור מן העיקר. Therefore the gemara concludes that the fact that the kodshei kodshim doesn't become pasul when being brought into the heichal is in fact learned from the sevara of שלא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר, but the right to eat inside the azara which would seem inappropriate to do in the presence of the shechina, requires a special pasuk.

From Rashi's approach we learn that the sevara of שלא יהא הטפל חמור מן העיקר tells us 2 different dinim. 1. avoda that can be done in the courtyard, can be done in the heichal. 2. when there is a p'sul of removing something from the courtyard i.e. יוצא, it wouldn't apply to the heichal. However, the eating of kodshim in the heichal isn't learned from this sevara and requires a pasuk. The Brisker Rav discusses whether the pasuk is mechadesh that it is mutar to eat kodshim in the heichal under extenuating circumstances (rashi) or whether it is to teach that one fulfills the mitzvah of eating kodshim even when it is done in the heichal (rambam).

Menachos 6a - Treifa passul for a korban

After a long discussion as to why we require a special pasuk to invalidate a treifa for a korban, the gemara concludes that there are actually three pesukim that come for this purpose. First, the pasuk of משקה ישראל teaches that only something which is mutar to eat can be brought as a korban, but the limitation of this drasha is to something similar to orla and kilei hakerem that never had a moment when they were permitted. The second pasuk is the pasuk of ma'aser b'eheima מכל אשר יעבר תחת השבט which excludes treifa that doesn't have enough life to pass, but the limitation of this pasuk is that it would only exclude a treifa that was a treifa prior to becoming hekdesh. Therefore we require a third pasuk of מן הבקר to exclude even a treifa that became a treifa after it was already hekdesh.

The Netziv in Meromei Sadeh uses this gemara to explain a Rambam. The Rambam (Issurei Mizbeiach 5:9) writes that produce which has not been tithed is unfit for the wine pouring because it is a מצוה הבאה בעבירה. The difficulty is that the gemara in pesachim 48a explicitly excludes this from the pasuk of משקה ישראל from which we darshen מן המותר לישראל that it has to be fit to eat. Why does the Rambam need to invalidate it using the concept of מצוה הבאה בעבירה?

The Netziv explains that from our gemara we learn that although the drasha of ממשקה ישראל - מן המותר לישראל is a real drasha m'doryasa, it only applies to things similar to orlah and kilei hakerem that never had and never will be mutar. We can't exclude from this pasuk anything that had a sha'as ha'kosher (was mutar) or anything that will have a sha'as hakosher (will be mutar after tithing). Therefore, the gemara in pesachim that uses this pasuk to exclude tevel must only be an esmachta, not a real drasha. That is why the Rambam has to use the concept of mitzvah haba'ah b'averia to exclude tevel, rather than using the pasuk of משקה ישראל.

Zevachim 114b - Mechusar Z'man

The mishna discusses various cases of me'chusar z'man and cites a machlokes between the Rabbonon and Rav Shimon whether there is a violation of schechting outside the beis hamikdash when at the moment it is unfit to be brought as a korban inside. The implication is that if one were to be makdish an animal that is me'chusar z'man (either before the 8th day or the day that the mother was schechter) or a bird that is me'chusar z'man (Torim before they are old enough), the hekdesh status would be binding. Tosafos (d.h. heter) questions this because the gemara 12a says that only the night before the 8th day can one be makdish it, which implies that before that time the kedusha status wouldn't take effect. Tosafos concludes that although there is a prohibition to be makdish an animal that is me'chusar z'man, the kedusha status would indeed take effect. Tosafos writes that even according to Rava in Temura 4b who says that when the Torah says not to do something it is generally not binding, this would be an exception to the rule - the makdish would be in violation even though the hekdesh will take effect.

The Minchas Chinuch (293) says that the Rambam seems to concur with Tosafos on this point. The Rambam (Ma'aseh Korbanos 18:10) compares being makdish an animal before the 8th day to being makdish a ba'al mum. Therefore, just as by being makdish a ba'al mum the status is binding, so too being makdish a mechusar z'man the status is binding (others assume that according to the rambam the hekdesh isn't binding). However, Rashi in Bechoros 21b (d.h. lei'lif) understands that the hekdesh isn't binding at all. The Shita Mikubetzes (zevachim 12a) also writes that before the night of day 8, the kedusha will not be binding. He questions how kedusha can be binding an a fetus, it should be no better than me'chusar z'man? The Shita Mikubetzes answers that kedusha of the fetus is binding together with the mother, or that the p'sul of mechusar z'man only begins at a time when it is fit to be sacrificed - at birth.

Zevachim 112b - Stages of Mishkan

The mishna teaches about the stages of the mishkan and the associated halachos.

There were 5 stages:

1. Pre-Mishkan - All bamos were permitted everywhere and avoda was done by bechoros.

2. Mishkan in midbar - Bamos were forbidden and avoda switched to kohanim. Kodshei kodshim could be eaten inside the curtains and kodshim kalim within the camp of Yisroel.

3. Mishkan in gilgal - For the 14 years that they were dividing and conquering, the mishkan was in gilgal. During this period they were allowed to build private bamos and anyone could sacrifice on them - kohein, bechor and even a zar. Kodeshi kodshim had to remain within the curtains of the mishkan, but kodshim kalim could be eaten anywhere. Rashi explains that since the degalim (camping according to tribe) was no longer in tact, and they were scattered around E.Y. to conquer, the kedusha of the machane yisroel was lost. Rashi seems to understand that the obligation to eat kodshim in machaneh yisroel only exists when there is status of machaneh yisroel. However, the Rambam (pirush hamishna) writes that the reason that we don't restrict kodshim kalim to be eaten only in Jewish cities (as it does by nov and givon) is that they didn't have cities under their control yet. The implication of the Rambam is that since they didn't have specific cities yet, the status that enabled them to eat kodshim extended throughout E.Y. wherever they were trying to conquer. This seems very different that Rashi who writes that during the time the status was void thereby allowing them to eat everywhere, presumably even in chutz la'aretz.

4. Mishkan in Shilo - Mishkan stood in Shilo as a stone structure with a curtained roof for 369 years. Bamos were no longer allowed and all korbanos had to be associated with the mishkan in shilo. Being that kedusha that emanated from the mishkan didn't extend to the city Shilo and didn't infuse it with any inherent kedusha status (in this respect it wasn't like yerushalyim), they were able to eat kodshim so long as the mishkan was visible from where they were. Rambam (pirush hamishna) writes: ואין ספק שהנביאים שראו אותו הבית עשו זה ולמדוהו וסמכו זה למה שנאמר פן תעלה עולותיך בכל מקום אשר תראה וכו' אבל אתה אוכל בכל מקום שאתה רואה. The Rambam seems to understand that this requirement was an institution of the nevi'im, not a Torah mandate. They merely use the pasuk as hint to their institution. However, the simple reading of the gemara 118a is that this is d'oraysa.

5. Mishkan in Nov and Givon - The mishkan was in nov and givon for a combined 57 years. During this time bamos were once again permitted. Kodshim kalim was able to be eaten in all Jewish cities.

6. Mikdash in Yerushalayim - All bamos became forbidden forever and kodshim kalim had to be eaten within the wall of Jerusalem.

Zevachim 110b - Nisuch HaMayim D'oraysa

The gemara discusses whether the water that is poured on Succos (although the gemara implies that according to R. Akiva it is done even at other times of the year, but tosafos rejects this) is d'oraysa. The gemara concludes that it is in fact a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai. Tosafos (d.h. ishtamitsei) discusses whether there is any opinion who holds that it is merely d'rabonon. Tosafos says that according to the opinion that it is d'rabonon, it seems strange that chazal would institute a service done in the beis hamikdash with non-kodesh material. If the prohibition of bringing chulin into the azara is d'oraysa, they shouldn't have the ability to institute this, but even if it is only d'rabonon, Tosafos asks that it is awkward that they would institute bringing a service of pouring chulin water in the azara? Tosafos answers that since they were about to enter the rain season, they instituted this service as a means of mentioning the importance of rain from Hashem. It seems that this approach would only work to explain why they would do something so awkward as institute the bringing of chulin in the azara. But, according to the opinion that it is d'orasya, it would seem that chazal don't have the ability to institute nisuch hamayim, and that opinion would have to hold that it is d'oraysa.

Another point that comes out of this gemara is that although the Rambam writes that halacha l'moshe misinai cannot be debatable and there cannot be machlokes about it, here we have an example of halacha l'moshe mi'sinai on which there is a debate because there is an opinion who holds that it is not a halacha l'moshe mi'sinai and therefore only d'rabbonon.

Zevachim 104b - Ibur Tzurah for Kodshim that became passul m'safeik

The Rambam (pesulei hamukdashin 19:2) writes that any korban that is questionable whether it became passul, requires עבור צורה before burning it - meaning that it must sit overnight which renders it passul as no'sar, and then it can be burned. However, the gemara poses a series of questions whether the פרים הנשרפין would become passul such as whether their is a p'sul of sitting overnight, whether there is a p'sul of being taken out of the courtyard and when part of if was taken out together with the majority of one of the limbs. The Rambam paskens that since the gemara leaves with a תיקו in all these cases, we have to be machmir to assume that they became passul and are burned in the courtyard (which is where you burn kodshim that became passul). The Rambam then adds that although when there is a safeik whether it became passul it would normally require עיבור צורה which means to sit overnight, that is only by regular kodshim that is not supposed to be burned and is therefore considered degrading to burn it. But, the פרים ושעירים הנשרפים which are supposed to be burned even if they didn't become passul, the only issue is where to burn them, do not require עיבור צורה [since they are supposed to be burned anyway, the burning of them isn't considered a בזיון קדשים - kesef mishnah quoting maha'ri kurkos].

The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 143) raises an interesting question. Normally the function of עיבור צורה is that since until now it is only questionably passul, we can't burn it until עיבור צורה which makes it definitively passul. However, since one of the question in the gemara is whether sitting overnight would create a status of no'sar invalidating the פרים הנשרפין, the concept of עיבור צורה doesn't apply. The Rambam shouldn't need to give the answer that he gives, rather he should say that sitting overnight doesn't accomplish anything by these korbanos - why would it help to sit overnight since one way or the other it would only be questionable whether it became passul? The Minchas Chinuch answers that since there is another safeik whether it became passul, sitting overnight would be an additional safeik. There would be reason to wait another night so that there is a double safeik whether it became passul before burning it, and that is why the Rambam had to say that the reason it doesn't need עיבור צורה is because even if it is kasher it is meant to be burnt so that the burning isn't degrading for it. The difficulty with the answer of the Minchas Chinuch is that the Rambam seems to require the reason that he gives even for the case where it already sat overnight. In the case where it sat overnight, it certainly wouldn't accomplish anything to let it sit overnight again, yet the Rambam gives his reason as to why it would be burnt immediately.

Zevachim 102a - Moshe Rabbeinu a King

The gemara says that Elisheva the wife of Aharon had a husband who was kohein gadol and a brother in law who had the status of a king. The gemara questions whether Moshe had status of a Kohein Gadol also, and ends up with a machlokes tana'im, but all agree that he had the status of a king. Even Ulah who says that Moshe wanted to be king but was never granted rights to be king, concludes that he himself was king but it wasn't bequeathed to his children. The idea that Moshe had status of a king is also confirmed by the gemara in Shavuos that15a that to give kedusha to the mishkan there had to be a king and a navi - rashi explains that moshe had status of both a king and a navi. Rashi in Bamidbar (10:2) on the pasuk of making trumpets says that they should blow before Moshe "like a king, as it says ויהי בישרון מלך" (although Rashi in Devorim (33:5) doesn't explain that the pasuk refers to Moshe).

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Dibros Moshe, Kiddushin Hearos on daf 37, heara 57 - pg. 542) raises a question. Although the pasuk refers to Moshe as a king, he didn't seem to act as a king. A king cannot forgo on his honor, yet we find that Moshe was willing to go to Dasan and Aviram and forgo his kavod to stop the machlokes. Furthermore, we find in Yoma 3 that according to R. Yoshiah the trumpets had to be paid for by Moshe himself - why would something that is there to honor the king have to be paid for by the king?

Rav Moshe Feinstein explains that Moshe's status as king was very different than a regular king. He wasn't formally appointed as king by klal yisroel or by Hashem. Actually Moshe says in parshas ba'haloscha כי תאמר אלי שאהו בחיקך כאשר ישא האומן את היונק and Rashi comments that Moshe had to take responsibility over klal yisroel and tolerate their nasty comments with very thick skin. This behavior is very not king-like, rather very shepherd-like (although Rambam in Melachim 2:6) explains that a Jewish king is essentially a shepherd, that is only to do the actions of a shepherd but not to tolerate the lack of respect). Therefore, Moshe' status as king resulted from his mastery of Torah. As Chazal say מאן מלכי? רבנן. When one Torah scholar stands above the rest in his generation, he has status as king in the sense that all are subject to his p'sak. Since Moshe's status as king wasn't by appointment, rather from the fact that he was the greatest Torah scholar - משה רבינו, Hashem wanted trumpets blown to honor him, but didn't want him to receive benefit from his Torah and therefore insisted that Moshe pay for the trumpets himself.

With this Rav Moshe explains that gemara in Kiddushin 33b says that one must stand for a Nassi until he is no longer visible as we see that they stood for moshe until he reached his tent (parshas ki tisa) - Rashi comments: Moshe was a Nassi. The Mitzpeh Eisan asks that Moshe was more than a Nassi, he was a king. How can we learn from Moshe that this halacha even applies to a Nassi? Rav Moshe explains that Moshe's status as king came from his Torah. The greatest Torah scholar of the generation is the Nassi. Although Moshe was able to rise above the standard title of Nassi to be king because he was רבן של כל ישראל, the level of kavod owed to him was that of a Nassi since the source of his status of kavod is the same as a Nassi. That is why Moshe was able to be mochel on his kavod.

It seems to me that Rav Moshe Feinstein's approach is also found in the Ibn Ezra in Devorim (33:5) on the pasuk of ויהי בישרון מלך where he writes:

הוא משה, ששמעו ראשי עם התורה מפורשת מפיו, והטעם כי הוא היה כמלך והתאספו אליו ראשי השבטים

The Ibn Ezra understands that the king refers to Moshe because he taught Torah to klal yisroel. With the approach of Rav Moshe Feinstein that regarding kavod Moshe's status was limited to that of a Nassi and he was able to be mochel and forgo his honor, we can understand rashi in parshas yisro. Rashi explains the pasuk that says Aharon and the elders joined Yisro to eat bread - where was moshe? Moshe was standing and serving. How can Moshe be mochel on his kavod to serve Yisro since a king can't be mochel on his kavod? Clearly, regarding the kavod due to Moshe his status was that of a Nassi, not a king.

Zevachim 98b - Chatzitza

The gemara assumes that when a person is accustomed to doing something that causes stains, they aren't makpid about those stains and therefore they aren't considered a chatzitza. Therefore, blood isn't considered a chatzitza on the clothes of a butcher and wax isn't considered a chatzitza on the clothing of a wax merchant. But, the gemara is clear that wax would be a chatzitza on butcher and blood would be chatzitza on the clothes of a wax merchant, because only the exact item that they are involved in wouldn't be a chatzitza. The gemara then questions when one is a butcher and a wax merchant and has both blood and wax on his clothes, is it considered a chatzitzah. Perhaps each one independently isn't a chatzitza but the combination of the two at the same time is significantly degrading and qualifies as a chatzitza, or not? The gemara leaves with a teiku.

The Rama (Y.D. 198:17) writes that one who is a shochet or butcher who's hands are always bloody, blood would not be a chatzitza for them since most people of that type aren't makpid about blood. The Beis Hillel (gilyon of shulchan aruch) says that if a woman was a writer and dyer, and she has both ink and dye on her when she goes to the mikva, she must go again. The rationale is that the gemara remains with a teiku about a combination of two substances even when the person is involved in both occupations, and therefore it is necessary to be machmir. The Sidrei Tahara (Shiyurei Tahara 34) quotes this agrees with the Beis Hillel because the Rambam (Mikvaos perek 3) concludes that it is a safeik, and so does the magen avrohom (161:7). It seems that the poskim are machmir even though the chatzitza is only on part of her body or even a small amount on part of her hand, since we have a safeik whether she is makpid. Why don't we say that since it is only a mi'ut which is d'rabonon, and we have a safeik about whether she is makpid, it would be a safeik d'rabonon and we can be meikel to say that it doesn't qualify as a chatzitza?

Zevachim 97b - Aseh Doesn't Push off a Lo Ta'aseh in the Mikdash

In my sefer, Nasiach B'chukecha, I have a lot of discussion about this gemara from many different perspectives. The gemara asks that an aseh of eating kodshim should push off the lo ta'aseh not to eat the issur absorbed in it. This compels Rava to introduce a new concept that aseh doesn't push off lo ta'aseh in the mikdash and he supports this from the fact that the aseh to eat korban pesach (which includes the marrow in the bone) doesn't push off the lo ta'aseh to break the bone. Rav Ashi answers that the prohibition to eat the absorbed issur is actually an aseh in addition to the lo ta'aseh, and an aseh doesn't push off a lo ta'aseh.

1. Tosafos asks how can the mitzvah to eat korban pesach push off the lo ta'aseh not to break the bone since they aren't happening simultaneously. Piskei Tosafos answers that since the aseh can't be fulfilled any other way, it pushes off the lo ta'aseh even though it isn't simultaneous. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 224 for more discussion.

2. Just as we don't apply the concept of aseh pushing off a lo ta'aseh to allow one to eat matza that is made with tevel flour, we shouldn't allow the mitzvah of eating kodshim to push off the lo ta'aseh of eating the absorbed issur. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 237 for a discussion about this issue and a fascinating yesod from the ohr sameiach. Also, in my additions to the sefer I pointed out that the Keren Orah addresses this question and offers two approaches (See hebrew text below).

3. The mitzvah is to eat the kasher kodshim, the issur is not to eat what is absorbed in it. Even though the issur and mitzvah are not in the same item (they just happen to be mixed) we apply the concept of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 239.

4. Do Rava and Rav Ashi argue about the concept of an aseh not pushing off a lo ta'aseh in the mikdash? Also, is the rationale that a lo ta'aseh in the mikdash is too strong to be pushed off, or that an aseh in the mikdash is not strong enough to push off a lo ta'aeh. See Nasiach B'chukecha pg. 243. See also Keren Orah (first one on 97b).

Regarding the distinction between matzah of issur and kodshim that has issur absorbed in it, see below:

הבאתי בפנים חידושו של האור שמח דלעולם לא מצינו שיש מצות עשה על האדם לאכול דבר האסור לו, דכל שאכילתו נמנעת מחפץ השם לא שייך שיהיה עליו מצוה לאכלו. והביא דמיון לזה מהא דאיתא בזבחים צז ע"ב דקפריך ליתי עשה דאכילת קדשים וידחה ל"ת דאכילת הפסול הבלוע בו, דכיון שאין העשה על עיקרו של שומן הפסול אלא הבשר הכשר שהפסול נבלע בו, שפיר שייך עשה דוחה ל"ת. שוב מצאתי בקרן אורה (זבחים צז ע"ב) שהרגיש בזה דמאי פריך ליתי עשה דאכילת כשר ולידחי ל"ת דפסול הבלוע הא מצוה הבאה בעבירה היא כמבואר ברמב"ם דאין יוצאין ידי חובת מצה במצה של איסור, וא"כ מאי שנא קדשים ממצה. וכתב לחלק בב' אופנים. חדא כעין חילוקו של האו"ש דדוקא בדבר שאסור מצד עצמו כמו טבל כיון דהוא אכילת איסור אין עליו מצות עשה "כיון שאסרתו תורה באכילה היכי נאמר דמצוה לאוכלו" אבל הכא דלא נאסר רק מחמת הבלוע בו שפיר אמרינן דעשה דוחה ל"ת. ולפי"ז היה יוצא דמצה הבלוע בו דבר האסור אתי עשה ודחי ל"ת, וכתב הקרן אורה דזו לא שמענו. עוד כתב לחלק דעשה דמצה לא דמי לאכילת קדשים, דעשה דאכילת קדשים מוטל על גוף הזבח משא"כ מצות אכילת מצה הוא על הגברא ואינו מיוחד למצה שבלע איסור. ולכן במצה שהיא אסורה לו אף כשהאיסור רק מצד הבליעה אסור לאכלו כיון שאין המצוה לאכול מצה האסורה המוטלת לפניו. אבל באכילת זבח שאין המצוה על הגברא אלא שתהא הקרבן נאכלת אלימא העשה לדחות האיסור. ולפי"ז אף לפי מה דמסיק רבא דאין עשה דוחה ל"ת שבמקדש, וגם לפי מה דמסיק רב אשי שבאכילת הפסול הבלוע איכא לאו ועשה, מ"מ קדשים שנבלע איסור דעלמא שלא שייך למקדש ואין עליו אלא לאו גרידא, אתי עשה דאכילת קדשים ודחי לא תעשה של אכילת איסור הבלוע בו.

Zevachim 96b - Hag'ola with Liquids Other Than Water

The Rama in Hilchos Pesach (452:5) quotes the machlokes Ramban and Rashba whether hag'ola can be done using other liquids or whether it must be done specifically with water. The Rama writes that you cannot do hag'ola with any liquid other than water, but bidieved it works even if done with other liquids. The Gr"a points out that our gemara seems to contradict the Ramban because when the gemara tries to figure out the distinction between hag'ola and merika u'shetifa, Rava suggests that the difference is whether one must use water. By merika u'shetifa the Torah explicitly writes ואם בכלי נחושת בשלה ומורק ושטף במים (vayikra 6:26), insisting on water. But for hag'ola one can even use wine. Clearly we see that other liquids are acceptable for hag'ola? The Gr"a says that according to the Ramban we must say that only wine would be acceptable for hag'ola but no other liquid. Or perhaps we pasken like the other distinctions that the gemara makes between hag'ola and merika u'shetifa, not like the Rava. Although the Rama says that bidieved we can rely on kashering using other liquids, R. Akiva Eiger (Teshuvos 83) explains that once food has been cooked in a pot that has been kashered using another liquid the food can be eaten, however one cannot lichatchila cook in a pot that was kashered using another liquid. However, in situations where there is no possibility of kashering with water we can use other liquids since sha'as had'chak is like a bidieved. R. Moshe (Igros Moshe Y.D. 2:41) proves that the Rashba is correct and that other liquids can be used from the gemara in avoda zara 76a (which is also quoted in the gemara zevachim 97a) where each day of cooking a korban shelamim served as a hag'ola for the previous days korban that was cooked in that pot and prevents the absorbed food from becoming no'sar. The cooking of korban meat qualifies as "other liquids", not water, yet it seems to be an acceptable method of hag'ola. One example when it is necessary to kasher using other liquids is in a chocolate factory. Chocolate is very sensitive to water and can be ruined by even a small amount of moisture. Therefore, the only way to kasher from non-kosher (or non cholov yisroel) chocolate would be to do a run of kosher chocolate on the machine, and consider the first run to be non-kosher since it is used as the kashering run.

Raba Bar Ula says that the distinction between hag'ola and merika u'shetifa is that for merika u'shetifa the vessel must be rinsed in cold water after the hag'ola. Tosafos points out that when one kashers using hag'ola it isn't necessary to rinse the utensil in cold water after kashering, but concludes that the minhag is to do so. This is also recorded in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 452:7) that the custom is to rinse the vessels in cold water immediately after hag'ola. The rationale for this custom is to explain the gemara that merika u'shetifa requires an extra rinsing, implying that even hag'ola requires one rinsing (Tosafos in Avoda Zara 76 quoted by gr"a). Those who don't require a rinsing for hag'ola (Rashi and Tosafos) understand that the "extra rinsing" refers to the cold rinsing that is done after the hot one, and doesn't refer to an extra cold rinsing.