Chulin 5a - Mumar to be Mechalel Shabbos and Non-religious Nowadays

The gemara says that we don't accept a korban from a mumar for avoda zara or a mumar who violates shabbos publicly, but we do accept from a mumar who violates another aveira. From this the poskim derive that one who violates shabbos publicly has a reduced status in halacha, and for many things is considered like a goy. His shechita is passul, he can't be counted as a minyan, one cannot cook for him on yom tov.... Rashi explains:

דהעובד עבודת כוכבים כופר בהקב"ה, והמחלל שבת כופר במעשיו ומעיד שקר שלא שבת הקב"ה במעשה בראשית

Rashi understands that the violation of shabbos is more fundamental than mila, kashrus and other issurim in the Torah because it is a denial of G-d creating the world. However, Rashi doesn't explain why this is only true when one publicly violates the shabbos, but is not true when one privately violates the shabbos.

R. Moshe (Igros Moshe o.c. 1:33) explains the distinction and with this explains why many people nowadays wouldn't have this status. When one violates shabbos privately we consider this to be לתאבון, but when one violates shabbos publictly he is doing a very open act of rejecting Hashem as the creator who rested on shabbos. Since we aren't able to know what he is thinking, we have to look at his actions to make that determination. A public violation of shabbos indicates a rejection of the creator. Therefore, this distinction only applies when one recognizes the seriousness of shabbos and what it represents, yet makes a conscious decision to violate it publicly. But, when one has no appreciation of shabbos at all, their violation isn't a denial of Hashem and therefore it is tantamount to a private violation that we attribute to his yetzer horah getting the better of him. The Sridei Eish (R. Yechiel Yacov Weinberg) refers to this teshuva of R. Moshe and writes that he agrees with the logic.

Based on this approach many shabbos violators nowadays would have the status of a regular מומר לתאבון even if they violate shabbos publicly. However, the leniency wouldn't extend to those who grew up religious with an appreciation for shabbos and later chose to reject it.

Most non-religious Jews would have the status of מומר לתאבון, as opposed to מומר להכעיס or מומר לחלל שבת בפרהסיאץ. But, they don't have all the advantages of a mumar l'tai'avon. When the gemara speaks of a מומר לתאבון, it speaks about someone who makes decisions before he does aveiros. When he has nothing to gain and no benefit in violating, he will always decide to keep the mitzvos i.e. purchase kosher food. It is only when it is too expensive, too hard to obtain, or doesn't taste as good that he will decide to eat non-kosher. It is for this reason that when we can ascertain that he has nothing to gain by doing something wrong, he will do it right. But, for the most part, nowadays people who aren't religious, don't make any decisions at all. Meaning, they categorize themselves as "I don't keep kosher" or "I am reformed so I drive on Shabbos". Since they don't make any decisions or make any attempt to do what is right, they wouldn't be trusted to do something properly, even when there would be no gain to do it improperly. Even Rava who says that we don't say כיון דדש בה כהתירה דמי ליה - these people are כהתירא דמי ליה, where we no longer have the assumption of לא שביק התירא ואכיל איסורא.

Chulin 4a - Yotzei V'nichnas

In Avoda Zara 12a, I mentioned Tosafos who says that the concept behind yotzei v'nichnas being effective is not that a spot check is good enough. Rather, the concept of יוצא ונכנס is that he creates fear on the goy who is constantly concerned that the mashgiach will show up unannounced and catch him red handed - נתפס עליו כגנב. Therefore, it is only effective in a situation where the goy has what to lose if he gets caught, and when there is a real concern that the mashgiach can and will show up an any moment.

The Cheshek Shlomo points out that the gemara in chulin 4a seems to echo this idea. The gemara says that according to Rava that yotzei v'nichnas is effective, why would the braisa speak about ישראל עומד על גביו, rather than speaking about the bigger chiddush of yotzei v'nichnas. The gemara explains - אמר לך יוצא ונכנס נמי כעובד על גביו דמי, meaning that it is the same. However, this doesn't seem to answer the gemara's question - it would still be a bigger chiddush to say that יוצא ונכנס works? The Cheshek Shlomo explains that the braisa is actually saying a big chiddush according to Rava. It is true that yotzei v'nichnas works, but one may think that it works as a spot check to allow us to assume that if now he didn't mess up now, he wouldn't have messed up at other times. By the braisa equating yotzei v'nichnas to ישראל עומד על גביו it is esentially teaching us that יוצא ונכנס works through the same method of someone being there constantly, since it creates a fear of someone walking in at any moment.

With this we can understand why Abaye disagreed with Rava and held that יוצא ונכנס doesn't work for shechita, even though it works everywhere else. The gemara seems to make a very superficial distinction between the case of the wine where the goy is in the store but not supposed to be touching it, and the case of shechita where he is actually touching it. Rashi 3b offers a deeper understanding to that distinction. Rashi explains that the reason shechita is different is that the animal is in his hand and כהרף עין שוהה או דורס - he can instantaneously with the twist of the wrist mess up the entire shechita. Since he can do so within a split second there is no longer the fear of getting caught which undermines the entire concept of יוצא ונכנס.

Chulin 3b - Mumar L'hachis

Rava says that a mumar l'tei'avon which is someone who will only eat issur when there is no other kosher option is allowed to do shechita, just not allowed to check the knife (since he isn't believed to do things that require very much effort). The clear implication of Rava's statement is that a mumar l'hach'is, meaning one who ignores the kosher option and opts for the non-kosher food, his shechita is invalid even bidi'eved. However, it isn't clear why we invalidate his shechita. Rashi (d.h. chutz) writes - אבל להכעיס אפילו נמצאת סכינו יפה לא, דמועד לנבל בכוונה בידים. Rashi understands that we are concerned that he will intentionally mess up in the shechita and we therefore treat his shechita as a neveila. According to Rashi he is not inherently invalid, we are just concerned for intentionally botching the shechita. It should follow that if someone was watching the mumar l'hach'is carefully and determines that he didn't violate any of the 5 halachos of shechita, it would be valid. However, Tosafos d.h. kasavar, writes that the same source that we use to exclude a goy from shechita, וזבחת, from which we learn you need to be a בר זביחה, we exclude a mumar l'hach'is. Tosafos understands that to qualify as a bar zevicha you need to be someone who believes in the importance of shechita, therefore a goy and a mumar l'hachis who completely disregard the process of shechita are passul. According to Tosafos this is an inherent p'sul and therefore a mashgiach standing over him wouldn't help, just like it wouldn't help for a goy. The Shach (2:16) understands that this is a d'oraysa exclusion, and the product is a neveila d'oraysa. The Rambam has a similar approach to Tosafos that we equate a mumar l'hach'is to a goy, but is somewhat different. According to the Rambam we learn from the pasuk of ואכלת מזבחו to exclude a goy, and include a mumar l'hachis who has status of a goy. According to the Rambam the pasuk which declares the shechita to be treif is in the context of a goy, but we equate a mumar l'hachis based on the rule that a mumar has status of a goy. Whereas according to Tosafos, the pasuk doesn't speak about a goy, rather about one who is not a בר זביחה which incorporates both a goy and mumar equally. The difference between then is whether the equating of a mumar to a goy in this context relies on a general principal that a mumar is like a goy (rambam) or just happens to be that they are both excluded for the same reason which is not believing in the rules of shechita. - see page 15 of the pdf sefer on shechita that i linked to yesterday.

Chulin 2a - Women and Shechita - Eldad Hadani

One of the opinions that has become a favorite to pick on in Hilchos Shechita is a sefer called Hilchos Eretz Yisroel by Eldad HaDani (see wiki). The first Tosafos in Chulin quotes Sefer E.Y. as the source to forbid women from shechita because דעתן קלות. Tosafos rejects this opinion by proving from the Mishna in Zevachim that woman are allowed to shecht even kodshim, so they can certainly shecht chulin. The Beis Yosef adds that the explanation of Hilchos E.Y. that they are דעתן קלות simply means that they are more prone to fainting when carrying out the gruesome shechita. Although Tosafos opinion is echoed by all the Rishonim, the Rama (1:1) writes that the minhag is for women not to shecht, which he quotes from the Agur. The Beis Yosef challenges whether there can exist a minhag "not to shecht". Although we have never heard or seen a women shechting, that would not have status of minhag - לא ראינו אינה ראיה. The Shach (1:1) disagrees with the Beis Yosef and says that when something is common and prone to happen, we do say לא ראינו is a proof, because if it was possible to happen, odds are that it would have happened. The Pri Megadim says that there are two reasons that we don't allow women to shecht: 1. they are suspect of violating lifnei iver, 2. they are prone to fainting. Therefore he rules that even bidieved one cannot eat from the shechita of a woman unless their knife was examined carefully and they have a chazaka that they can handle the gruesome shechita without fainting. The Aruch Hashulchan adds an interesting point - since there is a concern regarding the knife that it wasn't examined properly, women wouldn't be able to shecht chulin but would be able to shecht kodshim since the gemara says (zevachim 88) that they would take new knives rather than fixing nicks in the knife. This approach would undermine the proof of Tosafos that if they can shecht kodshim, they can certainly shecht chulin. I found that in the sefer of notes on Rav Eliyahuv's shiurim, he cites a possible source for the minhag that women don't shecht from kiddushin 52b. The gemara says וכי אשה בעזרה מנין, Rashi says that a women wouldn't enter the Azara. Tosafos disagrees because we don't find any issur for a woman to enter the azara. One of Tosafos proofs is that women can do shechita which would require them to enter the azara. Nevertheless, Rashi assumes that the minhag was not to let women in the azara, which could have led to a minhag to not allow women to shecht kodshim. Since they weren't shechting kodshim, it could have extended to chulin as well. The proof Tosafos in Kiddushin cites that women could enter the azara since they are allowed to do shechita is difficult in light of the gemara Chulin 2b that talks about shechting from outside the azara with a long knife (although the gemara is only speaking about using a long knife to prevent touching the animal after it is dead, Tosafos explains that since we are talking about tamei meis, we have to be speaking of a knife that is long enough for him to remain outside the azara and shecht inside the azara ) - women could have done the same.

I wrote a sefer of comments on the Chochmas Adam in Hilchos Shechita. If interested please CLICK HERE.

Menachos 99b - Learning at ALL times

R. Elazar Moshe Horowitz (Pinsk) points out a very interesting paradox in the opinions regarding the mitzvah of limud ha'torah. R. Yishmael is the opinion who did not permit his nephew to study chochmas yevanis because the mitzvah to study Torah is incumbent on a person at ALL times, whereas R. Shimon Bar Yochai (quoted by R. Yochanan) says that one can fulfill their obligation through the reading of shema in the morning and evening. However, in the gemara Brachos 35b, it is R. Yishmael who permits working to compliment Torah study - הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ, whereas R. Shimon Bar Yochai held that if one devotes himself to Torah the his work will be done by others. It comes out that R. Yishmael holds that one must learn ALWAYS, yet allows for one to do work, and R. Shimon Bar Yochai doesn't allow for work yet he holds that the mitzvah to study Torah can be fulfilled simply by reading shema?

Rav E.M. Horowitz suggests that according to R. Yishmael the demand is to learn every moment of the day, therefore one may not study other things. Yet, he allows for one to work since without the ability to earn a living one will not be able to focus on their learning - יפה ת"ת עם דרך ארץ. On the other hand, R. Shimon Bar Yochai held that there is no heter for one to stop learning in order to work, therefore the justification of those tzadikim who throughout history did work must have been based on the assumption that the mitzvah to study Torah is not at all times.

The approach within the opinion of R. Yishmael seems very plausible. The mitzvah to study torah is continuous and applies all day and night, therefore the mitzvah itself must include a dispensation for earning a living since otherwise it would be impossible to manage. However, his approach within the opinion of R. Shimon Bar Yochai is difficult. If indeed R. Shimon holds that the demand to study Torah can be fulfilled with shema, how can he put any restrictions at all on working?

It seems to me that R. Shimon Bar Yochai in Menachos is making a halachic statement regarding the fulfillment of the bare minimum requirement to study Torah. But, in Brachos he isn't making a halachic statement, he is rather recognizing a reality. If the Torah scholars would be mevatel their limud ha'torah for the purpose of earning a living, they may be permitted to do so but would still forfeit tremendous potential of achievements in their learning. R. Shimon wasn't making a halachic statement, rather he was saying that the Torah scholars shouldn't be mevatel their learning since תורה מה תהא עליה, therefore he was confident that to protect the achievements in Torah, G-d would make it so that their work will be done by others.

Menachos 99b - ביטולה זהו קיומה

There is a well known phrase ביטולה של תורה זהו קיומה which seems to be an adaption and modification of the Talmudic phrase ביטולה של תורה זהו יסודה. The source for the modification is found in Rabbeinu Gershom who translates the term יסודה to mean קיומה. The connotation of the phrase ביטולה זהו קיומה is similar to that of יצא הפסדו בשכרו, meaning that sometimes it is necessary to do something against the Torah which ultimately brings about a greater fulfillment of the Torah. It is of the same genre as עת לעשות להשם הפרו תורתך, where the violation of the Torah is necessary for the greater fulfillment of the Torah. However, it seems to me that by modifying the term יסודה to קיומה, there is a potent message in the connotation that is being diluted by this change of term. Rashi explains that the term יסודה implies that through bitul torah, one can actually receive reward as if he were יושב ומייסדה ועוסק בה. Meaning, we don't simply encourage the temporary violation for the greater good that will come from it, but rather we consider the actual violation to be a constructive building of the foundation of Torah. The gemara learns this out from the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu broke the luchos and Hashem agreed that he made the correct choice. Rashi loosens the definition of ביטולה זהו יסודה to mean that one receives reward as if he was building a foundation for Torah, and derives this from Moshe where we see that Hashem sanctioned his good intentions. But, if we truly interpret that the Bitul Torah can be regarded as an actual constructive building of the Torah, we need to fine tune how exactly the breaking of the luchos would serve as a source for this concept?

The Shita Mi'Kubetzes (and Maharsha) cite the kal v'chomer that Moshe made which led him to break the luchos - מה פסח שאינו אלא מצוה אחת אמרה תורה כל בן נכר לא יאכל בו, כל התורה כולה וכל ישראל מומרים על אחת כמה וכמה. Moshe made a kal v'chomer that if we are willing to be me'vatel the mitzvah of korban pesach to avoid one who is נתנכרו מעשיו לאביו שבשמים and isn't fulfilling other mitzvos, we should certainly be mevatel the entire Torah to prevent the Jews who are mumrim from receiving it. The idea that a בן נכר doesn't bring korban pesach is that the korban pesach represents G-d's protection of the his people (separating them from the Egyptians) - therefore one who is a בן נכר and isn't worthy of this protection, the korban pesach will have the opposite effect. Similarly, giving Torah to the Jews when they are sinning will have the adverse effect that it should. Rather than providing them with zechuyos, it serves as a מקטרג to prosecute against them. Moshe's logic was that Torah which is built on a faulty foundation will not hold, therefore the foundation must be destroyed before the Torah can be built. The breaking of the luchos sends the message that they must do teshuva, so that that destruction is the first step in the construction of the foundation. From this we learn that sometimes the foundation is built by the destruction of the Torah, so that people will learn that the foundation must be improved before it can hold the weight of the Torah. This is the concept of ביטולה זהו יסודה, it is b'geder סותר על מנת לבנות במקומו where the destruction is actually the first step in the process of construction.

Menachos 95a - Travelling of Camps in Midbar

The Meshech Chochma (Parshas Bamidbar 2:17) explains the pasuk - ונסע אוהל מועד מחנה הלוים בתוך המחנות, כאשר יחנו כן יסעו איש על ידו לדגליהם - to contrast the norm of travelling. Kavod is only applicable when people are in their formal settings. but when they are traveling there is no concept of showing kavod - אין מכבדין בדרכים. It is for this reason that the Torah insists that the arrangement of the shevatim around the mishkan be maintained even when they travel. Since the Mishkan traveled within the camp and Hashem's presence was there even at the time of travelling, as the gemara darshens (Menachos 95a) - ונסע אוהל מועד, אע"פ שנסע אוהל מועד הוא ואינו נפסל לחם הפנים ביוצא. Since the Kedusha was maintained even while travelling, it was necessary to maintain their formal formation around the mishkan.

This Meshech Chochma is very difficult in light of the gemaras conclusion that there is really no machlokes about the lechem hapanim and kodshei kodshim becoming passul. The gemara concludes that all agree that at the time of travelling, the מחנה שכינה lost it's kedusha, therefore any lechem hapanim that was off the table, and kodshei kodshim would be passul. However, the lechem hapanim that was actually on the table would not become passul. Rashi explains that the אוהל מועד did NOT retain it's status when they travelled, yet the breads on the table would not become passul based on the pasuk of ולחם התמיד עליו יהיה indicating that so long as they remain on the table, they retain their kedusha. Just as they don't become passul due to לינה, they also don't become passul due to יוצא. The gemara does conclude that there is a machlokes tana'im whether the מחנה לויה ומחנה ישראל also lose their kedusha when they travel, or whether the status of מחנה לויה וישראל remain so that the metzorah and zav are still not permitted to enter their respective camps. It seems strange for the Meshech Chochma to base himself on the drasha that even during the travels the ohel mo'ed retained it's kedusha, since it is rejected at the maskana. It seems that the Meshech Chochma understands like R.E.M. Horowitz who says that when the gemara concludes that the pasuk of ונסע אוהל מועד is for the degalim, it doesn't mean as rashi indicates that אוהל מועד is לאו דוקא. Rather, it means that for degalim we darshen ונסע אוהל מועד -אע"פ שנסע אוהל מועד הוא, but we don't use that drasha to permit kodshim to be eaten since for that we require curtains of the azarah (נראה לי דהכי קאמר, לדגלים קרא גלי שהן בקדושתן, ולא לקדשי קדשים דבעו מחיצת קלעים, ומיושב קושיות תוס' בכמה דוכתי). According to this approach, even in the conclusion of the gemara it maintains it's initial drasha that the מחנות and even the מחנה שכינה retain their kedusha, just that it wouldn't permit the eating of kodshim due to the lack of קלעים.

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On a related point (assuming like rashi that the מחנה שכינה didn't retain it's kedusha during the travels) - the gemara says that the issue of the מחנה לויה וישראל retaining their status while they traveled is dependent on the machlokes whether זבין ומצורעין would be chayev misah for entering the azara when the korban pesach is being brought b'tumah. The comparison seems very strange because when the korban pesach is brought b'tumah, the machlokes hinges on whether when we permit tu'mah, we permit all tu'mah. What does this have to do with the issue of whether the camps retain their status during the time of travel? It seems to me that the machlokes between R. Eliezer and the Rabbonon is a very fundamental one. Is the status of the מחנה לויה וישראל dependent on the מחנה שכינה - in other words, is the kedusha of מחנה לויה וישראל an extension of קדושת מחנה שכינה or is their status completely independent of the קדושת מחנה שכינה. R. Eliezer holds that the kedusha status of all the machanos emanates from מחנה שכינה, therefore when a pesach is brought b'tum'ah and we don't treat מחנה שכינה with special status, the status of מחנה לויה וישראל is also lost. The Rabbonon argue and say that the kedusha of the מחנה לויה וישראל is not dependent on מחנה שכינה so that even when the מחנה שכינה is being violated, the מחנה לויה וישראל must be maintained. Similarly, when they traveled in the dessert when all agree that the מחנה שכינה didn't maintain it's status, there is a machlokes whether it is possible for מחנה לויה וישראל to retain their status and not permit זבין ומצורעין to enter the camps, respectively.

Menachos 89a - Amount of oil in Menorah

The gemara says that the Rabbonon determined that the amount of oil necessary for each candle in the menorah was 1/2 lug of oil per night. This amount would be the right amount for even the longer nights of the winter. However, there is a machlokes in the gemara how they figured out that this was the right amount. One opinion says that began with a larger amount and when they found too much oil left over in the morning, they slowly reduced the amount that they initially put in the candle - the advantage to this approach is אין עניות במקום עשירות, we aren't concerned with "waste" in the beis hamikdash. The other opinion says that they started with a smaller amount of oil (rashi says that they began with a rivi'is - not clear where he gets that from), and when they realized that it didn't last the entire night, they slowly started to add oil - the advantage to this approach is התורה חסה על ממונן של ישראל , not to waste oil. The opinion who says that they started with a small amount of oil and when they realized it wasn't enough, they would add on the future nights, is very difficult to understand. How could they have been cheap on the oil in order to save money since it could lead to not fulfilling the mitzvah of having the candles burn all night long. This gemara seems to imply that the mitzvah of lighting the candles in the beis hamikdash was הדלקה עושה מצוה, similar to what we say by ner chanuka. However, the gemara and rambam clearly hold that the mitzvah was to hvae the candles burning all night long and the mitzvah is not fulfilled at the moment of lighting. Furthermore, even by chanuka the halacha demands that at the time of lighting there is sufficient oil to burn for the duration of the time. This should certainly be necessary by the candles in the beis hamikdash. How can there be an opinion that they began with a smaller amount of oil, and not fulfill the mitzvah of lighting the menorah?

The Nesivos HaMishpat (Chavos Da'as) has a sefer with hagahos on shulchan aruch and its commentaries called M'ginei Artetz. In Hilchos Chanuka he writes:

בספר מגיני ארץ מבעל נתהמש"פ על הל' חנוכה החליט דבמנורה שבמקדש לא אמרינן שהדלקה עושה מצוה וז"ל לכן נראה דמצוה דהדלקה דחנוכה אינו דומה למצות הדלקה דמנורה, דבנר חנוכה אין המצוה רק תחלת ההדלקה שידליק שיעור כזה, תדע דהא כבתה אין זקוק לה ומש"ה צריך לכתחלה ליתן כשיעור, משא"כ במנורה המצוה והחיוב הוא שיהיה דולק כל שיעור הזה דהא כבתה זקוק לה ומש"ה סגי אפילו כשנותן לכתחלה פחות מכשיעור רק שיראה להוסיף בכל פעם עד שידליק כל השיעור וכמ"ד ממטה למעלה (היינו מ"ד במנחות פט ע"א שמתחלה נתנו רביעית ואח"כ הוסיפו עד חצי לוג כשראו שאין סיפוק). ולפי"ז אתי שפיר בס' תרע"ג ס"ב דאמר הדלקה עושה מצוה לפיכך אם כבתה וכו' שעמד עליו הט"ז בס"ק ח' (שהקשה מה הקשר בין הדלקה עושה מצוה לכבתה אין זקוק לה, הא אף אם הנחה עושה מצוה נמי נוכל לומר שאם כבתה אין זקוק לה). ולפמש"כ אתי שפיר כיון דאין מצותה שיהיה דלוקה כל שיעור הזה כמו במנורה, רק תחלת ההדלקה לפיכך אם כבתה וכו' ואתי שפיר עכ"ל. הרי סובר דהא דנקט המחבר לשון "הדלקה עושה מצוה" לאו לאפוקי הנחה אלא לאפוקי המנורה שבבית המקדש שהמצוה לא נגמר במעשה הדלקה אלא המצוה היא שתהא דולקת ועומדת.

The Nesivos explains that the opinion who says that they started with a smaller amount of oil doesn't mean to say that they put a rivi'is in the first night and when they saw it went out early they added a little the next night. Rather, they started with a rivi'is and when they realized at 4am that it wasn't going to last until the morning, they added a little more. Then at 5am when they saw it wouldn't last they added a little more, until they realized that it would take a half lug to stay burning until the morning. This is actually very medu'yak in rashi who writes:שבתחלה נתנו רביעית ועמדו שם וראו שאין סיפוק ושוב הוסיפו עד חצי לוג. Rashi clearly holds that they stood there all night adding oil until they figured how much would be needed. The nesivos explains that this was av viable option since in the beis hamikdash we don't say הדלקה עושה מצוה, so that adding oil after it is already burning is acceptable. However, Rashi in the k'sav yad clearly writes: בתחלה רביעית הלוג, ולא דלק אלא חצי הלילה, ליל שני הוסיפו וכן כמה לילות עד ששיערו חצי לוג ללילה. Rashi in the k'sav yad holds that they would add more the next night. According to this approach it is very difficult how they could be meva'tel the mitzvah the first few nights just to save a few pennies! Rabbeinu Gershom seems to say that they originally thought that less than a half lug would be sufficient. They never made this decision in order to save money, rather because they thought that it could indeed burn all night. Eventually they realized that a half lug was necessary to burn all night, but we learn from the fact that they initially put in what they thought is the bare minimum that the Torah cares about not wasting money and it is therefore "not permitted" to add more than a half lug.

Menachos 86b - Need the Lights?

The gemara emphasizes that Hashem doesn't need the light of the Menorah because all 40 years that the Jews were in the dessert they were led by the light of Hashem. Therefore the light of the menorah, and particularly the Ner Ma'aravi was an indication that the presence of Hashem is with the Jewish people. The gemara also says that the windows in the Beis HaMikdash were wide on the inside and narrow on the outside to funnel the inner light out to the world, as opposed to enabling sunlight to come from outside.

Tosafos says that a similar gemara in Shabbos makes a point of saying tha Aharon didn't need the light of the Menorah, as opposed to our gemara where the emphasis is on Hashem. I would suggest that they are both true. At the beginning of Parshas B'ha'aloscha the pasuk says אל מול פני המנורה יאירו שבעת הנרות. Rashi explains that the Menorah was designed so that the 6 candles, 3 on each side, faced the center candle "Why? So that people should say that He needs the light". The Maharal explains that normally one designs a candelabra so that each candle shines in a different direction to light up the larger area. The fact that all candles faced the center is symbolic of the fact that Hashem doesn't need the light. The pasuk then continues "ויעש כן אהרן אל מול פני המנורה העלה נרותיה" and Rashi explains that this is too show the praise of Aharon that he didn't deviate in any way from what he was told. The commentaries are very troubled with this pasuk. We are speaking of Aharon the Kohein, the brother of Moshe Rabbeinu - who would think that he would deviate from the way things were done? The Maharal says that he made special effort to be meticulous so that each wick faced the middle candle. This was s delicate detail that one could have been lax in, yet Aharon did it with great precision. To build on this approach, the pasuk is trying to teach that aside from Aharon lighting the candles all facing center to show that Hashem doesn't need the light, he also did this to show that he who will be working in the mishkan, doesn't need the light. When Aharon did the lighting of the menorah to face the middle, he did so with the intention of showing that Hashem doesn't require the light and that he doesn't need the light. This pasuk may be the source of both our gemara which says that the way the menorah was lit shows that Hashem doesn't need the light, and the gemara in Shabbos which says that it shows that Aharon doesn't need the light.

Menachos 85a - Coals to New Castle

The gemara tells of a strange discussion that took place between two Egyptian sorcerers and Moshe Rabbeinu. They challenged Moshe that his "tricks" of turning the stick into a snake and water into blood are unimpressive - תבן אתה מכניס לעפריים - you are bringing more straw into a place abundant with straw. Egypt had plenty of magic so that Moshe's magic didn't impress them. Moshe responds למתא ירקא, ירקא שקול, to a place where vegetables are abundant that is where you bring your vegetables to sell. Rashi explains that the entire dialogue was silly and pointless. Since they challenged Moshe with a silly parable, he responded in kind. The message in Moshe's statement seems to be that where magic is popular, it is appreciated. The Maharsha explains that they specifically chose a parable of straw which is all the same. They were indicating to Moshe that his magic was no better than theirs. To that Moshe responds with a parable of vegetables which are all different grades and qualities, indicating that the signs he was preforming were well beyond their capabilities.

I would like to suggest an alternate approach to the conversation. The concept of bringing something unnecessary, such as coals to new castle (known as a major coal exporter), is foolish only if the goal is to sell your coal. However, if the goal is not to peddle your own wears but to show contrast in order to undermine what is already there, it is very logical to bring a higher form of the same. Their argument to Moshe is that he won't be able to use his magic to convince the Jews or Pharoh that he is an agent of G-d because it is like bringing straw to עפריים - a city that thrives on straw. To that Moshe responds that he doesn't need miracles to convince the Jews of Hashem. The Jews inherently will believe that he was sent by Hashem to take them out as promised, but they are being fooled by the magic of the Egyptians. Therefore, Moshe responds that he is bringing his high grade vegetables into a place that has low grade vegetables (as the maharsha explained), with the goal of undermining their magic. The magic of the Egyptians was the curtain blocking their vision from seeing Hashem. Once Moshe is able to show that their magic isn't special, he removes the curtain and enables them to clearly see him as the shaliach of Hashem.

Menachos 83b - Omer and Shtei HaLechem from Old Grain

The mishna says that the only two korbanos that MUST be from new grain and from E.Y. are the korban omer and shtei ha'lechem. The gemara says that the mishna is against the Tanna of the Braisa who allows that there is a mitzvah to bring the omer and shtei ha'lechem from new grain, but if they are brought from the old grain, they are kasher. There are a few conclusions that we can draw from this gemara. 1. All agree that ideally the omer and shtei halechem should be from the new grain. 2. The machlokes between the braisa and the mishna is whether the omer and shtei halechem brought from old grain would be a valid korban (braisa), or invalid (mishna). 3. There is no distinction between the omer and shtei ha'lechem, if one is valid from old grain then the other is also valid.

These seemingly obvious conclusions make the Rambam very difficult to understand. The Rambam writes about this din in 3 places. In Hilchos Issurei Mizbei'ach (6:15) he copies the language of the mishna implying that both omer and shtei halechem MUST be from new grain of E.Y. However, in Hilchos Temidin U'musafin, in the context of shtei ha'lechem (8:2) the Rambam writes - שתי הלחם אינן באין אלא מן הארץ ומן החדש שנאמר ממושבותיכם תביאו לחם תנופה, לא מצאו חדש יביאו מן העליה. The Rambam holds that shtei ha'lechem would be valid when brought from old grain. Yet, one perek earlier in the context of korban omer, the Rambam writes (7:8) that the omer must be brought from Eretz Yisroel but makes no mention of the requirement of being from the new grain. Furthermore, the Ra'avad makes a strange comment on the Rambam who permits the shtei halechem to be brought from old grain when no new grain is available - הלכה זו בהפך. It is very unclear what is bothering the Ra'avad. Perhaps the Ra'avad understands that it is more likely to permit grain from outside E.Y. since we hold that there is an issur chadash even in chutz la'aretz, rather than permit using old grain.

The Kesef Mishna struggles with the Rambam and suggests (2nd approach) that the Mishna holds that both omer and shtei halechem lichatchila must be brought from new grain, but bidieved can be brought from old grain. The tanna of the braisa holds that there is a distinction between omer and shtei ha'lechem - shtei ha'lechem even lichatchila can be brought form old grain and is only a mitzvah min ha'muvchar to be brought from new grain, whereas omer lichatchila must be brought from new grain. This approach understands that there is a difference between the terms "mitzvah" and "lichatchila". The term mitzvah implies that it is ideal but not necessary, whereas the term lichatchila implies that it is necessary but not essential to the kashrus of the korban. Therefore the Rambam would hold that we pasken like the braisa that the omer lichatchila must be brought from new grain, whereas shtei halaechem it is only ideal but can be brought from old grain. According to this approach, the tanna of the mishna can hold that both the omer and shtei ha'lechem lichatchila must be brought from new grain, and only bidieved can be brought from old grain - the Rambam paskens like the mishna. This is also the approach of the Maha'ri Kurkos, there are 3 levels: mitzvah min hamuvchar, lichatchila and bidieved. The only arguement between the braisa and the mishna is whether the din of bringing from new grain is lichatchila or just ideal, but all agree that if no new grain is available, it can be brought from old grain.

In the question and answer of the gemara, the gemara asks on the braisa how we permit the omer and shtei halechem from old grain - what do we do with the pasuk of ראשית, to which the gemara answers that is only l'mitzvah. The gemara then asks what about the pasuk by shtei halechem which says מנחה חדשה implying new grain, and answers that it is coming for something else. When the gemara initally asks from the pasuk of ראשית it isn't clear if the gemara is asking from the pasuk by the omer - ראשית קצירכם, or from the pasuk by shtei ha'lechem - קרבן ראשית תקריב. According to the approach of the kesef mishna, the gemara which asks from ראשית and answers that it is only l'mitzvah has to be speaking about the shtei halechem which lichatchila can be brought form old grain, but omer is not just l'mitzvah, it must lichatchila be brought from new grain. Similarly, Tosafos (bottom of page) seems to understand that the question is from shtei halechem because Tosafos understands that חדשה is emphasizing what we learn from ראשית and the repeat should be me'akeiv. However, according to the kesef mishna the repeat should only tell you lichatchila (since the first time is l'mitzvah), which is not like tosafos who understands that the repeat is to tell you it is me'akeiv. Rashi in the k'sav yad explains that the question from ראשית is both by shtei halechem and omer, to which the gemara is answering that it is only l'mitzvah - against the approach of the kesef mishna.

Tosafos d.h. masninisin, is quoted by the ma'ahri kurkos on the Rambam as holding that the mishna permits both the omer and shtei ha'lechem to be brought bidieved from old grain, implying that the braisa holds that even lichatchila it can be brought from old grain, just not l'mitzvah (which is like his approach and the kesef mishna approach in the Rambam). However, he seems to have a completely different girsa in Tosafos. According to our girsa, Tosafos seems to be saying the opposite. Tosafos says that the language of the mishna אינן באין אלא מן החדש is does NOT imply just lichatchila, which is against the braisa that holds it is only lichtachila. Tosafos seems to hold like rashi (k'sav yad) that there are only 2 categories: 1. l'mitzvah = lichatchila, 2. bidieved.

Menachos 77b - Shiur of Challa

The gemara discusses the amount of "teruma" that needs to be taken from the Todah breads and contemplates learning out the amount from terumas ma'aser. The gemara suggests learning out from challah which is also called teruma, to which rashi explains that the shiur would be 1/48th. Both Rabbeinu Gershom and the kesav yad of rashi explain that it would be 1/24th [This is not a consequential difference since the shiur for challa is 1/24th for a ba'al habyis and 1/48th for a nach'tom. The Nodeh B'Yehuda suggests that according to the Rambam in pirush hamishna the real shiur for challah is 1/48th, just that the women baking will tend to be cheap and if we tell her 1/24 she will at least give 1/48th - that is why rashi picks the number 1/48]. The Nodeh B'yehuda (tinyana y.d. 201) asks that challah doesn't have a shiur according to the Torah, similar to Teruma gedolah which has no shiur. Since the shiur of 1/48 is only Rabbinic, how can the gemara suggest to learn out that the shiur of the Todah breads will also be 1/48?

The Nodeh B'Yehuda suggests something that "no commentary or posek had already said". The mitzvah of challah contains two parts. One is to remove the status of tevel on the dough thereby permitting it to be eaten. The second is the aspect of gifting it to the kohein. The first aspect has no shiur, similar to Terumah where even the smallest amount renders the remainder chulin. But, the shiur of 1/24 or 1/48 is a Torah obligation as the minimum amount to be given to the kohein. However, the shiur of 1/24 is the minimal amount of the minimum amount that is chayev in challa (isaron), that is necessary to be considered a "giving" to the kohein. On a Torah level it wouldn't matter whether one is kneading 1 Isaron or 50 Isaron, the amount that must be given to the kohein is the same - 1/24 of an Isaron. The Rabbonon then came along and required that one give 1/24 of whatever amount they are baking to the kohein. The son of the Nodeh B'yehuda elaborates about his fathers opinion and writes that although there are two parts, they must go together. One cannot separate a tiny amount to be matir the dough to eat and then separate 1/24 to give to the kohein. One must separate initially 1/24th in order to fulfill the mitzvah properly, but if they had already separated a tiny amount, there is no way to add on to that amount and properly fulfill the mitzvah. According to this approach, if one would separate a tiny amount to be given to the kohen, it is a מעוות שלא יוכל לתקון and at the time of separating they are inevitably in violation of the mitzvah to give a proper amount of challah to the kohein.

The Mitzpeh Eisan says that this peshat has already been said by the Tosafos Rid in Kiddushin 58.

Menachos 75b - Shehechiyanu on Mitzvos for First time

The gemara says that if one was bringing a korban mincha in Yerushalayim they make shehechiyanu. Rashi explains that we are speaking about a koehin who has never before brought a korban mincha or at least never brought this type of korban mincha. According to Rashi the gemara is being mechadesh that one make a bracha of shehechiyanu on their first time fulfilling a mitzvah. Tosafos says that the reason for making the shehechiyanu is not because it is his first time but because the kohanim were divided into mishmaros and batei avos so that each kohein would only do avoda twice a year. Tosafos holds that bringing korbanos is considered a mitzvah that comes m'zman l'zman and is worthy of shehechiyanu.

There is a discussion in the Rishonim whether one makes a bracha on the mitzvah of kisuy ha'dam (covering the blood when schechting a bird or chaya). According to Tosafos this gemara would not be a source for the bracha on kisuy ha'dam because you would only make shehechiyanu on mitzvos that are somewhat dependent on the calendar and therefore come m'zman l'zman. However, according to Rashi this gemara would set a precedent for making a shehechiyanu the first time that one fulfills a mitzvah. The Shach (y.d. 28:2) quotes the rokeach who says based on this gemara that the first time in one's life that they fulfill any mitzvah, they make shehechiyanu. The shach points out that our minhag is not to make a shehechiyanu the first time we fulfill a mitzvah from the fact that we don't make shehechiyanu on tzitzis and tefillin. He therefore argues on the Rama who says to make shehechiyanu the first time doing kisuy ha'dam. The tzvi la'tzadik justifies the position of the Rama. The Rama holds like Rashi/Rokeach that we make a bracha the first time performing a mitzvah, so long as it is fulfilled the first time as an adult. Therefore, tzitzis and tefillin which people usually begin before bar mitzvah, they don't make a shehechiyanu when they are pre-bar mitzvah, but also don't make it upon becoming bar mitzvah since they have already done the mitzvah before. The Gilyon MaHarsha (gemara) asks from kiddushin and mezuza (which are performed the first time as an adult) and still we don't make shehchiyanu. The Pri Megadim holds that since it is a safeik (according to Tosafos we don't have a source for making a shehchiyanu the first time performing a mitzvah), one shouldn't make shehechiyanu the first time performing a mitzvah.

Menachos 72a - Harvesting Pushing Off Shabbos

Tosafos 66a writes that if one forgot to count sefiras ha'omer at night, the be'hag holds that they can count by day with a bracha. Tosafos attempts to support that bidieved one can count by day from the mishna 71a that the mitzvah of harvesting is at night, but bidieved can be by day. Tosafos quotes Rabbeinu Tam that since we pasken that harvesting pushes off shabbos, we are forced to say that harvesting cannot be done by day (the assumption is that if it can be done the day after the night of the 16th it can also be done the day before - tosafos 72a). Therefore, we don't pasken like the mishna that harvesting by day is kasher, rather we pasken like the mishna in megilla that any night mitzvah cannot be fulfilled during the day.

Tosafos understands from the sugya 72a that the two halachos of 1. harvesting can be done by day (even the day of the 15th or 14th), and 2. harvesting pushes off shabbos, cannot both be correct. The gemara 72a explains that if the harvesting is kasher when done by day, even if it is bidieved, we cannot push off Shabbos just to fulfill the ideal of harvesting at night. However, the Rambam (Temidin U'musafin 7:6-7) paskens that harvesting the omer pushes off shabbos, yet paskens that if done by day it is kasher bidieved (as the mishna 71a and braisa 72a seem to say). The Shach in Hilchos Milah (y.d. 262) asks on the Rambam that his rulings contradict the gemara which clearly states that if it can be done before shabbos, it doesn't push off shabbos - the notion of pushing off shabbos just to fulfill the mitzvah min hamuvchar is rejected by the gemara? Based on this, the Shach proves that based on the sevara of the gemara that even a bris mila which pushes off shabbos, would not push off shabbos if it could be done before shabbos. The ideal fulfillment of a mitzvah doesn't push off shabbos, unless the mitzvah will be entirely lost. Based on the fact that milah pushes off shabbos, the Shach rejects the p'sak of the Rama who says that mila is kasher even if done before the 8th day. The Aruch HaShulchan points out that the halacha of ketziras ha'omer doesn't prove anything about milah. He explains this based on Tosafos on the bottom of 72a that by mila the gezeiras hakasuv of b'yom - even on shabbos, teaches that even if it can be done before it would push off shabbos. It is only by harvesting the o'mer where the fact that it pushes off shabbos is learned from korban tamid that Tosafos explains that if it can be done before shabbos it wouldn't be similar to Tamid and we couldn't learn from there that it pushes off shabbos.

To answer the question on the Rambam, both the Beis Halevi (teshuvos 1:38) and the Aruch Hashulchan (y.d. 262) explain that the Rambam had other gemaras to rely on that assume that even the ideal method of performing a mitzvah can allow shabbos to be pushed off, even though it could have been done prior to shabbos. Since both harvesting on the night of the 16th and mila on day 8 is the ideal way to perform the mitzvah, it pushes off shabbos. Based on the Rambam that harvesting is kasher by day, Rabbeinu Tam has no proof against the Behag and counting the omer can also be by day.

לכאורה יש קושיא גדולה על הנחת הגמרא. יש כאן ב' דיונים, חדא אם מקיים מצות קצירה והשני אם כשרה לקרבן העומר. והנה, כיון דמצות קצירת העומר דוחה שבת, היה מסתבר לומר דכל שאפשר לקיים מצות קצירה לפני השבת אינו דוחה את השבת, ורק כשאי אפשר לקיים מצות קצירה קודם השבת דוחה את השבת. אבל אין זה מקושר להא דאם נקצר ביום כשרה, שהרי אפילו אם היה כשרה להביא ממנו קרבן עומר, אילו לא מקיים מצות קצירה היה ראוי לדחות את השבת דמצות קצירת העומר דוחה את השבת. וא"כ היה אפשר לפרש כוונת הרמב"ם שאם קוצר ביום אינו מקיים מצות קצירה מש"ה מצות קצירת העומר דוחה את השבת, והא דכתב הרמב"ם שאם נקצר ביום כשר, היינו שכשר להביא ממנו קרבן עומר ולאו משום שבדיעבד מקיים בזה מצות קצירה. אמנם בגמ' לא משמע כן כלל, שהרי בגמ' קאמר דאי ס"ד נקצר שלא כמצותו (כגון ביום) כשר, אמאי דחי שבת, נקצריה מערב שבת, אלא מדדחי שבת ש"מ נקצר שלא כמצותו פסול. הרי בהדיא תלה הגמ' דין דחיית שבת בכשרות ופסלות להביא ממנו קרבן עומר, ובאמת היה מסתבר שיהיה תלוי אם מקיים בזה מצות קצירה והכי הול"ל דאי ס"ד שבנקצר ביום מקיים מצות קצירה עכ"פ בדיעבד לא הו"ל לדחות שבת, א"ו אינו מקיים מצות קצירה, אבל לא הו"ל לתלות דחיית שבת בכשרות ופסלות. איברא, שהיה אפשר לפרש דקים להו לחז"ל דכל שמצות קצירה הוא חלק ממצות העומר, וכל שאינו מקיים מצות קצירת העומר, נפסל להביא ממנו קרבן העומר. לפיכך קים להו בפשיטות דהא דיצא ולא יצא במצות קצירה תלוי בכשרות ופסלות להביא ממנו לעומר, דאם יצא כשר לעומר ואם לא יצא מצות קצירה פסול לעומר. אמנם זה לא יתכן, שהרי במתניתין עא ע"א תנן מצות העומר לבא מן הקמה, לא מצא יביא מן העמרים. רש"י פירש דמצות להביא מן הקמה שתהא קצירה לשמה ומשמע שבזה מקיים מצות קצירה, אבל אם לא מצא קמה משום שכבר נקצר הכל שלא לשם מצוה או ע"י נכרי באופן שלא קיים מצות קצירה, מ"מ יביא העומר מן העמרים. אלמא שאין מצות קצירה חלק יסודי של מצות העומר, ואף בלי קיום מצות קצירה יכול להביא ממנו העומר. וא"כ חזרא קושיין לדוכתיה על הש"ס, אמאי תלה דחיית שבת בכשרות ופסולת של העומר, הו"ל למתלי דחיית שבת בהא דאם אפשר לצאת מצות קצירה כשקוצר מבעוד יום. ואפשר לומר דס"ל להש"ס דבאמת אין מצות קצירה דוחה שבת אלא מצות הבאת העומר דחי שבת, ולכן הכל תלוי אם כשר או פסול להביא ממנו קרבן העומר. וקאמר הש"ס דאילו היה כשר לעומר כשנקצר ביום, אין הכרח לדחות שבת כדי להביא העומר וע"כ לא דחי שבת, אבל אם נקצר ביום פסול ורק בליל ט"ז כשר, ע"כ דחי שבת כדי להביא ממנו קרבן העומר למחר. ויש להביא סמך לזה, דבגמ' עא ע"א יליף דדוחה את השבת מדכתיב "תקריב" ואפילו בשבת, ולכאורה קמיירי בקצירה (דלא כמו שדחק התוס' דקמיירי בהקרבה) ויליף מקרא ד"תקריב" אלמא דעיקר ההיתר לקצור בשבת הוא משום מצות הקרבת העומר ולא משום מצות קצירה. היוצא מדברינו שבאמת אינו ברור לי מקורו של הרמב"ם לדחות גמ' ערוכה. מ"מ יסוד המח' בין הנחת הש"ס והנחתו של הרמב"ם, שהש"ס סובר דמצות הקרבת העומר דוחה שבת אלא שבדרך כלל אין הכשר מצוה דוחה שבת, וזה חידוש של מצות קצירה דדחי שבת כדי להקריב ממנו העומר. ולפי"ז אם היה אפשר להקריב בלא דחיית שבת אין מצות קצירה דוחה שבת. אבל הרמב"ם סובר דמצות קצירה דוחה שבת כמו מצות הקרבה, ואע"פ שאפשר להקריב מן העמרים, כיון שמבטל בזה מצות קצירה דחינן שבת כדי לקיים מצות קצירה כראוי. ואכתי צ"ב יותר

שוב מצאתי בשפת אמת שכתב לפרש דברי הרמב"ם ממש כמו שכתבתי שכוונתו דכשר להביא העומר ממנו אבל לא קיים מצות קצירה, ודחאו

Menachos 70a - Harvesting Before the Omer

The Mishna says that one cannot harvest before the Omer (according to some girsa'os it should say before pesach). The Rambam (Hil. Temidin U'musafin records this halacha by saying

אסור לקצור בא"י מין מחמשת מיני תבואה קודם לקצירת העומר שנאמר "ראשית קצירכם" שיהיה תחלה לכל הנקצרים

The Rambam clearly holds that this halacha is limited to harvesting inside Eretz Yisroel. He also clearly writes that the heter to harvest is not dependent on the bringing of the korban o'mer, rather on the harvesting of the o'mer. Although the Kesef Mishna asks that the gemara 70b implies that one cannot harvest before the bringing of the omer, the lechem mishna explains that the Rambam's ruling of it being dependent on the harvesting of the omer is clear from Rashi 70b that harvesting is already permitted on motzei yom tov, immediately after the harvesting of the omer.

However, it is unclear whether this prohibition applies even in E.Y. after the destruction of the beis hamikdash when there is no longer a korban omer. The Sha'ages Aryeh (chadashos 8) explains that the Rambam holds that it applies nowadays as well, since he doesn't limit the prohibition by saying that it only applies with a beis hamikdash. Obviously, there isn't any harvesting of the O'mer nowadays, but the sha'agas aryeh holds that it would be assur until the morning of the 16th since the omer was able to be harvested all night after the 16th. The main proof of the sha'agas aryeh that the prohibition to harvest in E.Y. applies even when there is no beis hamikdash is that Tosafos in Pesachim 56a explains that the people of Yericho (mentioned in the mishna 71a) who harvested before the omer. The Sha'agas Aryeh understands from the juxtaposition to בית השלחין that the heter to harvest before the omer is that it is grain unfit for the o'mer, implying that otherwise it would be assur. Tosafos in Pesachim writes that the "anshei yericho" was after the destruction of the beis hamikdash, implying that even after the destruction there was an issur to harvest before the morning of the 16th from any grain that was technically fit for the korban omer. In the next siman (9) the sha'agas aryeh goes on to discuss whether if one were to harvest before the omer, the grain would be forbidden to eat.

The Rashash doens't mention the sha'agas aryeh, but quotes from the mishkanos ya'acov (y.d. 64) who also held that the prohibition to harvest before the 16th of Nissan applies nowadays. The Rashash aruges and says that since the pasuk makes it dependent on the harvesting of the omer, it will only apply when there is an omer to harvest. Tosafos 70b explains that the machlokes in the gemara between R. Yona and R. Yossi bar zavda whether it is assur until the omer is brought or until the omer is harvested, is speaking about the prohibition to harvest prior to the omer (not the issur to eat chaddash, as rashi explains). According to Tosafos approach, the conclusion of the gemara is that harvesting is assur until the harvesting of the omer, which implies that the prohibition is only when there is an omer to harvest for.

Menachos 69b - Ma'aseh Nissim

The gemara asks a strange question about whether wheat that falls from the sky can be used for the שתי הלחם that is brought on Shavuos. The gemara explains that the fundamental question is whether the requirement to bring the שתי הלחם from מושבותיכם means that it must be brought from produce of Eretz Yisroel, or is just to exclude using grain grown in chutz la'aretz. Meaning, grain that is not grown in E.Y. but is also not grown in chutz la'aretz would fall under this question. This gemara understood this question to be merely a theoretical, but nowadays is very practical. Hydroponics which is the ability to infuse water with nutrients that are typically found in the soil to provide a source from which the plant can draw it's nutrients, would seemingly qualify as produce not grown in E.Y. or chutz la'aretz.

Rashi and Tosafos try to explain the case of "wheat falling from the clouds". Rashi says that if a cloud would swallow a boat full of wheat and ascend, it could rain wheat. Tosafos doesn't take issue with that being a possibility, but says that if we are speaking about naturally grown wheat then the fact that it was brought up in a cloud shouldn't be relevant. Had it been wheat that was grown in E.Y. it would be usable for the shtei halechem, and if it was wheat grown in chutz la'aretz then it isn't usable. Therefore, Tosafos says that we are speaking of miracle wheat that initiated from the cloud and wasn't grown down on the land.

The Mitzpeh Eisan asks in the name of the minchas kohein that miracle wheat shouldn't be acceptable as a korban mincha because only food that is permitted to be eaten can be used - ממשקה ישראל - מן המותר לישראל, and miracle food is not allowed to be eaten like the gemara says in ta'anis that it is forbidden to benefit from something produced by a miracle? The Mitzpeh Eisan answers the question that the concept of not benefiting from a miracle isn't an issur, it is merely a middas chasidus. He then proceeds to prove from various places that there is no actual prohibition to benefit from a miracle, and therefore this wheat would be usable from the shtei halechem.

It seeems to me that the mitzpeh eisan may have overlooked a Rashi in ta'anis who writes this explicitly. The gemara in Ta'anis 24b speaks of a miracle where sand turns to flour, and on 25a speaks of a fire that is produced by a miracle that was used for havdala. Rashi 24b writes -

אמר להו מעשה נסים הוא, ובמה דאפשר להתרחק ממעשה נסים יותר טוב ונכון

Rashi clearly writes that the idea of not benefiting from ma'aseh nissim is "proper" but certainly not an issur. Regarding the use of fire produced by a miracle for havdala, rashi says that they lit another candle from that one therefore it wasn't considered using the fire of a miracle. It isn't so clear why rashi has to say that unless he holds that one must actually derive benefit from the havdala candle (we usually assume that we don't need to benefit but we show that we are able to benefit from the light).

Menachos 68b - Chodosh B'zman Ha'zeh

The gemara cites various opinions as to when it would be permitted to eat chodosh nowadays, depending on whether it is d'oraysa, and depending on the institution of R. Yochanan Ben Zakai who held that the entire day of the 16th is assur. The gemara explains that the opinions who aren't concerned for the sfeika d'yoma must hold that the issur chodosh in chutz l'aretz is only d'rabonon, therefore mi'safeik it is mutar. However, the final opinion in the gemara is that chodosh is assur m'doroysa on chutz la'aretz and is assur without a beis hamikdash the entire day 16, therefore is assur nowadays until nightfall after the 17th of Nissan. This is paskened in Rambam and Shulchan Aruch at the end of hilchos pesach. The Rambam refrers to the issur through the 17th as "divrei sofrim" rather than a s'feika d'yoma because nowadays we are experts in when the actual rosh chodesh is and only maintain the original system based on מנהג אבותינו בידינו. The Rambam seems to refer to this "minhag" as divrei sofrim.

The Mordechai (Beitza, perek 1) asks that we have a rule that דבר שיש לו מתירין is assur even when it is just a safeik. Why does the gemara have to say that chodosh is assur on the 17th since it is d'oraysa and we are concerned for the sfeika d'yoma, even if it's only d'rabonon we should be concerned for the sfeika d'yoma? He answers that since the issur comes again the next year, it isn't considered a דבר שיש לו מתירין. The Achronim ask on this Mordechai that the grain which became mutar this year will never become assur again, therefore we should consider the grain of this year a davar she'yesh lo matirin and say that it is assur m'safeik, even if the safeik is d'rabonon? The Cheshek Shlomo (R. Shlomo Vilna) answers that the safeik of chodosh is not on the grain, rather it is a safeik on the days whether the 17th is still assur to eat chodosh. Had the safeik been a safeik on the grain, it would not be considered a safeik that is חוזר לאיסורו but not that the safeik is on the day, it is considered a safeik that will return next year until we start sanctifying the new moon through witnesses. The concept of דבר שיש לו מתירין only applies when the issur happens to occur but not when it is an established system that will return year after year. Therefore, even though the actual grain will never become assur, it is regarded as a דבר שיש לו מתירין.

Menachos 66a - Agenda of Baytusim

The mishna on 65a explained that they would harvest the omer in large groups reciting responsive statements to show that they are not in line with the baytusim who had an agenda to make shavuos on sunday. The gemara 65a on the bottom indicates that the distortion of the baytusim didn't stem from their misinterpretation of the verse ממחרת השבת, rather they had an agenda to make shavuos on Sunday and therefore misinterpreted the verse.

Why did the baytusim want shavuos to be on Sunday?

It seems that they were primarily be creating a separation between the holiday of shavuos and the day of receiving the Torah. Being that the Torah never connects shavuos with matan torah, they had the ability to claim that the two have nothing to do with one another. If it were a celebration of matan Torah it must always be 50 days after the second day of pesach, but if the 50 day count only began from the next shabbos, it would not fall on the day of matan torah.

The Chasam Sofer (O.C. 141) raises the question - why didn't they want to celebrate matan torah? The Baytusim also believed in the written Torah so what was the point of creating a disassociation with shavuos? The Chasam Sofer explains that according to our tradition, the written Torah was accepted through na'aseh v'nishma, but the oral Torah had to be forced upon us כפה עליהם את ההר כגיגית (shabbos 88a). It doesn't seem right to celebrate a Torah that was forced upon us, therefore we celebrate the willful acceptance of the written Torah. But, the baytusim who didn't believe in an oral torah must have understood that he force was on the written Torah, so there is nothing to celebrate. That is why they felt that there shouldn't be a holiday associated with receiving the Torah. The approach of the C.S. strange because it is likely that the baytusim wouldn't have had the "tradition" that any torah was forced upon us and would have assumed that we accepted the "only" torah which was the written one by saying na'aseh v'nishma.

I would like to suggest another approach. The gemara 65a explains that in the conversation between R. Yochanan Ben Zakai and the Baytusim they made a claim that Moshe on his own tried to make shavuos back to back with shabbos so that klal yisroel can celebrate for two days. This indicates that their primary intention was to say that Shavuos was not a divine holiday, rather it was an institution of Moshe Rabbeinu. Why did they want to say this? I explained in my sefer Mayim Rabim (pg 205) that the events of matan Torah where Moshe added an extra day, was an implementation of the power of the Rabbonon to interpret the Torah and innovate law on a d'oraysa level. The Baytusim obviously couldn't accept that the Torah handed this level of power to the Rabbonon. They therefore would assume that Moshe's additional day was something he did on his own, without divine intervention. The Baytusim follow through with this conspiracy theory by saying that Moshe did things on his own, without G-d telling him to do so. They were adamant that shavuos should be on Sunday to indicate that it was Moshe's doing, not G-d, which would support the notion that there was never any power given to human beings at the time of matan torah.

Menachos 65b - Counting Verbally

The gemara understands from the pasuk וספרתם לכם that there is an obligation on each and every person to count sefiras ha'omer. Tosafos contrasts this to the mitzvah of counting to the yovel year which is only a mitzvah on the beis din, and question whether it is an obligation on the beis din to verbally articulate the count with a bracha as we do by sefiras ha'omer. However, for the counting of a zava Tosafos writes that there wouldn't be a bracha since it can get messed up if she would begin to bleed. Tosafos seems to be saying that we wouldn't make a bracha on something that is not predictable and within a person's control such as the bleeding of a zava, but it would still be fundamentally the same as the counting of sefira and yovel - to verbally articulate the count. The Pischei Teshuva (Y.D. 196:4) cites the Shl"a who requires a verbal articulation of the 7 clean days of a zava. The Shl"a understands from Tosafos that the bracha isn'e made, but the requirement to count is fundamentally the same as the counting of the omer and yovel. However, the Node B'yehuda argues as does many others, that the counting is fundamentally different and wouldn't require a verbal articulation. The Sidrei Tahara (196:18 d.h. mihu) writes that although one doesn't need to verbally articulate the number of days, they must have a concious thought of the number of days and consider them to be counting toward he clean days.The question is, what is the indication that the counting of a zava should be fundamentally different than the counting of sefira and yovel? To answer this question, the Sidrei Tahara quotes the Re'ah who writes תשובת דבר זה מה שהקדמתי לך בראש ספרי כי כל ענין התורה תלוי בפירוש המקובל. Meaning, we must follow the oral interpretation and cannot figure it out from the text. He points out that we find a similar discrepancy regarding the term זכירה. By yetzias mitzrayim we have a tradition that it must be verbally articulated but not by miriam. The Sidrei Tahara himself suggests a hint in the pasuk for the distinction of a zav and zava. By a zav and zava it says וספר לו and וספרה לה - why would the Torah have to point out that they are counting for themselves? It must be to teach that they are trusted on the bedika, rather than demanding a verbal count. The Meshech Chochma (Emor) has a different approach to explain the difference. Normally when we refer to a count, the purpose is to separate the days that are counted and infuse them with a special status. For example by a zav and zava it is a status of clean days that is acheived by being clean, it is not automatic. However, in the context of sefiras ha'omer and yovel where the days pass automatically and there is nothing specific to do, the requirement to count must mean a verbal count because there is no other possible demand. This explains the pasuk of וספרתם לכם ממחרת השבת וכו but the pasuk of תספרו חמשים יום is more similar to the "count" of zav and zava by giving that day a special stature, and not demanding a verbal count. תספרו חמשים יום means that day 50 is yom tov and is distinct in it's nature than the days that proceeded it. With this we are able to easily answer Tosafos question (d.h. kasuv) - why do we only count 49 days and not 50? The answer is that whenever we can explain the count to refer to a special status i.e. clean days or yom tov, we don't assume it requires a verbal count. The Meshech Chochma also explains the gemara on the bottom of the page - ואם תאמר ממחרת שבת בראשית, פעמים שאתה מוצא נ"א ופעמים שאתה מוצא נ"ב... meaning that sometimes the special day which is the "counted" day, will not be on day 50, rather anywhere between 50-56.

Menachos 64b - How Long did Mordechai Live?

The gemara tells about a civil war between the kings that descended from the chashmonaim when they were trying to capture Yerushalyim and were advised to send a pig up the basket that we used to import the korban tamid. During that period there was no wheat or barley anywhere in the vicinity of Yerushalayim. The Maharsha explains that they were making a concerted effort to be mevatel the korban tamid, omer and shtei ha'lechem. The gemara tells that Mordechai was able to figure out how to communicate with a mute person who was able to tell him through sign language where there would be hidden areas that the troops did not destroy from which they can bring the korbanos. To put things in historical perspective, the chanuka story occurred 206 years before the destruction of the 2nd beis hamkidash. The chashmonaim were all killed out by Herod who took control 103 years before the destruction of the beis hamikdash (avoda zara 9a). It would seem that this story was at the end of the chashmonaim reign - approximately 110 years or so before the destruction. This is almost 100 years after the chanuka story and over 300 years after the purim story (2nd beis hamikdash stood for 420 - גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון).

Rashi writes that Mordechai mentioned in the gemara is the same Mordechai from the time of achashveiros, who was also called פתחיה in the mishna in shekalim and בלשן in nechemia. Tosafos says that it would be strange to suggest that he lived so long and therefore writes that people who were appointed to leadership due to their knowledge and intellect were named after Mordechai. The Ya'avetz supports Rashi - Is it so strange to say that yiras hashem increases lifespan and posits that in the generation of the שיורי בית ראשון, those who remained from the first beis hamikdash, this wasn't such an anomaly.

It seems to me that the biggest problem with suggesting that it was the same Mordechai is that we usually assume that by the time of the chanuka story there were no nevi'im left around. It certainly seems this way from Rashi in Ta'anis 28b who explains that Hallel on chanuka is called a d'oraysa because it was included in the original takana of the nevi'im (mentioned in arvei pesachim) to say hallel every time the Jews are saved from danger. Rashi seems to be okay with takanas nevi'im being called d'oraysa but is troubled that there were no nevi'im at the time of chanuka. To answer this Rashi explains that the framework of saying hallel on being saved from and existential threat to the nation was instituted hundreds or even thousands of years before the chanuka story - just that the chachamim at the time considered this the miracle of chanuka to fit that framework. Yet, we know that Mordechai was from the list of 48 Nevi'im as rashi writes in megillah and together with Esther wrote the Megillah.