Chulin 33a - Chatzi shiur for a goy

The gemara raises the concept of מי איכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעכו"ם אסור, meaning that goyim can't be frummer than jew - if it's assur for a goy, it has to be assur for a jew. Tosafos raises various questions and exceptions to this rule. Tosafos writes that anything which is a mitzvah for a Jew can be an issur for a goy, such as shabbos and studying Torah are assur for a goy. The rationale is that since the entire concept of it being assur to a goy stems from the fact that it is a mitzvah unique to Jews, it doesn't break the rule of מי איכא מידי וכו. At the end of Tosafos, they write:

אע"ג דעובד כוכבים אסור במשהו בשר וגידים ועצם, וישראל לא מיתסר אלא בכזית בשר, הא אמר ריו"ח דחצי שיעור אסור מה"ת

Tosafos seems to imply that there is no concept of a shiur when it comes to a goy, so whether they eat more than a kezayis or less than a kezayis, it is all the same issur (even though by Jews it is more chamur to eat a kezayis, but since there is an issur of chatzi shiur it doesn't violate the מי איכא מידי concept). This seems to support the idea that shiurim are a halacha l'moshe misinai that was said to Jews and not to goyim. However, the Pri Megadin understands from Tosafos that by goyim even the gidim and bones combine with the meat to create a shiur of a kezayis, but the requirement of a kezayis to violate applies to a goy as well. The language of Tosafos where he contrasts that a Jew is forbidden to eat a kezayis of meat, implies that by a goy the bones combine to create a kezayis. However, the Rambam (9:10) writes explicietly that shiurim were only given to Jews, but Goyim are in violation for even eating the smallest amount of eiver min ha'chai.

Chulin 30b - P'sul of Chalada

The gemara Chulin 20b says that the p'sul of חלדה is similar to a weasel that lives in the holes of houses which is often hidden. There seems to be a machlokes in the gemara there whether it is necessary for the beis ha'shechita to be opened so that the part of the knife that is cutting is visible, or whether it is sufficient for part of the knife to be visible as it is cutting (see rashi d.h. הא מיגליא). Nevertheless, there is a din that the knife cannot be hidden underneath something at the time of the shechita. The gemara asks a series of questions according to Rav who says that even if the knife is hidden underneath the skin of the animal it is a problem, what is the din if it is under a cloth, or under the tangled wool. Rashi explains that even if the skin of the animal creates a problem, that is because it is at least part of the animal, but a foreign object such as a cloth may not be a problem. According to Rashi it isn't clear what the question would be regarding the tangled wool - shouldn't that be exactly like the skin of the animal? the Ran explains that the tangled wool isn't part of the animal, therefore even if a cloth would be a problem, the tangled wool would be less connected to the animal and may not be a problem. However, the Rosh seems to understand that the tangled wool is part of the animal that is going to be sheared - the question is that if skin is a problem, maybe the tangled wool is not a problem, and if the tangled wool is also a problem, the cloth which is a completely foreign object may not be a problem. Either way, the sevara of the Rosh, Ran and Rashi is that the more foreign the object the less likely it is to be a problem of chalada. The Ran and Rosh also seem to agree that even according to the maskana of the gemara leaving with a תיקו that the cloth and wool are indeed a problem, it is only because they are attached or tied onto the animal. However, a cloth that is draped over the animal isn't a problem of chalada.

The Rambam (3:10) concludes from the gemara that even if one spreads a cloth over the knife and the animals neck it is considered chalada - הואיל ואין הסכין גלויה הרי זו ספק נבלה. The Rambam seems to hold that chalada is a din that during the act of shechita the knife must be visible so that anything blocking the knife, even if not attached to the animal could constitute a problem of chalada.

The Mishna L'melech references Rashi in Bechoros 24b. The mishna that says when one is shechting a b'chor they are allowed to detach hair to make a place for the knife and it isn't considered a violation of shearing a b'chor. Rashi explains that the reason it is necessary to make a space for the knife is to avoid chalada. Tosafos asks on Rashi that it can't be for a halachic reason, rather a practical one, because the gemara leaves with a תיקו whether tangled hair creates a problem of chalada - if Rashi is correct that the mishna requires cutting the hair to avoid chalada, the gemara should have proven from the mishna in bechoros that it is a problem. Perhaps Rashi would say that the proof from the mishna isn't muchrach since the peshat could be like tosafos that it was cleared for practical reasons. However, since we pasken that we have to be machmir about chalada by tangled hair due to the teiku that the gemara leaves with, rashi explains the mishna by bechor that one would actually be required to cut the hair to avoid chalada.

Chulin 24b - נשיאת כפים

The gemara says that a kohein can only go up to du'chan when he is old enough to have a beard. Tosafos asks from the gemara in megila which implies that as soon has one is no longer a katan he can du'chan, and from a gemara in succah which implies that even a katan can duchan. Tosafos concludes that there are 3 distinctions. When he is only enough to have a beard he can duchan alone even b'kvius. When he has 2 sa'aros and is no longer a katan he can du'chan alone but not b'kvius. But as a katan he cannot duchan alone. These 3 categories are paskened in Shulchan Aruch 128:34.

It isn't clear whether a katan can du'chan with others even b'kvius. The Biur Halacha cites the O'las Tamid that so long as he is duchaning with other kohanim, a katan can even do so b'kvius, and deduces this from the language of the Shulchan Aruch. The Biur Halacha also writes that in the absence of another kohein, one can appoint a person who is a gadol but isn't old enough to have a beard, even as the established kohein. The rationale would be that technically once he is a gadol he is old enough to du'chan, just that we don't allow him to do it b'kvius due to kavod tzibur, so when there is no other kohein we assume that the tzibur is mochel.

It would seem that a katan is not able to du'chan even m'doraysa just like avoda where the gemara learns out from pesukim that a katan is pasul for avodah. If this is true it would make sense why even if the tzibur is mochel, it would not help to have a katan duchan alone. The only purpose of a katan duchaning would be chinuch as the Shulchan Aruch seems to say. However, Rashi in Megila 24a which is quoted in M.B. 122 writes that the reason a katan can't duchan alone is due to kavod hatzibur. This implies that m'doraysa even a katan can duchan. Therefore it is hard to understand why the olas tamid is only matir a gadol who doesn't have a beard to duchan in the absence of another kohein since we assume the tzibur is mochel, but wouldn't allow a katan to duchan. Since both one who is not ממלא זקנו and a kattan are only not allowed to duchan due to kavod tzibur, we should assume that the tzibbur is mochel when there is no one else?

Perhaps the peshat is that a kattan's ducaning is invalid m'doraysa just like he is pasul for avoda. However, for the purpose of being mechaneich him we should allow him to du'chan as we are mechaneich children for everything. Rashi just means to say that for the kavod tzibur we aren't mechaneich children to duchan. But ultimately, even if a katan would duchan, it would not count. Therefore, the mechila of the tzibbur only helps for a gadol who isn't ממלא זקנו but doesn't help for a katan.

Tosafos (here and more so in succah 42a) implies that ta'aniyos are considered k'vius. Therefore it should come out that one who is not ממלא זקנו cannot duchan alone on taniyos and on yom kippur. The Biur Halacha doesn't understand why the poskim don't mention this.

Chulin 22b - Excluding a safeik

Apologies for not blogging for almost 2 weeks. I am in Jerusalem training to be a mohel by Moishele Weissberg and have been very busy.

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The gemara says that there in the development of birds there is a stage where the feathers begin begin to get yellow but aren't yet golden which is excluded by the pasuk because it is too old to qualify as bnei yona, but too young to qualify as torim. The gemara asks whether we consider the birds at that stage to have a separate status and would therefore not qualify as being part of either group, or whether it is a safeik so it cannot be sacrificed as torim because it may be too young, and cannnot be sacrificed as b'nei yona because it may be too old. According to this second approach that it is actually one or the other, just that we have no way to determine, Tosafos points out that if the kohein would sacrifice both, it would certainly be effective to fulfill the persons neder (although the other would be a violation of chulin b'azara). The gemara responds that this second option is not possible because if it is a safeik, "would we need a pasuk to exclude a safeik!" The Turei Even in Chagiga points out that it would seem that this is a proof to the concept that safeik d'oraysa is l'kula on a Torah level, because if the Torah would demand being machmir for a safeik, it would make sense that we would need a pasuk to exclude the safeik. However, this proof can be easily pushed off based on the interpretation of what the gemara means to say that we don't need a pasuk to exclude a safeik. Tosafos explains that in our gemara, the explanation could simply be that it wouldn't make sense that the Torah would exclude it mi'safeik. Meaning, that it is entirely possible that we would need a pasuk to exclude a safeik case and say that it is definitely not included, but here the gemara is suggesting that even after it is excluded by the pasuk it remains a safeik. Therefore, the gemara responds that we never find that a pasuk would exclude something and have it remain a safeik even after being excluded.

Tosafos points out that this approach although it would work in our sugya, wouldn't work in various other places where the gemara uses the same phrase. Therefore, Tosafos suggests that there are different types of sfei'kos. When the safeik is based on the metzius of the object, such as a tumtum where we don't know if he is male or female, but each one is different, the pasuk could exclude a safeik. However, when the safeik is a safeik in din such as an androginus where they are all the same, just that we don't know what the din is on such a person, the pasuk wouldn't exlcude a safeik. The rationale for this distinction is that the pasuk may come and tell me what to do in a situation that I can't clarify the facts, but when there is a safeik in din, the Torah wouldn't ever deal with that as a safeik since the Torah doesn't have a safeik in din - קמי שמיא גליא אם הם קטנים או גדולים וכו הלכך לא אתא גרא למעוטי מטעם שהם ספק שאינו ספקא קמי שמיא

According to both of these approaches, there would be no proof at all to the concept of safeik d'oraysa because the gemara is not saying that we don't need a pasuk to exclude a safeik d'oraysa, Rather, the gemara is saying that although we may need a pasuk to exclude a safeik d'oraysa, that cannot be what the Torah is doing. However, Rashi seems to use the language of Tosafos - מי איכא ספקא קמי קודשא בריך הוא, but ends with a strange phrase - וכיון דלא פשיטא לן לא הא ולא הא, מהיכא תיסק אדעתין לאכשורינהו. This seems to indicate that since the Torah isn't dealing with the safeik and isn't including them into either category, we are forced to exclude them from both categories mi'safeik. This would seem to imply the opposite of the Turei Even's suggestion and that since the Torah doesn't include them, we are forced to exclude them mi'safeik, which would indicate ספק דאורייתא לחומרא.

Chulin 11b - Relying on Rov for Treifa

The gemara goes through a lengthy discussion to prove that we rely on rov (majority), ultimately trying to prove this from shechita itself where we aren't concerned that there was a hole in the esophagus on the exact spot that the shechting took place. The gemara rejects this proof (and the other proofs) by suggesting that wherever possible we don't rely on rov, but when there is no choice we do rely on it. It then proves this from Rebbi Meir who would be concerned even for a minority, so how was he able to eat any meat - clearly when impossible he relied on rov and wasn't concerned for the minority, we too rely on rov when there is no alternative. According to the simple conclusion of the gemara it should be necessary to examine every animal for all 18 possible treifos, since wherever possible we cannot rely on rov. However, Rashi twists the gemara at the very end to have an opposite conclusion. Since following the sources suggested in the gemara for relying on rov we would not be able to rely on rov when it is possible to check, rashi says that it must be that the source for relying on rov is a הלכה למשה מסיני (or from the simple reading of the pasuk - אחרי רבים להטות without exception), and would apply under all circumstances. Therefore, even when it is possible to check, one would not need to check. Although the simple reading of the gemara doesn't yield this conclusion, it seems that the practice of eating meat without checking for all treifos led rashi to interpret the gemara differently and say that one would never need to check for treifos (except for the lungs where they are very common).

Tosafos holds that Rebbi Meir's opinion of being concerned for the minority is only a stringency of the Rabbonon. On a Torah level even R. Meir would follow majority, just that m'drabonon he is concerned for the minority (there is a Mordechai who argues on this Tosafos). According to this approach, Tosafos explains that we are proving from R. Meir that since following the minority is only d'rabonon, they were only go'zer when possible, therefore the Rabbonon who hold that we don't follow majority when possible to check, would also agree that since it is only a chumra m'drabonon, when checking isn't possible we rely on the Rov. According to this approach, on a Torah level one can rely on the Rov even when possible to check, and the requirement to check would only be rabbinic. Therefore, the gemara cannot conclude as Rashi suggests that we have a halacha l'moshe misinai allowing us to rely on rov even when possible to check, because the entire obligation to check when possible is rabbinic. Therefore, according to Tosafos the conclusion of the gemara should be that m'drabonon one is responsible to check after all 18 treifos and not rely on the majority.

Chulin 10b - Eid Echad Ne'eman B'issurin

Rashi says that the source for eid echad being trusted for issurim is the pasuk that speaks of an individual shechting a korban, and all the kohanim eating from the shechita. Since we don't find that the pasuk requires there to be witnesses watching the shechita, we see that the shochet himself who is the eid echad is believed. Tosafos in Gittin 2b writes that the source of an eid echad being believed is the pasuk of וספרה לה by a woman who is a zava - she checks herself and her husband trusts her.

Rashi in Yevamos 88a writes that if an individual says that he knows that a piece of meat is שומן and not חלב he is trusted - דאי לאו הכי, אין לך אדם אוכל משל חברו, ואיןלך אדם סומך על בני ביתו. If we didn't allow the concept of eid echad, no person would be able to eat in their own home. This Rashi is usually quoted to be arguing on Tosafos and holding that the source of eid echad is merely a sevara, since otherwise it would be impossible to function normally. However, in light of Rashi in chulin who also cites a pasuk in the context of shechita, it seems that rashi in Yevamos isn't claiming to cite a source, rather proving that it must be true that we rely on an eid echad.

There is a very interesting Hagahos Ashri (Rosh 14) who writes that an eid echad isn't believed when there is a chezkas issur, but this is only if he is the class of people who are אנשים ריקים ופוחזים. Meaning, the same level of witnesses who the Torah believes if they are two, which includes even empty people who aren't at all learned, are not believed as individuals when there is a chezkas issur. But one who is kasher is believed even against a chazaka. According to the hagahos ashri, in a situation of chezkas issur, there are two classes of Jews, the lower of which isn't trusted unless they testify as a group of 2 witnesses.

Chulin 9a - Talmid Chacham Must be an expert in practical matters

R. Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a T.C. is obligated to learn 3 things, writing, shechita and milah. Rashi explains that writing simply means that he must be able to sign his name for an eidus. Shechita means that he must know how to maneuver his hand to shecht properly and not just know the halachos (and the same for tying the knot of the tefillin). The Maharsha explains that a person has an obligation to learn and know the entire Torah, so Rashi is trying to emphasize the practical aspect of it - knowing the halachos of shechita isn't sufficient, rather one must be able to be מאמן ידו and do the shechita.

R. Chanina Bar Shalmei adds the knot of the tefillin, birchas chasanim and tzitzis. The gemara asks why the first opinion doesn't list those three and says - הני שכיחן. Rashi explains that since tefillin, birchas chasanim and tzitzis are common, everyone will automatically become an expert in them by osmosis without having to invest effort into learning how to do them. Rabbeinu Gershom offers a slightly different approach - since they are so common it is easy to find others who can do them. According to Rabbeinu Gershom, we have a justification nowadays for why we aren't obligated to become an expert in any of the 6 items. Since it is common to find people who are able to do these things (even the first 3), it is no longer necessary to make such an effort to be able to do them.

Tosafos seems to understand the gemara's comment of הני שכיחן like Rabbeinu Gershom. Tosafos equates this with what the gemara says that tefillin in the house of bar chavu are משכח שכיחי. Tosafos understands from here that since there are experts around who can do it, it is not essential that everyone else learn how to do it. The implication is that not everyone will know how to tie the knot of tefillin, but when needed one will be able to find someone to do it. From this Tosafos proves that the knot of the tefillin doesn't need to be retied every day as suggested by Rabbeinu Eliyahu, rather the requirement of וקשרתם just means that we must tighten it on our heads as Rabbeinu Tam explains. From the understanding of Rabbeinu Tam that the definition of וקשרתם is to tighten the strap around the head, it is imperative that it be tight and not loose since that is the definition of the mitzvah.

To respond to the proof of Tosafos, Rabbeinu Eliyahu may interpret the gemara of הני שכיחן like Rashi, which would mean that everyone will automatically become an expert since it is necessary to do every single day. According to Rabbeinu Eliyahu one wouldn't need to learn to be an expert in something that is routine and he would be doing every single day from the time he is 13.

Chulin 5a - Mumar to be Mechalel Shabbos and Non-religious Nowadays

The gemara says that we don't accept a korban from a mumar for avoda zara or a mumar who violates shabbos publicly, but we do accept from a mumar who violates another aveira. From this the poskim derive that one who violates shabbos publicly has a reduced status in halacha, and for many things is considered like a goy. His shechita is passul, he can't be counted as a minyan, one cannot cook for him on yom tov.... Rashi explains:

דהעובד עבודת כוכבים כופר בהקב"ה, והמחלל שבת כופר במעשיו ומעיד שקר שלא שבת הקב"ה במעשה בראשית

Rashi understands that the violation of shabbos is more fundamental than mila, kashrus and other issurim in the Torah because it is a denial of G-d creating the world. However, Rashi doesn't explain why this is only true when one publicly violates the shabbos, but is not true when one privately violates the shabbos.

R. Moshe (Igros Moshe o.c. 1:33) explains the distinction and with this explains why many people nowadays wouldn't have this status. When one violates shabbos privately we consider this to be לתאבון, but when one violates shabbos publictly he is doing a very open act of rejecting Hashem as the creator who rested on shabbos. Since we aren't able to know what he is thinking, we have to look at his actions to make that determination. A public violation of shabbos indicates a rejection of the creator. Therefore, this distinction only applies when one recognizes the seriousness of shabbos and what it represents, yet makes a conscious decision to violate it publicly. But, when one has no appreciation of shabbos at all, their violation isn't a denial of Hashem and therefore it is tantamount to a private violation that we attribute to his yetzer horah getting the better of him. The Sridei Eish (R. Yechiel Yacov Weinberg) refers to this teshuva of R. Moshe and writes that he agrees with the logic.

Based on this approach many shabbos violators nowadays would have the status of a regular מומר לתאבון even if they violate shabbos publicly. However, the leniency wouldn't extend to those who grew up religious with an appreciation for shabbos and later chose to reject it.

Most non-religious Jews would have the status of מומר לתאבון, as opposed to מומר להכעיס or מומר לחלל שבת בפרהסיאץ. But, they don't have all the advantages of a mumar l'tai'avon. When the gemara speaks of a מומר לתאבון, it speaks about someone who makes decisions before he does aveiros. When he has nothing to gain and no benefit in violating, he will always decide to keep the mitzvos i.e. purchase kosher food. It is only when it is too expensive, too hard to obtain, or doesn't taste as good that he will decide to eat non-kosher. It is for this reason that when we can ascertain that he has nothing to gain by doing something wrong, he will do it right. But, for the most part, nowadays people who aren't religious, don't make any decisions at all. Meaning, they categorize themselves as "I don't keep kosher" or "I am reformed so I drive on Shabbos". Since they don't make any decisions or make any attempt to do what is right, they wouldn't be trusted to do something properly, even when there would be no gain to do it improperly. Even Rava who says that we don't say כיון דדש בה כהתירה דמי ליה - these people are כהתירא דמי ליה, where we no longer have the assumption of לא שביק התירא ואכיל איסורא.

Chulin 4a - Yotzei V'nichnas

In Avoda Zara 12a, I mentioned Tosafos who says that the concept behind yotzei v'nichnas being effective is not that a spot check is good enough. Rather, the concept of יוצא ונכנס is that he creates fear on the goy who is constantly concerned that the mashgiach will show up unannounced and catch him red handed - נתפס עליו כגנב. Therefore, it is only effective in a situation where the goy has what to lose if he gets caught, and when there is a real concern that the mashgiach can and will show up an any moment.

The Cheshek Shlomo points out that the gemara in chulin 4a seems to echo this idea. The gemara says that according to Rava that yotzei v'nichnas is effective, why would the braisa speak about ישראל עומד על גביו, rather than speaking about the bigger chiddush of yotzei v'nichnas. The gemara explains - אמר לך יוצא ונכנס נמי כעובד על גביו דמי, meaning that it is the same. However, this doesn't seem to answer the gemara's question - it would still be a bigger chiddush to say that יוצא ונכנס works? The Cheshek Shlomo explains that the braisa is actually saying a big chiddush according to Rava. It is true that yotzei v'nichnas works, but one may think that it works as a spot check to allow us to assume that if now he didn't mess up now, he wouldn't have messed up at other times. By the braisa equating yotzei v'nichnas to ישראל עומד על גביו it is esentially teaching us that יוצא ונכנס works through the same method of someone being there constantly, since it creates a fear of someone walking in at any moment.

With this we can understand why Abaye disagreed with Rava and held that יוצא ונכנס doesn't work for shechita, even though it works everywhere else. The gemara seems to make a very superficial distinction between the case of the wine where the goy is in the store but not supposed to be touching it, and the case of shechita where he is actually touching it. Rashi 3b offers a deeper understanding to that distinction. Rashi explains that the reason shechita is different is that the animal is in his hand and כהרף עין שוהה או דורס - he can instantaneously with the twist of the wrist mess up the entire shechita. Since he can do so within a split second there is no longer the fear of getting caught which undermines the entire concept of יוצא ונכנס.

Chulin 3b - Mumar L'hachis

Rava says that a mumar l'tei'avon which is someone who will only eat issur when there is no other kosher option is allowed to do shechita, just not allowed to check the knife (since he isn't believed to do things that require very much effort). The clear implication of Rava's statement is that a mumar l'hach'is, meaning one who ignores the kosher option and opts for the non-kosher food, his shechita is invalid even bidi'eved. However, it isn't clear why we invalidate his shechita. Rashi (d.h. chutz) writes - אבל להכעיס אפילו נמצאת סכינו יפה לא, דמועד לנבל בכוונה בידים. Rashi understands that we are concerned that he will intentionally mess up in the shechita and we therefore treat his shechita as a neveila. According to Rashi he is not inherently invalid, we are just concerned for intentionally botching the shechita. It should follow that if someone was watching the mumar l'hach'is carefully and determines that he didn't violate any of the 5 halachos of shechita, it would be valid. However, Tosafos d.h. kasavar, writes that the same source that we use to exclude a goy from shechita, וזבחת, from which we learn you need to be a בר זביחה, we exclude a mumar l'hach'is. Tosafos understands that to qualify as a bar zevicha you need to be someone who believes in the importance of shechita, therefore a goy and a mumar l'hachis who completely disregard the process of shechita are passul. According to Tosafos this is an inherent p'sul and therefore a mashgiach standing over him wouldn't help, just like it wouldn't help for a goy. The Shach (2:16) understands that this is a d'oraysa exclusion, and the product is a neveila d'oraysa. The Rambam has a similar approach to Tosafos that we equate a mumar l'hach'is to a goy, but is somewhat different. According to the Rambam we learn from the pasuk of ואכלת מזבחו to exclude a goy, and include a mumar l'hachis who has status of a goy. According to the Rambam the pasuk which declares the shechita to be treif is in the context of a goy, but we equate a mumar l'hachis based on the rule that a mumar has status of a goy. Whereas according to Tosafos, the pasuk doesn't speak about a goy, rather about one who is not a בר זביחה which incorporates both a goy and mumar equally. The difference between then is whether the equating of a mumar to a goy in this context relies on a general principal that a mumar is like a goy (rambam) or just happens to be that they are both excluded for the same reason which is not believing in the rules of shechita. - see page 15 of the pdf sefer on shechita that i linked to yesterday.

Chulin 2a - Women and Shechita - Eldad Hadani

One of the opinions that has become a favorite to pick on in Hilchos Shechita is a sefer called Hilchos Eretz Yisroel by Eldad HaDani (see wiki). The first Tosafos in Chulin quotes Sefer E.Y. as the source to forbid women from shechita because דעתן קלות. Tosafos rejects this opinion by proving from the Mishna in Zevachim that woman are allowed to shecht even kodshim, so they can certainly shecht chulin. The Beis Yosef adds that the explanation of Hilchos E.Y. that they are דעתן קלות simply means that they are more prone to fainting when carrying out the gruesome shechita. Although Tosafos opinion is echoed by all the Rishonim, the Rama (1:1) writes that the minhag is for women not to shecht, which he quotes from the Agur. The Beis Yosef challenges whether there can exist a minhag "not to shecht". Although we have never heard or seen a women shechting, that would not have status of minhag - לא ראינו אינה ראיה. The Shach (1:1) disagrees with the Beis Yosef and says that when something is common and prone to happen, we do say לא ראינו is a proof, because if it was possible to happen, odds are that it would have happened. The Pri Megadim says that there are two reasons that we don't allow women to shecht: 1. they are suspect of violating lifnei iver, 2. they are prone to fainting. Therefore he rules that even bidieved one cannot eat from the shechita of a woman unless their knife was examined carefully and they have a chazaka that they can handle the gruesome shechita without fainting. The Aruch Hashulchan adds an interesting point - since there is a concern regarding the knife that it wasn't examined properly, women wouldn't be able to shecht chulin but would be able to shecht kodshim since the gemara says (zevachim 88) that they would take new knives rather than fixing nicks in the knife. This approach would undermine the proof of Tosafos that if they can shecht kodshim, they can certainly shecht chulin. I found that in the sefer of notes on Rav Eliyahuv's shiurim, he cites a possible source for the minhag that women don't shecht from kiddushin 52b. The gemara says וכי אשה בעזרה מנין, Rashi says that a women wouldn't enter the Azara. Tosafos disagrees because we don't find any issur for a woman to enter the azara. One of Tosafos proofs is that women can do shechita which would require them to enter the azara. Nevertheless, Rashi assumes that the minhag was not to let women in the azara, which could have led to a minhag to not allow women to shecht kodshim. Since they weren't shechting kodshim, it could have extended to chulin as well. The proof Tosafos in Kiddushin cites that women could enter the azara since they are allowed to do shechita is difficult in light of the gemara Chulin 2b that talks about shechting from outside the azara with a long knife (although the gemara is only speaking about using a long knife to prevent touching the animal after it is dead, Tosafos explains that since we are talking about tamei meis, we have to be speaking of a knife that is long enough for him to remain outside the azara and shecht inside the azara ) - women could have done the same.

I wrote a sefer of comments on the Chochmas Adam in Hilchos Shechita. If interested please CLICK HERE.

Menachos 99b - Learning at ALL times

R. Elazar Moshe Horowitz (Pinsk) points out a very interesting paradox in the opinions regarding the mitzvah of limud ha'torah. R. Yishmael is the opinion who did not permit his nephew to study chochmas yevanis because the mitzvah to study Torah is incumbent on a person at ALL times, whereas R. Shimon Bar Yochai (quoted by R. Yochanan) says that one can fulfill their obligation through the reading of shema in the morning and evening. However, in the gemara Brachos 35b, it is R. Yishmael who permits working to compliment Torah study - הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ, whereas R. Shimon Bar Yochai held that if one devotes himself to Torah the his work will be done by others. It comes out that R. Yishmael holds that one must learn ALWAYS, yet allows for one to do work, and R. Shimon Bar Yochai doesn't allow for work yet he holds that the mitzvah to study Torah can be fulfilled simply by reading shema?

Rav E.M. Horowitz suggests that according to R. Yishmael the demand is to learn every moment of the day, therefore one may not study other things. Yet, he allows for one to work since without the ability to earn a living one will not be able to focus on their learning - יפה ת"ת עם דרך ארץ. On the other hand, R. Shimon Bar Yochai held that there is no heter for one to stop learning in order to work, therefore the justification of those tzadikim who throughout history did work must have been based on the assumption that the mitzvah to study Torah is not at all times.

The approach within the opinion of R. Yishmael seems very plausible. The mitzvah to study torah is continuous and applies all day and night, therefore the mitzvah itself must include a dispensation for earning a living since otherwise it would be impossible to manage. However, his approach within the opinion of R. Shimon Bar Yochai is difficult. If indeed R. Shimon holds that the demand to study Torah can be fulfilled with shema, how can he put any restrictions at all on working?

It seems to me that R. Shimon Bar Yochai in Menachos is making a halachic statement regarding the fulfillment of the bare minimum requirement to study Torah. But, in Brachos he isn't making a halachic statement, he is rather recognizing a reality. If the Torah scholars would be mevatel their limud ha'torah for the purpose of earning a living, they may be permitted to do so but would still forfeit tremendous potential of achievements in their learning. R. Shimon wasn't making a halachic statement, rather he was saying that the Torah scholars shouldn't be mevatel their learning since תורה מה תהא עליה, therefore he was confident that to protect the achievements in Torah, G-d would make it so that their work will be done by others.

Menachos 99b - ביטולה זהו קיומה

There is a well known phrase ביטולה של תורה זהו קיומה which seems to be an adaption and modification of the Talmudic phrase ביטולה של תורה זהו יסודה. The source for the modification is found in Rabbeinu Gershom who translates the term יסודה to mean קיומה. The connotation of the phrase ביטולה זהו קיומה is similar to that of יצא הפסדו בשכרו, meaning that sometimes it is necessary to do something against the Torah which ultimately brings about a greater fulfillment of the Torah. It is of the same genre as עת לעשות להשם הפרו תורתך, where the violation of the Torah is necessary for the greater fulfillment of the Torah. However, it seems to me that by modifying the term יסודה to קיומה, there is a potent message in the connotation that is being diluted by this change of term. Rashi explains that the term יסודה implies that through bitul torah, one can actually receive reward as if he were יושב ומייסדה ועוסק בה. Meaning, we don't simply encourage the temporary violation for the greater good that will come from it, but rather we consider the actual violation to be a constructive building of the foundation of Torah. The gemara learns this out from the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu broke the luchos and Hashem agreed that he made the correct choice. Rashi loosens the definition of ביטולה זהו יסודה to mean that one receives reward as if he was building a foundation for Torah, and derives this from Moshe where we see that Hashem sanctioned his good intentions. But, if we truly interpret that the Bitul Torah can be regarded as an actual constructive building of the Torah, we need to fine tune how exactly the breaking of the luchos would serve as a source for this concept?

The Shita Mi'Kubetzes (and Maharsha) cite the kal v'chomer that Moshe made which led him to break the luchos - מה פסח שאינו אלא מצוה אחת אמרה תורה כל בן נכר לא יאכל בו, כל התורה כולה וכל ישראל מומרים על אחת כמה וכמה. Moshe made a kal v'chomer that if we are willing to be me'vatel the mitzvah of korban pesach to avoid one who is נתנכרו מעשיו לאביו שבשמים and isn't fulfilling other mitzvos, we should certainly be mevatel the entire Torah to prevent the Jews who are mumrim from receiving it. The idea that a בן נכר doesn't bring korban pesach is that the korban pesach represents G-d's protection of the his people (separating them from the Egyptians) - therefore one who is a בן נכר and isn't worthy of this protection, the korban pesach will have the opposite effect. Similarly, giving Torah to the Jews when they are sinning will have the adverse effect that it should. Rather than providing them with zechuyos, it serves as a מקטרג to prosecute against them. Moshe's logic was that Torah which is built on a faulty foundation will not hold, therefore the foundation must be destroyed before the Torah can be built. The breaking of the luchos sends the message that they must do teshuva, so that that destruction is the first step in the construction of the foundation. From this we learn that sometimes the foundation is built by the destruction of the Torah, so that people will learn that the foundation must be improved before it can hold the weight of the Torah. This is the concept of ביטולה זהו יסודה, it is b'geder סותר על מנת לבנות במקומו where the destruction is actually the first step in the process of construction.

Menachos 95a - Travelling of Camps in Midbar

The Meshech Chochma (Parshas Bamidbar 2:17) explains the pasuk - ונסע אוהל מועד מחנה הלוים בתוך המחנות, כאשר יחנו כן יסעו איש על ידו לדגליהם - to contrast the norm of travelling. Kavod is only applicable when people are in their formal settings. but when they are traveling there is no concept of showing kavod - אין מכבדין בדרכים. It is for this reason that the Torah insists that the arrangement of the shevatim around the mishkan be maintained even when they travel. Since the Mishkan traveled within the camp and Hashem's presence was there even at the time of travelling, as the gemara darshens (Menachos 95a) - ונסע אוהל מועד, אע"פ שנסע אוהל מועד הוא ואינו נפסל לחם הפנים ביוצא. Since the Kedusha was maintained even while travelling, it was necessary to maintain their formal formation around the mishkan.

This Meshech Chochma is very difficult in light of the gemaras conclusion that there is really no machlokes about the lechem hapanim and kodshei kodshim becoming passul. The gemara concludes that all agree that at the time of travelling, the מחנה שכינה lost it's kedusha, therefore any lechem hapanim that was off the table, and kodshei kodshim would be passul. However, the lechem hapanim that was actually on the table would not become passul. Rashi explains that the אוהל מועד did NOT retain it's status when they travelled, yet the breads on the table would not become passul based on the pasuk of ולחם התמיד עליו יהיה indicating that so long as they remain on the table, they retain their kedusha. Just as they don't become passul due to לינה, they also don't become passul due to יוצא. The gemara does conclude that there is a machlokes tana'im whether the מחנה לויה ומחנה ישראל also lose their kedusha when they travel, or whether the status of מחנה לויה וישראל remain so that the metzorah and zav are still not permitted to enter their respective camps. It seems strange for the Meshech Chochma to base himself on the drasha that even during the travels the ohel mo'ed retained it's kedusha, since it is rejected at the maskana. It seems that the Meshech Chochma understands like R.E.M. Horowitz who says that when the gemara concludes that the pasuk of ונסע אוהל מועד is for the degalim, it doesn't mean as rashi indicates that אוהל מועד is לאו דוקא. Rather, it means that for degalim we darshen ונסע אוהל מועד -אע"פ שנסע אוהל מועד הוא, but we don't use that drasha to permit kodshim to be eaten since for that we require curtains of the azarah (נראה לי דהכי קאמר, לדגלים קרא גלי שהן בקדושתן, ולא לקדשי קדשים דבעו מחיצת קלעים, ומיושב קושיות תוס' בכמה דוכתי). According to this approach, even in the conclusion of the gemara it maintains it's initial drasha that the מחנות and even the מחנה שכינה retain their kedusha, just that it wouldn't permit the eating of kodshim due to the lack of קלעים.

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On a related point (assuming like rashi that the מחנה שכינה didn't retain it's kedusha during the travels) - the gemara says that the issue of the מחנה לויה וישראל retaining their status while they traveled is dependent on the machlokes whether זבין ומצורעין would be chayev misah for entering the azara when the korban pesach is being brought b'tumah. The comparison seems very strange because when the korban pesach is brought b'tumah, the machlokes hinges on whether when we permit tu'mah, we permit all tu'mah. What does this have to do with the issue of whether the camps retain their status during the time of travel? It seems to me that the machlokes between R. Eliezer and the Rabbonon is a very fundamental one. Is the status of the מחנה לויה וישראל dependent on the מחנה שכינה - in other words, is the kedusha of מחנה לויה וישראל an extension of קדושת מחנה שכינה or is their status completely independent of the קדושת מחנה שכינה. R. Eliezer holds that the kedusha status of all the machanos emanates from מחנה שכינה, therefore when a pesach is brought b'tum'ah and we don't treat מחנה שכינה with special status, the status of מחנה לויה וישראל is also lost. The Rabbonon argue and say that the kedusha of the מחנה לויה וישראל is not dependent on מחנה שכינה so that even when the מחנה שכינה is being violated, the מחנה לויה וישראל must be maintained. Similarly, when they traveled in the dessert when all agree that the מחנה שכינה didn't maintain it's status, there is a machlokes whether it is possible for מחנה לויה וישראל to retain their status and not permit זבין ומצורעין to enter the camps, respectively.

Menachos 89a - Amount of oil in Menorah

The gemara says that the Rabbonon determined that the amount of oil necessary for each candle in the menorah was 1/2 lug of oil per night. This amount would be the right amount for even the longer nights of the winter. However, there is a machlokes in the gemara how they figured out that this was the right amount. One opinion says that began with a larger amount and when they found too much oil left over in the morning, they slowly reduced the amount that they initially put in the candle - the advantage to this approach is אין עניות במקום עשירות, we aren't concerned with "waste" in the beis hamikdash. The other opinion says that they started with a smaller amount of oil (rashi says that they began with a rivi'is - not clear where he gets that from), and when they realized that it didn't last the entire night, they slowly started to add oil - the advantage to this approach is התורה חסה על ממונן של ישראל , not to waste oil. The opinion who says that they started with a small amount of oil and when they realized it wasn't enough, they would add on the future nights, is very difficult to understand. How could they have been cheap on the oil in order to save money since it could lead to not fulfilling the mitzvah of having the candles burn all night long. This gemara seems to imply that the mitzvah of lighting the candles in the beis hamikdash was הדלקה עושה מצוה, similar to what we say by ner chanuka. However, the gemara and rambam clearly hold that the mitzvah was to hvae the candles burning all night long and the mitzvah is not fulfilled at the moment of lighting. Furthermore, even by chanuka the halacha demands that at the time of lighting there is sufficient oil to burn for the duration of the time. This should certainly be necessary by the candles in the beis hamikdash. How can there be an opinion that they began with a smaller amount of oil, and not fulfill the mitzvah of lighting the menorah?

The Nesivos HaMishpat (Chavos Da'as) has a sefer with hagahos on shulchan aruch and its commentaries called M'ginei Artetz. In Hilchos Chanuka he writes:

בספר מגיני ארץ מבעל נתהמש"פ על הל' חנוכה החליט דבמנורה שבמקדש לא אמרינן שהדלקה עושה מצוה וז"ל לכן נראה דמצוה דהדלקה דחנוכה אינו דומה למצות הדלקה דמנורה, דבנר חנוכה אין המצוה רק תחלת ההדלקה שידליק שיעור כזה, תדע דהא כבתה אין זקוק לה ומש"ה צריך לכתחלה ליתן כשיעור, משא"כ במנורה המצוה והחיוב הוא שיהיה דולק כל שיעור הזה דהא כבתה זקוק לה ומש"ה סגי אפילו כשנותן לכתחלה פחות מכשיעור רק שיראה להוסיף בכל פעם עד שידליק כל השיעור וכמ"ד ממטה למעלה (היינו מ"ד במנחות פט ע"א שמתחלה נתנו רביעית ואח"כ הוסיפו עד חצי לוג כשראו שאין סיפוק). ולפי"ז אתי שפיר בס' תרע"ג ס"ב דאמר הדלקה עושה מצוה לפיכך אם כבתה וכו' שעמד עליו הט"ז בס"ק ח' (שהקשה מה הקשר בין הדלקה עושה מצוה לכבתה אין זקוק לה, הא אף אם הנחה עושה מצוה נמי נוכל לומר שאם כבתה אין זקוק לה). ולפמש"כ אתי שפיר כיון דאין מצותה שיהיה דלוקה כל שיעור הזה כמו במנורה, רק תחלת ההדלקה לפיכך אם כבתה וכו' ואתי שפיר עכ"ל. הרי סובר דהא דנקט המחבר לשון "הדלקה עושה מצוה" לאו לאפוקי הנחה אלא לאפוקי המנורה שבבית המקדש שהמצוה לא נגמר במעשה הדלקה אלא המצוה היא שתהא דולקת ועומדת.

The Nesivos explains that the opinion who says that they started with a smaller amount of oil doesn't mean to say that they put a rivi'is in the first night and when they saw it went out early they added a little the next night. Rather, they started with a rivi'is and when they realized at 4am that it wasn't going to last until the morning, they added a little more. Then at 5am when they saw it wouldn't last they added a little more, until they realized that it would take a half lug to stay burning until the morning. This is actually very medu'yak in rashi who writes:שבתחלה נתנו רביעית ועמדו שם וראו שאין סיפוק ושוב הוסיפו עד חצי לוג. Rashi clearly holds that they stood there all night adding oil until they figured how much would be needed. The nesivos explains that this was av viable option since in the beis hamikdash we don't say הדלקה עושה מצוה, so that adding oil after it is already burning is acceptable. However, Rashi in the k'sav yad clearly writes: בתחלה רביעית הלוג, ולא דלק אלא חצי הלילה, ליל שני הוסיפו וכן כמה לילות עד ששיערו חצי לוג ללילה. Rashi in the k'sav yad holds that they would add more the next night. According to this approach it is very difficult how they could be meva'tel the mitzvah the first few nights just to save a few pennies! Rabbeinu Gershom seems to say that they originally thought that less than a half lug would be sufficient. They never made this decision in order to save money, rather because they thought that it could indeed burn all night. Eventually they realized that a half lug was necessary to burn all night, but we learn from the fact that they initially put in what they thought is the bare minimum that the Torah cares about not wasting money and it is therefore "not permitted" to add more than a half lug.

Menachos 86b - Need the Lights?

The gemara emphasizes that Hashem doesn't need the light of the Menorah because all 40 years that the Jews were in the dessert they were led by the light of Hashem. Therefore the light of the menorah, and particularly the Ner Ma'aravi was an indication that the presence of Hashem is with the Jewish people. The gemara also says that the windows in the Beis HaMikdash were wide on the inside and narrow on the outside to funnel the inner light out to the world, as opposed to enabling sunlight to come from outside.

Tosafos says that a similar gemara in Shabbos makes a point of saying tha Aharon didn't need the light of the Menorah, as opposed to our gemara where the emphasis is on Hashem. I would suggest that they are both true. At the beginning of Parshas B'ha'aloscha the pasuk says אל מול פני המנורה יאירו שבעת הנרות. Rashi explains that the Menorah was designed so that the 6 candles, 3 on each side, faced the center candle "Why? So that people should say that He needs the light". The Maharal explains that normally one designs a candelabra so that each candle shines in a different direction to light up the larger area. The fact that all candles faced the center is symbolic of the fact that Hashem doesn't need the light. The pasuk then continues "ויעש כן אהרן אל מול פני המנורה העלה נרותיה" and Rashi explains that this is too show the praise of Aharon that he didn't deviate in any way from what he was told. The commentaries are very troubled with this pasuk. We are speaking of Aharon the Kohein, the brother of Moshe Rabbeinu - who would think that he would deviate from the way things were done? The Maharal says that he made special effort to be meticulous so that each wick faced the middle candle. This was s delicate detail that one could have been lax in, yet Aharon did it with great precision. To build on this approach, the pasuk is trying to teach that aside from Aharon lighting the candles all facing center to show that Hashem doesn't need the light, he also did this to show that he who will be working in the mishkan, doesn't need the light. When Aharon did the lighting of the menorah to face the middle, he did so with the intention of showing that Hashem doesn't require the light and that he doesn't need the light. This pasuk may be the source of both our gemara which says that the way the menorah was lit shows that Hashem doesn't need the light, and the gemara in Shabbos which says that it shows that Aharon doesn't need the light.

Menachos 85a - Coals to New Castle

The gemara tells of a strange discussion that took place between two Egyptian sorcerers and Moshe Rabbeinu. They challenged Moshe that his "tricks" of turning the stick into a snake and water into blood are unimpressive - תבן אתה מכניס לעפריים - you are bringing more straw into a place abundant with straw. Egypt had plenty of magic so that Moshe's magic didn't impress them. Moshe responds למתא ירקא, ירקא שקול, to a place where vegetables are abundant that is where you bring your vegetables to sell. Rashi explains that the entire dialogue was silly and pointless. Since they challenged Moshe with a silly parable, he responded in kind. The message in Moshe's statement seems to be that where magic is popular, it is appreciated. The Maharsha explains that they specifically chose a parable of straw which is all the same. They were indicating to Moshe that his magic was no better than theirs. To that Moshe responds with a parable of vegetables which are all different grades and qualities, indicating that the signs he was preforming were well beyond their capabilities.

I would like to suggest an alternate approach to the conversation. The concept of bringing something unnecessary, such as coals to new castle (known as a major coal exporter), is foolish only if the goal is to sell your coal. However, if the goal is not to peddle your own wears but to show contrast in order to undermine what is already there, it is very logical to bring a higher form of the same. Their argument to Moshe is that he won't be able to use his magic to convince the Jews or Pharoh that he is an agent of G-d because it is like bringing straw to עפריים - a city that thrives on straw. To that Moshe responds that he doesn't need miracles to convince the Jews of Hashem. The Jews inherently will believe that he was sent by Hashem to take them out as promised, but they are being fooled by the magic of the Egyptians. Therefore, Moshe responds that he is bringing his high grade vegetables into a place that has low grade vegetables (as the maharsha explained), with the goal of undermining their magic. The magic of the Egyptians was the curtain blocking their vision from seeing Hashem. Once Moshe is able to show that their magic isn't special, he removes the curtain and enables them to clearly see him as the shaliach of Hashem.

Menachos 83b - Omer and Shtei HaLechem from Old Grain

The mishna says that the only two korbanos that MUST be from new grain and from E.Y. are the korban omer and shtei ha'lechem. The gemara says that the mishna is against the Tanna of the Braisa who allows that there is a mitzvah to bring the omer and shtei ha'lechem from new grain, but if they are brought from the old grain, they are kasher. There are a few conclusions that we can draw from this gemara. 1. All agree that ideally the omer and shtei halechem should be from the new grain. 2. The machlokes between the braisa and the mishna is whether the omer and shtei halechem brought from old grain would be a valid korban (braisa), or invalid (mishna). 3. There is no distinction between the omer and shtei ha'lechem, if one is valid from old grain then the other is also valid.

These seemingly obvious conclusions make the Rambam very difficult to understand. The Rambam writes about this din in 3 places. In Hilchos Issurei Mizbei'ach (6:15) he copies the language of the mishna implying that both omer and shtei halechem MUST be from new grain of E.Y. However, in Hilchos Temidin U'musafin, in the context of shtei ha'lechem (8:2) the Rambam writes - שתי הלחם אינן באין אלא מן הארץ ומן החדש שנאמר ממושבותיכם תביאו לחם תנופה, לא מצאו חדש יביאו מן העליה. The Rambam holds that shtei ha'lechem would be valid when brought from old grain. Yet, one perek earlier in the context of korban omer, the Rambam writes (7:8) that the omer must be brought from Eretz Yisroel but makes no mention of the requirement of being from the new grain. Furthermore, the Ra'avad makes a strange comment on the Rambam who permits the shtei halechem to be brought from old grain when no new grain is available - הלכה זו בהפך. It is very unclear what is bothering the Ra'avad. Perhaps the Ra'avad understands that it is more likely to permit grain from outside E.Y. since we hold that there is an issur chadash even in chutz la'aretz, rather than permit using old grain.

The Kesef Mishna struggles with the Rambam and suggests (2nd approach) that the Mishna holds that both omer and shtei halechem lichatchila must be brought from new grain, but bidieved can be brought from old grain. The tanna of the braisa holds that there is a distinction between omer and shtei ha'lechem - shtei ha'lechem even lichatchila can be brought form old grain and is only a mitzvah min ha'muvchar to be brought from new grain, whereas omer lichatchila must be brought from new grain. This approach understands that there is a difference between the terms "mitzvah" and "lichatchila". The term mitzvah implies that it is ideal but not necessary, whereas the term lichatchila implies that it is necessary but not essential to the kashrus of the korban. Therefore the Rambam would hold that we pasken like the braisa that the omer lichatchila must be brought from new grain, whereas shtei halaechem it is only ideal but can be brought from old grain. According to this approach, the tanna of the mishna can hold that both the omer and shtei ha'lechem lichatchila must be brought from new grain, and only bidieved can be brought from old grain - the Rambam paskens like the mishna. This is also the approach of the Maha'ri Kurkos, there are 3 levels: mitzvah min hamuvchar, lichatchila and bidieved. The only arguement between the braisa and the mishna is whether the din of bringing from new grain is lichatchila or just ideal, but all agree that if no new grain is available, it can be brought from old grain.

In the question and answer of the gemara, the gemara asks on the braisa how we permit the omer and shtei halechem from old grain - what do we do with the pasuk of ראשית, to which the gemara answers that is only l'mitzvah. The gemara then asks what about the pasuk by shtei halechem which says מנחה חדשה implying new grain, and answers that it is coming for something else. When the gemara initally asks from the pasuk of ראשית it isn't clear if the gemara is asking from the pasuk by the omer - ראשית קצירכם, or from the pasuk by shtei ha'lechem - קרבן ראשית תקריב. According to the approach of the kesef mishna, the gemara which asks from ראשית and answers that it is only l'mitzvah has to be speaking about the shtei halechem which lichatchila can be brought form old grain, but omer is not just l'mitzvah, it must lichatchila be brought from new grain. Similarly, Tosafos (bottom of page) seems to understand that the question is from shtei halechem because Tosafos understands that חדשה is emphasizing what we learn from ראשית and the repeat should be me'akeiv. However, according to the kesef mishna the repeat should only tell you lichatchila (since the first time is l'mitzvah), which is not like tosafos who understands that the repeat is to tell you it is me'akeiv. Rashi in the k'sav yad explains that the question from ראשית is both by shtei halechem and omer, to which the gemara is answering that it is only l'mitzvah - against the approach of the kesef mishna.

Tosafos d.h. masninisin, is quoted by the ma'ahri kurkos on the Rambam as holding that the mishna permits both the omer and shtei ha'lechem to be brought bidieved from old grain, implying that the braisa holds that even lichatchila it can be brought from old grain, just not l'mitzvah (which is like his approach and the kesef mishna approach in the Rambam). However, he seems to have a completely different girsa in Tosafos. According to our girsa, Tosafos seems to be saying the opposite. Tosafos says that the language of the mishna אינן באין אלא מן החדש is does NOT imply just lichatchila, which is against the braisa that holds it is only lichtachila. Tosafos seems to hold like rashi (k'sav yad) that there are only 2 categories: 1. l'mitzvah = lichatchila, 2. bidieved.

Menachos 77b - Shiur of Challa

The gemara discusses the amount of "teruma" that needs to be taken from the Todah breads and contemplates learning out the amount from terumas ma'aser. The gemara suggests learning out from challah which is also called teruma, to which rashi explains that the shiur would be 1/48th. Both Rabbeinu Gershom and the kesav yad of rashi explain that it would be 1/24th [This is not a consequential difference since the shiur for challa is 1/24th for a ba'al habyis and 1/48th for a nach'tom. The Nodeh B'Yehuda suggests that according to the Rambam in pirush hamishna the real shiur for challah is 1/48th, just that the women baking will tend to be cheap and if we tell her 1/24 she will at least give 1/48th - that is why rashi picks the number 1/48]. The Nodeh B'yehuda (tinyana y.d. 201) asks that challah doesn't have a shiur according to the Torah, similar to Teruma gedolah which has no shiur. Since the shiur of 1/48 is only Rabbinic, how can the gemara suggest to learn out that the shiur of the Todah breads will also be 1/48?

The Nodeh B'Yehuda suggests something that "no commentary or posek had already said". The mitzvah of challah contains two parts. One is to remove the status of tevel on the dough thereby permitting it to be eaten. The second is the aspect of gifting it to the kohein. The first aspect has no shiur, similar to Terumah where even the smallest amount renders the remainder chulin. But, the shiur of 1/24 or 1/48 is a Torah obligation as the minimum amount to be given to the kohein. However, the shiur of 1/24 is the minimal amount of the minimum amount that is chayev in challa (isaron), that is necessary to be considered a "giving" to the kohein. On a Torah level it wouldn't matter whether one is kneading 1 Isaron or 50 Isaron, the amount that must be given to the kohein is the same - 1/24 of an Isaron. The Rabbonon then came along and required that one give 1/24 of whatever amount they are baking to the kohein. The son of the Nodeh B'yehuda elaborates about his fathers opinion and writes that although there are two parts, they must go together. One cannot separate a tiny amount to be matir the dough to eat and then separate 1/24 to give to the kohein. One must separate initially 1/24th in order to fulfill the mitzvah properly, but if they had already separated a tiny amount, there is no way to add on to that amount and properly fulfill the mitzvah. According to this approach, if one would separate a tiny amount to be given to the kohen, it is a מעוות שלא יוכל לתקון and at the time of separating they are inevitably in violation of the mitzvah to give a proper amount of challah to the kohein.

The Mitzpeh Eisan says that this peshat has already been said by the Tosafos Rid in Kiddushin 58.

Menachos 75b - Shehechiyanu on Mitzvos for First time

The gemara says that if one was bringing a korban mincha in Yerushalayim they make shehechiyanu. Rashi explains that we are speaking about a koehin who has never before brought a korban mincha or at least never brought this type of korban mincha. According to Rashi the gemara is being mechadesh that one make a bracha of shehechiyanu on their first time fulfilling a mitzvah. Tosafos says that the reason for making the shehechiyanu is not because it is his first time but because the kohanim were divided into mishmaros and batei avos so that each kohein would only do avoda twice a year. Tosafos holds that bringing korbanos is considered a mitzvah that comes m'zman l'zman and is worthy of shehechiyanu.

There is a discussion in the Rishonim whether one makes a bracha on the mitzvah of kisuy ha'dam (covering the blood when schechting a bird or chaya). According to Tosafos this gemara would not be a source for the bracha on kisuy ha'dam because you would only make shehechiyanu on mitzvos that are somewhat dependent on the calendar and therefore come m'zman l'zman. However, according to Rashi this gemara would set a precedent for making a shehechiyanu the first time that one fulfills a mitzvah. The Shach (y.d. 28:2) quotes the rokeach who says based on this gemara that the first time in one's life that they fulfill any mitzvah, they make shehechiyanu. The shach points out that our minhag is not to make a shehechiyanu the first time we fulfill a mitzvah from the fact that we don't make shehechiyanu on tzitzis and tefillin. He therefore argues on the Rama who says to make shehechiyanu the first time doing kisuy ha'dam. The tzvi la'tzadik justifies the position of the Rama. The Rama holds like Rashi/Rokeach that we make a bracha the first time performing a mitzvah, so long as it is fulfilled the first time as an adult. Therefore, tzitzis and tefillin which people usually begin before bar mitzvah, they don't make a shehechiyanu when they are pre-bar mitzvah, but also don't make it upon becoming bar mitzvah since they have already done the mitzvah before. The Gilyon MaHarsha (gemara) asks from kiddushin and mezuza (which are performed the first time as an adult) and still we don't make shehchiyanu. The Pri Megadim holds that since it is a safeik (according to Tosafos we don't have a source for making a shehchiyanu the first time performing a mitzvah), one shouldn't make shehechiyanu the first time performing a mitzvah.