Shabbos 41b - Davar Sh'eino Miskavein and P'sik Reisha

There are two major arguments between R. Yehuda and R. Shimon. One is about a davar she'eino miskavein, meaning that one doesn't want the melacha that will result from the action being done AND it is not inevitable. Another is about melacha she'ein tzricha l'gufa which means that one intends to do the melacha, but not for the purpose that it is normally done for.

The argument about דבר שאינו מתכוין is a general argument in all areas of  Torah, not limited to Hilchos Shabbos but the machlokes about מלאכה שא"צ לגופה is a machlokes specifically in Hilchos Shabbos about what qualifies as a מלאכת מחשבת, which makes the criteria for a shabbos violation higher.

The gemara is also clear in many places that R. Shimon admits that if the דבר שאינו מתכוין is going to inevitably result in a melacha - פסיק רישא, it is forbidden. However, it is not clear if it would be a Torah violation or merely a Rabbinic violation. Tosafos assumes that since a דבר שאינו מתכוין has the advantage that one doesn't intend to violate the melacha, even if it is a פסיק רישא and inevitable, it should be no worse than a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and therefore for shabbos one would be patur, but in other areas of Torah one would be chayev. The implication of Tosafos is that a פסיק רישא would technically qualify as a מלאכת מחשבת, just that if the person isn't interested in the outcome, they are still patur because it is a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה. But if they would be happy with the outcome, although that was not their intent, they would be chayev since a פסיק רישא does qualify as a meleches machsheves. That is why Tosafos holds that acc. to R. Yehuda who says that a מלאכה שא"צ לגופה is chayev, even if one does a דבר שאינו מתכוין which is a פסיק רישא, they will be chayev. Similarly, the Maharsham cites Tosafos Rid in Yoma that according to R. Shimon who exempts for a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה he will also exempt for a pesik reisha and hold that it's only assur m'drabonon, but according to R. Yehuda he will be chayev for a פסיק רישא. Not everyone agrees to this. The Eglei Tal (melacha of baking, 55:5) cites the Terumas HaDeshen 265 and Rivash (394) who both say that even if one would desire the outcome of the pesik reisha, since they aren't intending to do that melacha, it still would not qualify as a מלאכת מחשבת and they would be patur.

Shabbos 39a - Defining Bishul

The gemara doesn't directly discuss the definition of bishul on a Torah level. Tosafos d.h. kol, says that anything that has been fully cooked prior to shabbos, would be permitted to put in a kli rishon on shabbos. The Biur Halacha (318:4) points out that this implies that anything which is not fully cooked would be prohibited on a Torah level to advance its cooking beacuse it would be considered a violation of bishul. This is the opinion of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch that advancing cooking, even after it is already cooked to ma'achal ben drusai would be a violation of cooking. Therefore, even if the food is still hot, one cannot do anything to advance its cooking i.e. stirring or covering the pot. Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch implies that even if something is fully cooked and cools below yad soledes bo, raising the temperature to above yad soledes bo would also constitute a violation of cooking.

However, the Biur Halacha points out that all the Rishonim who permit chazara on something which is ma'achal ben drusai, must hold that after the point of ma'achal ben drusai there is no longer a violation of cooking. The Ran (17b) writes this explicitly - דכיון שנתבשל כמאכל בן דרוסאי לית ביה משום מבשל דאורייתא. Tosafos 36b d.h. chamin, also permits chazara on something which is ma'achal ben drusai, indicating that there is no cooking violation at that point. The Biur Halacha points out that there are many rishonim on both sides, and therefore it is worth being machmir for an issur d'oraysa.

It seems that both opinions hold that bishul is not defined at a finite point. Meaning, unlike water where the violation of bishul occurs when something is brought from the temperature of below yad soledes to above yad soledes, cooked foods have no finite point. Rather, until something is "cooked" which according to some is fully cooked (shulchan aruch) and according to others is ma'achal ben drusai (ran), there is a Torah violation of cooking to do anything that will advance or hasten the process, even if it never reaches the point of fully cooked or ma'achal ben drusai.

It seems from shulchan aruch that liquid foods that require cooking are bound to both definitions of cooking. If they are below yad soledes and one raises their temperature to above yad soledes, that constitutes cooking. And if they are already yad soleded but not yet fully cooked and one raises the temperature by covering the pot to hasten the cooking, that would also constitute cooking.

Shabbos 38 - Penalty for Violating Shehiya and Chazara

The gemara on the top of the page asks when one violates the prohibition of shehiya by leaving a pot on the stove in a way where it is prohibited (acc. to chananya/rama when it is not yet ma'achal ben drusai, and acc. to rabbonon/shulchan aruch when it is still נצטמק ויפה לו), we make no distinction between shogeg and meizid. R. Nachman bar Yitzchok explains that although when one violates a d'oraysa such as actual bishul on shabbos, if done by accident it is mutar for him to eat it on shabbos (acc. to r. meir), here we are more machmir and forbid it on shabbos because people are מערים to do it intentionally and claim it is an accident. However, in the braisa, Rav Meir makes it clear that if the food was fully cooked, even though it was נצטמק ויפה לו, we will not be machmir to forbid it bidieved. Even the opinion (rabba and rav yosef) who is more lenient for shehiya done accidentally because no ma'aseh was done, would presumably be machmir by chazara because an action of violation is done. Therefore, if one violated chazara by accident, the food would be assur until shabbos is over. The Rama (253) writes that since chazara is violated by a ma'aseh, even if done by accident, the food would be forbidden until after shabbos even if it were fully cooked, and one would even have to wait כדי שיעשו. But if chazara was violated on something that is fully cooked and נצטמק ורע לו, the Rama permits it to be eaten since there is no benefit from the violation.

When a goy does chazara, the Rama says that we give it the status of an accidental violation of shehiya and permit the food if it were fully cooked, even if it were נצטמק ויפה לו, but if it weren't fully cooked it is assur until after shabbos. The Biur Halacha points out that even according to the minhag to follow chananya and permit shehiya when it is כמאכל בן דרוסאי, chazara would still be forbidden, therefore unless it is fully cooked, the food would be assur, even if done by a goy. It is clear from the Rama that we don't allow chazara to be done by a goy. However, the biur halacha (end of siman) cites the pri megadim (38) who says that since we permit shevus d'shevus for the sake of shabbos, it is permitted to have a goy to chazara on a solid cooked item (on which there is no bishul issue). The Chazon Ish takes issue with this and explains that the concept of shevus d'shevus only permits an issur where the violation is the ma'aseh, but chazara is like shehiya were the violation is the situation, not the act of putting it on. Therefore, even if a goy would put it on the Jew is obligated to pull it off and not maintain a situation that is מחזי כמבשל. This argument between the pri megadim and chazon ish is the basis for discrepancy in shabbos kashrus policies between the star-k and ou.

Shabbos 37b - Covering With Ashes and Flaring Up

The gemara says that when you cover it with ashes and the flares up again, it is sufficient. The gemara rejects the notion that when it flares up it is הדרא למילתא קמייתא  as if it were never covered, but it isn't clear whether it has full status of being covered. Tosafos d.h. Shema Minah, has two approaches. The first is that קטמה והובערה has the full status of קטומה and one is allowed to place even something that has started cooking and hasn't yet reached מאכל בן דרוסאי. However, the second approach of Tosafos compares the language of קטמה והובערה to the language of the gemara earlier קטמה ונתלבתה, and explains that קטמה ונתלבתה means that it regains some strength but the original covering of the coals with ash is still recognizable and therefore is considered fully covered to permit shehiya and chazara. But the language of קטמה והובערה implies that it flares up fully as if it were never covered and therefore only permits the leaving of a food that is fully cooked but is נצטמק ויפה לו. It will not permit the leaving of food that has not been fully cooked acc. to Rabbonon, or food which hasn't yet reached מאכל בן דרוסאי acc. to Chananya.

The Magen Avrohom assumes that even if it flares up back to the way it was, we can consider it like ketuma completely, and permit shehiya and chazara as we would if it were ketuma. R. Akiva Eiger disagrees and requires us to be concerned for the second approach of Tosafos and it would only allow the shehiya of a food that is fully cooked, even if it is נצטמק ויפה לו, which without גרופה וקטומה, the Rabbonon who disagree with Chananya would normally not allow.

The rationale for the second approach of Tosafos seems to be that the concept of נצטמק ויפה לו or נצטמק ורע לו is really subjective. As we see at the very end of the gemara, if one needs the food to retain its shape and quantity for guests, it is considered for him to be נצטמק ורע לו, even though for others it would be נצטמק ויפה לו. Therefore, by going through the motions of covering it with ashes, one shows that he considers the additional cooking to be נצטמק ורע לו, even though it is objectively נצטמק ויפה לו. That is why even when it flares up, it is still permitted to leave the food there, because he has already shown that he considers it נצטמק ורע לו by placing the ashes. The fact that it flares up doesn't undo what he has shown. But, food which has not been fully cooked is very objective, therefore, if the היכר is not longer there because it has already flared up, one can not leave food that hasn't been fully cooked since we are afraid he will stir the coals to raise the temperature and make it fully cooked.

This raises and interesting conceptual point. Is the purpose of גרופה וקטומה to have a היכר that is recognizable and will remind someone not to stir, or is it merely to do an action that reveals that this person doesn't care about extra heat and therefore won't come to stir the coals? It could be dependent on the two approaches of Tosafos. The first holds that if the action is done, that is sufficient even if it is no longer recognizable, whereas the second approach holds that if it isn't recognizable it isn't considered קטומה (just that we permit נצטמק ויפה לו since we consider him to have revealed to us that for him it is נצטמק ורע לו).

Shabbos 33b - Children being me'vatel their father's learning

The gemara says that the death of askara begins in the intestines and ends in the mouth because it comes for the sin of bitul torah (rav shimon). The Chachamim challenged Rav Shimon from women, goyim and children who don't have the sin of bitul torah, yet sometimes suffer from askara. The gemara says that women are punished for being mevatel their husbands, goyim for being mevatel jews, and children for being mevatel their fathers.

The idea of punishing women for being mevatel their husband is understandable based on the gemara in Brachos נשים במאי זכיין - where the gemara 17a says the s'char for women is באתנויי גברייהו בי רבנן, that they wait for their husbands to return from the beis midrash. The implication is that although women don't have enough zechus in their own limud hatorah, they are obligated to assist their husbands in limud hatorah which gives them the full zechus of limud hatorah. It would then follow that they are punished for being mevatel their husbands with the full punishment of bitul torah.

The idea of punishing goyim could also be explained based on the gemara in the beginning of avoda zara where the goyim claim to have zechuyos for all the markets and bridges that they constructed (similar to r. yehud bar ilai's position in the upcoming gemara) because it was all done בשביל ישראל שיתעסק באורייתא. This implies that it is incumbent upon the nations of the world to be involved in improving the world to help the Jews be busy with talmud torah. Therefore, if they fail to do this and instead cause bitul torah, they are punished.

However, why would children be punished for being mevatel their father from limud hatorah? Rashi indicates that we are speaking about small children who aren't commanded in keeping mitzvos and unaware of the consequences of their actions, nonetheless they are punished with askara for being mevatel their father. Why? Rav Moshe (Dibros #91) suggests that it is not a punishmet, rather the existence of the world if for the sake of Torah study. When something interferes with the ability to study torah, Hashem responds by removing the interference. Rav Moshe equates this with being a rodef. The person trying to interrupt Torah study is a rodef in the destruction of the world. The halacha of rodef applies even to a child who is not intending to do any harm. Therefore, Hashem takes away the child so that he doesn't prevent the limud hatorah of his father.

In my opinion, Rav Moshe's approach isn't correct. Had the child been removed from the world in a painless way, perhaps it can be understood as a way of removing the obstacle rather than a punishment. But the gemara is focusing on why children die from askara, which implies that there is actually a punishment. Why should innocent children be punished for actions that they are unaware of their consequences?

Just as according to the opinion that children are killed for the sin of nedarim that their father doesn't keep, that is the same idea when it comes to bitul torah. It is not the sin of the child, rather the sin of the parent that the young child suffers for. The father who gives in to the request of his young children and is mevatel torah to grant them every wish, and takes them wherever and whenever they want to go, is punished for not taking his limud hatorah seriously enough. It is an exact parallel to בעון נדרים בנים מתים, where the child is not being punished, the parent is.

Shabbos 32b - Negligent and then Accident

In the sugya of תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס, the Nemukei Yosef (Baba Kama 10b b'dafei HaRif) writes in the name of the Ramah that if the person isn't negligent originally because he had not reason for the o'nes situation arising in the end, they are not responsible. The Nemukei Yosef continues, therefore one who doesn't daven when they could have, but later an unexpected o'nes arises that prevents them for davening, it is considered an o'nes and they have the right to daven a make-up tefillah. Similarly, one who makes an oath to pay a debt by a certain day, although he had money earlier from which to pay, if by the time the debt is due he is an o'nes and is unable to pay, he is considered an o'nes and not in violation of his promise. This issue is actually a debate in the Rishonim. Although the Rama in Y.D. 232:12 cites an argument in the context of an oath as to whether we consider it o'nes, the Shluchan Aruch in Hilchos Tefillah (108:8) paskens clearly like the Nimukei Yosef that it is regarded as an o'nes, and the Rama there makes no mention of any dispute.

The gemara says that children die for their father not fulfilling their pledges of tzedaka and korbanos. Rav Moshe (Dibros 89) asks that presumably it is speaking about a situation where the father doesn't have money to pay so he is an o'nes. Why then are the children punished?

Rav Moshe suggests that this would actually be dependent on the machlokes mentioned above whether pushing something off that later develops into an o'nes qualifies as o'nes, and suggests that our gemara is against the Nimukei Yosef. The difficulty with this approach is that the Nimukei Yosef is not just a da'as yachid, but we actually pasken like the Nimukei Yosef.

To me it seems that this gemara has nothing to do with the Nimukei Yosef. We are not speaking about a situation where the person made a pledge when he had money, and later lost the money. That would qualify as an o'nes as the Nimukei Yosef says and there would be no punishment. Rather, we are speaking about one who is somewhat negligent in not properly calculating what they can really afford, leading them to pledge what they cannot afford at the time they make the pledge. This is on the level of sho'geig but not an o'nes, therefore one can be punished for that. This approach is explicit in rashi d.h. ki shegaga - בשוגג קפצתי לנדור ולא אשלם. The situation is at the time the person made the pledge they were too hasty and didn't properly calculate to see that they can't afford what they are pledging. For this negligence they are responsible.

Shabbos 32a - Danger of Child Birth

Rav Moshe (Dibros 86) expresses an idea that if Hashem commands the mitzvah of פרו ורבו, even if it would otherwise be a situation of danger, the very fact that there is a mitzvah to do it anyway, indicates that there is divine protection. He actually uses this idea l'halacha in igros moshe to explain why he considers it forbidden to induce labor. The promise that Hashem makes to protect during child birth is only for those who go into labor naturally, and not when it is induced.

Based on this assumption, Rav Moshe asks on Rashi's interpretation of the mashal - Leave the drunkard and let him fall alone. Rashi explains that when a woman gets pregnant she needs rachamei shamayim to go through child birth, by Hashem leaving her alone and not being mashgiach on her, she will die on her own. This implies that childbirth is inherently dangerous which Rav Moshe points out contradicts the idea that it has an automatic divine protection?

To reconcile Rav Moshe's idea with Rashi, it seems that the concept of divine protection is not that Hashem made the normal course of the world for woman to give birth and it not to be dangerous. Rather, by commanding people to procreate, G-d provides the assurance that for every single situation He will watch and protect. Therefore, in a situation where one has other aveiros that they are guilty of, Hashem simply removes his divine protection, as Rashi explains, and the drunkard falls by himself.

Shabbos 31a - Assumptions of a Beis Din When Converting

The gemara in Yevamos 109b says evil will befall those who accept geirim, implying that one should not accept converts to the Jewish people. However, Tosafos cites a gemara in Sanhedrin 99b that says that Avrohom, Yitzchok and Ya'akov should have accepted Timna to convert. Because they didn't she went and married Eisav, resulting in Amalek who caused major problems for the Jews. To reconcile these two sources, Tosafos says that it depends on how adamant they are about converting. When they are adamant about converting, we must accept them, but otherwise they should be rejected. Tosafos then questions the actions of Hillel in our gemara, how could he convert these three converts who aside from making ridiculous requests were not pushing hard for conversion? Tosafos answers that Hillel was confident that in the end they would be גרים גמורים, as it turned out. But how does this answer solve the problem? They weren't pushing hard for conversion so why did Hillel accept them? It seems that Tosafos understands that pushing hard and being adamant about converting - מתאמצין להתגייר, has no essential value. Rather, there is always suspicion that a convert is not intending to keep the mitzvos properly, and therefore we must reject them. However, when they are adamant about converting and don't take no for an answer, or when the beis din is confident that they will keep mitzvos properly as Hillel was, they should be accepted for conversion.

Tosafos both 109b and 24b seem to understand that Hillel actually converted these converts prior to their acceptance of all the mitzvos, based on his confidence that he will be able to win them over. However, the Maharsha in our gemara explains that Hillel merely accepted them on the conversion track, but did not actually convert them until they accepted the mitzvos. He actually derives from here that if a goy comes to study Torah for the purpose of conversion, we are allowed to accept him.

Rashi also seems to understand like Tosafos that Hillel actually converted them immediately. However, Rashi makes things a little confusing because Rashi writes that Hillel was confident that they will ultimately accept, but also writes that the ger who denied torah sh'bal peh, wasn't considered a kofer because he believed in torah sh'bal peh, but didn't believe it was from Hashem. Why isn't Rashi happy saying simply that Hillel's confidence was sufficient to accept them as geirim even though they weren't yet keeping mitzvos? Rashi seems to understand that had they been labeled as kofrim, Hillel would never have had the confidence that he can win them over to be geirim gemurim. But, Hillel realized that they didn't deny the mitzvos of torah sh'bal peh, they were just missing the education necessary to realize that it is from Hashem, therefore he was confident that after educating them, they will accept.

Rav Moshe (Dibros #81) has another approach in understanding Rashi. The ger believed in Torah sh'bal peh and accepted to fulfill it, but he didn't believe that the p'sakim of the chachamim of his generation qualifies as Torah Sh'bal Peh. Since conceptually he accepted, he is only lacking in education, not belief or acceptance to do. Therefore, Hillel was able to accept him. However, Rashi is still bothered that although Hillel may accept him, since he doesn't qualify as a חוץ לדבר אחד, he shouldn't accept someone who won't keep all halacha properly, to which Rashi answers that Hillel was confident that in the end, he will accept. According to this approach the right to accept this ger was not due to Hillel's confidence that he will in the end be shomer all mitzvos, but rather because his rejection was only of the chachamim of his generation caused by a lack of education.

Shabbos 30a - Comatose People and Mitzvos

On a recent trip to Baltimore for a Bar Mitzvah, my uncle R. Hillel Tendler shared a story. Rav Moshe and Rav Hutner were once travelling together in a car, and they passed a street corner where there was someone asking those passing by to stop for a moment and put on tefillin. Rav Hutner pointed it out to Rav Moshe, perhaps lauding their efforts to reduce the numbers of קרקפתא דלא מנח תפילין. Rav Moshe responded that he didn't think it served any purpose at all. Rav Moshe explained that tefillin is an אות, meaning it is a way to indicate to Hashem that we are his subjects and willing to serve Him. One who wears tefillin and doesn't have this intent, has not fulfilled the mitzvah of tefillin.

Although those allowing the tefillin to be put on them were likely intending to do a mitzvah, Rav Moshe held that the mitzvah of tefillin is not merely the act of placing it on one's arm and head, but rather the intent to be subject to Hashem's mitzvos, therefore one who goes through the motions but doesn't recognize this, remains a קרקפתא דלא מנח תפילין. Perhaps he derived this from the fact that although in krias shema (va'eschanan) the Torah speaks about tying tefillin, in Parshas Bo it doesn't focus on the action at all. Rather the Torah says that the Tefillin function as an אות and as a זכרון, indicating that this is an essential component of the mitzvah. Based on this, I would suggest that the concept of not having a היסח הדעת in tefillin which the gemara Yoma 8 learns from the tzitz, is not a separate violation, rather an essential component to the proper fulfillment of the mitzvah of tefillin which demand a constant awareness of being subject to one's creator.

This story made me wonder about whether there is value in putting tefillin on people who are comatose in a hospital or hospice...

The gemara learns from the pasuk במתים חפשי that when a person dies they become חפשי from studying Torah and doing mitzvos. The implication of the gemara is that this is an advantage of those alive over those who are dead and can no longer perform mitzvos. Rav Moshe (Hearah # 74) asks that this doesn't seem to be a distinction between live vs. dead, because there are many live people as well who are incapacitated and unable to perform mitzvos? Rav Moshe explains that the point of the gemara is to contrast those who are dead and no longer have any connection with mitzvos to those who are alive. When a person is dead there is no longer any value in assisting them in doing mitzvos such as putting tzitzis and tefillin on them. So long as a person  is alive, even if they are incapacitated and are אנוס in their inability to do the mitzvah, if one were to assist them by placing tefillin or tzitzis on them, they would be fulfilling a mitzvah. Another distinction is, whether it is permitted to daven in front of someone who can't perform mitzvos. Davening in the presence of a corpse for example would be לועג לרש because they no longer have any connection to mitzvos, but davening in the presence of one who is alive, just "tied up", is not in violation of לועג לרש since they are obligated in mitzvos.

It would seem that Rav Moshe when he recommends assisting those who are incapacitated in performing the mitzvah of tzitzis and tefillin, is speaking about one who is conscious and able to focus mentally on the mitzvah, but unable to do the act of putting on tefillin and tzitzis. However, if one is comatose and not mentally aware of the fact that they will be performing mitzvos, it would seem that there is absolutely no value in assisting such a person by putting tefillin and tzitzis on them. Leaving aside the chiddush in Rav Moshe's understanding about the special nature of the mitzvah of tefillin,  there is a more fundamental problem that applies to tefillin and tzitzis equally. Even according to those opinions who hold that mitzvos don't require intent - מצות אין צריכות כוונה, that simply means that one doesn't need to intend to be fulfilling a mitzvah with this act. However, all agree that a מתעסק does not fulfill the mitzvah. One who has no awareness that he is ever doing a mitzvah, has a halachic status of a mis'aseik and is not considered to have fulfilled a mitzvah.

Therefore, for a sick patient in a hospital, when he has enough mental awareness that he will be fulfilling a mitzvah by the action he is doing, there would be a purpose in putting tzitzis on him. Regarding tefillin (assuming the story above is accurate), one must assess the patient to see whether they are capable of not just realizing they are doing a mitzvah, but recognizing an allegiance and obedience to Hashem through this mitzvah. But a patient who is not functioning mentally, such as cerebral death, or even a deep coma, there would be no purpose at all in putting tefillin or tzitzis on their body. It would seem logical though, that even a patient in a coma has a connection to mitzvos in the sense that they cannot be fed issurim. One cannot for example dress a comatose patient in shatnez clothing (unless they are in a state that they don't feel temperature and don't derive any הנאת חימום from the clothing, in which case there is no issur). And of course, if they reach a point of brain-stem death, they must be buried without delay.

Shabbos 29b - Putting Oneself Into a Chilul Shabbos Situation

The mishna says that one is allowed to extinguish a candle out of fear that the goyim will catch him on their holiday. The gemara explains that even according to R. Yehuda who says that a melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa is assur, it is permitted (not just patur) for the sake of pikuach nefesh. Rav Moshe (Dibros Moshe #72) raises a very interesting question. What gives him the right to light in the first place? How can someone light candles on erev shabbos knowing that it is a holiday and therefore dangerous to have candles burning so that he will need to extinguish the flame on shabbos?

In perek Rebbi Eliezer D'mila (shabbos 134) the Ran cites a famous machlokes between the ba'al hameor and the ramban. In a situation where one needs warm water to bathe a child after a bris, and doesn't have warm water, can they do the bris now knowing that they don't have water, but then rely on the pikuach nefesh need of the child to heat up water on shabbos after the Bris. The Ba'al Ha'meor holds that one is not allowed to put himself into a situation where he will have to violate shabbos for a pikuach nefesh need. Rather, we push off the bris. But the Ramban takes a באשר הוא שם approach and says that right now he is obligated to perform the mitzvah of milah which pushes off shabbos. Even if afterward he will have to violate shabbos for pikuach nefesh, so be it. It would seem that according to the Ramban it is obvious why we can allow him to light candles erev shabbos even though he realizes that he will have to violate shabbos by extinguishing the flame when it becomes a pikuach nefesh concern, because we judge the situation at the moment.

Although one can argue that even the Ramban will only allow a bris which itself is such a significant mitzvah that it pushes off shabbos, but who says the Ramban will allow one to light candles if they know that they will need to extinguish the flame for pikuach nefesh? Rav Moshe proves from the Ba'al Hameor that the Ramban will maintain his באשר הוא שם position even for a less significant mitzvah like lighting candles. The Ba'al Hameor proves that one pushes off the bris from the mishna in beitza that one must push off the mitzvah of simchas yom tov and not shecht an animal if they know that after the shechita they will have to rely on the mitzvah of kisuy ha'dam pushing off yom tov. What is the proof? Maybe bris which is significant enough to push off shabbos is allowed to be done, but other mitzvos such as simchas yom tov cannot. Clearly, even the ba'al hameor understands that if we are to permit the activity based on the fact that now we aren't required to worry about what it will lead to, we can permit any activity. Therefore, the Ramban who holds that one can do a bris knowing it will lead to violating shabbos for pikuach nefesh, would also allow lighting candles knowing that it will lead to violating shabbos for pikuach nefesh.

However, according to the Ba'al Hameor, the question remains. How can we allow this person to light candles to begin with?

I would like to answer this based on the steipler. The Ba'al hameor himself allows one to get onto a boat for a mitzvah purpose right before shabbos, even though he knows he is putting himself into a situation of chilul shabbos for pikuach nefesh. Why then does the ba'al hameor require the pushing off of the mitzvah of milah? The Steipler explains that the Ba'al Hameor holds that before shabbos one is not required to abstain from an activity that will lead to chilul shabbos. But, on shabbos one is not allowed to do anything that will lead to pushing off shabbos for pikuach nefesh because we regard it as if he is beginning the violation of shabbos right now, even before the pikuach nefesh situation arises. Therefore, before shabbos you can get on the boat, but on shabbos you can't do the bris (or get onto the boat). Based on this, even the ba'al hameor will allow the lighting candles before shabbos knowing that the flame will need to be extinguished for pikuach nefesh, since it is being done before shabbos.

Shabbos 27b - Materials Obligated in Tzitzis

According to the way R. Nachman Bar Yitzchok understands the Tana D'bei Rabbi Yishmael who limits בגד to garments made of wool and linen, it is in the context of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Meaning, only garments made of wool and linen are obligated in tzitzis according to the torah. However, Rava understands that the focus on wool and linen is for the strings, meaning that wool or linen strings work on any garment regardless of the material, but otherwise the strings must be the same material as the garment i.e. cottons strings won't work on a silk garment. Tosafos writes that we pasken like Rava which is the p'sak of the Rama (9:1), that all materials are obligated in tzitzis m'doraysa, but the Mechaber paskens like the tana d'bei rabbi yishmael that only wool and linen are chayev m'doraysa. Rav Moshe has an interesting teshuva where he explains that even according to the Rama, synthetic materials are exempt from tzitzis (even m'drabonon). His rationale is that only materials that require being made into threads and woven together have the status of a "beged", but materials that can be used without being made into threads such as all synthetics, even if they are made into threads and woven, they don't have status of a "beged" and are therefore exempt from tzitzis. Therefore, even if one is not going to be machmir for what the shulchan aruch considers d'oraysa, one cannot make tzitzis on a synthetic garment. A bracha recited on tzitzis when the garment is synthetic will be a bracha l'vatala.

Shabbos 25b - Bracha on Candle Lighting

Tosafos questions whether the language of חובה has an implication of being a practical necessity, but not a mitzvah and therefore not worthy of a bracha. However, Tosafos writes that when we say that lighting candles for shabbos is a חובה, we don't mean to the exclusion of a mitzvah and therefore a bracha may be recited.

Tosafos then says that there is another reason that some hold not to make a bracha on shabbos candles. Since if it were lit from before shabbos one would not be required to extinguish the flame and relight, therefore even when they do light, no bracha is made. Tosafos rejects that rationale, even if the assumption that one wouldn't have to extinguish and relight was correct, from the bracha on kisuy ha'dam and on bris mila. By kisuy ha'dam the gemara says that if the wind covered over the blood, he would be exempt from the mitzvah, yet when he does the mitzvah he makes a bracha. Similarly, if one would be born circumcised there is an opinion that he doesn't even require hatafas dam, yet when one does a bris they must make a bracha. Here too, although if the candle was burning from before, one would not need to do anything, however, when there is not candle burning they are required to light with a bracha. At the very end Tosafos rejects even the premise and holds that a candle that was burning from before, must be relight for the sake of shabbos [Tosafos proves this from the gemara 23b which says that one cannot light too early as rashi explains because it won't be recognizable that it is for shabbos - clearly a candle burning from before isn't sufficient. However, it could be that if one is going to do the mitzvah, they must light in the proper time, because lighting early isn't a fulfillment of the mitzvah rather an avoidance of the mitzvah. But if one had a preexisting candle burning, they would have no obligation to light at all].

The machlokes between the two opinions of Tosafos seems to be how to define the nature of the mitzvah to light candles. Is the mitzvah to do a מעשה הדלקה to ensure that there is light for shabbos, but the mitzvah is still the מעשה הדלקה, or perhaps the nature of the mitzvah is simply to ensure that there is light for shabbos and the act of lighting isn't an act of a mitzah? The first opinion seems to hold that the fact that a light burning from before is sufficient indicates that there is no mitzvah in the act of lighting, therefore even when one lights, no bracha is said. Whereas the second opinion holds that although the goal is to provide light so that if one already had a candle there is nothing to do, nonetheless, without a candle they are obligated to actually light and therefore a bracha can be recited.

Shabbos 24a - Saying Aneinu When Not Fasting

The Shulchan Aruch (565:3) writes that some say a yachid only says aneinu by mincha on a fast day because we are afraid that he will fall ill and will not be able to complete the fast causing his tefillah to be invalidated retroactively (but the shliach tzibbur will say it even by shacharis in the repetition because he can assume at least someone will complete the fast). The Shulchan Aruch continues by saying that this is only when communities fast for rain, but the four fasts that were instituted by the navi and accepted by klal yisroel one should say aneinu in all the tefilos because even if one eats it is appropriate to say aneinu since it is a yom ta'anis for klal yisroel. The Rama disagrees and writes that the minhag is always to just say it by mincha, even on the four fasts. Based on the logic of the Shulchan Aruch, on the four fasts one should say aneinu even in the ma'ariv preceding the fast [sha'ar hatziyun 8 explains that although one may still eat, the status of ta'anis begins even in the evening, which is clear from the fact that if one fell asleep they would not be able to eat when they woke up].

In the gemara it is clear that even when one is fasting a ta'anis for rain, aneinu is said in all the shemoneh esrei of the day, starting with ma'ariv the night before. However, Rashi adds that we don't say aneinu by ma'ariv and even shacharis because we are concerned that the person won't be able to finish the fast and will retroactively be considered a שקרן בתפלתו. The Maharsha explains that one cannot ask that if this were truly a concern, why was it only instituted by the ge'onim and not in the time of the gemara, because in the time of the gemara people were stronger and assumed to be able to complete the fast. Whereas in the time of the geonim people became weaker and this became a concern. According to this approach, one can only say aneinu in their shemone esrei if that day has the status of a ta'anis, which is achieved by fasting for the full day. The machlokes between the Shulchan Aruch and Rama is whether the four fasts automatically assume the status of ta'anis based on chazal takana, regardless of the hanhaga of the individual.

Tosafos asks on Rashi that if by not completing the fast, one essentially ruins the tefillos that they davened with aneinu, why does the gemara allow for one to break their fast midway through, and make up for it a different time. By breaking the fast they are invalidating their tefillos that were said with aneinu? Tosafos asks this as a question, but the Ran says that based on this question we see that the premise is wrong. Even if one doesn't end up completing the fast, they are not considered to be a שקרן בתפלתו because at the time that they davened they were fasting. Both the Shulchan Aruch and Rama assume like Rashi, that aneinu is only appropriate if the day will have a status of ta'anis, and not if one just happens to be fasting at the moment they are saying it. Furthermore, the Ran's approach doesn't explain why one would say aneinu by ma'ariv since he will be eating both before and after, it only explains why one can say aneinu by shacharis when he is actually fasting, even though he doesn't intend to complete the fast.

In the Mishna Berura 566:14 he cites a machloes whether a tzibbur can read va'yichal on a ta'anis when there isn't a minyan fasting (if it is monday or thursday in the morning they certainly can since it is a day for krias ha'torah anyway). The Eliyahu Rabba and Pri Megadim write that without a minyan fasting one cannot read vayichal even on a ta'anis tzibbur, whereas the Sha'arei Teshuva writes that on a Ta'anis Tzibbur even if only seven people are fasting the tzibbur reads va'yichal. This is all by a ta'anis tzibbur for rain, but it seems that reading vayichal when no one in the tzibbur is fasting on one of the four ta'aniyos should be dependent on the machlokes Shulchan Aruch and Rama. According to the S.A. since the day has status of ta'anis, vayichal could be read even with no one fasting, whereas according to the Rama it should have the same din as ta'anis tzibbur for rain that we need either 10 fasting or at least 7.

Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch 566:6 writes that one shouldn't get an aliya on the ta'anis unless he is fasting and intends to complete the ta'anis. This should also be dependent on the S.A. and Rama, according to S.A. one should be able to get an aliya even if they are not fasting, but according to the Rama they should not get an aliya unless they are fasting.

R. Akiva Eiger (24) has an interesting teshuva where he is me'supak whether the reading for mincha on Yom Kippur is a din ta'anis or a din yom tov, and therefore questions whether a choleh who had to break his fast can get an aliya. R. Akiva Eiger definitely assumes that the reading of vayichal on one of the four fasts which is a din ta'anis may only be given to one who is fasting, which is consistent with the opinion of the Rama.

However, the Chasam Sofer (O.C. 157) has a teshuva where he discusses anticipating an aliya for mincha on a tisha b'av that he wasn't fasting and questions whether he could have taken the aliya. In his second argument which he seems to imply is valid by itself is that tisha b'av is a takana as a day of ta'anis on klal yisroel, and therefore even one who isn't fasting is still obligated in the krias ha'torah. - והכא נמי ט' באב יום מועד דפורענותא הוא ואפילו אינו מתענה בו מ"מ מחוייב בקריאת היום

The difficulty with the chasam sofer is that his logic seems to be very similar to that of the Shulchan Aruch in that the day has status as a fast day, even if the individual is not fasting. But it is on this very point that the Rama disagrees and holds that without fasting, one cannot say aneinu, and a tzibbur not fasting should not be able to read vayichal, and an individual should not be able to get an aliya. How can the chasam sofer pasken along the lines of the Shulchan Aruch, against the Rama? Perhaps even he only says this for tisha b'av because it is a day of פורענותא, but on the other ta'aniyos he would agree that one who is not fasting cannot get an aliya. But, Rav Moshe (o.c. ?, 113) had a teshuva discussing this issue and definitely assumes that the logic of the chasam sofer would apply to all 4 ta'aniyos.

Shabbos 23a - Order of Brachos on Chanuka Candles

Learning the daf today in the kollel, R. Menachem Levine asked why it is it that the bracha of שעשה נסים לאבותינו comes before the bracha of שהחיינו. It makes sense that we make the bracha of להדליק נר של חנוכה first based on the gemara in Succah 56a that שהחיינו comes after לישב בסוכה because the mitzvah of the day comes first, even though שהחיינו has the advantage of being tadir (more common). Here too, the bracha of l'hadlik is like the bracha of lei'shev ba'succah and should come first. But shouldn't the bracha of z'man which the gemara considers to have an advantage of tadir (over lei'shev) come before the bracha of she'asa nissim which is certainly less common?

In fact, the Maseches Sofrim 20:6 actually puts the she'asa nissim after she'hechiyanu. The order that we have is based on Rashi, Rambam, Rosh.... who all seem to assume that she'asa nissim should precede she'hechiyanu.

The Maharsham (notes in back) points you to the She'iltos D'rav Achai (Vayishlach, 26) where the order is also first שהחיינו and then שעשה נסים like the maseches sofrim. The Netziv in his commentary on the she'iltos writes that he thinks the bracha of שעשה נסים also qualifies as the חיובא דיומא which the gemara says in Succah 56a earns it first place in the order and trumps the advantage of tadir. Although he doesn't explain why he considers שעשה נסים לאבותינו to qualify as חיובא דיומא, the obligation of the day, there are two possible approaches (both were suggested today in our Beis Midrash, R. Noy and R. Apt, respectively). One approach is that the bracha of she'asa nissim becomes a bracha that is closely tied to the mitzvah of lighting chanuka candles. Although the shehechiyanu is also tied to the act of the mitzvah, not the kedusha of the day (see Biur Halacha 692:1 citing Mor U'ktzia - Rav Moshe has a teshuva where he strongly rejects the position of R. Yacov Emden), nonetheless, it is less connected to the performance of the mitzvah than the bracha of she'asa nissim (perhaps because shehechiyanu is very generic and said in many cases for many different reasons). A second approach, and one that I think is more plausible is that the gemara tells us that Chanuka was instituted as ימים טובים בהלל והודאה, actually making no mention of the mitzvah to light candles. Rashi says - ולומר על הנסים בהודאה. Of course Rashi is referring to the al hanisim of shemneh esrei, but the fulfillment of this hoda'ah is also achieved through the bracha of שעשה נסים לאבותינו בימים ההם בזמן הזה, therefore it qualifies as חיובא דיומא even though if it is not at all connected to the mitzvah of lighting candles.

The Netziv cites a k'sav yad of the she'iltos where he seems to compromise and say that one who is lighting makes שעשה נסים first, but one who is making a bracha on the seeing of the candles makes shehechiyanu first. The Netziv explains that the one lighting has begun the obligation of the day, therefore he is supposed to first finish with the obligations of the day before making she'hechiyanu. That is why he says שעשה נסים first. But one who is making a bracha on simply seeing the lights, would make the bracha that is more tadir, namely she'hechiyanu.

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Another interesting issue regarding the brachos is a machlokes cited by the Ritva whether all 3 brachos should be made prior to lighting (as we do based on the Rama 676:2), or make the bracha of l'hadlik prior to lighting, then light and only after lighting make the other two brachos. The second opinion seems to hold that whether one is lighting himself or seeing the light of someone else, the brachos of she'asa nissim and she'hechiyanu are made on the seeing of the light and therefore must be done after it is lit. But, the first opinion who holds that all 3 brachos are made prior to lighting, seems to hold that all 3 brachos are made on the act of doing the mitzvah. It is only when one doesn't get to do the mitzvah do we still give him the opportunity to make brachos on just seeing the light.

This may be dependent on another machlokes (also cited by the Ritva). One who hasn't yet lit, but intends on lighting later, should he make the brachos of she'asa nissim and she'hechiyanu when he sees the candles of someone else burning (Rashi), or should he wait to make the brachos on his own lighting at home [The Ran goes a step further and says that even if one will not hear brachos because he is travelling but they are lighting for him at home, he still doesn't make brachos on seeing someone else's candles burning]. Rashi understands that even when one lights, they are essentially making she'asa nissim and she'hechiyanu on the seeing of the candles burning, not on the doing of the mitzvah, therefore they may as well make the brachos on seeing someone else's candles burning. But the other opinion holds that when they actually perform the mitzvah, the brachos are being made as part of birchos hamitzvah (and all should be made עובר לעשייתן), which is more ideal than simply making the brachos on seeing candles burning.

Shabbos 22a - Bizuy Mitzvah (Degrading a Mitzvah)

The Gemara learns out from a pasuk that there is an issur for one to do mitzvos in a degrading fashion. One cannot do the mitzvah of kisuy ha'dam, covering the blood of a bird or chaya by simply kicking the dirt, but rather must place it with their hand. Most achronim (Chareidim, Aderes, Chayei Adam 68:2, to the exclusion of the Rosh Yosef - I discussed this in my sefer Nasiach B'hukecha page 32 and in the not yet printed additions) understand that it is a real drasha, meaning that it is considered d'oraysa. Furthermore, in my sefer I assumed that the Chayei Adam even understood that the limud from here to other mitzvos such as using the succah decorations for the duration of succos which the gemara considers a bizuy mitzvah, or lighting a cigarette from chanuka candles would be a Torah prohibition of Bizuy Mitzvah. The Chayei Adam points to Rashi d.h. Avuhon d'kulho, where Rashi writes that all other forms of bizuy mitzvah are learned from the mitzvah of kisuy ha'dam, implying that all the examples of bizuy mitzvah mentioned in the gemara are assur according to the Torah.

However, it is very possible that even if we assume that the drasha of the gemara is a real drasha and that there is indeed an issur d'oraysa to kich up the dirt, it won't apply to the other cases of the gemara. Although the concept is not a gezeiras ha'kasuv and would be d'oraysa by cases that are similar to kisuy ha'dam, it would not be d'oraysa by the succah decorations or lighting something from Chanuka candles. The case of kisuy ha'dam is where one is actually performing a mitzvah in a degrading fashion such as kicking up dirt. Anything similar to that such as one who performs the act of a mitzvah in a derech bizayon it would be considered an issur d'oraysa. However, the cases of succah decorations and lighting something with a chanuka candle are very different. In those situations he is using the object of the mitzvah for something mundane that has no kedusha or mitzvah relevance, but he isn't actually degrading the mitzvah while performing it. The object of a mitzvah may only be associated with a mitzvah on a Rabbinic level, as we find that the concept of being הוקצה למצותה as discussed by Tosafos is only a d'rabonon violation. Therefore, it seems logical that the benefit one derives from an object that only is "designated" for the mitzvah on a d'rabonon level, should only be a d'rabonon violation. In my sefer pg. 36 (note 9) I tried to deduce from Tosafos that the bizuy mitzvah of using succah decorations is only d'rabonon.

Assuming that this is correct, performing a mitzvah in a degrading fashion is a Torah violation of bizuy mitzvah, whereas using an object of a mitzvah for something mundane is a Rabbinic form of bizuy mitzvah, it leads to another question. If one were to perform a mitzvah d'rabonon in a degrading fashion similar to kicking up dirt of kisuy ha'dam, would that be a Torah violation or merely a Rabbinic violation. On one hand it would seem to be only Rabbinic because the entire mitzvah is only d'rabonon, but on the other hand, he is doing avodas Hashem in a degrading way which may be a Torah prohibition, even though the actual mitzvah is only d'rabonon. Just as Rav Moshe writes in a teshuva that hidur mitzvah applies m'doraysa to the talis that we wear in shul because it is an object associated with service of Hashem, similarly bizuy mitzvah may apply to any action that is done as avodas Hashem. וצריך עיון.

Shabbos 21a - Bad Wicks and Oils

The Mishna gives a list of bad wicks and oils, and the gemara explains that the problem with them is that they flicker and don't burn well. However, the gemara doesn't say why this is so problematic. There seem to be 3 approaches. Rashi writes that there is a concern that you will adjust the candle to make the flame burn better, thereby violating Shabbos. The Rambam (pirush hamishna) writes that if the flame flickers, one is likely to leave the room thereby undermining the entire purpose of lighting candles for shabbos [However, in Hil. Shabbos (5:8) he concurs with Rashi]. The Rambam's approach is to equate the bad burning oils with the bad smelling oils where the gemara says explicitly that the concern is that you will leave the room. There is a third approach cited in the Tosafos Yeshanim (printed in the vilna edition, bottom right margin) that is similar to the Rambam who say that the concern is that the flame will actually extinguish and will undermine the entire purpose of the candles which are to allow for shalom bayis.

The approach of the Tosafos Yeshanim is similar to that of the Rambam, and even helps avoid the Rashash's question. The Rashash asks on the approach of the Rambam, why would someone leave a room with poor lighting and prefer a dark room with on light? According to the Tosafos Yeshanim the concern is that the candle will go out completely and undermine its purpose. The main distinction between the approach of Rashi and that of the Rambam and Tosafos Yeshanim is that Rashi's problem applies to all the candles in the home, whereas the issue of the Rambam and Tosafos Yeshanim only applies to the candle with which the mitzvah was performed.

In the context of Chanuka, Tosafos asks on the opinion who says that one cannot use bad wick and oils on shabbos chanuka because one is allowed to use the light and may come to adjust it. Why not say that just as one can't use bad wick and oils for chanuka candles during the week because of כבתה זקוק לה, one must relight if it goes out, for that same reason it can't be used on Shabbos? The Rashash points out that Rashi seems to answer this question by adding the words - דלמא פשע ולא מתקן לה. Meaning, we aren't concerned for the candles going out on Friday night because since it is prohibited to relight it, the person is considered an a'nus and is not in violation of anything. Rather, the concern is that he will be neglectful and not relight the candles when he is able to. This reason only applies during the week, compelling the gemara to resort to another rationale on shabbos, namely - מותר להשתמש לאורה and therefore there is a concern of adjusting the light.

Rashi's approach answers a much more fundamental question. The implication is that when chazal forbid the use of bad wicks and oils, they even forbid their use when there is no alternative. In the context of Shabbos where the concern is adjusting the flame and violating Shabbos, it makes sense for chazal to say that it's better to skip the mitzvah altogether, than to light candles in a way that may lead you to violate shabbos. But, in the context of Chanuka, if one has not better wick an oils, does it make sense to tell him to not light at all out of a concern of them going out? Wouldn't it be better to light the bad wicks and oils based on the chance that they will stay lit and he will fulfill the mitzvah? According to Rashi this question can be answered. Had Chazal permitted the use of the bad wicks and oils, it could lead to a situation where the person is neglectful and fails to relight when he should have. Therefore, they forbade the use of these wicks and oils creating a situation of o'nes, so that if he has nothing else he is an a'nus in not fulfilling the mitzvah.

A similar question can be asked on the Rambam and Tosafos Yeshanim back in the context of shabbos candles. Why would we say to someone who only has bad wicks and oils that he should not light at all? Wouldn't it be better to light and allow for the possibility of fulfilling the mitzvah, rather than not light at all and definitely not fulfilling the mitzvah? According to rashi who is concerned for the violation of shabbos - שמא יטה, the chance of the mitzvah isn't worth the risk of violating shabbos, but according to the Rambam and T.Y. where the concern is merely not fulfilling the mitzvah, it is better to use the bad wicks an oils rather than use nothing!? Perhaps they understand that the entire mishna is speaking when one has an alternative to light with proper wicks and oils, but in the absence of an alternative, something is still better than nothing.

Shabbos 17b - Construction on Shabbos

Rabbeinu Tam permitted one to hire workers בקבלנות, which means they are paid for the job and not encouraged to work on shabbos. Tosafos writes that he proves his heter from our mishna. Just as one is allowed to give hides to a tanner knowing that he will tan the hides on shabbos, so long as he doesn't need to tan them on shabbos, similarly one can hire gentile workers who will be working on shabbos so long as they can choose not to work on shabbos. The issur of hiring workers is technically only if you are hiring them to work on shabbos, but if you hire them to do the job at their convenience and they choose to work on shabbos, that is not a problem. However, Tosafos rejects Rabbeinu Tam because whenever the goy is working on the Jews property and doing construction, it is a very public activity and people are unaware of the deal and will assume that he hired the workers by the hour to work on Shabbos. Tosafos concludes that even Rabbeinu Tam when he built his house, would not allow the workers to actually work on shabbos.

Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe 4:52) discusses a situation where a hotel owner hires a Jewish contractor who has non-jewish employees. The owner of the hotel is religious, but the contractor is not and doesn't really care about the nuances of the halacha. However, if the owner of the hotel would not allow the work to take place on shabbos, the contractor is not willing to guarantee the job. Rav Moshe writes that nowadays it is very common for property owners to hire out contractors who are paid for the job and not by the hour, therefore even according to Tosafos, the concern of people thinking that he hired the workers by the hour doesn't apply. It is similar to a field which is normal to be done using arisus, and therefore permitted (as Tosafos Yeshanim brings). However, if the work is going to be done 7 days a week so that the Jewish hotel owner is actually benefiting from it being done on shabbos, it is assur. But, if the workers are going to work on shabbos and take off sunday, since they could just as easily work on sunday and take off on shabbos, it is mutar. This is all from the perspective of the hotel owner, but from the perspective of the contractor, even if he agrees to hire the workers by the job and not pay them by the hour, it is still a problem since it is very normal for contractors to hire by the hour, and therefore the ma'aris ayin problem of Tosafos applies. Therefore, the only approach to allow this would be for the contractor to sell the business on shabbos to his workers, which Rav Moshe is not happy about - קשה לעשות בדור פרוץ כזה וגם מפורסם שהוא של ישראל. 

Shabbos 17a - Like the day of the Golden Calf

The gemara makes strange comparison. On the day which they imposed the 18 gezeiros, it says that it was קשה לישראל כיום שנעשה בו העגל, a difficult day for the Jews as the day they made the golden calf. In what way was it like the day of the golden calf? Rashi says that it is a continuation of the previous sentence, ואותו היום היה הלל כפוף ויושב לפני שמאי כאחד מן התלמידים, Hillel who was the Nassi was being mistreated and embarrassed into sitting in front of Shamai like one of the students. The humility of Hillel in allowing himself to be treated this way was a bizayon to Torah and therefore compared tot he day of the eigel. Following this approach the Minchas Bikurim on the Tosefta writes that just as the day of the eigel was a rejection of the Nasi, Moshe Rabbeinu, so too this day was a rejection of the Nasi, Hillel. Another possibility as to what Rashi means to say is that just as on the day of the Eigel, Aharon had a misplaced humility and didn't force them down, here too Hillel had a misplaced humility and allowed himself to be trampled by Shamai.

In the Tosefta 1:8 the statement of Hillel being forced to sit in front of Shamai is missing. In truth Tosafos 14b struggles with the idea that Hillel and Shamai were actually present on the day of the gezeiros of the 18 things - they were gezeiros of Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel, not Hillel and Shamai.  According to the Tosefta that doesn't force us to say that Hillel himself was mistreated on that day, what is the comparison with the day of the eigel? The Minchas Bikurim on the Tosefta offers another explanation. Until that day, machlokes was very limited. There were only 3 arguments between Shamai and Hillel, but on that day machlokes became prevalent and widespread and it was like two toras were developing in the Jewish people. He is subtly referencing the Gemara in Yevamos 13b where one cannot act like Beis Shamai in a place of Beis Hillel and visa versa because it looks like שתי תורות.

Another suggestion as to why it was such a difficult day, I found in Lieberman's commentary on the Tosefta. He suggests that Torah needs to be decided based on a fair vote and majority. Generally speaking Hillel had the majority and Beis Shamai were the sharper ones (Yevamos 14a). However, on that day they happened to have a majority as Rashi comments on the Mishna 13b, and they took advantage of that majority by not letting anyone out and forcing a vote as rashi says on 17a. Torah needs to be decided by a fair אחרי רבים להטות, not a imposed and forced majority. Therefore, this event essentially undermined the Torah, just as the eigel undermined the Torah.

The Yefei Einayim cites a Tosafos in Gittin 36b that quotes a Yerushalmi that the students of Beis Shamai became so militant that they were killing the students of Hillel. That is why it was a terrible day, just like the day of the eigel where b'nei levi were forced to kill their brothers and sisters.

Shabbos 16b - Tovelling Glass

The gemara has two approaches as to why the Rabbonon were gozer tu'mah on glass vessels. One approach is that they are comparable to metal vessels since they can be melted down and reformed, just that chazal intentionally implemented some distinctions so that it will be clear that it is only d'rbaonon (so that one is not misled to burn teruma and kodshim after coming into contact with them). The second approach (Rav Ashi) is that they are comparable to earthenware vessels since they are made from sand, just that chazal were slightly more machmir by glass allowing the vessel to become tamei from the outside (since they are transparent, even the outside qualifies as the inside).

Tosafos 16b (d.h. rav ashi) points out that the gemara in Avoda Zara 75b (citing Rav Ashi) compares glass vessels to metal and imposes on them a requirement of tevillah when they are purchased from a goy. Why in the context of tevillah for new vessels does Rav Ashi compare glass to metal to require tevillah, whereas in the context of tu'mah he compares them to metal?

The Ritva writes that really it is similar to both, but in the context of being go'zer on tu'mah, the rabbonon didn't want to spread tu'mah more than necessary so they compared it to earthenware in order to limit the spread of tu'mah. But in the context of the mitzvah of tevilas keilim they were machmir to consider it like metal vessels.

However, Tosafos 16a d.h. ela, writes that even when the gemara compares glass to metal, it isn't completely retracting from it's initial approach to compare them to earthenware. The logic of being able to be melted down and reformed making it similar to metal, isn't sufficient by itself to compel a gezeira of tu'mah. They considered glass similar to earthenware in the primary gezeira, but then made it a little more machmir to receive tu'mah even from the outside since it has some property of metal (able to be melted down). According to this Tosafos, the gemara in Avoda Zara that requires tevila for glass since it has the property of metal in that it can be melted down and reformed, is very difficult. Why is that logic enough to compel a mitzvah of tevillah, and not enough to compel susceptibility to tu'mah?

Shabbos 15 - Decree of Tu'mah Outside of Eretz Yisroel

The gemara concludes that there were 3 gezeiros made on ארץ העמים, all lands outside of E.Y. Originally the יוסי בן יועזר ויוסי בין יוחנן made a gezeira that any Teruma that comes into contact with the land of eretz ha'amim is safeik tamie, the Rabbonon of 80 years prior to churban widened the gezeira that even teruma that is in air space of eretz ha'amim is safeik tamei, and when the Sanhedrin went into exile and were in Usha they decreed that the land itself is m'tamei vadai even to burn teruma, and the air remains safeik.

How are Kohanim lenient nowadays to live outside of E.Y. and not be concerned with tu'mah of eretz ha'amim?

The Shach (hil. aveilus) writes that since nowadays there is just as much tu'mah in E.Y., there is no advantage to E.Y. over eretz ha'amim. However, R. Akiva Eiger cites the Rikash who says that the reason people are lenient nowadays is either because they need to for parnasa or since we are all assumed to be tamei meisim anyway, it doesn't matter. The second approach seems to suggest that for a tu'mah d'rabonon such as eretz ha'amim we can rely on the Ra'avad who says that once someone is already tamei, there is not issur to make themselves tamei again. On the other hand, Pischei Teshuva (5) citing Shevus Ya'acov seems to uphold the gezeira of eretz ha'amim even nowadays.