1. The Nodeh B'yehuda (mentioned in pischei teshuva 47:2) is not sure whether amasla can only be used if a new circumstance arises, such as when originally she was being approached by people who were not "proper" when she claimed she was married and now she is approached by someone proper, or when originally she was ill when she claimed she was tamei and not she feels better. But, if her situation didn't change, rather she says she originally was not willing to accept kiddushin from someone who is not "proper" and now she lowered her standard, or originally she said she was tamei bec. she was ill and now still claims to be ill but is willing to declare herself tahor anyway, she may not be believed with such an amasla.
2. The Hafla'ah (mentioned in pischei teshuva) is mechadesh that amasla does not work for testimony that was accepted in beis din to override the problem of "kivan shehigid shuv eino chozer umagid". Based on this R' Akiva Eiger makes a distinction between a father's claim that he was mekadesh his daughter and a woman's claim that she is mikudeshes, even if both claims were made in beis din. The woman is believed with an amasla since the power of her statement is only due to "shvaya anafsha chaticah d'issura", but the father who is believed based on a gezeiras hakasuv, has the status of eidus and he may not be able to take his words back based on an amasla.
3. Taz (y.d. 185) is mechadesh that a statement made in public cannot be taken back using an amasla, but Toras Hashlamim argues.
2 comments:
THe chiddush isn't purely that of the Taz. The Taz is explaining the halacha that if she wears bigdei niddus she can't give an amasla. The Taz and Rashba disagree about why this should be the case - either because the amasla has to be as big as the original lie and a person wouldn't lie to many people relying on an amasla that affects only one person (Taz), or because the assumption is that a person would not do a ma'ase like wearing bignei nidus but would lie verbally (Rashba). The nafka mina would be if she didn't wear bigdei niddus but made a public announcement that she is a nidda and then tries to give an amasla.
Also of note is the question why a husband is allowed to be machmir on himself not to believe her in violation of his chiyuv onah. Rav Moshe has a teshuva where he discusses this point. That is clearly the chiddush of the gemara providing a ma'ase rav for such a strange thing.
aryeh,
i took a look at the teshuva you refer to (y.d. 4:14 - pg. 181 d.h. ma shekasav harama). The rama who allows a husband to be machmir on himself and not follow her amasla, is based on this gemara about shmuel. But, R' moshe asks a very strong question. Although the chasam sofer (y.d. 149 - mentioned in pischei teshuva 188:2) allows a husband to be machmir in hilchos nidah, even though his chumra will affect her, because the chumra would also be advantageous to her (all madreigos and ma'alos of avodas hashem is a simcha for her"). But in this case where she knows that she is tahor, there is no advantage for her to be machmir, so what right does he have to be machmir since he is obligated in the mitzva of oneh to her? R' moshe suggests that since she caused the confusion by originally claiming to be ta'ameh, he is entitled to be skeptical about her amasla and be machmir.
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