In all the cases of the gemara, it discusses a situation where the condition was that "if i don't come, then it should (or shouldn't) be a gett". In any condition of "if i don't come, then...", if a conscious decision was made to "not come", the condition was fulfilled. But, the gemara discusses a situation where there wasn't a conscious decision, rather an o'nes occurred that prevented him from coming. In actuality he fulfilled the condition of "not coming", so the gemara questions whether "not coming" because of some o'nes qualifies as "not coming", or maybe it does not qualify as "not coming" (but would certainly not qualify as "coming").
Therefore, if one would make a condition "if i do come, then...", but he does not come because of o'nes - If we would hold yeish o'nes b'gittin - meaning we pay attention to the reason why he did not come, would we be able to say that since his not coming was a result of o'nes it is as if he actually came! It would seem logical that o'nes can only take a circumstance where the condition was fulfilled and view it as if it was not fulfilled since the act of "not coming" would not constitute "not coming", but it cannot make a condition that was not fulfilled as if it were fulfilled.
It seems to me that this would be dependent on what seems to be a contradiction in rashi, in why o'nes would make a difference by gett. Rashi on the bottom of 2b indicates that when a person makes a stipulation his true intent is to say 'if i decide not to come', and therefore if his not coming is based on an o'nes, he does not intend to ruin the gett, rather he wants the gett to go through. Based on this, even if his condition was "if i do come, then...", he only intends to ruin the gett if he makes a decision not to come, but if an o'nes happens to prevent him from coming it would be a gett (not because it is as if he came, but rather because he never meant to ruin the gett when his not coming is due to o'nes). But, Rashi on 3a explains that the Torah recognizes the concept of o'nes by the pasuk of "ul'na'arah lo ta'aseh davar". Based on this approach, we do not focus on his particular mindset at the time of stipulation, rather we assume that when an act is done out of o'nes, it does not qualify as doing that act. Therefore, if the act of "not coming" is out of o'nes, it will not qualify as "not coming". But, it will also not qualify as "coming", therefore when his condition is "if i come, then..", whether yeish o'nes or ein o'nes, the condition was not fulfilled.
3 comments:
ראיתי בגריש"א שהביא מראשונים כדרך השניה שלך
Avi, You say that there is a stirah in Rashi's understanding of o'nes bgittin. Without looking around on the topic, I thought that Rashi on 3a was the pshat in o'nes b'gittin. The Rashba explains that Rava holds that ain ones bgitin, but giluy daas does help to be mevatel a gett. What Rashi on 2b in D"H Dilma was explaining was that if we say yeish o'nes b'gittin, if he dies it is like giluy daas that he wants the gett to work. If he is sick, since there is no giluy daas for the gett to be good, it should be ruined by the D'oraisa ones. Please tell me if this makes any sense to you.
Aron
YES, shkoyach.
i understand what you mean. It is possible that Rashi means as you said - that rashi on 2b is not really giving the rationale for yeish o'nes but rather to explain that the mindset by meis that it should be a gett, does not apply to choleh. But, it is also possible (as rashi seems to say lulei the stirah from 3a) that his intent is actually to be mavatel the gett if an o'nes occurs, which would apply whether or not the torah recognizes the concept of o'nes in general.
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