Bar Pada says that the kedusha that was placed on the trees is a constant status of kedusha so that even if it removed through redemption (before the trees were cut), the kedusha returns automatically. The gemara wants to deduce from here that if a man would be mekadesh a woman with 2 coins saying that if they get divorced the second coin should automatically create a new kiddushin that it would work (the gemara then goes on to make distinctions between the redemption by the person himself or a third party getting involved, and the woman returning to her own reshus through a divorce is like a third party as explained by the famous Ran).
Why is the gemara able to prove anything from Bar Pada - we don't pasken like Bar Pada, rather like Ulah, so even if we can prove this from Bar Pada it is irrelevant? According to the Rashba (cited in Ran 28b) that Ulah agrees with Bar Pada about this point that the kedusha will always come back after redemption, and they only argue about the case where the trees were cut, it works out well since on this point Ulah agrees. But according to Ramak (quoted in Ran) that Ulah disagrees with the first point as well because he holds that the language of "until they are cut" is meant to automatically remove the hekdesh when they are cut, but not meant to indicate the hekdesh should automatically come back after the redemption while they are still standing. So, why are we proving from Bar Pada that the second kiddushin would occur after the divorce, rather than proving from Ulah that it will not?
It seems clear that even according to the Ramak, the concept of Bar Pada that kedusha that is removed by redemption can return automatically is definitely accepted by Ulah as well. The dispute between Ulah and Bar Pada is merely what the person meant by the language of "until they are cut". But if he stated explicitly that he is makdish from now until it is cut and even if redeemed should become hekdesh automatically, all agree that it would work. Therefore, this concept the gemara is learning from is universally accepted and if the proof would work, it would reflect on the halacha l'ma'aseh even though we pasken like Ulah.
2 comments:
הר"ן גופא רצה לפסוק כבר פדא כיון שהגמרא שקל וטריא אליביה... אך מבין אני מה שרצית לומר אם לדידן באמת פסקינן כעולא
I hear what you are saying. the Ran indicates that it is possible that we pasken like bar pada since the gemara has a shakla v'tarya within his opinion, but doesn't seem to be sure. the Rambam paskens like ulah that kedusha is paka b'kdi and learns that ula agrees with the first statement of par pada that kedusha constantly returns like the rashba in the ran. my point was that if you learn like the ramak and learn that we pasken like ulah completely which the ran seems to be mesupak about, we can still answer the concern that there is a shakla v'taraya within shitas bar pada.
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