Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Erchin 7a - Brain Death

The gemara says that before beis din would carry out capital punishment on a pregnant woman, they would kill the fetus inside of her to prevent the nivul that would occur if they were to kill her first. The gemara concludes from this that if they would first kill her, she would die before the fetus. However, the gemara asks from a source that indicates that a fetus would always die prior to the woman carrying it. The gemara reconciles this by making a distinction between a woman who is murdered in which case she may die first, and a woman who dies naturally in which case the fetus will ALWAYS die first.
It is reported that this gemara was a strong indication for Rav Shlomo Zalman to reject brain stem death as being dead. Since a brain stem dead patient can carry and deliver (Cesarean) a child, it must not be considered dead because it would contradict the gemara's rule that the child will always die before the mother. The fact that the mother can be brain dead and deliver a healthy child indicates that brain death is still alive.
However, in the very next line the gemara says that shabbos may be violated to save the unborn fetus of a pregnant woman who died in childbirth. The implication is that although she died naturally, her fetus may still be living. Rashi comments that sometimes the mother will die before the fetus which creates a safeik pikuach nefesh that justifies the violating of shabbos to save the fetus. According to Rashi it seems that there cannot be a rule that a mother will always die before the child. This would certainly undermine Rav Shlomo Zalman's assumption because the fact that a viable child may be born from a brain dead patient would not prove that brain stem death is still considered living. In truth, Rashi's approach is quite difficult. Just as we are able to assume in the case of inheriting from the mother to bequeath to the father's relatives, that fetus perished before the mother based on the rationale of the gemara - איידי דוולד זוטרא חיותיה עיילה טיפה דמלאך המות ומחתך להו לסימנין, we should be able to rely on that assumption for shabbos as well. Yet, Rashi would seem to hold that we can make that assumption when dealing with monetary issues but it will not be overwhelming enough to prevent an attempt at saving the fetus on the chance that it outlived the mother.
The Shita Mi'kubetzes (15) reconciles the apparent contradiction with a smoother approach. The Shita explains that when a woman is carrying a child but hasn't yet gone into labor, any natural cause of death would affect her fetus before it affects her, therefore her fetus will die first. But, when she has already gone into labor and the fetus has gotten some degree of independence, it is possible and even likely that the fetus will be able to live even after the mother has died (therefore permitting the violation of shabbos to save the fetus). According to this approach the original rule remains strong that prior to labor, when a pregnant woman dies a natural death, her fetus will always die before she dies. Therefore, it is reasonable for Rav Shlomo Zalman to assume that if a brain dead woman can "live" on life support for weeks until her baby is born, it is an indication that she isn't truly dead because a dead woman cannot produce a live baby.
Many years ago, there was an experiment done in Israel led by Dr. Avrohom Steinberg (a proponent of brain stem death being halachic death) to disprove Rav Shlomo Zalman's source. The experiment involved decapitating a pregnant sheep while hooked up to a heart-lung machine, and then successfully delivering a live lamb. There is no debate that a decapitated person or animal is considered dead, yet the baby lamb was able to outlive the trauma of the mother's decapitation. What does this prove? Seemingly it would prove that the gemara's principal is outdated. In the time of the gemara the rule may have been true that a fetus cannot remain alive after it's mother has died, but with modern technology it is a possibility. Therefore, the gemara would not disprove the concept of brain stem death being halachic death.
The problem with this experiment (which i surprisingly couldn't find discussion about) is that the gemara itself differentiates between natural death and one who is killed. The gemara accepts that when one is killed, the fetus can outlive it's mother. It is only when the mother dies through natural causes that the fetus must die first. Therefore, the sheep experiment would concur to the gemara's principal that killing the mother would not kill the fetus, yet when the mother would become brain dead without the trauma of being murdered, it would still be a viable source that brain death is not halachic death. It is unclear to me what exactly this experiment was meant to prove. It seems that the experiment wasn't meant to technically undermine the proof from our gemara. Rather the experiment was just meant to show that the heart and lung can continue to work well after decapitation, proving that life cannot be determined by heart and lung functionality.

For Dr. Steinberg's presentation of the experiment to Rav Shlomo Zalman, CLICK HERE. For an easier read and more cynical article detailing Israeli politics on this issue that was printed in Ha'aretz in english CLICK HERE.

Sunday, January 15, 2012

Erchin 3b - Chatzitza for Tefillin

The gemara says that without a mishna explicitly obligating kohanim to wear tefillin, we would have thought that they were exempt from the head tefillin while doing the avoda. The rationale is that since they cannot wear the arm tefillin while wearing bigdei kehuna because it will be a chatzitzah, they should also be exempt from the head tefillin, therefore we require a mishna to say that they aren't exempt from the head tefillin. It is clear from the gemara that while doing the avoda the kohanim were not able to wear the arm tefillin. There are techincally two options regarding the arm tefillin. Either to wear it under the bigdei kehuna which the gemara rejects due to the chatzitza or wear it over the bidgei kehuna which rashi and tosafos both reject because והיה לך לאות ולא לאחרים לאות, meaning that the tefillin shel yad must be covered and not exposed.
The Rashba in a Teshuva (תרכ"ז) permits one to wear tefillin even if there is something separating between the tefillin and his skin. He derives this from the fact that the only problem that rashi and tosafos mention with putting tefillin on top of the bigdei kehuna is that tefillin shel yad can't be exposed, it must be hidden. This implies that we aren't concerned for chatzitza and for tefillin shel rosh which should be exposed, there is not issue at all with placing them on top of something else. The Shulchan Aruch (27:5) relies on the Rashba for one who has a head injury to put the tefillin shel rosh on top of a bandage or thin cap (without a bracha). The M.B. (18) similarly permits one to put tefillin shel yad on top of a bandage (without a bracha) relying on the rashba when there is no alternative. However, under normal circumstances the Shulchan Aruch (4) writes that chatzitza is an issue and the tefillin must be placed directly on one's arm and head without anything blocking. The Rosh and Gr"a cite the source from על ידך and בין עיניך implying that it must be directly one one's skin without any chatzitzah.
Our gemara seems to support the position of the Rosh (against the Rashba) because the gemara questions why the tefillin shel rosh isn't a problem while wearing the hat, and responds that the hat sat higher on the head behind the tefillin. Why couldn't the gemara say that the tefillin was placed on top of the hat? It must be that the hat would be a chatzitza for the tefillin just as the tefillin would be a chatzitza for the hat. Perhaps this is why the Shulchan Aruch when relying on the Rashba insists on a "thin" hat, because he understands from the gemara that a thick had similar to the one worn by kohanim would indeed be a chatzitzah. However, it is hard to understand why a thin hat wouldn't be a chatzitza and thick one would, therefore the M.B. explains the problem with the thick hat to be that the tefillin will not be situated in the right place.
Another point that we can derive from this gemara is that kohanim are obligated to wear tefillin shel yad while doing avoda. The shita mikubetzes (6) asks that this seems to contradict a gemara in zevachim which exempts kohanim from the mitzvah of tefillin entirely while doing avoda based on עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה. The Shita explains that עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה only applies when he would have to put on tefillin at a time where otherwise he would be doing avoda so that the mitzvah would be a bitul of the avoda, but he is required to put on tefillin prior to the avoda and continue wearing them while doing the avoda since there is no contradiction. One of the commentaries in the back (Rashash Toibish) answers based on the Ran in Succah 25a who says that one is exempt from a mitzvah while performing another mitzvah even if he can do both. However, it would seem that since one can put on tefillin prior to beginning the avoda at a time when he hasn't even begun the avoda, even the Ran would require him to do so.

Friday, January 13, 2012

Erchin 2b - Avoiding Mitzvos

The Gemara says that when a child reaches an age that he knows how to wrap himself in clothing, his father is obligated to purchase tzitzis for him. Tosafos points out that the nature of the mitzvah of tzitzis is not an absolute obligation and therefore the father is only obligated to purchase tzitzis for his child when the child has a four cornered garment. But the father is not obligated to purchase a four cornered garment for his child to train him in the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tosafos points out that although the gemara in Menachos 41a considers one who avoids or evades the mitzvah of tzitzis to be deserving of punishment, that is only in those days when they were accustomed to wear four cornered garments, therefore one who went out of their way to avoid it was clearly trying to evade a mitzvah. However, nowadays where most garments are made without having four corners, if one would neglect purchasing a garment that is obligated in tzitzis they aren't deserving of punishment. Tosafos seems to imply that in a time when it was normal to wear four cornered garments, not only should one not avoid the mitzvah for their own garments, they shouldn't even avoid the mitzvah for their child's garments.
The Shita Mi'kubetzes adds that although nowadays it isn't a punishable offense to avoid the mitzvah of tzitzis, it is still proper for one to purchase a four cornered garment to intentionally create an obligation on themselves of tzitzis. The source is from Moshe who yearned to enter Eretz Yisroel to fulfill mitzvos.

In the additions to my sefer Nasiach B'chukecha, I pointed out that there seem to be four levels of avoiding/obligating oneself in mitzvos that they aren't technically obligated in. See Below:

הגדרה בחיוב להכניס עצמו להיות חייב במצות ולפטור את עצמו ממצות:
לענ"ד נראה שיש ד' שלבים לגבי הא דאין לו לאדם לבקש תחבולות לפטור את עצמו מן המצות והחובה להכניס את עצמו לחיוב מצוה. מצינו ענין זה בד' מקומות בש"ס. א. בגמ' קדושין לג ע"א גבי מפני שיבה תקום, קאמר שיכול יעצים עיניו כמו שלא ראהו, וקפריך אטו ברשיעי עסקינן, ומפרש שיכול יעצים עיניו מקמי דלמטי זמן חיובא דכי מטא זמן חיובא הא לא חזי ליה דקאים מקמיה ת"ל תקום ויראת. ופרש"י דילפינן מהכא שיש לך לירא מן היוצר היודע מחשבותיך שאתה מבקש תחבולות להפטר ממצותו. וראיתי בספר דברות משה (קדושין הערה ל"א) שמפרש שזה חמור מהא דאמר מלאך לרבי קטינא דענשינן בעידן ריתחא, שהרי הכא ילפינן מקרא שלא מהני תחבולותיו לפטור את עצמו מן המצוה כלל, והוא מבטל המצוה בידים אלא שנפטר מדין אנוס שלא ידע שעבר מחמת עצימת עינים [ויותר מזה ראיתי בגור אריה (פרשת בהעלותך פרק ט' פסוק א') על פרש"י שם דלא פתח הפרשה בענין הקרבת הפסח משום שהיא גנותן של ישראל שלא הביאו קרבן פסח כל מ' שנה חוץ מזו. התוס' בקדושין לז ע"ב כתבו או שלא היו חייבים עד שנכנסו לארץ או שהיו חייבים אלא שפטורים משום שהיו ערלים, ומ"מ גנות הוא להם שנשארו במדבר מ' שנה מחמת חטא המרגלים. אבל המהר"ל כתב שם וז"ל ולפי דעתי אין צריך, שאף אם הוא פטור מן המצוה או מחמת אונסה או שפטרו, גנאי הוא לו, דסוף סוף לא עשו המצוה כמה שנים שהיו במדבר, שכל מי שהוא פטור מן המצוה מחמת שהוא אונס גנאי הוא לו שלא עשה המצוה, דלא אמרינן בבב"ק כח ע"ב אונס רחמנא פטריה רק לענין פטור מן העונש, אבל מ"מ גנאי הוא לו שלא עשה המצוה והיה לו זכות, וכאן לא היה להם זכות אותו המצוה עכ"ל. הרי סובר דגנאי הוא שלא לקיים מצוה אע"פ שהוא רק מחמת אונס, וכ"ש בנידון דידן שמכניס עצמו למצב כזה ובודאי לאו שפיר עביד שהוא מכניס עצמו למצב שיהיה גנאי לו במה שלא יקיים המצוה. עיין במשך חכמה (פרשת בא י"ג, י') שיש הבדל בין ביטול עשה באונס, לעבירת ל"ת באונס, דבל"ת אין העשיה נחשב לכלום וכאילו לא עשה, אבל בעשה אף כשהיה אנוס מ"מ לא מיחשב כמאן דעביד דסוף סוף לא עשה. ובזה מיישב קושיית התוס' בנדה סא ע"ב אמאי שייך לועג לרש בציצית ולא בכלאים, וכן אמאי קפדינן על בדיקת תפילין ומזוזה יותר מבדיקת ריאה, וכן אמאי קפדינן על שמירת המצה רק למצות לילה הראשונה]. אכן, מדברי הביה"ל (או"ח ס' קכ"ח ס"ב בד"ה או, וכן בס"ד בד"ה אינם) משמע שסובר דקרא ד"ויראת מאלקיך" כללא היא ושייך הכי בכל מקום שמבקש טצדקי לפטור את עצמו ממצות, ואינו דין מיוחד בקימה מפני שיבה, וגם אינו מיוחד למי שמכניס עצמו למצב של אונס. אלא שצ"ע דא"כ אמאי קאמר מלאכא דבעידן ריתחא ענשין, הא יש בזה ביטול מצות "ויראת מאלקיך" וזה חמורא יותר מהא דענשינן בעידן דריתחא, לכן נראה שדרכו של הדברו"מ מדוייק טפי. ב. בגיטין פא ע"א וכן בברכות לה ע"ב אמר רבב"ח אמר ריו"ח משום ר"י בר אילעי בא וראה שלא כדורות הראשונים דורות האחרונים, דורות הראשונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך טרקסמון כדי לחייבן במעשר, דורות האחרונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך גגות ודרך קרפיפות כדי לפוטרן מן המעשר. ונראה שגם זה חמור מהא דאמר מלאכא לרבי קטינא, שהרי הכא הם בקשו תחבולות שלא כדרך העולם כדי לפטור את עצמן מן המצות, ונתכוונו לכך שעיקר תכליתם הוא למפטר נפשייהו. ולא דמי לרב קטינא שמסתמא לא נתכוין לפטור את עצמו מן המצוה, רק שניכר לאינשי כן כדהעיר שם בדברו"מ. והנה, בגמ' מנחות סז ע"ב מדמה ענין זה להא דרבי אושעיא שמערים להכניס במוץ כדי להאכיל לבהמתו, וגם למי שאופה פחות מחמשת רבעים ועוד כדי לפטור את עצמו מן החלה. וכל החילוק בגמ' הוא אם גזרו משום בעלי כיסין שהיו מוכרים לעכו"ם ואמרו שאף בשל עכו"ם חייב בתרו"מ, וקאמר דבתרו"מ אע"פ שאפשר להערים להכניסו במוץ כדר"א או להכניסו דרך גגות וקרפיפות לא חששו שיעשה כן משום דהוא מילתא דפרהסיא וזילא ביה מילתא שיאמרו פלוני מערים לפטור את עצמו, ולכן לא נשאר רק עצה למכור לעכו"ם לכך גזרו אף בשל עכו"ם. משא"כ גבי הפרשת חלה שאפשר לאפות פחות מכשיעור בצנעא לא ימכרנו לעכו"ם ומש"ה לא גזרו. מ"מ משמע שבכל ענין שיעשה אפילו כשרק אופה פחות מכשיעור איכא איסורא במה שמערים לפטור את עצמו מן המצוה. ג. במנחות מא ע"א דמלאכא אשכחיה לרב קטינא שהיה לובש בגדים בקייטא ובסתוא שפטורים מציצית, וקאמר ליה קטינא קטינא, סדינא בקייטא וסרבלא בסיתוא, ציצית מה תהא עליה. ומפרש בגמ' דהכי קאמר ליה "טצדקי למפטר נפשך מציצית". ופרש"י וז"ל תבקש תחבולות לפטור עצמך מציצית עכ"ל. ומפרש בדברו"מ הנ"ל דעיקר החשש משום שנראה לאנשי שהיה מבקש תחבולות לפטור את עצמו מציצית דומיא דדורות האחרונים שהכניסו פירותיהן דרך גגות, אע"פ שבאמת זה לא היה כוונתו, ואעפ"כ ענשינן ע"ז בעידן דריתחא. ונלענ"ד שזה מדוייק מאוד בדברי המרדכי (ס' תתקמ"ה) הובא בב"י (או"ח ס' כ"ד) שכתב דמי שיש לו טלית בת ד' כנפות ומבקש עלילות ליפטר נענש, ומשמע מזה דכשאין לו טלית בת ד' כנפות אינו נענש שזה דומה לשלב הד' דמידת חסידות הוא להכניס עצמו למצב של חיוב. ועוד כתב המרדכי וז"ל ודוקא בימיהם שהיו רגילים ללבוש טליתות בת ד' כנפים אבל אנחנו אין דרכנו בבגדי ד' כנפים אפילו בעידן ריתחא לא מיענשי, ומיהא מצוה מן המובחר היא כדאמרינן לא נתאוה משה ליכנס לארץ משום פירותיה אלא כדי לקיים מצות התלויות בה, וה"ה בציצית שגדולה מאוד ומתן שכרה מרובה כדאמר ששקולה כנגד כל המצות. תוס' שאנ"ץ עכ"ל [גם הרא"ש במו"ק (פ"ג ס' פ') כתב כדברי המרדכי דרק כשהיו להם ד' כנפות שייך הא דנענשין מי שלא היתה לו, אבל בזמננו הא דיש לו לחזור אחר ציצית הוא רק מדין משה שביקש ליכנס לארץ לקיים מצות התלויות בה וכ"כ השטמ"ק בערכין ב ע"ב במה שהוסיף על התוס' ד"ה הכל]. ולפמש"כ האגרו"מ אתי שפיר דרב קטינא עצמו לא נתכוין לפטור את עצמו ממצות אלא שמאיזה טעם לא לבש בגד של ד' כנפות. לפיכך כל טענת המלאך לרבי קטינא הוא שניכר לאינשי שמבקש תחבולות לפטור עצמו ממצות ציצית, ולכך כתב המרדכי שזה שייך בזמן שבני אדם רגילין בבגד של ד' כנפות, ולא בזמן הזה [אכן, באמת נחלקו התוס' והמרדכי אם שייך הא דענשין בעידן דריתחא רק כשיש לו ואינו לובשה כמש"כ המרדכי מתחלה דקמיירי דוקא כשיש לו, ומשמע מזה דכשאין לו אף בעידן דריתחא לא ענשינן ליה במה שאינו מחפש אחריו לקנותו. אבל התוס' כתבו דרב קטינא לית ליה בגד המחוייב בציצית, ואעפ"כ קאמר מלאכא דענשינן בעידן דריתחא. עיין בביאורים של הגר"מ בנעט דלדעת המרדכי ניחא דרק שייך למ"ד חובת גברא דקמיירי כשיש לו מש"ה ענשינן בעידן דריתחא אבל אין כופין על קיום מצוה כיון דאינו מחוייב עד שעת לבישה. אבל למ"ד חובת טלית לא שייך הגדרה זו דאין כופין ואעפ"כ ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, דאי כשיש לו מחוייב ועומד וכפינן ליה, ואי כשאין לו הא לא ענשינן. אבל לדעת התוס' קמיירי בדלית ליה ורק משום דחובת גברא ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, אבל אי חובת טלית לא ענשינן כיון שאין החיוב מוטלת אקרקפתא דגברא לא נחשב מי שאין לו כמי שפוטר את עצמו מן המצוה. והשטמ"ק (אות ח') מפרש דלמ"ד חובת טלית נמי ענשינן בעידן דריתחא כשאין לו אלא דשמא היה לו בבית, מש"ה אילו הוי חובת טלית לא הו"ל להמלאך לטעון עליו במה שאינו לובשו]. ד. הבאתי בפנים מתוס' בפסחים קיג ע"ב שמי שאין לו בגד של ד' כנפות יש לו לחזור ולהביא עצמו לידי חיוב, כמו שעשה משה רבינו ע"ה כדאיתא בסוטה יד ע"א שביקש ליכנס לארץ כדי לקיים מצות התלויות בארץ. ונראה דהכא ליכא איסור כלל, שהרי אינו מבקש תחבולות לפטור את עצמו אלא הוא מדת חסידות להכניס עצמו למצב שיהא מחוייב בהמצוה כמו שעשה משרע"ה [וק"ק על האגרו"מ (או"ח ח"ד ס' ד') שהשוה דברי התוס' להא דמלאכא לרב קטינא, דלכאורה לא דק. אמנם באמת יש סתירה בדברי התוס' עצמם שהרי כתבו במנחות דקמיירי בדלית ליה ואעפ"כ ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, וא"כ אמאי כתבו בפסחים שהוא רק בגדר הא דמשה ביקש ליכנס לארץ. ואפשר דדעת התוס' דמי שעומד במצב שהוא פטור אלא שבידו להתחייב עצמו כמו שעשה משה, ולא הכניס את עצמו למצב של חיוב נמי ענשינן בעידן דריתחא, ובזה מיושב גם דברי האגרו"מ שהשוה התוס' בפסחים להא דענשינן בעידן דריתחא וצ"ע]. ויש לעיין בזה, דבשלמא קיום מצות התלויות בארץ שיש בהם תועלת גדולה, שייך חומרא כזה להביא את עצמו לידי חיוב, אבל במצות השמטת כספים או מצות שלוח הקן, או פדיון פטר חמור, או גירושין וכיוצ"ב יש לעיין אם שייך חומרא בזה להביא את עצמו לידי חיוב. ומסתברא שיש לחלק בין מצוה למצוה. ולפמש"כ בשם המרדכי נראה דדוקא במצות גדולות שייך מידת חסידות להכניס עצמו למצב של חיוב כמו מצות התלויות בארץ וכן ציצית ששקולה כנגד כל המצות, אבל בשאר מצות שאין מתן שכרן גלויה לנו, אף ממידת חסידות א"צ להכניס עצמו למצב של חיוב, וצ"ע בזה ואכמ"ל.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Bechoros 57b - Issur to use animals without ma'aser b'heima

The Mishna says that chazal established 3 time periods throughout the year when they required everyone to do the ma'aser b'ehima. The way they imposed this requirement was by considering all animals to be like tevel when the time comes until they separate ma'aser be'heima. When the time comes one is not allowed to eat or sell any of the animals just as they aren't allowed to use grains that are tevel until separating terumah and ma'aser. This is a Rabbinic institution of tevel, which implies that m'doraysa there is no prohibition. Rashi writes explicitly that on a Torah level there is no prohibition at all to use or eat animals before ma'aser b'heima has been separated. Rashi implies that on a Torah level the mitzvah of ma'aser be'heima doesn't impose any restrictions against using the animals.
This is very difficult because by using the animals prior to ma'aser be'heima one can essentially be causing a bitul to the entire mitzvah. Let's say one has only 10 animals or 100 animals - by using any of the animals they are causing a bitul of ma'aser be'heima. How can there be no Torah prohibition to use an animal or animals when it can very likely be causing a bitul of the mitzvah? Furthermore, even when there is no bitul mitzvah, it would seem logical to assume that since there is no time limit by which this mitzvah must get done (one cannot mix animals of two years but they aren't required to do ma'aser be'heima by the end of any given year), shouldn't the mitzvah inherently include an issur to use it until the mitzvah is performed? A similar discussion is raised in the context of using a keli without tevilas keilim. Since the Torah demands that one do tevilas keilim, it should be prohibited to use a keli without doing tevila m'd'oraysa. If not, then one can indefinitely push off this mitzvah without ever being in violation of it. The Biur Halahca (323:7) takes for granted the the prohibition to use a keli prior to immersion in a mikvah is only m'drabonon. It would seem more logical to me that this would be an issur d'oraysa because otherwise one can never be considered to have violated or been me'vatel this mitzvah. Even if we assume like the biur halacha that it is only an issur d'rabonon, here by ma'aser be'heima it is worse since the use of it will often cause a complete inability to do the mitzvah later such as in the case where he has a number divisible by 10 so that any animal used will cause a remainder of 9 on which one can't perform this mitzvah.
It seems to me that Rashi is troubled by this question and is therefore compelled to write - 
אבל קודם לכן מותר דמצוה בעלמא הוא לעשר בהמותיו, דהעשירי קודש מאחר שקרא עליו שם, הבל הרשות בידו לאוכלו בלא מעשר
Rashi understands that the mitzvah is not an obligatory mitzvah, just a מצוה בעלמא. It sounds like he is trying to say that this mitzvah isn't an absolute obligation that one is being me'vatel by using the animal, rather it is a mitzvah to do it but not a violation not to do it.

Wednesday, January 04, 2012

Bechoros 53a - Uprooting Ma'aser B'heima

The gemara says that although m'doraysa the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima applies outside of E.Y. and even without a Beis HaMikdash, the Rabbonon uprooted the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima. At first the gemara thought that they uprooted it because of a gezeira משום יתום, meaning an animal that is technically not chayev in ma'aser b'heima and would end up being put in the coral for ma'aser b'heima and may end up as a korban. The gemara asks that if that were the concern they should have been concerned even when there was a Beis HaMikdash - אי הכי מעיקרא נמי לא. Therefore the gemara concludes that they abolished the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima due to a gezeira of תקלה, meaning that people would have animals that have kedusha status sitting around and it would lead to using them in forbidden ways. When there was a Beis HaMikdash the ma'aser b'heima would quickly be brought as a korban so that this wasn't a concern, but post beis hamikdash it is a concern.
The Minchas Chinuch (287) explains this gemara by first establishing a concept. We know from the gemara in Yevamos 90 that chazal are empowered to abolish a positive mitzvah in the Torah if it would lead to a violation of some sort as they did with shofar and lulav on shabbos for concern that one would carry it. The achronim ask why didn't they abolish the mitzvah of shofar out of fear that one will make a musical instrument which certainly seems a more likely concern. They answer that a gezeira that one may make an instrument would apply equally to yom tov as it would to shabbos, therefore they would have to completely abolish the mitzvah of blowing shofar on Rosh Hashana. Although they have the power to abolish a mitzvah for a particular time period, they don't have the authority to do so permanently. Therefore, had they based themselves on a reason that applied to Yom Tov also, they couldn't abolish it even on shabbos. They had to find a reason that only applied to shabbos and not Yom Tov.
The gemara at first suggests that they abolished ma'aser b'heima due to the gezeira of a יתום, that one will bring animals that are technically exempt from ma'aser b'heima. However, this gezeira would apply equally with our without a beis ha'mikdash (actually the concern would even be greater when there was a beis hamikdash and one would end up bringing an animal as a korban that is exempt). The Rabbis couldn't make a gezeira that would eradicate entirely the mitzvah of ma'aser b'heima. This is the gemara's question of אי הכי מעיקרא נמי לא. The gemara doesn't just mean to ask that they should have made the gezeira even when the Beis Hamikdash was standing, but rather the gemara means to say that since the gezeira should apply even when the Beis Hamikdash was standing and they couldn't limit their eradication of the mitzvah, they couldn't make this gezeira at all. They were powerless to make a gezeira that would eradicate the mitzvah under all circumstances. Therefore, the gemara is compelled to say that their motivation was תקלה which was a problem that only exists when there is no beis hamikdash but would disappear with the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash when people will once again have the ability to sacrifice the ma'aser b'heima as a korban.
A question that can still be asked is why weren't they gozer against doing ma'aser b'heima outside of E.Y. even when there was a beis hamikdash, since R. Akiva held that the animals from outside E.Y. couldn't be brought as a korban - the problem of תקלה should apply as much as when there was no beis hamikdash? Perhaps when there was a beis hamikdash people were more familiar with how to treat kodshim animals even outside of E.Y. and therefore the תקלה concern wasn't as much of a concern.

Tuesday, January 03, 2012

Bechoros 51b - Pidyon HaBen With the Intent of Receiving the Money Back

The gemara tells that R. Tarfon and R. Chanina would often return the money that he received for pidyon ha'ben (the gemara indicates that there is an advantage to this - קיים זה אף הלכה זו. Rabbeinu Gershom explains that the advantage is to publicize that the halacha allows for the money to be returned. This is similar to what the Rosh explains in Pesachim (Perek 1, 10) that there is an advantage to doing things that are not obviously permitted in order to educate people that it is indeed permitted). The gemara then tells of a situation where someone was hanging around R. Chanina after doing pidyon ha'ben and waiting to get his money back. R. Chanina realized that the person didn't give the money whole heartedly and only gave it because he expected it to come right back. R. Chanina told him that the pidyon ha'ben wasn't effective [Rashi has two versions as to whether it is not effective only if it is returned, or even if it isn't returned. Rabbeinu Gershom and Shulchan Aruch (305:8) assume like the first approach of rashi that so long as it isn't returned, the pidyon ha'ben will be effective. Perhaps after R. Chanina would tell him he can't return the money and the giver would accept that, he would be able to return it].
Tosafos asks that the gemara in Kiddushin says that if one would give pidyon ha'ben to the kohein as a gift with the intent of getting it back, it would be effective. This seems to contradict R. Chanina who held that since the person expected it back, it wouldn't be effective. Tosafos answers that had R. Chanina accepted the money with the intent to return it, as the giver had intended, it would be binding. But, since there is a halacha that a kohein isn't allowed to provide incentive to receive pidyon ha'ben (כהן המסייע בבית הגרנות), R. Chanina didn't receive the money with the intent of returning it. Had both the giver and receiver both intended that it should not be returned, or both intended that it should be returned, the pidyon ha'ben would be effective. The problem in the case of the gemara is that the giver intended to receive it back and the receiver received it without the intent of returning it back. Tosafos question seems to assume that the intent to receive it back should be no worse than the explicit condition to receive it back which is effective. 
However, the Gr"a (shulchan aruch 305) points out that according to the Rosh in Succah, Tosafos question doesn't even begin. The Rosh in Succah (3,30) explains that a מתנה על מנת להחזיר is a very specific and rigid agreement that requires a kinyan on the return end as well. It isn't merely an informal assumption that the money will be given back. Therefore, the case of R. Chanina doesn't meet the requirements of a מתנה על מנת להחזיר. When the giver intends to give it for only a short amount of time and then receive it back, it is like a מתנה לזמן, a gift with an expiration date which doesn't qualify as a matana at all and wouldn't work for pidyon ha'ben.

Monday, January 02, 2012

Bechoros 49a - Pidyon Ha'Ben After Death

The Mishna requires one to do pidyon ha'ben to a child who lived passed day 30, but then died. Tosafos questions whether one should make a bracha of shehechiyanu when performing pidyon ha'ben on a dead child. The Birkas Shmuel (Kiddushin #18) points out that the only rationale that Tosafos has not to say Shehechiyanu is that there is pain associated with it due to the child's death, but the implication is that the mitzvah is in full force as if the child was still alive and therefore shehechiyanu may be appropriate. The difficulty with this is that the Rivash explains in a teshuva (131) that the language for the bracha on pidyon ha'ben is "על פדיון הבן" rather than "לפדות". He explains that this fits well with the Rambam (Brachos 11:12) who says that anytime the mitzvah is done for someone else i.e. separating teruma one someone else's grain, or hanging a mezuza in someone else's house, the bracha should be על. Therefore, when one performs pidyon ha'ben for himself, the bracha should be לפדות, but when he performs it for his son, since it is primarily the son's obligation that the Torah requires the father to perfrom, the bracha should be על. The Birkas shmuel asks that the Rambam (11:10) says that shehechiyanu is made when one is doing their mitzvah, not when one is doing the mitzvah of someone else. If we regard pidyon ha'ben as the son's mitzvah, not the father's, hence the bracha is made using the term על, there shouldn't be any shehechiyanu. From Tosafos we find that not only is shehechiyanu made on a standard pidyon ha'ben that the father does for the son, but even after the son dies, the bracha of shehechiyanu is made. It would seem that after the son has died we can no longer say the father is performing the mitzvah for his son, because there is no obligation on a deceased person to do any mitzvah. The fact that the father performs the mitzvah after the son's death and makes the bracha of shehechiyanu, implies that the obligation of the father to redeem his son is primarily the father's own obligation, not merely something the Torah requires him to do for his son. The Birkas Shmuel points out that this directly contradicts the Rivash.
The Birkash Shmuel explains that the obligation for a father to do pidyon ha'ben after his son has died is not to fulfill a mitzvah obligation, rather the debt that was created by the mitzvah before the son had died must still be paid. It is a monetary obligation rather than a mitzvah obligation. However, he suggests that although there is no longer a mitzvah obligation on the father since the son has died (and we are assuming like the Rivash that the primary mitzvah is on the son), there is still a kiyum mitzvah, a fulfillment of a mitzvah that is achieved by the father doing pidyon ha'ben on the deceased son. Now, the bracha of shehechiyanu is different than the bracha of על פדיון הבן in that the bracha of shehechiyanu is on the joy one receives from the opportunity to fulfill a mitzvah. Even on a kiyum mitzvah the bracha of shehechiyanu is appropriate. But a birchas ha'mitzvah is a bracha on the chiyuv, not on the kiyum, as the text of the bracha indicates וצוונו על פדיון הבן. Since the primary chiyuv is on the son, just that until he is 13 the Torah places that obligation on the father to fulfill his son's mitzvah, the language of the bracha is על פדיון הבן since the primary obligation is on the son, not the father. But regarding the shehechiyanu which is on the kiyum ha'mitzvah, the father is certainly fulfilling a mitzvah and can therefore make shehechiyanu. Following this approach it should follow that when a father does pidyon ha'ben after the son had died, since there is a monetary obligation to pay a debt but no longer a mitzvah obligation since the son is dead, there shouldn't be any birchas ha'mitzvah at all. The Birkas Shmuel points out that someone asked him this question, but he was pushed off the question saying that since at some point there was an obligation, even though now it is only a kiyum, the bracha may still be made. But for shehechiyanu, if it were made for a chiyuv mitzvah, it would not be made at all when there is no chiyuv. The fact that Tosafos says it is made after the son's death indicates that it is made for a kiyum mitzvah even when there is no chiyuv.

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Bechoros 46a - Who is the halachic mother?

The issue of surrogacy and determining whether parenthood depends on genetics or on birth is very complicated in halacha and difficult to prove. See here for an article by Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg Shlit"a where he proves from various sources that the mother who gave birth to a child is considered the mother in halacha, not the mother who donated the genetic material. This is not the forum to weigh in on such a major topic but one of the cases in our mishna opens it up for discussion. 
Regarding fatherhood, it would seem that it is determined by the one who contributed the semen, since that is the only active role the father takes in producing the child. However, we find that if a man would have relations with a non-jew, the child born would not be halachically related to the father. Rashi writes that if a woman converts while pregnant, the child wouldn't inherit from the biological father since conception happened with a mother who was a goy, the Torah no longer connects the semen to the father - דזרע מצרי רחמנא אפרקריה דכתיב וזרמת סוסים זרמתם. Tosafos agrees, but comments that if the mother converts while pregnant, the child anyway isn't related to the father because the child is considered a convert and גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי breaks his relationship with his biological family. Therefore, it would seem that in a situation where the bio mother and the surrogate mother are both jewish, we would consider the father to be the father. But, if either one is not Jewish, whether the father is considered the father would seem to depend on who is the mother. If the bio mother is considered the mother, perhaps we would consider the bio father the father even though his semen eventually was placed in the uterus of a non-jewish woman. But, if we consider the surrogate mother to be the mother, the biological fathers connection would likely be broken as well.
It seems that the answer to who is the mother may also lie in this case. When a woman converts while pregnant, we consider the child born after conversion to be a bechor regarding pidyon ha'ben - he is the פטר רחם. It would seem that before we entertain the ability of the child to be considered the פטר רחם of this woman, we must first consider him the child of this woman. The gemara says in Yevamos 78a that when a woman converts while pregnant, the conversion works for the child also and he is considered a convert (the womb isn't a chatzitza for the tevilla). Since we would apply כקטן שנולד דמי at the time of conversion, we would not consider the woman pregnant with her own child (even if conception would normally determine motherhood), yet when the child is born we consider him to be a פטר רחם. It would seem that birth determines the relationship between the mother and child because otherwise we shouldn't consider this child to be the פטר רחם. One can disagree with this logic by underlying the assumption. Perhaps motherhood is not a prerequisite for this child to be a פטר רחם. Therefore, even though we wouldn't consider him to be the child of this mother, he would still have kedushas bechor for pidyon ha'ben.
R. Zalman Nechemia cites an excellent proof that it is dependent on birth from the gemara in Yevamos 97b that says when a woman converts while pregnant with twins, the two brothers are considered brothers for the prohibition of אשת אח (if one would have relations with the others wife after he dies). Even though conception would not consider them brothers because they went through a conversion in the process, the halacha still considers them to be brothers because they are born from the same womb. Just as the relationship between the two brothers is determined at birth, the relationship to the mother should also be determined at birth. According to this approach it is not gestation or incubation of the surrogate mother that would determine her to be the mother in halacha, because the gemara indicates that the same halacha would be true if the mother converted well into her ninth month, a day prior to the birth of the child. Rather, it is the actual birth that would determine the familial relationships.
Rav Zalman Nechemia points out that the gemara in Chulin 70a would seem to imply the exact opposite. The gemara discusses a case where an animal gives birth to a bechor directly into the uterus of another, the second animal then gives birth to this bechor and the gemara wants to know whether a child that doesn't belong to it can exempt it from bechor (in the future). The implication of the gemara is that the child doesn't belong to the second mother, even though it also gave birth to it. However, Rav Zalman Nechemia rejects this proof. He points out that since the first animal also gave birth to it, the child already has a mother, therefore the second mother isn't considered a mother. But if the surrogate mother is the first to give birth to the child (as a viable human being or animal), the surrogate mother would be considered the mother.
According to Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg the proof from Yevamos 97b is sufficient evidence that the family relationship is established at birth, therefore the surrogate mother is considered the mother. It would therefore follow that if he surrogate mother were a non-jew, even if the genetic mother was jewish, the child would not be jewish.
However, my uncle, Rav Shabtai Rappaport has a very unique (and complex) approach to this issue that I found in an article online - see here. He considers the gemara in Yevamos 97 evidence for determining the family relationships in regard to עריות but not for the purpose of determining status as a Jew. He suggests that the fact that the gemara in Yevamos 78 considers the child of a pregnant convert to be going through his own conversion, implies that the child's religious affiliation is determined at conception by the genetic mother. Since the genetic mother is a non-jew at the time of conception, the child would not be a Jew unless we consider him to have undergone his own conversion. Even if the mother converts while pregnant and the child is born to a Jewish mother, this would not transform him into a Jew since his genetic material wasn't Jewish at the moment of conception. In the case of surrogacy it would then follow that the surrogate mother is considered the mother, but the genetic mother determines whether the child is a Jew. When the surrogate mother is a non-jew and the genetic mother is a Jew, the child will be Jewish but his "mother" will be the non-jewish woman.
The approach of Rav Shabbtai Rappaport is novel, but it is odd to separate between the question of who is the mother and the one who passes on the Jewish "gene". To me it seems that the proof from the pregnant mother converting doesn't force us to say that Jewishness is passed on by the genetic mother. Perhaps if the mother were able to convert without also converting the fetus she is carrying, the child would still become Jewish upon birth from a Jewish mother. But, since the conversion of the mother automatically works on the child that she is carrying, the child is considered Jewish due to conversion rather than a result of being born to a Jewish mother.

Bechoros 45b - Kohein Marrying a Gerusha

The Mishna says that a kohein who marries a woman who is forbidden to him must make a neder to make her off limits in order to be kasher to do avoda. The gemara says that even if he hasn't actually divorced her, he can make the neder to continue doing the avoda and divorce her when he is done with the avoda. The gemara explains that we insist on a neder rather than just a formal acceptance that she should be off-limits to him (which is what we require for a kohein who is me'tamei l'meisim) because there more of a yetzer ho'rah for women who are forbidden to him.
The Shulchan Aruch (128:40) writes that a kohein who is married to a divorcee is not allowed to do birchas kohanim, nor is he entitled to any privileges of a kohein such as reading first in the torah. Even if he actually divorces her, he isn't entitled to these privileges until he makes a neder על דעת רבים which cannot be overturned that he will not marry women who are forbidden to him. Although the gemara seems to allow him to continue to do avoda after making the neder, even before divorcing her, we demand both that he divorce her and that he make the neder. The Be'er Hei'tev explains that the gemara only allows him to temporarily complete the avoda because he will divorce her immediately when he is done, but he is not allowed to simply make a neder and continue to stay married to her (he must divorce her at the first opportunity).
The M.B. explains that this penalty applies only to aveiros that are specific to kohanim, not to aveiros that apply to regular Jews as well (such as chilul shabbos). The M.B. quotes the Rambam who explains that when a kohein is lax in one mitzvah we don't add to his laxity in mitzvos by forcing him to forfeit the mitzvah of birchas kohanim. The concern of a rasha giving a bracha to klal yisroel he downplays because the bracha is really from Hashem, not from the Kohein.
The situation recently arose about a kohein who has been living with a non-jewish woman for many years and was recently told that he can no longer du'chan. What is the status of a Kohein who is living with a non-jewish woman? Does this qualify as a violation of something that we penalize him for by removing his privileges to du'chan and get the first aliya, or is this considered to a be a violation of other aveiros that doesn't ruin his rights as a kohein (which the mishna berura says includes even arayos)? Would we consider being married to a gerusha worse in this sense than being "married" to a non-jewish woman? To me it would seem very strange that a kohein who is "married" to a non-jewish woman would be kasher to duchan but if she would convert (making the issur slightly less severe), he would be passul. It is possible that although we don't remove privileges of a kohein who violates arayos or other aveiros, that is because each aveira is separate and in between he is not in a state of doing aveira. But, when he is "married" to a goy, since he is in a constant state of "being married" (meaning living b'kvius with her), it is not better than being married to a divorcee and we don't let him du'chan. A similar distinction is made by the Biur Halacha who discusses a kohein who is me'tamei l'meisim. The language of the Shulchan Aruch implies that even if he only does it once he becomes passul, but the language of the Mishna implies that only if he does it regularly does he become passul. The Biur Halacha asks, why when he marries women even one divorcee would he become passul, he only did it once? To this he answers - כיון דהוא מחזיקה לאשה ועומד במרדו הלא הוא מועד לאיסור זה. Meaning, a kohein who marries a gerusha is in constant violation of the prohibition, and the same may be said when he "marries" a goy. It seems to me that although there is to תפיסת קדושין to a goy, the penalty should still apply. Just as those opinions who hold that there is no tefisas kiddushin between a kohein and a gerusha would certainly agree to the Mishna that we penalize a kohein from "marrying" a gerusha, the same can be said for a goy. Even though there is no technical tefisas kiddushin, the k'vius of being legally married or living together permanently could be similar to marriage to a divorcee.
I just found that the Aruch La'ner addresses this question in his teshuvos Binyan Tziyon (6).  SEE HERE. He seems to assume that a goy is considered a p'sul kehuna because the Rambam writes that a kohein who has relations with a goy receives lashes for relations with a "zona". The Rambam clearly considers a goy to be from the p'sulei kehuna. Yet, he leans toward being ma'tir since the issur here seems to only be a penalty d'rabonon and we only find it in a situation where he is actually married. However, he isn't willing to be matir l'ma'aseh unless another posek would agree with him.

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Bechoros 38b - Is a Mum that can be cured considered a mum ka'vuah?

It is clear that when a bechor has a mum that will heal by itself, it qualifies as a temporary mum. Although it cannot be sacrificed as a korban until the mum heals, it would not constitute a mum to permit the shechting of the bechor as the gemara said on 37b. Tosafos discusses a mum that will not heal on it's own, but is curable through medical intervention. According to the first approach of Tosafos any mum that is curable, even if it will take medicines or surgeries, would qualify as a temporary mum thereby retain full kedusha of bechor. According to the second approach of Tosafos, a mum that requires some form of medical intervention to heal it, would qualify as a permanent mum and the bechor my be shechted and eaten without the medical intervention. 
This second approach of Tosafos opens up a very peculiar status. One can have a bechor with a mum that is curable but will not heal on it's own and is permitted to shecht it since it doesn't retain the kedusha of bechor. But if he decides to offer the medical treatment to cure the mum, the kedushas bechor will return. The Maharit Algazi questions whether this it is possible for the kedusha of a bechor to be restored through the healing of it's mum. It is very different than a temporary mum where the bechor retains it's full kedusha status even while it has a mum, just that it can't be brought as a korban. Here the kedusha status actually disappears when it gets the mum that will not heal on it's own, therefore you can shecht the animal and eat it, but if you fix the mum the original kedusha status will return. 
The Maharit Algazi cites a very interesting source for this phenomenon. The gemara says in Yoma 64a learns from a pasuk that after a temporary mum heals the animal can be brought as a korban. Why would we need a source for this, can't we simply learn from bechor that after the temporary mum passes the animal becomes fit for a korban? It must be that the pasuk comes to teach us that even when the mum is a mum that won't heal on it's own so that it qualified as a permanent mum and the animal lost it's kedusha status, after the mum is healed through medications the kedusha will return.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Bechoros 37a - Doing Avoda with Temporary Mum

The gemara says clearly that a temporary mum doesn't qualify as a mum at all to permit the shechting of a bechor outside the mikdash, or for redeeming pesulei hamukdashin.  However, it qualifies as a mum to prevent the animal from being brought as a korban until the mum heals. It isn't clear if a temporary mum would invalidate a kohein from doing the avoda even temporarily.
The Chachamim in the braisa say that a kohein cannot become a nirtzah since it will require the making of a mum and invalidate him from doing avoda. From this the gemara proves that the piercing is done in the cartilage part of the ear, rather than the fatty part, since in the fatty part it wouldn't make a mum. Rashi explains that a hole in the fatty part would heal and therefore not be considered a mum. Rashi implies that since the mum will heal, it isn't considered a mum at all to invalidate the kohein from doing the avoda, even temporarily. The Maharit Algazi points out that the third answer of Tosafos (d.h. ka'an) that a temporary mum would invalidate the kohein temporarily seems to be against Rashi.

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

Bechoros 31a - Paskening For Yourself

The Braisa says that one is not allowed to pasken on their own Bechor that it has a mum to allow himself to eat it. The gemara explains that we are speaking about a kohein who was given a bechor and qualifies as a יחיד מומחה who can normally pasken by himself, but we don't allow him to pasken on his own animal because we are afraid that he will be mo'reh heter for personal benefit.
Tosafos asks that based on this we should never permit anyone to pasken for themselves on any question of issur v'heter. Furthermore, the gemara in eiruvin says in that a talmid chacham can pasken for himself - how does this fit with our gemara?
The Rash in Negaim (cited by Gilyon HaShas) asks Tosafos question and says that it is dependent on whether it is אתחזק איסורא. When the item has a status of being forbidden and relies on the p'sak of the chacham to permit it, one cannot permit their own. But, when there is no default status of issur, one may pasken on their own. The Binas Adam (sha'ar issur v'heter 2) elaborates about this Rash and explains that when a question of issur v'heter would arise on the kashrus of an animal in the shechita process, that would qualify as a chezkas issur where one cannot pasken on their own. But, when it comes to checking the shechita knife on which there is no chezkas issur, one can check their own. It should follow from this that if the shechita knife would get a p'gam in it causing it to be invalid for shechita, the shochet shouldn't be able to check his own knife. However, the Lechem Chamudos (cited by binas adam) explains that anything which is one's control to fix, he is believed on even if it is אתחזק איסורא. Since the schochet can fix his knife by sharpening and removing the nicks, he is believed to say that it has been fixed.
The Binas Adam adds that we learn from our gemara that in a case which is אתחזק איסורא and not in one's own control to fix, even a talmid chacham isn't believed. This is clear from the case of Bechor where a יחיד מומחה isn't believed to pasken on his own.
Following this approach, the Chochmas Adam (109:6) paskens that although a husband may pasken on the bedika cloth of his wife (and she may pasken on her own), if a question develops about chatzitza while immersing in a mikva, the husband cannot pasken. The rationale for the distinction is that he can only pasken when it is not אתחזק איסורא. Once she is established as a Nida and the question is about her becoming tahora, it is אתחזק איסורא.

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Bechoros 30b - Accepting Mitzvos Except for One

The Braisa says that a Goy who accepts Mitzvos with the exception of one mitzvah, is not accepted as a convert. R. Yossi Bar Rav Yehuda adds that even for a detail that is d'rabonon we don't accept him. It is unclear from the gemara whether אין מקבלים אותו means that l'chatchila the Beis Din pushes him off, or that even bidieved would prevent the conversion from being binding. In the Teshuvos Beis Yitzchok (cited by Achiezer 3:26:5) he questions whether this is only lichatchila or even bidieved. The gemara in Shabbos 31 about the story with Hillel and the ger who didn't want to accept the oral torah implies that it is only lichatchila. If acceptance of everything would be essential to the geirus working, Hillel couldn't have converted him today just because he was confident that later on he would truly accept. But if it is only a lichatchila, it would be possible for Hillel to convert him today and wouldn't reject him because he was confident that with time he would fully accept (Even within the approach of Rashi who says that he didn't reject the oral Torah just didn't trust it's divinity, it would still seem impossible for Hillel to accept him today unless it would be binding bidieved regardless).
R. Chaim Ozer (Achiezer) rejects the notion that this requirement is merely lichatchila. The Rambam writes that the acceptance of the mtizvos is integral to the conversion (similarly Tosafos in Yevamos writes that it must be done by day in the presence of a Beis Din), the gemara in Bechoros seems to simply be defining "accepting the mitzvos". Therefore, if one doesn't accept a Torah mitzvah the geirus isn't binding. But R. Chaim Ozer questions that perhaps the rejection of a Rabbinic mitzvah wouldn't invalidate the geirus on a Torah level. R. Moshe Feinstein (E.H. 2:4) concurs with R. Chaim Ozer that the accepting of all the mitzvos is essential and not doing so would undermine the conversion entirely. Just as for the Kohen and Chaver mentioned in the braisa, if they lack commitment to their requirements, their acceptance would be void even bidieved, the conversion of the goy would also be void bidieved.
However, there is a very fundamental dispute between R. Chaim Ozer and Rav Moshe regarding the definition of חוץ מדבר אחד. They were faced with Jews coming to convert who were living with non-jewish women and would be Rabbinically prohibited to stay with them after the conversion. Therefore, the entire conversion was with the assumption that they would be violating the issur of staying together. Another example would be a Kohein who comes to convert his non-jewish wife, and clearly plans on staying with her after the marriage. This would be a conversion with the intent of violating a Torah prohibition.
Rav Chaim Ozer (3:26:4) writes that one who converts with the realization that their desires to violate a mitzvah is too strong and they will be in violation, would not qualify as a חוץ מדבר אחד and the conversion would be binding. The Braisa only intends to exclude one who stipulates that they are converting on the condition that such activity will not be prohibited to them. They are essentially picking and choosing which laws will be part of their Torah. But one who accepts all of them, just that he or she intends to violate some of them, would be a valid convert. R. Chaim Ozer realizes that following this approach one can potentially "accept" all 613, but not keep to any of them - would their conversion be valid!? He qualifies this by saying that if we are sure that he will definitely violate major prohibitions in the Torah such as Shabbos and Kashrus, it is and indication that he doesn't mean to truly accept mitzvos, and the lip service of declaring his acceptance is worthless. It is hard to understand where exactly R. Chaim Ozer would draw the line. Perhaps he would not consider violation of details an invalidation of the conversion, only the uprooting of an entire mitzvah. The underlying approach of R. Chaim Ozer seems to be that one need not commit to fulfill every detail, but they have to accept and recognize that this is a prohibition which they should be keeping. Based on this R. Chaim Ozer permits accepting a convert who is honest about where he stands and says that he will not be strong enough to keep one of the mitzvos in the Torah.
Rav Moshe takes a much clearer and harder line on this issue. Anyone who converts with the understanding that they will not be fulfilling one of the mitzvos in the Torah, even if they theoretically recognize it and accept it's divinity, cannot be a convert and the conversion isn't binding. Acceptance by definition is accepting to keep it. Although a ger may be ignorant and doesn't need much education to convert (the gemara in shabbos discusses a case of a ger who wasn't aware of the issur to worship idolatry), he must accept to follow the mitzvos of the Torah as he is taught them. Rav Moshe is troubled with the gemara in Shabbos where Hillel converted someone who wasn't willing to recognize the oral torah. This seemingly is no worse than חוץ מדבר אחד so how was the geirus binding? He explains Rashi to be saying that the convert wasn't rejecting the oral Torah, rather the convert didn't yet believe that the p'sakim of Hillel and Shamai were part of that divine torah. He hadn't yet come to terms with the sages of the generation being able to convey the divine message but wasn't rejecting any particular law. Even so, Hillel wouldn't have accepted him as a convert unless he was confident that in the future he would recognize that even that the discussions of the Rabbis were part of the oral torah. Rav Moshe understands from Rashi that had this qualified as a חוץ מדבר אחד, the geirus wouldn't be binding even bidieved, but since it was merely a lack of education which misled him to think that the torah discussed by hillel and shamai wasn't part of the oral torah, Hillel's confidence that education  would change his attitude was sufficient to convert him today.
The D'var Avrohom (3:28) wrote a letter to R. Chaim Ozer thanking him for sending him a copy of his sefer and offers some comments on this particular teshuva. He writes to R. Chaim Ozer that after reading his distinction of "accepting the mitzvos" and "keeping" the mitzvos, he laughed - ואני חוכך בזה. In this aspect he concurs with R. Moshe that if one "accepts" something with the intent of violating, it doesn't qualify as an acceptance. But regarding the first issue whether the חוץ מדבר אחד is enough to invalidate the geirus, he questions that it may only be a lichatchila requirement as suggested by the Beis Yitzchok. Strangely enough, Rav Moshe (Y.D. 3:106) in a later teshuva leans toward saying that the חוץ מדבר אחד is only a lichatchila for the beis din to reject him, but is not me'akev the geirus. He bases this on the point that was mentioned by R. Chaim Ozer that the rejection of a d'rabonon couldn't invalidate the geirus on a Torah level, therefore it would just be a lichatchila. Since the same language is used for the rejection of a Torah mitzvah - אין מקבלים אותו, this would also only be lichatchila.
There are some orthodox batei dinim that are lax in their insistence on kabalas ha'mitzvos. According to R. Chaim Ozer this would often not prevent the geirus from being binding, but according to Rav Moshe (in the earlier teshuva) any mitzvah that wasn't fully accepted at the time of the geirus would invalidate the entire process.
Unfortunately, I have seem many converts who reject certain halachos such as hair covering and other tznius related issues very soon after their conversion, and there is reason to believe that they had never intended to adhere to these rules. R. Moshe (y.d. 3:106:1 end of section) writes that when the religious people of that community are lax in certain halachos, it wouldn't be fair to consider these things a חוץ מדבר אחד to invalidate the geirus because the fact that all the "religious" women don't abide by it, causes the convert to think that it is just a chumrah being imposed by the beis din.Therefore, rather than regarding this as a חוץ מדבר אחד where she fails to accept something, it can be regarded as a lack of education which would not invalidate the geirus.

Monday, December 12, 2011

Bechoros 29a - Payment for Mitzvos

The Mishna says that one is not allowed to receive payment for judging, testifying, or doing the mitzvos associated with para aduma, and if one receives payment he is penalized that we invalidate what he did. The gemara explains that this is based on a general principal of מה אני בחנם אף אתם בחנם, which is learned from a pasuk that demands that we model ourselves after G-d and not take payment for the doing of mitzvos such as teaching Torah or paskening on questions. Although there is already a prohibition against a judge taking a bribe, Tosafos explains that this source is necessary to forbid him from taking payment that is not meant to influence the outcome of the judgement (but if it influences the outcome in either direction, it is regarded as a bribe).
When the gemara cites the source for not accepting payment as being the requirement to model G-d and do it for free, Rashi gives the examples of authorizing a p'sak i.e. din, and teaching Torah. Rashi fails to mention the issue of testifying and preparing the para aduma waters. The Cheishek Shlomo suggests that accepting payment to testify according to Rashi is only prohibited m'drabonon, not from the Torah. If it were forbidden m'doraysa it would be tantamount to a witness taking money to testify falsely categorizing him as a רשע דחמס and being passul for all testimonly. The Mishna implies that we only invalidate this testimony, implying that his violation isn't d'oraysa. It also isn't clear from Rashi whether payment for other mitzvos is forbidden m'doraysa or only m'drabonon.
The Rashash cites the Bartneura who elaborates about those who officiate gittin and take payment. He is assuming that sidur ha'get qualifies as din and would invalidate the gett. However, the Rama (E.H. 154) says that it doesn't qualify as din, just as limud ha'torah. The Rashash points out that this would justify the gett being kasher, but wouldn't justify the practice to accept payment for officiating a gett since it would still be a violation of מה אני בחנם אף אתם בחנם as we find by talmud torah. Tosafos justifies those who take payment for studying Torah based on the דייני גזירות in Yerushalayim who relied on this for their livelihood and therefore became the community responsibility to support them so that they can maintain their important work. This logic may also apply to mesadrei gittin or those who do other mitzvos i.e. milah for their livelihood. Someone asked me how I can charge to do a bris - i answered that the mitzvah of bris milah is to cut. I don't charge for the mitzvah of doing a bris, I only  charge for stopping the bleeding.

Thursday, December 08, 2011

Bechoros 25a - More about Davar She'eino Miskavein

The gemara suggest that R. Yossi Ben Meshulam agrees with Rav (who paskens like R. Yehuda) that דבר שאינו מתכוין is forbidden. How then does he permit the cutting of the black parts of the hairs of the פרה אדומה leaving behind only the red parts, although he isn't intending to be גוזז but to fix the parah a'duma, it should still be a violation? The gemara implies, and Rashi explains explicitly that since his intent when he is cutting the black parts of the hair is to fix the cow rather than take the hairs, it would be considered a דבר שאינו מתכוין. Tosafos points out that this seems to be a very strange application of דבר שאינו מתכוין. Normally a דבר שאינו מתכוין is where one doesn't even intend to do the ma'aseh issur, but where one intends to do the act of issur just that he is doing it for a different purpose than it is normally done for, it would be considered a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (which is a special p'tur in hilchos shabbos due to מלאכת מחשבת- it doesn't apply to other areas of halacha and even on shabbos is exempt from punishment but forbidden). In this case where the person is cutting the hairs of the parah a'duma intending to do the act of cutting, it would be similar to a standard מלאכה שא"צ לגופה, but shouldn't qualify as a דבר שאינו מתכוין? Tosafos asks this question in very few words -
 דאין זה כשאר לשון "אין מתכוין" בעלמא דכיון דבכוונה גוזז במספרים. Why does the gemara consider this to be a davar sh'eino miskavein? 
It seems to me that by certain מלאכות the purpose of the act is so integral to the melacha, that when the act is done for a different purpose it is tantamount to not intending to do the act at all. The prohibition of גוזז on kodshim is that it is forbidden to do things that enable one to take the products of the animal (whether it is the wool, the work in the field or the milk), while it is still alive. Although Tosafos (d.h. sa'ar) explains that the issur is a ma'aseh issur of cutting the wool, unlike the issur of the milk which is an issur on the product, the nature of the issur to cut the wool is because normally one would do this act to obtain the product. When one is גוזז but has no interest in the wool, it undermines the act of גוזז to the point where we consider him to not be intending for גוזז at all. Therefore, when he cuts the blackened parts of the hairs for the purpose of fixing the parah aduma, not for the purpose of using the hairs, it is considered as if he isn't intending to do the act of issur.

Wednesday, December 07, 2011

Bechoros 24b - Davar Sh'eino Miskavein

There is a machlokes between the Teruma HaDeshen and the Magen Avrohom whether we can be matir one to do a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה - an inevitable action where he isn't interested in the issur outcome, when the issur is only d'rabonon. The Terumas HaDeshen permits a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה באיסור דרבנן and the Magen Avrohom forbids it (O.C. 314:5). R. Akiva Eiger proves that the Magen Avrohom is correct from a gemara in Succah.
Normally we pasken like R. Shimon that a דבר שאינו מתכוין is permitted, not like R. Yehuda who forbids it. However, when it is inevitable - פסיק רישא, even R. Shimon admits that it is forbidden as the gemara says 25a. When the gemara speaks about a p'sik reisha it is usually in a context where the person is interested in the issur outcome. But when the person isn't interested in the outcome - פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה, Tosafos in Kesubos 6a cites the Aruch who permits it even by an issur d'oraysa. Tosafos disagrees and holds that it is forbidden at least by an issur d'oraysa. The Terumas HaDeshen and Magen Avrohom argue if we can be matir by an issusr d'rabonon.
Tosafos explains in our sugya that even though Rav paskens like R. Yehuda who forbids a דבר שאינו מתכוין, that is when the issur is d'oraysa. But if the issur is d'rabonon (either because it is mekalkel, or because תולש לאו היינו גוזז), it would be permitted. It seems that a דבר שאינו מתכוין  according to R. Yehuda is worse than a  פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה according to R. Shimon. The Aruch holds that פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה is permitted, so even though we hold like Tosafos that it is forbidden, we see that there is grounds to be matir. It would be logical to assume that if Tosafos holds that even R. Yehuda would permit a דבר שאינו מתכוין when it is only d'rabonon, according to R. Shimon who is always matir דבר שאינו מתכוין, but is machmir for a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה, he would at least be meikel when the entire issur is only d'rabonon. This would seem to support the opinion of the Terumas HaDeshen, against the Magen Avrohom. However, the M.B. writes that l'ma'aseh, most achronim agree with the Magen Avrohom to forbid a פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה even when the nature of the issur is only d'rabonon.

Tuesday, December 06, 2011

Bechoros 23a - Understanding Bitul B'rov

The gemara raises a concept of an item which is batul whether it is viewed as כמאן דאיתיה דמי. The gemara assumes that if we regard an item that is batul as if it doesn't exist then when a tamei item is batul it wouldn't even be me'tamei by carrying, but if we regard it as existing even while it is ba'tul it would be me'tamei through carrying but not through touching. The gemara leans toward the distinction between carrying and touching implying that we view the tu'mah to be in existence even while it is batul. The rationale for the distinction between carrying and touching is that when one touches something they cannot be touching every molecule at once. Therefore, we can only consider him to be touching an item of tu'mah if the majority is ta'mei, otherwise we would consider the entity to be not tamei. However, when it comes to ma'sah, since when something is carried, every molecule in it is carried, the existence of the tu'mah even as a minority would render the carrier tamei.
Tosafos (d.h. 23a) asks that eating an item should be more similar to tu'mas ma'sah than to tu'mas ma'ga. Why do we permit one to eat an issur that has been batul in rov? Since the minority is considered to still be in existence, it should be comparable to ma'sah where the entire item is being carried or eaten and therefore should be eating issur? Tosafos answers that when one eats something, every small amount that is swallowed is batul b'rov and is therefore similar to ma'ga where the touching of multiple times doesn't make it as if were touched at once. Therefore, just as by tu'mas ma'ga we would identify the entity based on the majority ingredient, the same would be for eating. Tosafos assumes that it would be impossible to eat the entire amount all at once. Perhaps it is because the בית הבליעה can only contain a beitza at one time which it 2 kezaysim. For there to be a full kezayis of issur in the בית הבליעה at once of something that has been batul b'rov, there would have to be more than 2 kezaysim in the beis ha'blia at one time, which is impossible. Furthermore, there should be an issur of eating even a chatzi shiur of issur, unlike tu'mah for which there is no contamination if it is less than the amount needed to be metamei.
The Rosh (Gid HaNashe end of 37) asks the very same question as Tosafos except that the Rosh preempts the answer of Tosafos in his question and says that one should have to be careful to eat in a way where every swallow could potentially contain only the heter food and not the issur food so that it would be more similar to ma'ga than ma'sah? The Rosh answers that we cannot compare tu'mah to issur. There are two types of tu'mah, therefore the chiddush of bitul b'rov may apply to one and not the other, such as to ma'gah and not ma'sah. However, regarding eating, if we would consider there to be any issur in what the person was consuming, the Torah wouldn't allow it's consumption. The fact that the Torah allows one to eat issur that has been ba'tul is a gezeiras hakasuv that in the world of issur, we view it כמאן דליתיה דמי, as if it weren't in existence. Therefore, a piece of issur that is batul in two pieces of heter can even be cooked together (on a torah level) and eaten all together as if the issur disappeared.
The approach of the Rosh seems to assume that the concept of tu'mah that has been batul being metamei by carrying to be d'oraysa, whereas Tosasfos concludes that it is likely only m'drabonon.

Bechoros 22a - Shiur for Opening of Uterus

The gemara quotes the Mishna in Ohalos (7,4) which says that the shiur for pesichas ha'kever is עד שיעגילו ראש כפיקה. The gemara explains that it is the size of a פיקה של צמר which is used for the שתי stitch. The context of the mishna is to know at which point the cervix is considered open enough so that the dead fetus inside can no longer be considered טומאה בלועה and will be me'tamei the vessels that are in the same room as her. It is unclear if this is also the shiur for פתיחת הקבר in the context of the statement in nidah - אין פתיחת הקבר בלא דם. The Nodeh B'Yehuda cited by the Pischei Teshuva (Y.D. 194,4) says that even forcing the cervix open from the outside would qualify as an opening of the cervix and we would have to be concerned that some blood was let out of the cervix. R. Moshe (Igros Moshe Y.D. 1, 83) says that although the binas adam and chasam sofer disagree with the nodeh b'yehuda, they only disagree when one would use a finger to open the cervix because they assume that a finger wouldn't reach through the cervix. However, even they would agree with the Nodeh B'yehuda that if a tool or instrument is used to enter the cervix, it could qualify as an opening of the cervix where we would say אין פתיחת הקבר בלא דם. R. Moshe (Igros Moshe Y.D. 1, 89) says that although the Nodeh B'yehuda says that only something with a very small diameter such as a pieces of straw wouldn't be considered an opening of the cervix, implying that if it were slightly larger it would be considered an opening of the cervix rendering her a nidah. R. Moshe disagrees because the only shiur that we find in chazal for the opening of the cervix is the shiur of כפיקה של צמר, which they also term as a פתיחת הקבר, therefore it is logical that this would be the shiur also in the context of אין פתיחת הקבר בלא דם. Although it is difficult to know exactly the size of the פיקה של צמר that is used for the שתי stitch, R. Moshe assumes that it must be smaller than the diameter of a small finger. Being that the Rambam paskens that it is possible to have an opening of the cervix without any bleeding, and it is possible that an externally forced opening wouldn't qualify as a פתיחת הקבר, R. Moshe is confident in being lenient with any instrument where the diameter is less than the size of an average persons pinky finger.

Sunday, December 04, 2011

Bechoros 21b - What Can You Assume When Buying an Animal from a Jew?

The gemara has three opinions when one purchases an animal from a Jew and wasn't told whether or not it had already given birth to a Bechor. Rav says that the assumption is that the first born will be a bechor because if the it had already given birth the Jew would have mentioned it to praise his the item he is selling. Shmuel says that it is a safeik since the seller may have assumed that the buyer wanted it to shecht so it wasn't relevant whether or not it had already given birth. R. Yochanan says that the buyer can assume that it is not a bechor because there is an obligation on the seller to notify the buyer if the first born would be a bechor otherwise he would be in violation of lifeni iever (tosafos).
There is a machlokes Rashi, Tosafos and Rabbeinu Gershom within the opinion of Rav as to what the advantage would be in telling the buyer that it had already given birth. Rashi says that it would have more value since the animal born from here on wouldn't have to be given to the kohein. Rabbeinu Gershom says the advantage would be that it is an animal capable of providing offspring. Tosafos (quoting rashi) says that the advantage would be that the animal has proven it is capable of surviving child birth and therefore more valuable. The Maharit Algazi asks although when the seller doesn't say anything we don't have to be concerned that it actually gave birth to a viable child, but why are we not concerned that it miscarried (ti'nuf) which would also exempt the next born from being a bechor? He explains that according to the rationale of Rashi and Rabbeinu Gershom, the logic would apply to ti'nuf as well. According to rashi since ti'nuf exempts from having to give the next born to the kohein, the seller would notify about tinuf as well. According to Rabbeinu Gershom, perhaps even ti'nuf would be an advantage in showing that it is capable of conceiving (although wasn't able to produce a viable offspring). But, according to Tosafos where the advantage is that the animal is capable of surviving childbirth, this wouldn't apply to ti'nuf. According to Tosafos the seller would have no reason to tell the buyer about the ti'nuf so we should be concerned that it was me'taneif and the next born may not be a bechor? Perhaps this is why Tosafos offers an alternate approach.
************************
Tosafos writes that only a Jew would be believed about the advantage of having already survived a childbirth and therefore being more valuable but a goy wouldn't be believed about this. Tosafos proves from here that even if a goy is מסיח לפי תומו, talking without trying to make a halachic statement, he isn't believed since we assume he is lying to make the item seem more valuable. The Maharit Algazi asks that this implies that if the goy was truly מסיח לפי תומו and not trying to make his item seem more valuable he would be believed even for bechor. But, the gemara says in yevamos that a goy is never believed מסיח לפי תומו on an issur d'oraysa, he is only believed when he is מסיח לפי תומו on an issur d'rabonon, but this is an issur d'oraysa? From this the Maharit Algazi concludes that the Rov of most animals having already given birth after reaching the ages listed earlier in the perek, is a valid rov on a d'oraysa level, just m'drabonon not a good rov since it is dependent on an action (gemara 20a). Since m'doraysa we have a rov that the next born is not a bechor, and it is only d'rabonon that we can't rely on the rov, we can believe a goy if he is truly מסיח לפי תומו without any motive to glorify his item.

Friday, December 02, 2011

Bechoros 19b - Following the Majority

The gemara suggests that perhaps the halacha of following rov only applies to רובא דאיתא קמן, a rov that is in front of us such as the majority of the sanhedrin voting on an issue, or 9 kosher stores and one non-kosher. But a רובא דליתיה קמן may not command the same status and we wouldn't follow it. The gemara rejects this from the fact that we follow the majority in assuming that most children will not turn out to be a s'ris or ay'lonis, even though that is dependent on a statistic of רוב קטנים לאו סריסים ורוב קטנות לאו איילונית נינהו, which is a רובא דליתיה קמן. However, why do we consider the rov by ketanim to be a רובא דליתיה קמן - just as we consider the 9 stores to be a רובא דאיתיה קמן, we should consider the rov of ketanim to be רובא דאיתיה קמן since most ketanim that are alive in the world today aren't s'risim or ay'lonis? Rabbeinu Gershom seems to address this question and writes- דלא חזינא רובא דעלמא אי הוי סריסים אי איילונית אי לא ואפ"ה אזלי בתר רובא. Even though we have a statistic telling us something that exists right now, since the numbers aren't obvious and can't be counted in front of us, it would qualify as a רובא דליתיה קמן. Similarly, the fact that most cows aren't treifos is a רובא דליתיה קמן because the statistic will not create a רובא דאיתיה קמן since they cannot be counted in front of us.
On another note, the gemara says that we don't follow a rov that is dependent on an action such as the fact that most animals would be pregnant by a certain age, which is dependent on the action of mating with a male. The rationale for not following this rov, the Ramban (Halachos of Bechoros) writes that a mi'ut which happens by itself is stronger than a rov that is dependent on an action. Rashba in Chulin 9a says that this limitation is only d'rabonon. Meaning, m'doraysa we follow rov even if dependent on an action but the Rabbonon tell us not to. Therefore, the Chazon Ish writes that we can only be machmir to not follow a rov dependent on an action, but we cannot be lenient to do so. The Binas Adam (sha'ar rov v'chazaka) proves that the Rashba is correct that it is only d'rabonon based on Tosafos ד"ה אי בעית אימא who says that R. Meir who is concerned for the mi'ut is only d'rabonon. Since the first answer of Rava that the concern of the mishna that the animal born now is a bechor is only m'drabonon, the answer of Ravina about not relying on rov which is dependent on an action is also only d'rabonon. However, this proof isn't very solid because when there is a chazaka that supports the mi'ut even R. Meir would agree that we are concerned for the mi'ut even m'doraysa and here there is a chazaka that supports the mi'ut (as tosafos explains in d.h. me'chvarta). The issue of whether R. Meir is concerned for a mi'ut only m'drabonon or even m'doraysa (when there is no chazaka), is a dispute between tosafos and mordechai (mentioned in this blog on the first perek of chulin).

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Bechoros 9b - Spending Money for Safeik Mitzva

The Mishna says that if one has a safeik whether they have a peter chamor, they must redeem it with a sheep but don't need to give it to the kohein  since the rule for giving is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה - the burden of proof is on the collector. The gemara says that this follows the opinion of R. Yehuda who says that a peter chamor is forbidden to derive benefit from, therefore one must redeem it even though it won't be given, but according to R. Shimon who says that it is permitted, there isn't even a mitzvah to redeem it. 
Tosafos raises an interesting question - A peter chamor without redemption requires it's neck to be broken. Since the mitzvah to break it's neck (arifa) is like any mitzvah where we are strict when there is a doubt, even if it weren't assur b'hanah, there should be a requirement to break it's neck. Tosafos answer cryptically and says that just as one doesn't need to give it to the kohein, there is also no requirement to do the arifa out of safeik. It isn't clear what Tosafos means to say - the concept of המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה exempts the giving to the kohein but doesn't exempt the breaking of it's neck? 
The Maharit Algazi suggests that since we have a concept of המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה and apply it even to mitzvos that one is obligated to do by the torah such as all safeik of gifts to the kohein, we can similarly apply this concept to any mitzvah where it is questionable if one needs to fulfill it and the fulfilling of it would entail a loss of money. Since the arifa of the peter chamor would be a loss of money, one isn't required to incur the loss for a safeik mitzvah.
This approach is very difficult to accept. It should follow that if one is in doubt whether they are obligated in matzah on pesach or whether they have already fulfilled their mitzvah, they shouldn't be required to incur any expense to fulfill the mitzvah. Had this been true, it should have been mentioned in earlier poskim. Rather, we generally assume that this rule is limited to mitzvos that require giving, but doesn't apply to expenses that need to be incurred to fulfill mitzvos between man and G-d. Therefore, this concept shouldn't apply to the mitzvah of arifa (breaking the donkeys neck).
The Rashash explains that Tosafos doesn't mean to fully equate the mitzvah of breaking the neck with the giving to the kohein, since the concept of המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה wouldn't apply to the mitzvah of arifa. Rather, Tosafos holds that the arifa is the consequence when one doesn't fulfill the mitzvah to give the sheep to the kohein as redemption of the newborn donkey which is incumbent upon him. When there is no requirement to give a sheep to the kohein, the mitzvah of arifa would also not apply.

Friday, November 18, 2011

Bechoros 6b - Heter to Drink Kosher Milk

The gemara says that the fact that milk of a kosher animal is permitted to drink is a chiddush because one could have argued that it would be included in either the prohibition against blood (דם נעכר ונעשה חלב), or the prohibition against אבר מן החי since it is part of a live animal. The gemara cites three possible pesukim as the source of the fact that milk is kosher (either the pasuk when Dovid brought milk to the troops, or the pasuk that praises the land of Israel for it's milk which indicates that it is permitted to drink, or a pasuk in Yeshaya).
The Shita Mikubetzes asks, why not use the pasuk by Avrohom when he fed the angels butter and milk. Being that Avrohom kept the entire Torah, the fact that he was willing to give milk to the angels indicates that it is permitted to drink? The R"I answers that Avrohom thought that they were bnei noach. Even if milk were forbidden to Jews, it wouldn't be one of the 7 Noachide laws and permissible for them to drink it. The Shita then cites a Yerushalmi (which is not in the Yerushalmi but in the pesikta and quoted by the da'as zekeinim on parshas vayera) that indicates they ate meat and milk (unlike the gemara in baba meztia which implies that didn't actually eat, and also says that it was served one by one i.e. milk before meat) . When it came time to give the Torah and the mal'achim were complaining they wanted to keep it, Hashem said that every child knows that meat and milk can't be eaten together, yet they ate meat and milk when they visited Avrohom. It isn't clear how this midrash connects to the discussion of the Shita Mikubetzes. Perhaps the Shita is trying to prove that Avrohom thought they were bnei noach from the fact that he fed them meat and milk, so there wouldn't be any proof from there about milk being permitted to drink.
The Maharit Algazi asks that according to the rationale that milk would be assur as אבר מן החי, it would surely apply to non-jews as well. The answer of the Shita that Avrohom assumed they were bnei noach doesn't work if the issur on milk would be an offshoot of אבר מן החי? The Chasam Sofer (y.d. 70) answers that the gemara never really suggested that milk would actually be אבר מן החי or בשר מן החי because it is neither an ei'ver or ba'ssar. Rather the gemara was suggesting that it should be LIKE אבר מן החי in the sense that it would be assur (not not for goyim), based on concept of הטמאים - לאסור צירן ורוטבן וקיפה שלהן. Meaning, since אבר מן החי is assur and the animal is assur when it is alive, so anything that comes from it when it is alive should be included in the prohibition of הטמאים. This prohibition would certainly apply to Jews only, therefore Avrohom would have had no problem giving milk to b'nei noach.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Bechoros 5b - Categorizing Animals Based on Features or Genetics

The Mishna discusses a case where a mother cow gives birth to a child that looks like a donkey. The gemara learns from the pasuk of פטר חמור that the child would not have Kedushas Bechor. It is clear from the gemara that we completely exempt it from any kedusha of bechor, but it isn't clear from the gemara which type of kedusha it would have if not for the pasuk excluding it. Meaning, do we regard it as a cow since genetically it is a cow, just that it looks like a donkey, or do we regard it as a donkey since it looks like a donkey?
It would seem that the answer lies in the end of the Mishna which cites a rule that היוצא מן הטמא טמא והיוצא מן הטהור טהור. The mishna seems to indicate that the genetic makeup of an animal determines the species to which it belongs, therefore an animal born from a kosher animal (even if it looks like a donkey) is kosher. Similarly, an animal born from a non-kosher animal (even if it looks like a cow) is not a kosher animal. If genetics determines the category, we would have to say that a cow that gives birth to a donkey would have been treated like a בהמה טהורה and been brought as a korban on the mizbei'ach, if not for the pasuk excluding it.
However, the implication of the mishna which uses a pasuk of פטר חמור to exclude this case, implies that we really need the pasuk to exclude it from the requirement of פטר חמור, not from kedushas mizbei'ach (although the gemara confirms that it would certainly be excluded from kedushas mizbei'ach as well). The Steipler (4) proves from Tosafos that this is true. Tosafos suggests that for a cow that gives birth to a donkey the pasuk of the mishna (פטר חמור) would be necessary to exclude if from the mitzvah of redemption like a donkey, and the pasuk in the gemara would be necessary to exclude the reverse (a donkey giving birth to a cow) from kedushas mizbei'ach. Although Tosafos concludes that either pasuk would exclude it completely, their logical default for not having a pasuk would be that the animal should be treated as it looks, not as the species of it's mother. Meaning, a cow that gives birth to a donkey would have been treated like a donkey to require redemption despite that it's genetic makeup is that of a cow. The Steipler proves from here that the species of any animal is determined by it's appearance, not by it's genetics. Nevertheless, there is a separate rule that if it looks like a kosher animal but is born from a donkey, it cannot be eaten - היוצא מן הטמא טמא, not because it's a donkey, but because it is a non-kosher cow. Similarly, if it looks like a donkey it is a donkey, yet if born from a cow it can be eaten because היוצא מן הטהור טהור. This approach of categorizing a donkey born from a cow as a "kosher donkey" is significant because for purposes other than eating i.e. eiver min ha'chai it would have status of what it looks like, not what it is genetically.
The gemara 6a seems to strongly support the approach of the steipler that the species is determined by it's appearance rather than it's genetics. According to the rule that having similarities to it's mother can make it have kedusha of bechor, the gemara questions whether a donkey that has similarities to it's mother which is a cow, would have kedusha. The gemara's suggestion of why it is too different from the mother and wouldn't have kedusha is - הא טמאה והא טהורה, הא קדושת הגוף והא קדושת דמים. The gemara describes it as a non-kosher animal and as the value having kedusha rather than inherent kedusha. Clearly, the gemara is understanding that since it looks like a donkey, if it were to have kedusha (because it has similarities to the mother), it would have קדושת דמים like any donkey, not קדושת הגוף like it's mother.

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Bechoros 3b - Avoiding Kedushas Bechor

The gemara discusses exactly how much of an animal must be given over to a goy in order to avoid kedushas bechor. The predominant opinion seems to be like R. Huna that the ear is enough, since we find that Rami Bar Rachel did that as well. Tosafos entertains the possibility that we would pasken that one would have to give over to the goy a portion in the animal that if missing would render the animal a neveila or treifa (rav chisda and rava), but considers it to be a chumra. Regarding the fact that one is removing kedusha from animal entirely by selling a portion to a goy, Tosafos suggests that it would only be an issue if one were to sell a portion of the fetus which itself would have otherwise had kedusha, but would not be an issue when selling a portion of the mother. Even though this may not be ideal, Tosafos considers it the proper thing to do nowadays since there is no better alternative and if this isn't done someone will surely violate a more severe prohibition with the animal.
The Turei Even (Rosh HaShana 13) suggests that being mafkir the animal would NOT be sufficient to remove the kedusha of bechor from the fact that Rami Bar Rachel who was looking for the simplest option, didn't use the method of hefker. The Chasam Sofer (Y.D. 316) dismisses the proof since it could be that a proper hefker in the presence of others could have been more complicated and difficult than simply selling the ear to a goy. The Maharit Algazi suggests a complicated approach. Hefker wouldn't work to remove the obligation of bechor on an animal that already has kedushas bechor. However, if one were to be mafkir the fetus prior to it's birth, since at the time when it would be fit to receive kedushas bechor it doesn't have an owner, it wouldn't get kedushas bechor. He then backs off based on a gemara in Chulin and says that even if born as hefker, as soon as a Jew would take possession of it, it would assume kedushas bechor.

Monday, November 14, 2011

Chulin 141b - Punishing for Shiluach Hakein

The gemara says that R. Yehuda gave malkus to someone who clipped the wings of a bird and then sent it away on its feet to fulfill the mitzvah of shiluach hakein because he holds that it must be sent away by flying, not by hopping. The Mishneh L'melech (hil. avadim 18) asks how he was able to punish for this mitzvah. We have a rule - כל מצות עשה שמתן שכרה בצדה אין ב"ד של מטה מוזהרין עליו, meaning that Beis Din doesn't punish for any mitzvah that has a reward tagged onto it. How was R. Yehuda able to punish for shiulach hakein which has the reward of long life attached to it? 
The Maharatz Chiyus suggests based on Rashi (?) that the reason that beis din doesn't punish when there is a reward attached is because by writing the reward the torah is hinting that the this is the reward for doing it and not receiving this reward is the punishment for not doing it, to the exclusion of any other punishment. The Maharatz Chiyus explains that this rule works by other mitzvos, but by shiluach hakein the mishna 142a says that the reward needs to be written to teach that there is tremendous reward even for small mitzvos such as this for which there is very little expense. From here we derive that for all mitzvos there is great reward, making it unnecessary to dictate the specific reward if not for the purpose of exempting you from any other punishment. Therefore, shiulach hakein is an exception to the rule since it serves as the source for teaching that there is great reward for even seemingly simple mitzvos, and is not meant to exclude any other punishment.
It seems to me that Rashi himself is coming to answer the question as to how R. Yehuda was able to punish for a mitzvah that the torah writes the מתן שכרה בצדה. Rashi says that the purpose of his "punishment" wasn't punitive, rather it was רידוי בתוכחה שלא ירגיל בזה, ואין לה קצבה אלא עד שיקבל עליו. Meaning, the purpose was not to punish, rather to change the person and motivate him to fulfill the mitzvah. Although Beis Din may not "punish" or "penalize" for mitzvos on which a reward is tagged on, they may still have the ability to encourage and motivate one to fulfill the mitzvah even through force.

Friday, November 11, 2011

Chulin 139b - Searching after mitzvos

The gemara says that one may have thought that they would be required to search after the mitzvah of shi'luach ha'kein and put in effort to find a birds nest on mountains and hilltops, to which the gemara responds that it only applies when you chance upon it. There is a great debate among the achronim regarding the mitzvah of shiluach ha'kein, whether it is an absolute obligation to send away the mother bird even if one has no particular interest in the baby birds, or is it a mitzvah more similar to divorce where if one wants to do something i.e. take the babies, or divorce their wife, the torah prescribes a format that must be followed. The Chacham Tzvi (83) and Chasam Sofer (100) suggest from this gemara that thought to demand searching after the mitzvah on mountain tops, that it is an absolute obligation. Although the gemara concludes that one isn't obligated to go to the extreme of trying to locate a birds nest, the underlying assumption that it is an absolute imperative even if one has no interest in the babies is never rejected.
On a bit of a different note using the same source, the Mekor Chaim (Nesivos on Hil. Pesach Siman 432) which I cited in my sefer Nasiach B'chukecha (195) proves from our gemara that one is required to invest effort into searching after mitzvos from the fact that the gemara required a specific pasuk to exempt the assumption of searching after the mitzvah on hilltops. Therefore, other mitzvos that don't have a pasuk exempting this level of effort, would demand that extreme amount of effort. However, in my edits on my sefer I pointed out that from Rashi we would be able to prove the exact opposite. Rashi writes - 
שנאמר שלח תשלח ב' פעמים, שומע אני לחזור אחר המצוה הזאת עד שתבא לידו. Rashi explains that the default position for having to put tremendous effort into searching after this mitzvah is not a gobal requirement or assumption that would be by all mitzvos. Rashi says that since we have the double language of שלח תשלח I would have understood that this mitzvah would require one to search after it in order to fulfill it, to which the gemara responds that כי יקרא implies the opposite. Therefore, other mitzvos which have no pasuk specifically implying that it demands an extreme level of effort, one would not have to put in tremendous effort to attain the mitzvah.

Monday, November 07, 2011

Chulin 135a - Reishis Ha'Geiz and Matnos Kehuna Nowadays

According to the Mishnayos both the mitzvah of ראשית הגז  and the mitzvah of מתנות כהונה apply without a Beis HaMikdash and even outside of Eretz Yisroel. However, Rav Nachman 136b made a statement that the minhag is to follow רב אלעאי by ראשית הגז and that it should only apply in E.Y. Rashi comments - והוא הדין במתנות, meaning that there is no rationale to differentiate between ראשית הגז  and the matanos of זרוע לחיים וקיבה. Since the minhag has become to follow רב אלעאי by ראשית הגז, we also follow him for matanos kehuna that they don't apply outside of E.Y. The Shulchan Aruch both in the halachos of Matanos Kehuna (y.d. 61:21) writes that they apply even outside of E.Y. and then cites a יש מי שאומר שאינן נוהגות בחוצה לארץ. The Shulchan Aruch in the context of matanos kehuna writes וכן נהגו on the lenient opinion even though the main opinion seems to obligate matanos even outside of E.Y. Interestingly, the Shulchan Aruch in the context of reishis ha'geiz doesn't even quotes the stricter opinion - he writes that it only applies in E.Y. to which the Rama adds that some says it applies even on a Torah level in chutz la'aretz but we aren't noheig to be machmir. The Shulchan Aruch is more confident about exempting from reishis ha'geiz in chutz la'aretz since that is explicit in Rav Nachman's statement. Although there is no rationale to differentiate between reishis ha'geiz and matanos, the gr"a (61:20) explains that the leniency is based on a minhag which may have only been to be lenient about reishis ha'geiz and not about matanos kehuna. The Beis Hillel (333) struggles with trying to understand why we are even lenient in E.Y. nowadays. Although the Pischei Teshuva (61:8) cites the chasam sofer who would routinely shecht an animal before yom tov and fulfill the mitzvah of matanos kehuna and reishis ha'geiz, the minhag is not to be makpid about fulfilling these mitzvos. The Beis Ephraim (on shulchan aruch 61) quotes the kerisi u'pleisi who wonders why we don't find people going out of their way to fulfill this mitzvah. He quotes the Pri Chadash who argues on the Beis Hillel's (who wrote that he was told that even in E.Y. people don't fulfill the mitzvah of matanos kehuna), and says that they didn't realize what they saw because it is מעשים בכל יום that matnos kehuna are given in E.Y. from the animals that are being shechted. The Beis Ephraim also quotes that the kreisi writes that his son in law insisted on giving matanos kehuna at the pidyon ha'ben of his son. Since he was being machzik the kohein as a kohein for the purpose of discharging his pidyon ha'ben obligation, he certainly can rely on his yichus to give him matnos kehuna.