Moed Kattan 12b - Adam Chashuv

The gemara uses the concept of adam chashuv a few times to say that even something which is mutar m'ikar hadin, should not be done by an adam chashuv. It is not clear if the reason is b'geder "ba'al nefesh yachmir" or if the reason is that even though it is totally mutar, people will be midameh it to something assur and come to be matir an issur. Rashi in Shabbos 51 explains that an adam chashuv should be more machmir bec. someone will see that he is lenient and come to be more lenient.
The sho'el in Igros Moshe O.C. 1:96 challenged R' Moshe about riding in a car to the Yeshiva after candle lighting bec. it was mar'as ayin. R' Moshe responds by explaining that mar'as ayin is when you do something that is mutar that people will confuse with something that is actually assur, but here the people are making a mistake in thinking that it is assur when it is mutar. That is called "am ha'ratzus" not "mar'as ayin" (That phrase is my own, not R' Moshe's!). Perhaps our gemara is a source that the sho'el is correct, in that an adam chashuv should not do something that is mutar if people will think that it is assur. Perhaps this is why R' Moshe refrained from driving to the Yeshiva from then on (as he writes about himself) and just argues the point that it is not an actual issur of ma'aris ayin. Also, if one reads the Teshuva carefully it seems that he rejects the notion that a few people who see would make a mistake and think that it is assur, would make it assur, since it is known to almost everyone that it is mutar. But in a case where many people may think that it is assur, even though it is mutar, an adam chashuv should refrain from doing it.

Moed Kattan 11b - Chol Hamoed vs. Aveilus

The gemara seems to assume that chol hamoed is an issur melacha d'oraysa as rashi implies (although tosafos chagiga 18a and the rosh at the beginning of the meseches learns the gemara to be lav davka) and aveilus is only d'rabonon (or at least melacha during aveilus is only d'rabonon as tosafos points out 14b). The machlokes in the gemara seems to be that R' Ashi holds that it is more mistaver to be machmir by chol hamoed which is d'oraysa (since we are meikil on chol hamoed certainly we are meikil for aveilus) than aveilus d'rabonon. R Shisha seems to hold that it is more mistaver to be machmir by aveilus which is d'rabonon than chol hamoed which is d'oraysa. This seems a bit strange. Are they arguing in general whether we are concerned to be mechazek drabonon's more than Torah laws?

Moed Kattan 10b - What is a Davar Ha'aveid?

The Rosh writes that although an opportunity to sell merchandise on chol hamoed for a high profit and after yom tov the profit will be minimal, is not considered davar ha'aveid. We see from the yerushalmi that a merchant who has an opportunity to buy merchandise on chol hamoed for a cheap price, and the opportunity will be lost after yom tov, [and certainly the opportunity to sell on chol hamoed for a high price which will be lost after yom tov] is considered davar ha'aveid and it is mutar. The language of the Rosh is "Loosing an opportunity to profit is considered a loss since it is not common". Shulchan Aruch paskens like this Rosh 639:5. The question is, why is this considered "davar ha'aveid"? Isn't davar ha'aveid only a loss of principal that you already have in your hands i.e. produce rotting?

I thought that perhaps we are speaking about the capital that one has invested in their business and is designated for buying and selling. That cash is not considered cash since its whole purpose it to invest in merchandise. The cash is considered a commodity like the merchandise who's value is determined by the amount of goods that it can be traded for. Therefore, just as one can offload merchandise on chol hamoed if it will loose its value by the time yom tov is over, one can also offload their "cash goods" on chol hamoed since it will loose its value in relation to the amount of merchandise that can be purchased with it by the time yom tov is over. Based on this, the heter of the Rosh would only apply to capital invested in the business, but would not necessarily allow for new cash to be invested in the merchandise.

But, someone in my shiur [Stan Sussman] pointed out that the simple understanding is that a lost opportunity to profit is deemed by halacha as a loss bec. the nature of business is to survive and prosper by taking advantage of these opportunities.

Moed Kattan 9b - Torah vs. Mitzvah

The gemara makes a distinction between mitzvos that can be done by others for which one does not stop their learning and mitzvos that cannot be done by anyone else for which one must stop learning. We find a similar distinction made if one is conflicted with a mitzvah vs. kibud av; the shulchan aruch 240:12 says that if the mitzvah can be done by others one should choose kibud av, but if it can't be done by others one should forfeit kibud av and do the mitzvah. Normally when conflicted with 2 mitzvos to do, one should weigh and choose the "greater" mitzvah, but Torah is an exception that even though it is greater you stop learning to do the mitzvah that cannot be done by others (there is not even a p'tur of osek b'mitzvah). The halacha indicates that kibud av is like Talmud Torah in that you don't choose the greater mitzvah, rather you do the mitzvah that cannot be done by others. The question is, if we consider Talmud Torah and Kibud Av to be the greatest mitzvos which is why they override any mitzvah that can be done by others, why do we forfeit them for "smaller" mitzvos that can't be done by others. Why is it that kibud av is different than other mitzvos?

It seems the source is the gemara in megillah at the end of the 1st perek that Gadol Talmud Torah than kibud av. We learn from this that if one has to forfeit Talmud Torah for a mitzvah, then certainly one must forfeit kibud av for a mitzvah, bec. Talmud Torah is greater.

Just as by Torah one is required to stop learning and do the mitzvah, bec. the advantage of learning is only 'al m'nas la'asos', but at the expense of a mitzvah the learning is not considered to be a significant. The same holds true with kibud av, since the concept is bases on the "3 parteners in man" idea, one cannot forfeit their responsibility for avihem shebashamaim to fulfill kibud av.

Moed Kattan 8b - Ein Mearvin

R' Nota Greenblatt was in Palo Alto and we were busy doing gittin all day, so i didn't have time to post.

Quick point: Re: The source for not making wedding on chol hamoed, what is the difference whether it is bec. of ein mearvin simcha b'simcha or bec. of v'samchata b'chagecha and not your wife? It may be true that ein mearvin is more general in that it applies to other situations and also other forms of mitzvah conflicts like bris and pidyon as tosafos points out. The question is doesn't the other opinion also agree in concept to ein mearvin, why would they need a special pasuk to exclude ishticha (your wife)?

Moed Kattan 7b - Pushing off Mitzvos

I once saw a fabulous ma'areh makom on this gemara quoted by R' Schachter (from YU).

The gemara implies that we need a special pasuk to give the kohen a heter not to see negaim on yom tov and during the sheva brachos. The Chazon Ish (Negaim 13:17 - last one in Negaim) discusses whether one is allowed to push off a positive mitzvah that does not have any time limit and do it later. Is the pushing off the mitzvah tantamount to being mevatel the mitzvah? The Chazon Ish explains that the gemara implies we need a special pasuk to give a heter to the kohain to push off seeing the negah (acc. to one opinion we even need a special pasuk for a heter to push it off for a d'var mitzvah), which indicates that without a pasuk the torah recognizes this procrastination (acc. to one opinion even if it is for a mitzvah) to be a violation of the mitzvas aseh. The Chazon Ish then pushes this off by saying maybe Negaim are more chamur or maybe there is just a ma'alah of zrizin to do it immediately and we need a pasuk to teach that in this case one should wait and there is no advantage of zrizin. He brings a proof from moshe Rabbeinu who settled into the hotel before doing milah to his son and was punished bec. it was inappropriate for moshe to do that, but clearly moshe would not have done an issur. It must be that delaying a mitzvah does not constitue a violation of the mitzvah in any way.

Moed Kattan 5b - Minhag to Wash Meisim - Rashi

Rashi writes about the sadeh bochim, that it was a place where the niftar was transfered from one group to another and "they would bathe him there". As far as I know, this is one of the earlier sources for the minhag of the chevra kadisha to wash the meisim. The Rambam also mentions this (Avel 4:1) and it is recorded in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch 352:4. The Kol Bo brought in Beis Yosef explains that the purpose is to wash him so that he doesn't smell so that the people carrying him won't be disgusted by the smell. However, the Darkei Moshe (also in Rama) quote the Binyomin Z'ev who adds that we are meticulous to wash between the hands, feet, ears, and even comb his hair.... "so that he comes b'tahara to his resting place like one is accustomed to doing every shabbos before going to shul".

It seems that the source for washing found in Rashi and the Rambam was for practical purposes of the living, but our minhag is more mystical to prepare the meis for where he is going.

Moed Kattan 5a - Tziyun Kevaros

Rashi explains that the purpose of grave marking is to prevent terumah eaters from becoming tomei and then eating teruma b'tumah without realizing. It seems that Rashi prefers this concern rather than the issur of being metamei l'mais bec. it includes not only kohanim but even their wives and daughters. But why does rashi in d.h. metzaynin and d.h. asu mishmeres, say that the concern is for terumah eaters, but in d.h. lifnei, rashi says the concern is for terumah and taharos carriers?

Based on the gemara in avodah zarah 14a says that we are only concerned for lifnei iver, but we are not concerned with lifne d'lifnei. Meaning that if it is more that one step removed, it is not a violation of lifnei iver. Therefore, Rashi explains that the main concern is terumah eaters who would eat terumah temeiah, but by the esmachta of lifnei iver teruma eaters would not be a problem bec. it is an indirect michshol - meaning, by not marking the grave they will be tomei and then go home to eat terumah. Instead Rashi explains that there is a concern of a direct michshol that someone will be carrying terumah/taharos and it will become tomei when it is passed over the kever.

General Question: Going to Work on Chol Hamoed

I was asked recently whether someone who works for a large tech company and is entitled to a week vacation must take the vacation during chol hamoed. He prefers to take vacation in the summer when he can actually have a vacation, but then if he takes of chol hamoed they will deduct money from his salary. I don't have an answer, but it seems the question can be broken down into 3 issues:

1. Although in a case where missing work one will not receive their hourly wages, that is not davar ha'aveid (rather missing out on gains). But, perhaps deducting money from a salary that he is entitled to for the work that he will put in this year is considered money already in his hand and qualifies as a davar ha'aveid?

2. Even if loosing salary is davar ha'aveid, since there are still vacation days that he is entitled to they must be taken during chol hamoed. Or perhaps if this person needs a "real" vacation for his emotional well being, that itself is like a davar ha'aveid and therefore he may be entitled to his vacation in which case the extra time off from work which will cause a reduction in his salary is considered davar ha'aveid?

3. Perhaps davar ha'aveid is only necessary for real work such as field work and sechorah, but this person will be sitting in front of a computer and typing (not even writing) which would not be a violation of chol hamoed, so even without davar ha'aveid it should be mutar?

ANY THOUGHTS?

Moed Kattan 4b - Digging an Amah on Moed

The Chachamim in the mishnah allow digging an amah on shevi'is. They reject both the sevara of nira'ah k'oder and the sevara of machshir agfei l'zriah. Tosafos seems to imply that the sevara of looking like oder which is R' Elazar d'rabonon concern, the Rabonon simply don't hold of. The same would be true if machshir agfei l'zriah would just be that it looks like plowing, the Rabonon can easily not hold of it. But, if the concern of machshir agfei l'zriah is that it is an actual melacha of plowing that is done through a pesik reisha, the rabonon have to hold that it is mutar bec. of a shinuy. Since the melacha of plowing is done with a shinuy, it is not a melacha, and mutar.

Although the Rabonon hold that the fact that it is a shinuy removes the prohibition of plowing during shevi'is, on chol hamoed one cannot build a new amah. Shinuy helps by shabbos or shevi'is to remove an issur melacha, but chol hamoed which is an issur tircha as the gemara points out, the fact that the melacha is done through a shinuy doesn't matter, it is still assur.

It is important to note that even in the context of chol hamoed we find that chazal also said that melachas u'man such as writing is assur. This is clearly an issur melacha and therefore shinuy would help.

תוספת שביעית

בדין תוספת שביעית ל' יום יש לחקור האם יש דין כעין תוספת שבת, דל' יום לפני שביעית נחשבים ממש לשביעית, או שדין תוספת שביעית הוא שאסור לעבוד בל' יום אלו- דבר שיועיל לשביעית עצמה. והנפ"מ לחרישת נטיעות ילדות דמועיל לעכשיו שלא יתקלקלו. ונמצא מדין שמותר לחרוש עשר נטיעות מוכח דכל הדין של תו"ש הוא לא לעשות עבודה שתהני לשביעית. וכך ביאר ב"הערות" דלכן אף לר"ע שלומד תו"ש מקראי ס"ל דעשר נטיעות מותר -כדמוכח במשניות שמודה בזה- אף שאין לו הל"מ
.
רק דצ"ב לפ"ז מה התוספת שהוסיפו ב"ש וב"ה, דאם רק ל' יום מועיל לשביעית מהו השיעור של פסח ועצרת. והנראה שדין ל' יום הוא דין שבזמן זה מהני לעצם הקרקע דהיינו דהחרישה ל' יום לפני שביעית תשביח את הקרקע לשביעית ושיעור פסח ועצרת זה לתבואה ולאילן. אך א"כ לכאורה הדרא קושיא לדוכתא דמהו מקור ההיתר לר"ע לחרוש עשר נטיעות אי מועיל לקרקע עצמה של שביעית. ואולי כיוון שהחרישה מועילה לאילנות כעת זה מפקיע מהטפל שמחזק הקרקע וצ"ע
any thaughts?

Moed Kattan 3a - Toldos by Shevi'is

The gemara seems to indicate that to be considered an av it must be written in the Torah by shevi'is, that is why plowing is considered a Tolda (even though by shabbos it is an Av). But not every melacha written by shevi'is is an Av. Regarding Zeriah/Zemirah the gemara understands that Zeriah is the Av and Zemirah the Toldah. Regarding Ketzirah/Betzirah the gemara understands that Ketzira is the Av and Betzirah is the Tolda. Rashi is very meduyak in that we determine Zeriah to be the Av because it is more basic, and by default Zemirah is the Tolda. But by Ketzirah and Betzirah, they are both exactly the same just that one is to grapes and the other to tavuah. We cannot figure out from sevara which is the av and which is the Tolda, so we look at shabbos and determine that just as by shabbos Ketzirah is the av, so too here Ketzirah is the Av.

***

In short: Zeriah and Ketzirah are Avos. Zemirah and Betzirah are Toldos that you are chayev malkus for. Charishah is according to all an issur D'oraysa (if we assume that R' Elazar is the opinion who says that you don't get malkus - see Tosafos 3b). R' Yochanan would hold that you get malkus by charishah and by all the toldos mentioned in braisa (bec. only acc. to R' Elazar we say the braisa is an Esmachta). R' Elazar holds that Charishah is d'oraysa (based on klal prat..) but no malkus (based on his explanation of R' Dimi), and all other Toldos mentioned in braisa are only D'rabonon.

Moed Kattan 2b - Weeding: Not Harvesting

Rashi explains that the machlokes regarding weeding is only whether it is planting or plowing, but it is definitely not considered harvesting since it is not being done to collect and use the grass. It would seem that this would only work if we assume that one is patur on melacha sh'ein tzricha l'gufa, but according to R' Yehuda (who the Rambam paskens like) that you are chayev for ein tzricha l'gufa, you should be chayev for 'kotzer'. However, Tosafos in Shabbos 73b d.h. vtzarich, explains that kotzer by definition must be done for the purpose of using the items that were collected. Kotzer is not just a ma'aseh melacha, and therefore does not qualify as a melacha at all unless it is done for the purpose of collecting the wood. Tosafos supports this from tearing not for the purpose of sewing and erasing not for the purpose of writing, would also be patur even according to R' Yehuda bec. the definition of tearing is to erase, and the definition of erasing is to write.

torah is a song

בסוף מגילה הגמרא אומרת דיש מעלה שהתורה היא בבחינת זמרה ושאלתי דהרי במקום אחר יש טענה על דוד שאמר זמירות היו לי חוקיך

Moed Kattan 2b - Melacha on Chol Hamoed - Deoraysa or Derabonon

There is a big machlokes rishonim whether melacha on chol hamoed would be violation of a d'oraysa or a d'rabonon. It is based on the understanding of the cryptic line in chagiga 18a - see tosafos there and rosh and the beginning of moed katan.

Today's gemara seems very meduyak like the opinion that it is d'oraysa. The gemara says why should it be mutar to water on chol hamoed and shevi'is. Chol Hamoed makes sense since "it is an isuur tircha and in a situation of loss there was no prohibition", but shivi'is is an issur melacha d'oraysa so how can chazal permit it. To this the gemara answers that on shevi'is watering is also only derabonon, either bec. shevi'is nowadays is only derabonon or bec. toldos are only derabonon. From the fact that the gemara does not say, "chol hamoed makes sense since it is only an issur derabonon and in a situation of loss there was no prohibition", implies that really chol hamoed is an issur d'oraysa. The gemara is saying that even though it is an issur d'oraysa, it is not an issur melacha rather an issur tircha. Since the nature of the issur is tircha, it is automatically relative to the level of stress necessary and the loss that would be suffered by not doing it. It is considered excessive tircha which would be assur d'oraysa only if it would be very difficult i.e. watering from well water, or it is only for extra gains but not a loss i.e. beis hashalchin. But if the tircha is not excessive and it is to prevent loss, the rabbis determined that there would not be a torah prohibition of tircha in that case.

מראה מקום

והכי אמר רב האי שמעתי מפי חכמים כי תחיית המתים עתידה להיות בניסן ונצחת גוג ומגוג בתשרי ומש"ה בניסן מפטירין העצמות היבשות ובתשרי ביום בא גוג - ע"כ לשון הטור

בדין שמואל שאי י"ד אדר נופל ביום שיש קורין זכור למחרת בט"ו כי היכי שיהיה זכירה ועשייה בהדי הדדי. מכאן מוכיח הנוב"י באו"ח קמא מ"ב שסעודת פורים ומשלוח מנות דינם בשבת ולא ביוא ראשון - לאנשי ירושלים. ושנה הבאה כך יוצא שיש פורים משולש. ובירושלמי מפורש שהסעודה ביום ראשון אך המנ"ב פוסק שיש להמיר לצאת גם בשבת וגם ביום ראשון (סעודה + משלוח מנות)

במגילה ל"א ע"ב מאד כדי לעיין בביה"ל דרשא ז

Megillah 30b - Torah Reading on Public Fasts

The gemara implies that if a Ta'anis would occur on Monday and we would be able to accommodate for reading both the parsha of the week and the reading for the Ta'anis by having the parsha of the week read by shacharis and the Ta'anis reading by mincha, we should do so. But since the Ta'anis for rain did not allow for reading by shacharis we forfeit the regular parsha of the week for the Ta'anis reading. Based on this, when one of the 4 fasts or Ta'anis esther falls on monday or thurs, why do we read vayechal both by shacharis and mincha? Shouldn't we read the regular reading by shacharis and vayechal just by mincha?

Megillah 30b - Torah Reading for Holidays

Why does the mishnah list that the reading for pesach is parshas hamoados, but on succos mention that we read the korbanos on chol hamoed? Tosafos already points out that out minhag is always to be maftir with korbanos, but the mishnah leaves them out. This seems to strengthen the question as to why we mention them on Succos.

There are 2 requirements in the krias hatorah of moadim. 1. To read inyana d'yoma based on the drasha at the end of the mishna "sheyihu korin kol echad v'echad b'zmano". 2. To read the korbanos of that day based on tosafos who quotes the gemara in yoma 31b that the reading is equivalent to sacrificing them. The mishna is only listing the readings of inyana d'yoma (#1). We see from here that the gemara considers the inyana d'yoma of pesach to read the mitzvos related to pesach i.e. matzah, chometz. But the mishnah considers the inyana d'yoma of succos to be the Parei Hachag. The korbanos that are pochsin v'holchin are an integral part of the yom as the maharsha (succah 55b) brings from the midrash to symbolize that the nations of the world will be pocheis v'holeich.

Megillah 30b - Rashi: Question From Ta'anis is Only on R' Yirmiya

The gemara asks: "On Ta'anis (that falls on monday or thurs.) why do we stop reading the parsha of the week, we can read the parsha of the week in the morning and the Ta'anis reading in the afternoon?" Rashi comments that this question is only according to R' Yirmiyah who says that we try to incorporate the parsha of the week together with the special reading on the 4 parshiyos, so we should do the same here. But acc. to R' Ami that we interupt the parsha of the week and substitute if with the 4 parshiyos, we can skip the parsha of the week here too.

Lulei divrei Rashi: I would like to suggest that this question can even be acc. to R' Ami. The reading of the parsha on shabbos is not called the inyana d'yoma, rather it is the seder haparshiyos in order to finish the entire torah in a year (that is why bnei ma'arava could institute a different system to finish in 3 years). But, once there is a parsha that is going to be read on shabbos, portions of that reading are automatically considered inyanan d'yoma on monday and thurs. [see Rashi 22b (d.h. sh'ani) that to extend the reading of monday and thurs. and read more pesukim of that parsha also qualifies as inyana d'yoma]. Therefore, even acc. to R' Ami that we push off the shabbos reading for the 4 parshiyos, that is only bec. the shabbos reading is not inyana d'yoma, but the mon./thurs. reading from the section that will be read on shabbos is considered inyana d'yoma. So even acc. to R' Ami the gemara can ask that we should incorporate both the parsha of the week and the Ta'anis reading.