Nazir 11a - Condition agains the Torah

The gemara says that if one made a nezirus on the condition that they should be permitted to drink wine it would be a condition against the torah, so the condition will be void and the statement of "i should be a nazir" is binding. Tosafos asks, why does the gemara invalidate the condition based on the concept of making a condition against the torah, the condition should be invalid for another reason, namely, if one can't make a messenger to do it he cannot make a condition on it (tosafos answers that since the korbanos can be done by others, even though other aspects of the nezirus cannot be done by other, it qualifies as able to be done by others to permit making a condition about it). R' Akiva Eiger asks why does tosafos feel that the rationale of not being able to make a messenger is a better reason to invalidate the condition than the fact that it is a neder agains the torah. The question is predicated on the assumption that Tosafos is simply asking that instead of saying the rationale of a condition against the Torah, we should say the rationale of not possible through a shaliach, and therefore asks why is one any better than the other. However, it seems to me that tosafos question is more significant. If the concept of not able to be done by a shaliach applies here to invalidate the condition then the ramifications would be more far reaching and invalidate any condition placed on nezirus. Tosafos is asking, why does the gemara only consider it to be a problem of a condition against the Torah which would be limited to the specific case addressed in the mishna; the gemara should say the problem is that it can't be done through a messenger so that one can never make a nezirus on condition.

Tosafos takes for granted that nezirus cannot be done through a shaliach. The maharatz chiyus has somewhat of a discussion about this and cites a noda b'yehuda who says simply from the fact that tenai works by neder, it must be possible through a shaliach. Perhaps Tosafos makes a distinction between neder and nezirus, and holds that you can do a neder through a shalicach like the noda b'yehuda which would answer R' Akiva Eiger second question. BUT that distinction itself would need to be explained.

Nazir 9a - Mistake and Chazara by Nezirus

This is somewhat involved so please read it slowly.

The gemara explains that if one says "i will be a nazir from figs", Beis Shamai considers his first statement of "i will be a nazir" to be an acceptance of nezirus, and his qualifying statement of "from figs" is like a charata on the first statement, which doesn't work by nezirus just as it doesn't work by hekdesh.

The Mahartz Chiyus points out that the Ramban (ma'aseh korbanos 15:1) says that just as we find in nedarim that one cannot retract from kiddushin or avoda zara even within toch kidei dibur, the same concpet would apply to hekdesh that one cannot retract even within toch kidei dibur (the source is a gemara in temura, and the question why it is not listed in nedarim is discussed by the radvaz). The rationale for this is either similar to what the Ran explains in nedarim that by things that people take very seriously and don't just blurt out, the second it leaves their lips it is as if the kidei dibur has already expired; or that we have a special din by hekdesh of k'misiraso l'hedyod that empowers the din of hekdesh to say that as soon as it leaves one's lips it is a done deal (Tosafos in Menachos 71b assumes the latter). Aside from the universally accepted concept of not allowing retraction, there is an entirely different concept that hekdesh b'taos is still hekdesh learned from temura (opinion of Beis Shamai in Nazir 31a) and therefore sheiala which works through rendering it a ta'os would also not apply to hekdesh (Baba Basra 120b). Now based on the pasuk that says "kadosh yihyeh" by nazir, we are able to technically learn both of these concepts from hekdesh.

Now, in our gemara we can view his statement of "from figs" to be either changing his mind which would not render the original statement a mistake, just a change of heart, AND we can view his statement as being a charata rendering his original statemet of "i should be a nazir", a mistake. It is for this reason that the gemara doesn't mention the issue of not allowing retraction by hekdesh/nazir, since that is not sufficient since we can still argue that it should be rendered a mistake. The gemara has to say that Beis Shamai goes lishitaso that rendering it a mistake would also not work.

This all makes sense if we understand the source of not allowing retraction to be like the Ran explains in nedarim, that as soon as hekdesh/nezirus is made, it is the equivalent of the kidei dibur expiring. This sevara would still not preclude the possibility of rendering the statement a mistake and that is why we can still have a machlokes in the mishna Nazir 30b whether rendering hekdesh a mistake would remove the hekdesh. BUT if we understand that the rationale for not allowing retraction is because 'amira l'govoah k'misiraso l'hedyot', meaning we empower hekdesh as if the transaction has been completed (as Tosafos writes in Menachos), this should also preclude the possibility of rendering it a mistake. How then can Beis Hillel hold that since hekdesh can be rendered a mistake and uprooted, sheila would work by hekdesh? Why would 'kimisiraso l'hedyot' only remove the possibility of retraction but would not ruin the possibility of making it a ta'os?

Nazir 7a - Day and NIght Together

The gemara says that when one says "i should be a nazir like the hair of my head", he is an nazir forever but takes a haircut once every 30 days. Why is this any different than one who says "i should be a nazir from here until the end of the world", we should interpret his words that every parsa or toll station is a new nezirus and also say that he takes a haircut once every 30 days (rather than saying it is one long nezirus of 500 years unless he is machzik b'derech)? Rava answers that when he accepts nezirus like the hairs of his head we assume that each hair represents another nezirus so he will have an unlimited amount of consecutive neziurs, but that is because each hair is independent. But the entire earth is one unit, therefore we view it as one long nezirus (unless he was already machzik b'derech). The gemara then asks that days are also separate units like hair, so we should say that when he accepts a long nezirus, each day is an independent acceptance just as each hair is an independent acceptance? The gemara answers: "day and night are not separated from one another", meaning they are not independent units. Tosafos seems to understand that since the days are not separated by nights, rather the day and night are considered one unit of "day", they are "touching one another" and not independent units. This explanation seems difficult because the fact that every day follows the previous one immediately should not negate the independence of each day.

The Mahartz chiyus explains that day and not being separated into different units means that there are always places on earth where it is day and other places where it is night. Day and night overlap in the sense that in half the earth it is day and the other half it is night. Therefore they are not considered independent units.

Nazir 6b - Machlokes T"K/ R"E according to R' Masna and Bar Pada

The gemara quotes 2 arguments between the tana kama and r' elazar.

1. stam nazir who becomes tamei on day 30 - t"k: starts nezirus over. r"e: has to wait 7 days to bring korbanos.

2. One who accepts a 100 day nezirus and becomes tamei on day 100 - t"k: starts over. r"e: recounts nezirus for 30 days.

In the opinion of the tana kama, R' Masna understands that we only say miktzah hayom kikulo to enable him to bring korbanos early, but if he becomes tamei before bringing korbanos we don't say miktzas kikulo, therefore he is soser the entire neziurs. Bar pada understands that it is a gezeira d'rabonon.

But in the opinion of R' Elazar, why when he becomes tamei on day 30 (1st case) is he soser only 7 days, but when he becomes tamei on day 100 (2nd case) he is soser 30 days? Tosafos explains that according to Bar pada it works out easily. When he becomes tamei on day 30, the nezirus is over after 29 days so he only has to keep 7 days to become tahor and bring korbanos, but when he becomes tamei on day 100 it is the last day of his nezirus so he should be soser all 100 days if not for the gezeiras hakasuv of reish lakish that teaches he is only soser 30 days.

R' Masna says that R' Elazar holds of miktzas hayom kikulo even for when he becomes tamei before bringing korbanos, therefore when he becomes tamei on day 30 we say miktzah hayom kikulo and his nezirus has already ended, so he only waits out 7 days (by stam nezirus we don't implement the gezeiras hakasuv of reish lakish, only where he accepted a specific number). But when he becomes tamei on day 100, we implement the gezeiras hakasuv of reish lakish that requires a new toras nezirus of 30 days.

The Orach Mishor has an interesting approach to explain R' Masna within R' Eliezer. When one accepts stam nezirus we implement miktzah hayom kikulo, because the number of days he is a nazir is determined by the torah/chazal, therefore we follow there rules which allows for miktzas hayom kikulo. But if one accepts a specific number of days for his nezirus, he means to include all those days fully and we cannot say miktzah hayom kikulo. Therefore, the case of being tamei on day 30 is where he accepted stam neziurs so we say miktzas hayom kikulo and he is now only has to wait 7 days to become clean. But when he accepted 100 day nezirus and becomes tamei on day 100, we don't say miktzah hayom kikulo, rather consider him within the nezirus where he should be soser everything, but we implement the gezeiras hakasuv of reish lakish to reduce his days to be soser only 30 days.

Nazir 5a - 40 Years from when the jews asked for a king

The Tosafos and Rosh both point out that the rebellion of Avshalom is dated in the pasuk from the time that the jews asked for a king - Why? They both explain that the rebellion of avshalom was considered a punishment for the improper behavior of the jews when they rebelled against Hashem by asking Shmuel for a king. Rashi even goes further to say that Avshalom himself realized that the jews would be vulnerable on the anniversary of the date they asked for a king, and he would be more likely to succeed (Maharsha seems to call this divrei nivius, which seems to be a rejection of rashi's approach considering this to part of Avshalom's cheshbon). It seems strange that beis dovid suffered the consequences for the sin of the entire klal yisroel asking for a king?

Nazir 4b - Nezirus Shimshon

I thank R' Menachem Spira for the reference to Igros Moshe (E.H. 1:14).

The gemara explains that according to R' shimon it is impossible to be mekabel a nezirus shimshon, because shimshon was given his status by a mal'ach and it was not a davar hanadur rather a davar ha'asur, therefore one cannot be matfis in that. The question is, what will R' Yehuda hold? How can one become a nazir shimshon and be matfis in a davar hanadur?

R' Moshe explains that just as we use the pasuk of "l'hashem" to include hatfasa in a bechor, even though it is not really davar ha'nadur, we also use the pasuk of "l'hashem" by nazir to teach that one can be matfis in shimshon even though it is a davar ha'asur (like the gemara thought when it asked the question on the tana'im by bechor). R' Moshe says that since it is a gezeiras hakasuv for nezirus shimshon that one can be matfis in a davar ha'asur, he assumes status of davar ha'asur and therefore cannot be sho'el on such a neder as we find in nazir 14 and makos 22, because she'eila isn't possible in a davar ha'asur.

The Rosh 4b also suggests the possibility the we use "l'hashem" by nazir as a gezeiras hakasuv to be matfis in shimshon. But, he also suggests that R' Yehuda holds that either manoach or shimshon was mekabel a standard nezirus when he was old enough to do so (with the exception of tuma'as meis). Based on this approach the mal'ach didn't force issurei nazir on him, but rather instructed his parents to tell him to be mekabel nezirus. According to this, there shouldn't be different rules for a nazir shimshon and R' moshe's question would return, why is there a din that a nazir shimshon cannot be sho'el on his nezirus? Perhaps the mala'ach commanded shimshon that he must be a nazir, so that if shimshon would be sho'el on his nezirus he would be violating the command of the mal'ach. Therefore when one is matfis in shimshon, it is the equivalent of accepting upon themselves nezirus, and an issur to be sho'el on the nezirus.

נזיר דף ד' בהא דלר"ש אין נזיר שמשון חל

הנה בפשטות משמעות הגמרא לר"ש ל"ש כלל שאדם יהא נזיר שמשון כיוון דקדושה מעין זו באה מה' ול"ש לאדם לעשות קדושה כזאת. והרש"ש בנדרים יט ס"ל דהמ"ח רק כשמתפיס בשמשון ואומר הריני כשמשון, אך אם אמר הריני נזיר כשמשון חל נזירות שמשון עליו לכ"ע, דהחסרון הוי רק בהתפסה כיון שהוי דבר האסור ולא דבר הנדור. ובאמת צ"ע ברש"ש שהטעם שחלוק דבר האסור מדבר הנדור מבואר בראשונים או משום דדבר האסור הוי איסור גברא (ריטב"א) או משום דשייך להמשיך רק "קדושה" ולא "איסורים" (ר"ן), וא"כ הכא בשמשון לכאורה הוי דומיא דדבר הנדור ולגבי התפסה שפיר צריך שיחול אלא כל הסוגיא לגבי עיקר נדר בשמשון אי שייך לנזור בשמשון, ולר"ש של"ש א"כ אפשר לומר שאם לא שייך לנזור כן ל"ש ג"כ להתפיס בכגון דא, ועדיין צ"ב.
אמרתי כעת לבאר שיטת הרמב"ם בבכור עפ"י ביאור הר"א שמצוטט בברכ"א על נדרים מחוברת אור תורה - בקיצור נמרץ: הרמב"ם בהלכות נדרים פ"א הי"ג פוסק הרי הן עלי כבכור מותר שאין קדושתו בידי אדם, ולעומת זה בהלכה ט"ו פוסק שאם אמר זה כזה על בשר בכור לפני זריקת דמים הרי זה אסור. ומבאר רב אלחנן שיש שני מיני התפסות, המשכה של זה כזה שמהני רק כשהבשר לפניו, והתפסה בעיקר הדין של קרבן וכדומה אף שלא בפניו. ור"ל שהרמב"ם סובר שזה כזה מהני בבכור כיוון שהוי קדושה וכן הוי איסור חפצא ולא שני מכל דבר הנדור, אלא כל המ"ח בסוגיא הוי לגבי התפסה בעיקר הדין כיוון שיש דין הקדש בבכור אך למעשה ההקדש שלי לא פועל הקדושה. ולפ"ז שוב רואים שכל הסוגיא בבכור, אליבא דהרמב"ם, דווקא לגבי התפסה של בעיקרו של דין בכור אך התפסת זה כזה לא איירי ולכ"ע מהני. וה"ה בהשוואה לנזיר שמשון אפשר לומר שכל הסוגיא בכה"ג אך בהתפסת זה כזה אולי מהני לכ"ע בנזיר שמשון ואיפכא ממש מדברי הרש"ש הנ"ל וצ"ע
אגב מאד כדאי לעיין בספר תוספות נזיר עם פירוש ארזי הלבנון מת"ח אחד בא"י, אשר בספרו הוא מתקן את כל השגיאות בתוספות (אשר ירבו ככל שהמסכתא הולכת) ו"למטה" בהערות מביא ליקוט מהאחרונים וכמה דברים משלו אשר ממש מאירים הסוגיא בטוב טעם ובלי אריכות מדי גדולה, ולענ"ד טוב הוא מאד מאד. הצלחה

nazir 4a - kiddush wine

tosafos pesachim 106a brings two opinions whether kiddush on wine is deoraya, but all agree that he doesn't have to drink the wine. the 'rashi' here is the da'as ychid that implies there is a chiyuv to drink the wine. the sha'ages aryeh is ma'arich to push off the shita of rashi. maharatz chiyus also points out that the 'mushba v'omed' of kiddush would just be rov rivi'is or ma'aleh lugmav, but nazir is only violated with a full rivi'is and chatzi shiiur is not a violation ofthe nezirus even if it is assur m'doraysa? b'kitzur, there are many difficulties with 'rashi' both ithin the sugya (see orach mishor who elaborates to fit rashi in the gemara) and frm other places.
but, the last answer of tosafos in pesachim would still require wine m'doraysa, just that the torah doesn't require u to drink it. rosh here seems to undrstand that kiddush on 'something' is d'oraysa and u can't be yotzei in tefilla, rather you need wine or bread.

Nazir 2a - Kinuyin

Connections between Nedarim and Nazir

(works more smoothly than purim to nedarim)

According to Reish Lakish that kinuyin are leshonos that chachamim created, Tosafos struggles with why they work md'oraysa to bring a korban. Tosafos answers: 1. since your intent is to accept nezirus and you know that this is a language created for the purpose of accepting nezirus, it is as if you said the term nazir in the torah. 2. it is not a binding nezirus d'oraysa, it is only d'rabonon and there would not be a korban.

The Ran in nedarim 2a asks the same question and answers:

ואפילו לריש לקיש נמי דאמר שהם לשון שבדו להם חכמים הרי הם ג"כ כנדר גמור מדאורייתא, שהרי כל הלשונות אינן אלא הסכמת אומה ואומה ולא גרעה הסכמת חכמים ז"ל מהסכמתם, הלכך הוו להו מדאורייתא

The Ran is mechadesh that a language created by chachamim is no different than other languages and therefore is binding d'oraysa. Tosafos in his first answer doesn't seem to go so far to say that it would qualify as a language, but rather that he is verbalizing a concept and understands its consequences, therefore even without a formal language, it can serve as an acceptance of nezirus.

Tosafos in nedarim 2a offers other suggestions: 1. the machlokes whether kinuyin are other languages or creations of chachamim is only a machlokes by nedarim, but by nezirus all agree that it is other languages. Then Tosafos gives 2 other answers:

דכיון דתקינו חכמים שנודרין בהני לישני הוי כעיקר נזירות, ויש כח בידיהם לעשות תקנתן כעיקר נזירותן, ועוד יש לומר כיון שתיקנו חכמים הני לישני כוונת הנודר לנדר גמור וגמר בלבו לעשותו כעיקר הלשון

The second approach seems like what tosafos says by us in Nazir, but the first approach sounds like the chachamim have the power to create a nezirus and on some level is using the concept of yesh koach b'yad chachamim l'akor davar min hatorah.

Also the Orach Mishor makes reference to a gemara later where Reish Lakish holds that chulin b'azara is not d'oraysa so the entire question would not even begin.

Nedarim 90b - Admiting to adultery

TO ME IT SEEMS THE CONNECTION (ALTHOUGH I AM NOT SURE WHY THERE HAS TO BE ONE) BETWEEN NEDARIM AND PURIM IS THAT THEY BOTH END WITH ADULTERY (BY ESTHER TO SAVE KLAL YISROEL).

In the Mishna Rishona a woman is believed to say she was raped (if she is a kohen's wife) or committed adultery intentionally (just that in the first case she would receive a kesuba and in the second she would not), to assur herself on her husband (someone asked why she is beleived according to the mishna rishona and we don't say ein adam meisim atzmo rasha - i think we discussed this issue in kesubos). In the Mishna Achrona we do not believe her because we are concerned she is lying to get out of the marriage.

The Ran has 3 explanations for this distinction: 1. Mei'ikar hadin she is believed, but the Rabonon have control to uproot a din d'oraysa and allow her to remain with her husband (and eat teruma). The Ran doesn't like this since he understands that the right of the Rabbonon to do this is limited to a temporary uprooting of a din b'kum v'aseh. The Ran is lishataso on 87a (by toch kdei dibur) where he rejects the same approach based on the fact that he holds that they can't do it permanently (the shita assumes that they can uproot for midgar milasa even permanently, and would be consistent with the first answer here). 2. Mei'ikar hadin she is believed but the rabbonon implement the fact that kiddushin is based on their da'as so they have power to render her "unmarried" at the time of the rape or adultery. Based on this approach they would presumably assume that when she lives with her husband after that time, it creates a new marriage and that is how we allow her to eat teruma. 3. In this approach the Ran assumes that whether or not she is believed is entirely based on whether chazal assumed based on an umdana she is telling the truth (mishna rishona bec. of embarrassment), or that she is lying (mishna achrona bec. of wanting to marry someone else). Based on this we understand why she can eat Teruma.

This is all regarding her level of believability. But there is still the issue of shavya anafsha chaticha d'issura (which is either m'din neder or like a hoda'as ba'al din) that creates an issur on her. Tosafos quotes a famous answer from Rabbeinu Eliezer that an eishes kohen who is raped and assur as a zonah is only an issur on the kohen, not on her, so since she is not believed, she is allowed to remain with him (there is still a question of how she can be machshil him to do an issur). Tosafos offers another answer that chazal have the right to take away her ne'emanus and remove her ability to create a shavaya anafsha chaticha d'issura.

Now, if an eishes kohein would be raped and claim she was raped, the beis din doesn't beleive her so we don't force divorce. But, when she asks her private Rav whether she is allowed to go back to live with him, the halacha would be that it is assur for her to live with him if she knows that she was actually raped. According to Rabbeinu Eliezer in Tosafos where there is no issur on her, she can live with him. But according to most rishonim who reject this chiddush, her Rav would have to tell her she must become a moredes and refuse to go back (even though we won't force him to give kesuba or a get). If a woman claims that she committed adultery willingly, all would agree that even though she is not believed in beis din. it is assur for her to go back home since she knows that she was mezaneh.

נדרים ופורים

הנה מן הדין שנתייגע למצוא הקשר שבין נדרים ופורים במיוחד שהסיום נופל בפורים. ובדרך צחות נ"ל כך. שדין נדר הוי הכח שניתן לאדם לחדש איסור דאורייתא על עצמו, דהיינו שנדרים הוי חידוש גדול שלא מצינו בכל התורה. ובדומה לזה הוי לאו של לא תסור דג"כ חל דיני תורה ע"י חוקי החכמים. וא"כ בין בנדר ובין בדין לא תסור טמון כח תורה שבע"פ שאומר שאנו מחדשים תורה - ואמת שבצד מסויים כל יו"ט ודיני קידוש החדש ג"כ בכה"ג בבחינת מקדש ישראל דמקדשי לזמנים - . ובאמת שלכן בדרך כלל אמרינן שכל הנודר כאילו בנה במה, דהיינו שנחדש על עצמו דינים שלא נאמרו בתורה ומדוע לו? והוי קצת בבחינת אל תוסף.
וכעת נראה שכנגד זה יש את פורים וחנוכה. שפורים הוי הוספה על ד"ת וכתבי הקדש עד שיש מחלוקת אי מטמאה את הידים. ויותר מזה, ניכר לעין ההקבלה שביניהם ע"י לימוד הגמרא במגילה דף ז' שאסתר ביקשה כיתבוני לדורות וענו לה החכמים שזה לא ראוי עד שמצאו מקור בתורה, דהיינו ממש כמו נדר חידוש ד"ת הוי כאילו בנה במה אלא א"כ יש לזה דבר שמצורף לזה ועושהו לדבר נכון.
והדברים אינם צריכים לפנים שבחנוכה הוא כנגד ההוספה שבבחינת לא תסור ולכן דווקא שם איתא בגמרא איך מברכין וציוונו כידוע. יוצא שבין בפורים ובין בחנוכה הוי בבחינת תושבע"פ אלא שבפורים זה נעשה כתבי קדש כין שנדר הוי ממש מפורש בפסוקים ובחנוכה זה בבחינת לא תסור. ועוד יש לבאר עפ"י זה מדוע דווקא פורים נס נסתר לעומת חנוכה ואכמ"ל

Nedarim 88b - Giving a limited gift

The gemara discusses whether and how one can limit a gift given to a woman to prevent her husband from being zocheh in it. The Ran on the mishna (second peshat) understands even according to R' Meir that her hand is like her husbands, one can limit the gift he gives her to specific activities to prevent her husband from acquiring it. Similarly, in the end of the gemara the Ran explains the opinion of the Rambam that if one gives a gift to a woman "on the condition that her husband is not zocheh in it, and that she can do what she wants with it", the clause of being able to do what she wants with it implies that it is not an absolute gift, rather he is giving her limited ownership so that she can slowly decide what she wants to spend each dollar on, so the husband is not zocheh in it. The entire discussion of what type of language is necessary to prevent the gift from being absolute, is because by default the gift will be absolute. But when we have an umdana that the gift is for a specific purpose, it is not considered "owned" by the receiver to use if for another purpose.
R' Moshe (Y.D. 2:112) has a similar approach to explain that when a father in-law gives money to his son in-law for living expensed to enable him to learn comfortably in kollel, the son in-law is not entitled to give 10% as ma'aser on that money because it is not an absolute gift, rather it is for the specific purpose of his living expenses. R' Moshe writes:

אבל הנדוניא הניתן לצורך כגון הכא שהעשרת אלפים ניתנו כדי שיהיה חתן פנוי ללמוד בכולל במנוחה, תלוי בדעת הנותן דלא היה נותן להם לחלק מזה לאחרים אף לא לצדקה ואין יכול לשנות מדעת הנותן, וכיון שחותנו אומר שניתן רק בשביל שיהיה פנוי ללמוד והחתן אינו מכחישו אין לו רשות לחלק אף המעשר מהם אף לא לצדקה

תכ"ד

יש שני דינים בתכ"ד, אחד שהמעשה לא נגמר עדיין לפני תכ"ד ולכן שייך לבטל המעשה מדין אתי דיבור ומבטל דיבור, משא"כ לאחר תכ"ד כבר הוי מעשה ואין דיבור מבטל דיבור. אך בדין קריעה רואים עוד דין בתכ"ד, דהתם לא שייך לזה אלא יש דין שאם קרע אפילו לפני שמתו מת ממש, עדיין יצא דין קריעה אי הוי תכ"ד , ורואים משם שתכ"ד אומר שכל מה שנעשה בתכ"ד הוי כאילו נעשה בזמן אחד ולכן יצא י"ח הקריעה. משא"כ במעשה קנין, למשל, זה לא מספיק, דאפילו אם חזרתי מדעתי בתכ"ד עדיין גם היה לי דעת ג"כ, דהיינו דיש כעת מעשה שיש בו באותו זמן דעת ואי דעת, ולכן שם צריכים לומר ג"כ דין דיבור מבטל דיבור - ופשוט לכאורה, נ"ל שזכור לי מימי נעורי

Nedarim 84b - Tovas Hana'ah

2 quick points:

1. The gemara says that depending on how ma'aser ani is distributed, it may qualify as a "giving" in which case there would be a real value to the tovas hana'ah, or it may qualify as a "leaving" in which case there would not be any value. It would seemt that by teruma regardless of how it is distributed, whether it is given to a specific kohen or left for kohanim to take it, we regard it as "giving" and there is considered to be tovas hana'ah. It is only by ma'aser sheini where there is a special gezeiras hakasuv to redefine the nature of the gift, so that when it is left out in the goren for people to take it is not considered giving and there isn't any tovas hana'ah. But by teruma where we do not have a gezeiras hakasuv, it would always be considered a giving with tovas hana'ah and that is why the mishna says that when a specific kohen is mudar hana'ah from you, there is not way that he can take your teruma.

2. The Ran seems to explain the connection between whether something turns its mixture into tevel, and tovas hana'ah to be a gezeiras hakasuv. When the Torah recognizes the "ownership" value of tovas hana'ah, it does so in the context of teruma which before being separated creates tevel, but by something which is not tovel (such as ma'aser ani in the hava amina), the right to choose who it goes to is not regarded as a tovah hana'ah. Is this just a gezerias hakasuv, or is there some rationale why the tovas hana'ah should be linked to whether it creates tevel?

Nedarim 83b - Inuy Nefesh L'achar Zman

R' Nachman interprets the mishna that the ba'al is not included in "briyos", and since she can derive benefit from him, he cannot be meifer. The mishna then makes a second point, that if she gets divorced she can benefit from leket shich'cha and peiah. The Ran explains that the ability to benefit from leket shich'cha... will not remove the neder from being inuy nefesh, therefore the only reason he can be meifer is because she can benefit from him. The mishna is saying that when the husband divorces her, he will automatically be included in "briyos" and included in her neder, and her only ability to eat at that point would be from leket shich'cha and peiah.

The Rosh writes: ואע"ג דהשתא לא הוי עינוי נפש, הואיל ויבא לידי עינוי נפש לכשתתגרש, מצי מפר

Seemingly the Rosh does not make sense because the din in the mishna is that he CANNOT be meifer. The Keren Orah explains the Rosh that the husband not being included in "briyos" and her ability to benefit from him, is not sufficient to qualify the neder as not being inuy nefesh because when he divorces her she will be assur to him as well so it should qualify as inuy nefesh. It is only because she also has the ability to benefit from leket shich'cha and peia that we consider the neder non- inuy nefesh and he cannot be meifer. This implies that even though she can now a neder may not be inuy nefesh, if it will lead to inuy nefesh we consider it inuy nefesh even now (therefore if she could not benefit from leket shich'cha... even if her husband can feed her now, it would be inuy nefesh). This works well with the previous gemara considering tuma'as meis inuy nefesh. Since later on she will not have people to bury her, we consider it emotional inuy nefesh now. Here too, if she would not be able to eat leket shich'cha... since later (after divorce) her husband will be included in "briyos" and she won't be able to benefit from him, we consider it inuy nefesh now.

Nedarim 81b - Tashmish: Is it an Inuy?

The gemara on 80b implies that if something is considered an inuy in the context of nedarim, it should also be an inuy in the context of yom kippur and be chayev kareis. The only distinction is, that by nedarim even refraining from activities that will lead to a delayed inuy qualify as inuy (such as not bathing), whereas by yom kippur we only consider it inuy if the effect of the inuy is immediate. There is another distinction based on the Ran 80b, that kareis is only applicable if it is an inuy that leads to "ibud nefesh", such as refraining from eating, so rechitzah may be assur m'doraysa both by neder and y.k. even though there isn't kareis. The bottom line is that anything that the Inuy of Neder and Y.K. (so long as the effect is immediate) are dependent on one another, if it is inuy d'oraysa by neder then it is d'oraysa by Y.K. (just that there isn't kareis since there isn't ibud nefesh by anything except eating and drinking), and if it is not recognized as inuy d'oraysa by neder then it is not d'oraysa by Y.K. and visa versa.

Based on this, Tashmish HaMitah, if it is considered an inuy by Y.K. it should be inuy by neder (to allow hafara), and if it is not considered inuy by Y.K. it should not be inuy by neder. Whether the inuyim are assur m'doraysa by Y.K. is a big machlokes Rishonim (Ran and Tosafos in the last perek of Yoma). Therefore, R' Yossi (who is the author of the braisa 81b) who considers tashmish to be devarim shebeino l'veina and not inuy, should consider it only d'rabonon by Y.K. Seemingly, when the gemara questions according to the Rabonon whether tashmish is considered inuy nefesh or devarim sh'beino l'veina by neder, is really asking also by Y.K. whether it is d'oraysa or d'rabonon, and l'maskana should be dependent on the machlokes rishonim in Yoma.

However, the Shita (81b) says that even if Tashmish is d'oraysa by Y.K. that is only for a man where abstinence is more difficult, but for a woman where abstinence is easier it would not be considered inuy. Based on this, the question of the gemara whether tashmish is inuy or devarim shbeino l'veina by nedarim, is only a question by a woman, but for a man all may agree that it is considered inuy d'oraysa (according to those who hold that the inuyim are d'oraysa, just exempt from kareis). Therefore, if we assume that by neder abstinence is not inuy d'oraysa by a woman, then by Y.K. we would also make a distinction between a man and woman. For a man tashmish would be a d'oraysa violation and for a woman only d'rabonon.

Nedarim 81a - Children of Talmidei Chachamim - Bracha on Torah

The gemara tries to understand why most talmidei chachamim aren't zocheh to sons who are talmidei chachamim, and offers different explanations:

1. R' Yosef - "so they shouldn't say Torah is inherited". Ran explains that the tendency is to expect the torah to be inherited so the sons of the talmidei chachamim often don't put in the effort necessary to master the torah. Rosh says that Hashem makes it more difficult for them to become talmidei chachmim so that it doesn't look like Torah is passed on by inheritance and would deter others from learning.

2. R' Shisha brei d'rav Idi - "so they shouldn't be arrogant on the tzibur". Ran explains that if the Torah remains in one family they will become arrogant and impose themeselves on the tzibur.

3. Mar Zutra - "because they express arrogance on the tzibur". The previous opinion was to prevent arrogance, but this opinion seems to understand it as a punishment to the talmidei chachamim for being arrogant on the tzibur (maharsha).

4. R' Ashi - "because they call people donkeys". Rashi explains they don't honor people properly. Maharsha explains that they consider others not having the inherent ability and genetic brainpower to become talmidei chachamim (like donkeys who don't have the potential), therefore they are punished by their own children not being talmidei chachamim which shows that that it is not inborn by nature, rather is only a result of hard work.

5. Ravina - "they don't make birchas hatorah". Ran explains in the name of Rabbeinu Yona (also rashi in baba metzia) that although they learned torah constantly, Hashem who understood their inner thoughts had to reveal that the beis hamikdash was destroyed because "Torah wasn't important enough to them so that it should be worthy of a bracha because they weren't learning lishma". The Beis Halevi (Parshas Mishpatim, and hakdama to teshuvos) explains that they considered learning only a hechsher mitzvah preparing them to perform mitzvos, but not a mitzvah in and of itself and therefore unworthy of a bracha. The Chasam Sofer (chiddushim) already offered this explanation many years before the Beis Halevi. He writes:

יש תורה לשם שמים ממש אך אין כוונתו אלא כדי לקיים המצות ולידע ההלכה איך יעשה המעשה, וכיון שכל עצמו של אותו העסק איננו אלא לקיים המצוה איננו עדיף מקיום המצוה גופיה דבעידנא דלא עסיק בה לא מגינא ולא מצלי. אך עיקר מצות עסק התורה הוא מצוה בפני עצמה להגות בה יומם ולילה ולהעמיק ולעיין בכל תוצאותיה ומובאיה כי עמקו מחשבותיה וכו' וזהו עוסק לשמה של תורה, לא על כוונה אחרת והיא המגינה ומצלי, ואז בשעת החורבן לא עסקו על זה האופן וכו'אך במה יודע איפה זאת אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שלא ברכו בתורה תחילה וכו' והשתא אי כל כוונת עסק התורה אינה אלא לעשות המצות א"כ אין למודה ועסקה גמר מצותה אין מברכין עליה, אבל המברך עליה מודה שכוונתו שמלבד קיום המצוה עוד העסק בעצמו מצוה

The Chasams sofer offers an alternate peshat that they weren't misbarech with Torah first, meaning they didn't glorify themselves as being experts in Torah, rather it became just another knowledge like other secular knowledge. This showed a lack of chashivus for Torah - [hence, the minhag to write "Rabbi Dr." rather than "Dr. Rabbi", v'dok].

Nedarim 80b - Laundry before Life

The gemara quotes from a tosefta that if there would be a spring in one city from which water flows down to another city, all agree that the upper city can stop the flow to the second city if they need it for drinking water in order to live. even at the cost of the lives of the second city. The rationale is "chayecha kodmin" - your life comes before others, and assumes that the spring belongs to the upper city. Based on the girsa of the ya'avetz in rashi (mefaresh), this halacha is only true if the actual spring is inside the upper city, so that the water belongs to them and the only question is whether they have to risk their lives to share it with others. But, if the spring was located above both cities and merely flowed through one city to another, the upper city is not considered the owner of the water and would not have rights to damn the river from flowing to the lower city.

In the Tosefta, there is a dispute whether the laundry of the upper city comes before the life of the lower city. Rabbanan say that the life of the lower city comes before the laundry of the upper city, but R' Yossi argues that the laundry of the upper city comes before the life of the lower city because the upper city is not required to undergo tza'ar haguf even at the cost of the lives of the lower city. Based on R' Yossi's opinion the Beis Shmuel (Even Ha'ezer 80:15) explains that a nursing mother is entitled to eat foods that may cause harm to the baby if by refraining from these foods she will have suffer physical pain, because R' Yossi entitles one to wash their clothing to alleviate tza'ar haguf even at the expense of the lives of the lower city. The Beis Shmuel seems to understand that this would only be when there is a definite tza'ar haguf to the upper city, and a safek sakana to the lower city, but if it would be a definite sakana to the lower city, all would agree that the sakana of the lower city takes precedence.

The B'er Heitev points out two difficulties with the Beis Shmuel's comparison: 1. Why would we follow R' Yossi, rather than following the Rabbonon who disagree with R' Yossi? 2. The laundry of the upper city can also lead to sakana and only under those circumstances would R' Yossi give precedence to the upper city. Regarding the second point, it does not seem that way from the language of the gemara; rather the gemara clearly indicates that the issur of "lo ta'amod al dam rei'echa" does not apply when it will cost you tza'ar haguf. But the first question is a strong question (as the Beis Shmuel himself points out). Another distinction that can be made is that in the case of the gemara they are holding back the water from the lower city which is indirectly causing harm, but when the mother eats foods that are bad for the nursing child, she is directly causing harm. Perhaps withholding water also qualifies as a "direct harm"?

Nedarim 76a - Kaddish prior to burial

R' Menachem Kagan referred me to a teshuva in the Igros Moshe (y.d. 163:3) where he discusses a point of argument between the shach and taz whether an onen who lost a parent right before shabbos (since aninus is suspended for shabbos) and has not yet had time to do the burial, should say kaddish over shabbos. The Taz thinks kaddish should be said, but the shach argues since the kaddish is to alleviate the din of gehenim which does not begin until kevura. R' Moshe sides with the Taz based on an argument he formulates from this gemara. The gemara says that a girl sold as a jewish slave is freed by reaching physical maturity (na'arus), certainly the father looses rights to sell her at that age. Similarly, if kaddish can help the niftar once they have entered gehenim, it can certainly be effective to provide zechuyos to prevent gehenim. However, R' Moshe qualifies this by saying that the kal v'chomer only addresses the fact that kaddish will work as a zechus even before kevurah, but it does not create a requirement because regarding the requirement it is more logical to assume that the requirement begins only after the din becomes severe and not beforehand. Based on this, the son is entitled to say kaddish prior to the kevura, but is not obligated to do so.

The difficulty with R' Moshe's kal v'chomer is that based on this a son should even say kaddish when the father is still alive, which is obviously not done? But in truth, R' Moshe realizes that saying kaddish is associated with one's parent being dead, that is why the Rama (o.c. 132) rules that a child must ask permission from his parent if he would like to say kaddish while they are alive. So it would be inappropriate for a child to say kaddish for a live parent. However, once the parent has been deceased and kaddish is an option, R' moshe, based on the kal v'chomer argues that it would accomplish its goal in providing zechus to the neshama.

May the zechus of this d'var Torah serve as an aliyas neshama for those who tragically lost their life permaturely in the confines of a Yeshiva and serve as a zechus for a refuah sheleima for those who have been injured.

Nedarim 75b - 76a - When Does Tahara of a Mikvah Occur?

הרש"ש ציין לעיין בכס"מ (פ"ו הל' ט"ז מהל' אבות הטומאות) שכתב חידוש גדול וז"ל ונראה מתוך דבריהם שהטעם מפני שאין הטמא נטהר אלא בעלייתו מהמקוה, לא בעודו בתוך המקוה עכ"ל. הרי סובר הכס"מ שאין המקוה מטהר אלא עלייתו מהמקוה בטהרה מטהרתו. וזה מדוייק בלשון הרמב"ם שכתב וז"ל הנוגע באב מאבות הטומאות המושלך בתוך המקוה כגון ניבהל או שרץ ה"ז טמא...אפילו כשהן בתוך המקוה מטמאין, וכשיעלה מן המקוה זה הנוגע יטהר עכ"ל. הרי סובר הרמב"ם דכשהוא טובל במקוה בהדי דבר המטמא אותו, נטמא ממנו דיליף מקרא שאף כשהמטמא בתוך המקוה יכול לטמא, ואף כשהמיטמא בתוך המקוה הוא מקבל טומאה ממנו כדמבואר בסוגיא דידן שאין המקוה מציל עליו מליטמא. עיין באור שמח (פי"ב מהל' מטמאי משכב ומושב הל' כ"ב) שהבין מדברי הרמב"ם דלא רק בעניני טומאה אמרינן שהמקוה פועל בעלייתו ממנו אלא אף בטבילה לשם עבדות ולשם גרות נמי המקוה פועל רק בעלייתו, ונפק"מ שבטבילת עבד שצריך רבו לתקפו במים להראות שעבודו עליו, קפיד הרמב"ם (פי"ג מהל' איסורי ביאה הל' י"א) שצריך רבו לתקפו במים "עד שיעלה והוא תחת שעבודו", דאילו היה מניחו בשעת עלייתו, הא צריך להראות שעבודו בשעה שהמקוה פועל עליו. ולפי דבריו נ"ל שגם בטבילת גר אילו קיבל מצות קודם שטבל וטבל ובשעה שהוא בתוך המים בעט והחליט שלא לקבל עליו המצות, נמצא שאין טבילתו מועיל לדעת הרמב"ם והוא חידוש נפלא! וצ"ע

אמנם מדברי הרא"ש לא משמע כן, שהרי כתב הרא"ש עו ע"א וז"ל כגון אם עמד כל גופו במקוה ונגע בידו אחת בשרץ ובידו אחרת נגע בכלי שמקצתו חוץ למקוה יציל עליו שלא יקבל טומאה בעודו במקוה לטמא הכלי בעודו במקוה, ובתו"כ דרשינן " והנוגע בנבלתם יטמא" אפילו הוא בתוך המים עכ"ל. ואילו היה סובר הרא"ש כמשמעות הרמב"ם אליבא דכס"מ למה הוצרך לומר שבידו אחת נגע בשרץ ובידו אחרת נגע בכלי, הא אף אם נגע בשרץ כשהיה בתוך המקוה ואח"כ הניח השרץ ונגע בכלי שמקצתו במקוה, כיון שעדיין לא נטהר מהמקוה דרק עלייתו מטהרתו, נטמא הכלי. ומדדחק הרא"ש שנגע שרץ בידו אחת וכלי בידו אחרת, ע"כ סובר דאילו הניח השרץ מיד נטהר ממי המקוה וכשנגע אח"כ בכלי אינו מטמא הכלי

נמצינו למדים דפליגי הרמב"ם והרא"ש אם המקוה מטהר מיד כשטובל כל גופו בתוכו, או רק אח"כ כשעולה ממנו, דלדעת הרמב"ם המקוה רק מטהר בעלייתו דכל זמן שלא נטבל הוי כנוגע בדבר המטמאו, ואף כשנטבל נמי עד שעולה מהמקוה הוי כאילו עדיין נוגע בדבר המטמאו, ולדעת הרא"ש המקוה פועל כפשטיה שהוא מטהר בטבילתו ולא בעלייתו

Nedarim 75b - Tovel V'sheretz B'yado

Finally a solution to the big question, when one is tovel with a sheretz in his hand, does the sheretz prevent the tahara of the mikva from being effective so that even if he would let go of the sheretz while he is in the mikva, he would not be tahor; or is the mikva effective so long as he is immersed but as soon as he comes out of the mikva holding the sheretz he will immediately return to tu'mah (but if he would let go of the sheretz in the mikva, he would come out tahor)?

The gemara clearly assumes that when there is a paradox caused by the mikva and sheretz, even if he enters his immersion being tahor and in the mikva grabs onto a sheretz, the sheretz overpowers the mikva and prevents the mikvah from being metaher him. This is what the gemara means that a mikvah does not prevent tu'mah (it only removes tu'mah once the source has been removed). Therefore, regarding teshuva it is a very good mashul, because one must let go of the aveira before starting the teshuva. If he does teshuva while still holding the aveira, the teshuva process is ineffective.

Nedarim 75a - Source for not doing Hakama in advance

The Ran seems to assume that there isn't any source for the mishnas assumption that hakama cannot be done in advance, therefore the default position is that it cannot be done in advance. Regarding hafara the mishna quotes a machlokes, r' elazar holds that it can be done in advance based on a kal v'chomer, but the Rabonon hold that it cannot be done in advance either because we make make a hekesh between hakama and hafara, since hakama cannot be done in advance, so too hafara cannot be done in advance.

R' Akiva Eiger asks, if there would be a source for hakama no being able to be done in advance, the hekesh would enable us to learn hafara from hakama, but since there is no source to say that hakama cannot be done in advance, rather there is a kal v'chomer that hafara can be done in advance, the hekesh should teach us to learn hakama from hafara ans say that they both can be done in advance? In truth, the gemara quotes braisas where the Rabonon clearly reject the premise of R' elazar's kal v'chomer and are left without a source for either hafara or hakama, but if so the question may still be asked perhaps both hafara and hakama can be done in advance rather than saying they both cannot be done in advance?

The Rosh was bothered by this question and therefore agrees with R' Eliezer Mimitz that he cites. The source of hakama not being effective when done in advance is that since he will probably not be happy with all her nedarim, it is a hakama b'taos (mistake) and not binding. Based on this we have a clear source that hakama cannot be done in advance and learn hafara from hakama based on the hekesh, that hafara also cannot be done in advance. Based on the approach of the Rosh, the Rashash points out that if one would specify certain nedarim by saying "if she makes a neder later about.... then i am mikayem the neder from today", the concern of ta'os would not apply, and the kiyum would be binding even before the neder is made. However, the Rashash quotes a source from the sifri that learns from a pasuk that one cannot do hakama in advance of the neder.

Perhaps the Ran would hold that the concept of hakama is impossible to work before the neder is chal, since by definition it simply supports a preexisting neder, so if there isn't any neder there isn't any hakama. However, by hafara it is possible that it would work in advance either because it simply would prevent the neder from being chal or because the neder is born with a blemish (like the ran explains when an animal is born with a mum) so that the neder is immediately chal and then removes, as the gemara discusses. Therefore, it is only possible for hafara to work in advance, but impossible for hakama to work in advance. Once we have a hekesh saying the two must be the same, we are forced to say that neither one can be done in advance.