Yevamos 68a - Safek 9 year old pasuls with bi'ah

Tosafos asks why a safek 9 year old should pasul from terumah (if he is pasul and has bi'ah with a bas yisroel or kohenes). We have a chazaka that he is less than 9 and a chazaka that she is kasher, so m'safek his bi'ah should not passul. Tosafos answers that we are speaking in a case where now he is 9 years old, so the chazaka d'hashta destroys the chazaka d'meikara (both on him and her) and creates a safek d'oraysa.

2 points:

1. Where do we find that the chazaka d'hashta overpowers chazaka d'meikara? We always assume that a mikvah with a chazaka d'meikara of kashrus, would pasken that one who was tovel yesterday is tahor even though today it is found to be less than 40 se'ah! I have written down to see sha'ar hayosher (2:4) - something along the lines that when we pasken on him, it is true that chazaka d'meikara is stronger, but when we pasken on her, his chazaka d'meikara doesn't help her, and his chazaka d'hashta ruins her (i don't have the sefer here).

2. Rashash points out that acc. to tosafos if the safek 9 year old would come to beis din before his ninth birthday, we would go with chazaka d'meikara to be machshir her to terumah. It would come out that until he is definitely 9 we will be machshir her temporarily, but after he is definitely 9 when we have a chazaka d'hashta we would passul her! It must be that we go after the time he came to beis din and pasken that if now he is still a safek, we would be machshir her forever.

קנין הגופ של עבד

בריש הפרק איתא בתוספות שעבדי מלוג לא אכלי כשהאשה חללה אפילו למ"ד קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, "כיון שאין הגוף שלו כמו שאין יוצאין בשן ועין לאיש" . ובמהשך התוספות מביא ראיה שאזלינן בתר קנין הגוף מהאי שמעוכב גט שחרוו אוכל בתרומה "אע"פ שאין לרב פירות אלא הגוף". ובפשטות התוספות תמוה, דהרי במעוכב גט שחרור הגוף שייך לעבד ואין לאדון אלא דין איסור כדי לתת גט שחרור (קרן אורה) ובפשטות צ"ל דכונת התוספות לקנין איסור ורק מוכיח שדין האכלת תרומה תלוי בקנין איסור ולא בדין קנין ממון ולכן סביר להניח שהשאה היא היא בעלת הקנין איסור בעבדי מילוג, וכך לכאורה הבין האבנ"מ בשו"ת סימן י"ח

אך יש לעיין, דלעיל בסוגיא דגירות עבדים בדף מו ע"א למדנו: "א"ל רב פפא לרבא חזי מר הני דבי פפא בר אבא דיהבי זוזי לאינשי לכרגייהו ומשעבדי בהו כי נפקי צריכי גיטא דחירותא או לא א"ל איכו שכיבי לא אמרי לכו הא מילתא הכי א"ר ששת מוהרקייהו דהני בטפסא דמלכא מנח ומלכא אמר מאן דלא יהיב כרגא משתעבד למאן דיהיב כרגא" ושם בתוספות מבואר דהעבדים האלו היו גויים והשאלה היתה אם יש להם קנין הגוף ונפ"מ בבאים להתגייר אי יכולים בלי גט שחרור וע"ש ברש"י ובתוספות הרא"ש. ובפשטות משמע שאלו העבדים אפילו שלא טבלו נקנו לרבם בגופם והיה משמע כמו פשטות התוספות הכא שמפקיר עבדו עדיין קנוי לו קנין הגוף כפשוטו אפילו בלי דיני איסור כההיא דהתם. וצ"ע ועיין בשו"ת פני משה על הסוגיא שם ומובא במחנה אפרים הלכות עבדים

Yevamos 67a - Slaves Eating Terumah Bec. of Fetus

The gemara assumes that if the fetus has a portion in the inheritance, the slaves would not be able to eat terumah since the fetus either has a din of a zar, or a gezeiras hakasuv that until he is born he can't feed terumah to the slaves. It is not so clear why the slaves can't eat: Is it bec. the fetus owns a portion in the estate, and therefore pasuls each and every slave from eating Terumah, or is it because the fetus owns a portion of the slaves and we are not sure which one so out of doubt we can't feed any of them terumah? Rashi (d.h. chelko shel ubar) seems to explain the second way, which implies that we say breirah even midoraysa, so which ever slave ends up by the fetus after the split, is the only slave that can't eat. But, until the split we are concerned that each slave is the portion of the fetus and therefore none of them can eat terumah.

Now, if we would know the fetus is male (sonogram), then even acc. to r' shimon b' yochai who is not concerned for the mi'ut, the fetus would definitely have a portion so the slaves could not eat teruma. But, based on rashi we should say that since most of the slaves belong to the live brothers, and only a mi'ut belong to the ubar i.e. 4 live brothers, 1 ubar, 5 slaves; we should be able to feed terumah to 4 out of the 5 slaves since on each of them there is a rov saying that he will belong to the live brother?

is chazaka a certainty

גמ: ת"ר ניסת לראשון ולא היו לה בנים לשני ולא היו לה בנים לשלישי לא תנשא אלא למי שיש לו בנים נישאת למי שאין לו בנים תצא בלא כתובה ע"כ
וביאר התוספות שהשלישי לא יתן כתובה אפילו לפני ששהה עמה עשר שנים כיון שהוי מקח טעות. והרמב"ן מבאר וז"ל "אבל מ"מ צריכה גט שאין כאן טעות ודאי אלא חששא היא וגבי ממון עליה להביא ראיה ולענין איסורא לחומרא וצריכה גט" ע"כ. ומבואר שהחזקה לא עושה אותה לוודאי עקרה ולכן צריכה גט

ולפ"ז מיושב קושית ר"א שהקשה על מה שאיתא בגמרא
איבעיא להו נישאת לשלישי ולא היו לה בנים מהו דליתבעוה הנך קמאי ... מסתברא מצית אמרה להו השתא הוא דכחשי ע"כ והקשה שבכל חזקה לא אומרים כן אלא אומרים שאיגלאי מילתא למפרע שמסיבה זו לא הולידה לכל הג' אנשים כעין בווסתות שלמפרע אמרינן שכיון שהוקבע ווסתה לא מטמאת טהרות מעת לעת למפרע, ע"ש בהוספות, אך לרמב"ן ניחא דאין זו חזקה רגילה אלא עדיין בגר ספק
ויש להוסיף שהסיבה שזה רק חששא כיוון שנוגד לטבע שאשה בטבע כן מולידה אך חזקה שמססיעת לטבע (רוב) כן תהיה בגדר וודאי. כ"ך נראה ועיקר הדברים מצאתי באחרונים שונים

Yevamos 64b - Why are women not commanded in P'ru U'rvu?

I thought that I remembered the Meshech Chochma writing that women are not commanded in p'ru u'rvu bec. they have a natural desire to have children and don't need the mitzvah for the push. There is a clear contradiction to that approach from the gemara which says that not having children would only be a punishment for him, not for her, since she doesn't care that much (like rashi explains). If her desire to have kids replaces the mitzvah, it should be just as much of a punishment for her as for him.

Actually the Meshech Chochma (Noach 9:7) works perfectly with this gemara. He offers 2 approaches why the Torah didn't command women in this mitzvah:

1. Diracheha Darchei Noam - since pregnancy and childbirth are dangerous for her, it would not be darkei noam for the Torah to obligate her in this mitzvah. But to compensate for this, Hashem built in to her nature a greater desire to have kids. This does not contradict our gemara bec. he is not suggesting that the desire given to woman is parallel to the mitzvah on men, rather just that Hashem partially compensated by giving her more of a nature to want to have kids.

2. Tav L'maisav Tan du - The desire of a woman to be married compensates for this mitzvah. Men would not get married without this mitzvah, but women who desire marriage more, don't need a mitzvah to encourage them to get married. But, he continues that once Hashem instilled in a women the nature of desiring marriage, the torah could not obligate women in this mitzvah. The reason is, if she would be obligated in this mitzvah, it would require her to ask for a divorce from her husband if she didn't have kids after 10 years (since she can't marry 2 husbands), which goes against her nature of her desire to stay married. The Torah never obligates her in something which would be totally against the nature of a person (pretty brilliant if you think about it!).

תוכחה

כשם שמצוה על אדם לומר דבר הנשמע כך מצוה על אדם שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע רבי אבא אומר חובה שנאמר אל תוכח לץ פן ישנאך הוכח לחכם ויאהבך
ופירש"י שקאי על מצות הוכח תוכיח, והריטב"א מקשה והרי איתא בערכין שיש מצוות תוכחה עד הכאה, וראיתי שהאריך מאד הרב יאהפ'ן בהערותיו וי"א שאה"נ שיעור עד הכאה שייך רק כשלבסוף יקבל תוכחתו. לעומת זאת הריטב"א מתרץ שביחיד יש מצוה עד הכאה והגמרא כאן עוסקת בתוכחת רבים ששם רק אם ישמעו, ומוסיף הריטב"א שגם ברבים צריך להוכיח פעם אחת מההיא מעשה דריש גלותא ע"ש. ולהלכה נפסק כריטב"א. ופרטי הדינים רבים ומאד נוגע להלכה ואולי חד מהרבנים יאמרו ראשי הפרקים.

Yevamos 63b - Ben Azai: No Marriage or Kids

Ben Azai comments that one who does not have children is guilty of murder and reducing the d'mus of Hashem. He justified his own actions by saying "What can I do, my soul yearns for Torah, the world can be sustained by others". There is a lot of discussion in the achronim to explain the position of Ben Azai, especially since it is paskened l'halacha in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch E.H 1:4.

R' Elchonon explains that although Ben Azai was obligated in this mitzvah since it is a mitzvah that cannot be fulfilled by others and even if preoccupied with torah study, one is not exempt from a mitzvah that can't be done by others. Nevertheless, he was an o'nes. Similar to the gemara Kiddushin 33a about one who thinks in Torah in the bathroom, is not guilty if the reason is that they are o'nes and cannot distract their mind from learning.

Maharam Shik (thanks to my brother, r' aryeh, for the ma'areh makom) focuses on the second part of Ben Azai's statement, "the world can be sustained by others". Since the world can be sustained by others, pru u'rvu is considered a mitzvah that can be done by others, and one is not obligated to stop learning to fulfill this mitzvah. Obviously this approach is very difficult, since p'ru u'rvu is still an obligation on every individual. Although its purpose may be to sustain the world, the mitzvah an obligation on each person and cannot be done by others.

Perhaps both approaches are true. Ben Azai justifies his personal obligation by saying "what can i do, my sould yearns for torah", meaning he is o'nes as R' Elchonon explains. But then must justify his communal obligation of "l'sheves yitzara" to participate in the sustaining of the world, and to that he says "the world can be sustained by others".

Yevamos 62b - Celibate Children

To fulfill the mitzvah of pru u'rvu we pasken like r' yochanan that one has to leave the world with children, but if G-d forbid his children die during his lifetime, he does not fulfill the mitzvah. It is also clear from the braisa and paskened in shulchan aruch 1:5 that if one has a child who cannot have children i.e. s'ris or eiylonis, he did not fulfill the mitzvah since they are not capable of having offspring. However, the Beis Shmuel 1:8 writes that if one would have a boy and girl who are capable of having children, but decide not to have children (the example in the beis shmuel is where his daughter marries a sris, or son marries an eiylonis, but the chelkas michokeke says that the same is true if they decide not to marry at all), one would fulfill the mitzvah. Clearly, the poskim hold that if the father did all he can do, the fact that the children decide not to have children, would not take the mitzvah away from the father. The Pischei Teshuva quotes the sefer Bnei Ahuva (R' Yonasan Eibshitz) who considers a case where his daughter marries a s'ris to be tantamount to the daughter passing away, since it is impossible for her to leave the marriage and fulfill the mitzvah. Nevertheless, so long as the children still have the ability to have children, the father fulfills his mitzvah. R' Yakov Benzaquen (in our kollel) pointed out that based on this, if someone has a son and a daughter, and the daughter chooses not to get married, the father is still mekayem his mitzvah (as the chelkas michokek writes), but as the daughter gets older and due to her age no longer has the ability to have children, maybe the father should loose the mitzvah similar to a case where the daughter dies?

Yevamos 61b - Bitul Pirya V'rivya

Tosafos seems to understand that according to the first version of the gemara, the only difference between one who has children or not, is regarding the mitzvah of p'ru ur'vu; but regarding the mitzvah to get married, he must marry someone who is capable of having children even though he already has children (it is only in the second version where we say that if he has children he can marry one who is not bas banim). This seems very strange. Since we do not require him to have children (he can be batul from pru u'rvu), whey would we demand that he marry a women who is capable of having children? The same question can be asked on the R"I in Tosafos, even on the second version of the gemara. Is there an advantage in marrying a woman who can have children even when we do not require him to have more children? How can we say in the same sentence "you may be batul from pru u'rvu", BUT "you must marry a woman who can have children"?

zonah - rashi

rashi keeps on saying that a גיורת is not allowed to marry a כהן because we assume she was נבעלה to a גוי , does that mean that if you have witnesses that she never had relations that she would be permissible to a kohen?
תוספות clearly holds that any גיורת even one that is less the 3 years old has a דין זונה no matter what.

Another related point, Tosfos opinion's is that זונה happens from any חייבי כריתות, the rambam holds that it comes from חייבי לאוין ועשה ששוין בכל, again my question is what does rashi hold? in 61b he gives the example of עריות and ממזר ונתין, if he holds like the rambam he should say a bigger chidush of חייבי עשה, is rashi a third opinion?

a final point regarding a גיורת פחותה מג' there is an argument rambam and raavad if she is a זונה or if she is אסור from a הל"מ, see אגר"מ אה"ע א' י"א

question

I heard this question in name of Rav Brown (i am always skeptical to quote people by name on the blog from fear that I am misquoting or that they mind being quoted in the forum, stil...)
Rav Chaim famously says that an אונס is not a פטור but the reason he is פטור is because the מעשה is not מתייחס to the person. The depth is that not everything that a person does is really "him".
the question is then how can ביאת אונס work even with a pasuk, if it's not him?

Yevamos 58b - Is there any kind of bi'ah that is not koneh a Yevama?

The gemara cannot find a case of a shomeres yaveim who has had bi'ah with the yaveim and still remains a shomeres yaveim. In truth there are some cases, but for various reasons they don't meet the gemara's conditions. For example, Tosafos says that when the yaveim does not intend for bi'ah at all, he is not koneh her, yet it does not fulfill the gemara's condition of the bi'as ba'al preceding the bo'el, since the pesukim by sotah imply that the ba'al had intent for bi'ah before she was mezaneh with the bo'el.

But,

How many cases are there of a yaveim having bi'ah with a yevama and not being koneh her?

1. Any time he has not intent for bi'ah at all, as we see in the gemara 54a. This includes kavana to be matiach b'kosel, and falling from a roof, and when he is sleeping (acc. to tosafos).

2. Bi'ah with an eiver meis, tosfaos 53b says that even acc. to the opinion that you are chayev by arayos, you cannot be koneh a yevama (the gemara couldn't use this case on 58b - see aruch l'ner).

3. When he is sleeping, he is not koneh her bec. he is not a "bar da'as" (acc. to rashi). This peshat is just difficult in general bec. we see that a cheiresh and kattan (if not for a special pasuk in kiddushin 19), could be koneh even though they are not b'nei da'as.

4. We already discusses on this blog a discussion between R' Akiva Eiger and his son, if he has explicit intent to do bi'ah but not to be koneh her, whether he is koneh her. RA"E uses he gemara on 58b to prove that he would be koneh her even if he intends not to, so this one doesn't qualify.

5. RE"A on 53b discusses the possibility of requiring witnesses on the bi'ah similar to bi'as kiddushin where they are "l'kyumei davar" - create the kinyan, and not just as a verification that the event took place. Therefore, if the bi'ah of the yaveim to yevama took place without the presence of witnesses, it may qualify. But once again RA"E proves from 58b that one can be koneh a yevama with bi'ah even without any witnesses (he then disproves the proof, bec. it could be we wouldn't believe him that he had bi'ah with her and make her drink, unless the eidim can verify the bi'ah).

ANY MORE CASES?

Yevamos 57b - Chupah for Pesulos i.e. Chupas Nidah

Rashi says that the gemara is discussing chupah without kiddushin. Tosafos understands that Rashi learn the sugya that chupah works as kiddushin, the argument between rav and shmuel is whether chupah works by woman who is pasul from having biah with. Rav holds that chupah accomplished kiddushin and pasuls her (even acc. to r' elazar and r' shimon) since chupah by definition is closer to biah. Shmuel holds that chupah is never binding on a women who is forbidden to have biah with. The Ritvah understands in Rashi that the entire sugya assumes that chupah is not koneh, and both Rav and Shmuel agree that there is no binding cha'los from this chupah. Nevertheless, Rav holds that since she made herself available for bi'ah with someone who is pasul to her, we penalize her by pasuling her to terumah.

Tosafos understands that the gemara is speaking when there was kiddushin done in advance. Although everyone agrees that if she is widowed after kiddushin to someone who was pasul to her, she is not pasuled; and all agree that if she is widowed after bi'ah to a pasul she is a chalala and pasul; the machlokes is when she was widowed after kiddushin and chupa (but no bi'ah) to a pasul.

According to the first and third explanation, Rav and Shmuel argue whether chupah (even after kiddushin) would be binding to pesulos. According to the second peshat, there is no indication one way or the other whether chupah after kiddushin would be binding to pesulos. This is very applicable to a chupas nidah, since she is pasul to him at the time of chupah. Based on the first and third peshat, it is a machlokes Rav and Shmuel whether chupah would be binding on a nidah. Nimukei Yosef comments that we hold like Rav, chupas nidah is binding, to the exclusion of the Rambam's opinion (see Even Haezer siman 61:1). Some suggest that even those who consider chupas nidah valid, that is only if she will later become fit for bi'ah like a nidah, but a pesulah who won't be fit for bi'ah later, chupah would not be binding. Pischei Teshuva (E.H. 61:7) quoting Sha'ar Hamelech proves from the Nimukei Yosef who equates all pesulos with nidah, it is clear that even if she will not necessarily be fit later, chupah is binding on pesulos.

Yevamos 56a - Yibum of Cheiresh (deaf/mute)

The gemara is clear that when a cheiresh does yibum he is koneh her m'doraysa. The question is that according to the gemara earlier 54a that yibum is only koneh if one has in mind at least to do bi'ah, to the exclusion of being ma'tiach b'kosel and sleeping (acc. to tosafos), how can a cheiresh do yibum. Since we consider the da'as of a cheiresh to be worthless, he is not having kavana for biah which is needed even by yibum? Perhaps one could say that although a cheiresh doesn't have da'as when it comes to something significant, a small amount of da'as he still has, and therefore has the capacity to have da'as to do bi'ah, even though his intellect is not capable of da'as kinyan or da'as for mitzvos.

However, Tosafos Yeshanim 54a dealt with this question and explains differently. They explain that the requirement of da'as for biah is relative to the persons ability. A regular person who is capable of da'as for bi'ah, is required to have that level of da'as when doing yibum, otherwise he is not koneh. But a cheiresh who is not capable of having da'as even for bi'ah, can be koneh even without da'as. I find this to be a tremendous chiddush, bec. we usually have a minimum requirement for da'as. Where do we ever see that the amount of da'as the Torah requires depends on how much da'as you have?

Yevamos 55b - Gmar Biah for Yevama

Tosafos raises a contradiction between the gemara in kiddushin which implies that ha'arah does not work as biah for kiddushin, and in yevamos it says that it does work. Tosafos says that if he does only ha'arah then it works, but if he does a g'mar biah then he is only koneh at the completion of the biah since his da'as is on the g'mar biah. The Nemukei Yosef here and Ran in Kiddushin (brought in Beis Shmuel 166:6) writes that by a yevama even if his mind is on g'mar biah, he is already koneh at the time of ha'arah since his intent is not rellevant bec. even if they are both anusim he is koneh her.

However, Tosafos Yeshanim asks How can the gemara discuss whether the positive mitzvah of yibum will push off the issur of a widow to kohen gadol, the issur is violated at the time of ha'arah, yet the mitzvah of yibum is not performed until the g'mar biah, so it is not b'idnah. This question can be answered in many different ways. My point is to focus on the assumption of the question that yevama is only acquired with g'mar biah. It seems to me that the Tosafos Yeshanim understands that since the simple reading of the Torah "lehakim sheim" implies g'mar biah, we assume that a person who does a g'mar biah will have in mind to be koneh only with g'mar biah, and would not be koneh with ha'arah. Clearly, this is against the Ran and Nimukei Yosef, but the question is: Since da'as in not a factor, he should be koneh with ha'arah even if his mind is on g'mar biah (which is the proof of the Ran and Nimukei Yosef)?

Perhaps the chiddush of being koneh even o'nes is limited to a situation where he did not have intent to be koneh. But if he had explicit intent NOT to be koneh his yevama with biah, he would not be koneh her (i am not sure if this is true - any proofs for or against?). Therefore, when he does a g'mar biah the Tosafos Yeshanim understands that it is as if he has explicit intent to be koneh with g'mar biah and NOT ha'arah. That is why they assume that you are not koneh with ha'arah (not like the Ran and Nimukei Yosef).

Yevamos 54a - Giving up your life and Capital punishment

Sometimes when you are physically forced to do an issur, you are not doing the issur at all. For example if someone bends your body in front of avodah zarah, you are not doing the issur at all. Similarly, R' Chaim points out that if you are being forced to allow yourself to be thrown on a child, you are not doing the issur of retzicha at all. However, sometimes when you are forced, you are still doing the issur. For example if someone puts non-kosher food down your throat, you did the issur of eating issur just that you were physically forced (which is: 1. o'nes 2. passive). Similarly, if you are physically forced to commit adultery, you did the issur just that you were physically forced (R' Chaim asks how tosafos can compare a passive act of adultery to a passive act of murder since by adultery you committed the issur, but by murder you were just a weapon. see R' Elchonon 48 who explains Tosafos).

Tosafos assumes that the rules for yehareg v'al ya'avor are that if you are being forced to do an issur actively or passively doing an issur b'ratzon (willfully), you must give up your life. But if you are: 1. being forced to violate the issur and 2. passive i.e. karka olam, you do not have to give up your life. However, the rules for when you are liable for capital punishment is different. Originally (when Tosafos asks the question from yehareg v'al ya'avor) Tosafos holds that whenever you were supposed to give up you life and instead violated the issur, you are liable for capital punishment. But, Tosafos then changes that whenever you are forced, you are not liable for capital punishment. But if it was intentional you are liable for capital punishment, regardless of whether you were active or passive.

See First Comment

Yevamos 51b - Biah of a 9 year old

Rashi explains that reuven who was 9 did biah he would be koneh her, and if she then has biah with shimon (who was also 9) afterward, it would not assur her in reuven. Rashi asks that it should assur her just as any married women that commits adultery should be assur to the first. Rashi's answer doesn't make sense as Tosafos points out.

Tosafos asks specifically on Rashi that it should be similar to a shomeres yaveim that is mezaneh with someone from the street, that she becomes assur to her yevama. See Rashash who does not understand Tosafos question. R' Elchonon (43:1) explains that the yerushalmi says that acc. to abba shaul that biah for beauty results in a mamzer is bec. he holds like r' akiva that chayvei lavin make a mamzer, and when he has biah for beauty it is not a mitzvah of yibum so it is like yevama l'shuk. Similarly, a bias kattan since it can't be koneh mi'doraysa it is like yevama l'shuk which should pasul her. Based on this Tosafos is asking that the biah of Reuven when he is 9 should pasul her to Reuven himself, since it is the equivalent of her being mezaneh with someone from the outside.

Tosafos explains that the reason that the biah with shimon doesn't assur her to reuven is bec. it was not done willingly. However, the Rashba has a novel approach from the Ra'avad to answer the question. Even if the biah of reuven will be koneh her as a yevama, it will not create a state of ishus, since ishus does not apply to a child. Therefore, if she is mezaneh after yibum with reuven, she will not be assur to him.

Yevamos 49b - Moshe vs. Other Nevi'im

I always found Rashi's peshat in this gemara to be very insightful. The gemara implies that bec. Moshe's prophecy was with clarity he commented that no one can see Hashem, whereas Yeshaya who did not have clarity commented that he saw Hashem. The exact opposite should make sense! Rashi explains that Moshe had enough clarity to realize that what he was seeing was not Hashem, whereas Yeshaya who did not have clarity was fooled into thinking he saw Hashem even though he actually did not see Hashem. From Rashi we see that sometimes we can define clarity as knowing what we don't understand. For example, one can learn a sugya and comment "the whole thing makes no sense" - that is a lack of clarity. But one can learn the sugya and say "i understand everything except for these 3 points" - that is clarity. The greatness of Moshe is that he had an honest vision and knew what he was not understanding.
Perhaps this would be an alternate explanation to the gemara in chagiga 13b that differentiates between the prophecy of Yeshaya and Yechezkel (aside from rashi and tosafos), that the elaborate details of Yechezkel are indicative of a non-clear vision, where he thought that he saw what he described but didn't even realize he wasn't seeing what he thought he was. Yeshaya who did not elaborate was less fooled by his nevuah than Yechezkel.

Yevamos 49b - Uprooting the Kiddushin

Rashi by sotah seems to view kiddushin as an ongoing process, so that when there is a contradiction between ervah and kiddushin, the kiddushin is automatically broken. So, if there is not tefisas kiddushin by a sotah (meaning she would be like an erva) then her marriage would automatically dissolve when she is mezaneh, from the fact that she is still married and needs a get, we see that there is tefisas kiddushin by a sotah. Tosafos asks, if so then by nidah why would we need a special pasuk saying that there is tefisas kiddushin, we should understand from simple logic that there is tefisas kiddushin from the fact that kiddushin does not dissolve when she becomes a nidah? A simple answer could be that perhaps by nidah kidushin would dissolve (if not for a pasuk teaching that there is tefisas kiddushin), but by sotah since we know she needs a get, clearly kiddushin does not dissolve, and from that we derive that there is tefisas kiddushin.

Another answer is that although it is obvious m'sevara that if kiddushin would not be tofeis by a sotah, it would automatically dissolve, that is bec. she will never again be mutar to her husband. But by a nidah where she won't be assur forever and will later become mutar to her husband, we wouldn't say m'sevara that the kidushin will dissolve.

Yevamos 48b - Tosafos: Rejecting Avoda Zarah

Tosafos d.h. r' eliezer, points out that according to r' akiva part of the process of yefas toar is to reject avoda zarah. Tosafos says that this would not fit with the braisa 47b that the entire process of yefas toar is without kabalas hamitzvos, but if there is a kabalas hamitzvos you would do a standard conversion. Tosafos clearly assumes that rejecting avoda zara is the same as kabalas hamitzvos. Why? Does Tosafos assume that all that is needed for kabalas hamitzos by a ger is rejecting avoda zara (but not necessarily does there have to be an acceptance of other mitzvos), or does Tosafos assume that the rejection of avoda zara requires with it an acceptance of all mitzvos?