Yevamos 49b - Uprooting the Kiddushin

Rashi by sotah seems to view kiddushin as an ongoing process, so that when there is a contradiction between ervah and kiddushin, the kiddushin is automatically broken. So, if there is not tefisas kiddushin by a sotah (meaning she would be like an erva) then her marriage would automatically dissolve when she is mezaneh, from the fact that she is still married and needs a get, we see that there is tefisas kiddushin by a sotah. Tosafos asks, if so then by nidah why would we need a special pasuk saying that there is tefisas kiddushin, we should understand from simple logic that there is tefisas kiddushin from the fact that kiddushin does not dissolve when she becomes a nidah? A simple answer could be that perhaps by nidah kidushin would dissolve (if not for a pasuk teaching that there is tefisas kiddushin), but by sotah since we know she needs a get, clearly kiddushin does not dissolve, and from that we derive that there is tefisas kiddushin.

Another answer is that although it is obvious m'sevara that if kiddushin would not be tofeis by a sotah, it would automatically dissolve, that is bec. she will never again be mutar to her husband. But by a nidah where she won't be assur forever and will later become mutar to her husband, we wouldn't say m'sevara that the kidushin will dissolve.

Yevamos 48b - Tosafos: Rejecting Avoda Zarah

Tosafos d.h. r' eliezer, points out that according to r' akiva part of the process of yefas toar is to reject avoda zarah. Tosafos says that this would not fit with the braisa 47b that the entire process of yefas toar is without kabalas hamitzvos, but if there is a kabalas hamitzvos you would do a standard conversion. Tosafos clearly assumes that rejecting avoda zara is the same as kabalas hamitzvos. Why? Does Tosafos assume that all that is needed for kabalas hamitzos by a ger is rejecting avoda zara (but not necessarily does there have to be an acceptance of other mitzvos), or does Tosafos assume that the rejection of avoda zara requires with it an acceptance of all mitzvos?

Yevamos 48 - Kabalas Hamitzvos for an Eved - Delaying Geirus

1. 48a - Rashi learns the entire machlokes between rsb"e and chachamim to be whether the tevilla to set him free must be accompanied by kabalas hamitzvos, but the tevillas avdus certainly would not need kabalas hamitzvos (see Rosh end of siman 38). The sources from the pesukim by milah are difficult since they refer to the point on becoming an eved, not becoming free (see karnei r'eim on maharsha for a dochek peshat). However, based on rashi the distinction between yefas to'ar and eved is that by yefas to'ar where you are trying to make her into a jew by going the the steps of becoming an eved and setting her free within a few hours, she must have a kabalas hamitzvos when you set her free (the same would be for a regular eved that you try to do expedite the process would need kabalas hamitzvos). But, generally an eved will become an eved kenani, keep mitzvos like a women in your home for 20 years and then you will set him free. Since he had the training in mitzvos for 20 years (or whatever amount of time) he doesn't need kabalas hamitzvos. I once asked, why does a bar mitzvah boy not need kabalas hamitzvos like a ger? The answer is that he is like the eved who was trained for years in the keeping of mitzvos, so the transition is seamless even without formal kabala.

2. 48b - When the gemara says that converts are punished for not converting sooner, the ya'avetz explains that they can't be punished for not making a decision to convert until now, because they had not chiyuv to convert. Rather they are punished for delaying the process from the time they made their decision to convert (with this he answers tosafos question, that although Ruth may have been old, she didn't delay from the moment she made a decision). This would also explain why the braisa 47b says that when he accepts we do milah immediately not to delay the mitzvah. Perhaps the problem with delay is not from the perspective of beis din, but rather we encourage the process to mover quickly so that he will not be punished for delaying the process.

רות

rabbi resiman asked in his Navi shiur:

what is the whole issue of Rus being a מואביה the gemara says that she was the daughter of Eglon and the granddaughter of Balak, and we know from Rashi in chumash that Balak was a מדיני and since by a goy we go after the father comes out she wasn't a מואביה but a מדינית?
we can answer based on tosfos 48b

..." וי"ל דבת בנו של עגלון לאו דוקא אלא כלומר דמזרעו היתה כמו בן בנו של נמרוד הרשע (חגיגה יג..."

ולפ"ז ניחא שהיתה מואביה שלא היתה בן אחר בן, ושם בחגיגה ביאר התוספות שג"כ לאו דווקא שלא היה מזרע כוש, וכן הכא בדומה לא חייב שתהיה בן אחר בן.

Yevamos 47a - Accepting Mitzvos

The gemara mentions that we have to tell the potential convert about mitzvos "some light mitzvos and some stringent mitzvos", when he accepts we then do milah, wait for it to heal, then do tevillah and once again tell him about "some light mitzvos and some stringent mitzvos", he then leaves the mikvah and is a full fledged Jew.

It is not so clear to me at which stage he actually is doing the kabalas hamitzvos. The gemara explains that the first time we tell him about mitzvos it is for the purpose of a deterrent, to try and get him to change his mind from conversion (Meiri points out that even telling him the light mitzvos serves as a deterrent bec. it implies that the religion is about insignificant details). This would indicate that the first time we tell him about mitzvos it is not for the purpose of a true kabalas hamitzvos. Furthermore, Rashi seems bothered by this and comments that the real kabalas hamitzvos must take place while he is in the water at the very last stage, as he is about to become a jew. A further proof that the kabalas hamitzvos occurs the 2nd time, not the first, is that the gemara only mentions the 2 talmidei chachamim (which is really 3 as the gemara clarifies) who serve as the beis din are only involved in the later stage. Tosafos 45b explained that the function of the beis din is for kabalas hamitzvos (not tevilla), so it seems clear the the kabalas hamitzvos is really happening the second time, not the first.

Why then does the gemara say "kibel" - if he accepts then we do milah, which implies that the kabalas hamitzvos is before the milah? Perhaps that "kibel" simply means that he wants to continue but does not formally do a kabalas hamitzvos in front of a beis din.

Yevamos 46a - Bishul Akum - Geirus without Milah

1. Does something qualify as being able to be eaten raw and therefore not a problem of bishul akum, if it can be prepared to be eaten raw but instead was cooked? Meaning do we say that since salmon can be eaten raw by salting it i.e. lox, salmon that is cooked by a goy is not bishul akum? It seems from Tosafos that eaten raw must be an achila chashuva, and the proof is that meat that is salted although it can be eaten raw, it is still a problem of bishul akum. If it would be considered an achila chashuva to eat raw salted meat, would Tosafos say that there is no issur at all of bishul akum on meat! It seems clear that even if salted meat would be an achilah chashuva, Tosafos would say that salted meat is not bishul akum. Also, logically the heter is bec. the non-jews involvement in something that could have been eaten raw is considered insignificant. This would only apply to an item that could have been eaten prior to cooking as is, and was then cooked, but we certainly would not say that since it could have been prepared some other way without using heat, it can now be eaten when a non-jew cooked it. Therefore, Tuna fish that is cooked by a non-jew should be a problem of bishul akum, even though some eat small amounts of it while wrapped in seaweed and rice.

2. Tosafos 46b (d.h. drabbi yossi) discusses one who had their "gid" cut off, whether they can convert since milah can't be performed. It seems clear from the gemara in Avoda Zarah 27a "a women is like she is mahul", that the absence of an orla is tantamount to actually having a bris. However, this is only true if we assume that a ger who converts after being circumcised does not need hatafas dam (rabbeinu chananel). But according to the Behag who makes a distinction that a previously circumcised ger who had the status of an orel needs hatafos dam, but a child who was born mahul does not need hatafas dam since he never had status of an orel. Based on the Behag, one can argue that a women "is like she is mahul" bec. she never had the status of orel similar to a child born mahul, but one who had their gid cut off is like a goy who was circumcised prior to conversion who had the status of orel and needs hatafas dam. One could argue that since he has no gid and hatafas dam can't be done, he cannot convert. That is why Tosafos after quoting the Behag needs to be mechadesh that when hatafas dam is impossible i.e. when his gid was cut off, he can still convert.

Kinyan Haguf

When speaking of Kinyan Haguf of a slave we are use to associating it with Kinyan Issur, in this sugya, however, we see this is not so. The Gemara will say that if one acquires a slave from a goy he doesn't aquire a kinyan haguf, BUT if a Goy sells himself then the owner gets a kinyan Guf in him even before he goes to mikveh.
I found the Minchas Chinuch says (347:2) that the Halachic Nafka Mina is for that apply to "his hand is the maters hand"... needs thought... See also Kesef Mishne Avadim 9:4 for this type for concept that a goy can have a kinyan guf in a slave in some cases.

a nation similar to a donkey

I was asked: Rashi brings that one cannot marry a slave from the Hekesh of the nation which is similar to a donkey; why don't we say from this Hekesh that relations with a slave is like relations with a donkey and is forbidden with a capital punishment?
I found this question very intriguing, I posed it to a Talmid Chacham and this is what he answered:
The Drasha uses the word in the pasuk meaning "with" (im) and changes it to "nation" (am), and therefor the hekesh is limited to concepts of nationhood and therefor won't apply to the act of the relations but to the status of marriage and togetherness that they have,
any thoughts?

Yevamos 44a - Oleh L'chalitzha Oleh L'yibum

The gemara says a rule that all who are bound for yibum are bound for chalitzah, but all who are not bound for yibum are not bound for chalitzah. Tosafos assumes that there is also a rule that all who are not oleh l'chalitzah are not oleh l'yibum. Although the gemara never made such a statement, if we follow the rules of logic it is nonetheless true. The rules of logic are that the contra positive is always true, namely "If A then B = If not B then Not A". Since All who are oleh l'yibum are oleh l'chalitzah, therefore All who are not oleh l'chalitzah are not oleh l'yibum. This is why Tosafos assumption is correct (obviously this only works since the definition of "If A then B" is not that the only way to achieve B is A, rather that if one does A they will definitely achieve B so it is impossible to do A and not achieve B, therefore if one did not achieve B that is bec. they did not do A).

On a more lomdush note:

Tosafos says that although if one is not eligible for chalitzah they are not eligible for yibum, a deaf/mute is eligible for chalitzah just impossible for him to perform it, and he therefore is eligible for chalitzah. R' Akiva Eiger (Mishnah Sanhedrin chapt. 2 os 7) asks that a king is considered not eligible for chalitzah since it is against the kavod hamelech for her to spit in front of him, and she is therefore exempt even from yibum. Why it this so, it should be similar to a deaf/mute who is eligible just unable to perform? R' Elchonon (5:5) suggest that we only consider the situation eligible but impossible - 'pumei ka'iv lei" when it could technically change, but an issur to spit in front of a king will always be there and is considered not eligible. This answer is difficult bec. the point is that the inability to perform chalitzah is an external factor both by the deaf/mute and by the king.

R' Moshe (Igros E.H. 1:158) gives a very clear answer, he assumes that we look at it from the perspective of the mitzvah. So, a deaf/mute has a mitzvah of chalitzah just that he is unable to perform it, so he is still obligated in the mitzvah of yibum. But a king has not mitzvah of chalitzah since it is assur to perform it, therefore he is not eligible for yibum and since there is no mitzvah of yibum or chalitzah, there is no zika.

Yevamos 43b - Aveilus Chadasha and Yeshana

The gemara concludes that a Nesuah cannot even do Eirusin during aveilus chadasha, but during aveilus yeshana it is permitted. But masah u'matan and laundering are the opposite, they are permitted during aveilus chadasha (during shloshim), but assur by yeshana (as a side point: the gemara seems to understand that shloshim of aveilus chadasha is equal to shavua shechal bo of yeshana).

2 separate points:

1. Tosafos is bothered about this distinction. Tosafos seems to explain that the 2 contrasts of the gemara of 1. yeshana vs. chadasha, 2. rabim vs. yachid, are coming to explain these distinctions. Regarding eirusin, we are more machmir by an aveilus chadasha since it is more chamur, rather than an old aveilus which we don't have to be so strict about. However, regarding masah u'matan and laundering, we are machmir by a public aveilus from doing public activities bec. it looks as if you are not concerned about the aveilus, but by a private aveilus where it is not obvious to others that you are in a state of aveilus we are not machmir about public activities since people don't realize that you are an avel. Therefore, the distinction between chadasha and yeshana explains eirusin, and the distinction between rabim and yachid explains masah u'matan and laundering.

2. Tosafos has an approach that the mitzvah of pru u'rvu would override 12 months for a father and mother but not shloshim (Rabbeinu Tam then goes further to suggest that it can even override shloshim). Similarly at the end of Tosafos there is a tzad that seudas mitzvah will override 12 months of a father and mother but not shloshim. If we assume that 12 months is a chiyuv of aveilus for a father and mother similar to sheloshim of other relatives, it is not clear why we should make a distinction. This distinction seens to be a support for R' Moshe that the aveilus of 12 months is not a din in aveilus (see also chochmas adam 166:2), rather a mitzvah of kibud av, therefore, a mitzvah cannot push off aveilus, but it can override the mitzvah of kibud av.

Yevamos 42a - Waiting 3 Months after Conversion

A Jewish man lived with a non-jewish woman for years, she then converted and he did teshuvah, do they have to wait 3 months before getting married?

First, the mishnah 24b says that a non-jewish women who is suspected of having relations with a jewish man cannot marry her after she converts. The reason given in the gemara (explained by rashi) is that getting married strengthens the suspicion that they did in fact have relations. However, R' Shlomo Kluger in Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 11:5) points out that if they definitely had relations (not just suspect), then it should be permitted since in that case the marriage is not strengthening the "rumors", since we know for sure that they were mezaneh. However, the Nimukei Yosef (brought in Beis Shmuel) says that even if they definitely had relations, they cannot get married. R' Moshe (Igros E.H. 1:27) is mechadesh that the Nimukei Yosef is concerned that by getting married they would be publicizing the sin that they commited by having relations. This only applies to a situation where we know for sure they had relations but it was not public knowledge, however when they actually lived together, so it is public knowledge, one is supposed to publicize the aviera when they do teshuva.

Regarding waiting 3 months, R' Moshe writes matter of factly that she must wait. I don't understand why she needs to wait. We require havchana whenever we don't know who the father is, or don't know if conception occurred before or after his conversion (either for the purpose of shechina resting, or for the purpose of not leading to ervah). But, here everything is very clear, the child is Jewish since she converted while pregnant (or before she became pregnant). The father was jewish the whole time so that any son born later will be a brother both from the father and from the mother, so there won't be any concern even if yibum is done. Why would there be a need for havchana?

Perhaps the need for havchana is bec. we are concerned that before she converted she had z'nus with someone else. This is really a machlokes on 35a whether a convert has to wait 3 months or do we assume that she avoided becoming pregnant since she had in mind to convert. Although the Beis Yosef (13:5) argues on the magid mishna and says that we are concerned that she was mezaneh and became pregnant, in Shulchan Aruch he seemed to come out that she does not have to wait (Beis Shmuel 13:7). Why then is R' Moshe machmir for havchana? Is there any point in havchana to determine whether conception occurred before or after she converted (it shouldn't make a difference for anything)?

Yevamos 41b - Chalitzah within 3 Months

The gemara says that based on the rule of kol ha'oleh l'yibum..., chaltizah cannot be done so long as there is an issur to do yibum (provided that the issur will go away sometime in the future so the issue is only about delaying the chalitzah - rashi). The rationale seems to be that the chalitzah is considered "weak" whenever yibum isn't possible (that is the implication of rashi that when you can wait, you should wait to have the chalitza done b'heter). The gemara asks that we find that chalitzah can be done to a women who is a safek and may be the sister of his zekukah, even though it would be assur to do yibum to her until the safek is clarified. The gemara answers that when the issur of yibum is bec. of a safek, if Eliyahu Hanavi would clarify the safek then yibum can be done, therefore we consider her eligible for chaltiza. But within the first 3 months even if Eliyahu Hanavi would determine that she is not pregnant we would still not allow yibum since there was a gezeira of havchana, not just a chashash of her being pregnant (as we see that even by a ketana and many other women who cannot possibly be pregnant are included in the gezeira of havchana).

We see that even if practically yibum cannot be done since the safek has not been resolved by eliyahu, we would still allow chalitzah. Why? Shouldn't we say that since practically speaking yibum can't be done, so chalitzah can't be done either? It seems that the reason why chazal instituted an issur of chalitzah when yibum can't be done is not bec. the inability to perform yibum makes the chalitzah weak, but rather bec. people will see that chalitzah was done in such a situation and come to do yibum in the same situation. Therefore, in a case of safek they were not concerned bec. people who see that chalitzah was done will assume that the safek has been resolved and that is why chalitzah was allowed to be done. But in a situation where there is an issur yibum bec. of a gezeira i.e. havchana, if we would allow chaltiza, people will assume that if chalitza is allowed then yibum is also allowed.

Yevamos 40a - Achilah Gassa - Overeating

Tosafos asks that we find in nazir and horyos that achila gassa is not mitzvah min hamuvchar but it is called "achila". Tosafos answers that there are 2 types of achila gassa (see Tosafos Yeshanim - first answer is very unclear ?). In Pesachim 107b Tosafos explains this answer that when a person has no desire to eat more that is achila gassa that is still called achila and therefore they fulfill their mitzvah of eating pesach. But when a person is so full that they are disgusted with eating, that type of achila gassa is not called achila i.e. you are not yotzei on pesach and you are not in violation on yom kippur.

Based on Tosafos, when the gemara is looking for 2 types of achila for abba shaul, we should answer like the gemara does that if he wants he can eat l'teiavon, and if he wants achila gassa. But the type of achila gassa that we would be refering to is the one where you have no desire to eat but are not at the point where you are disgusted with food and that type of achila gassa is called achila. The pasuk would be telling you that you must eat l'teiavon, to the exclusion of even this type of achila gassa. Why does the gemara only entertain the more sever type of achila gassa and not the lesser form of achila gassa?

Yevamos 39b - Abba Shaul: Wrong Intentions Make the Child a Mamzer

Abba Shaul says that one who has improper intentions when performing the mitzvah of yibum (i.e. he is motivated by physical desires rather than the intent of performing the mitzvah) is "as if he had relations with an ervah" and there is a concern of the child being a mamzer. The opinion of Abba Shaul is very difficult:

1. From the phrase it sounds as if he is not convinced that the intentions actually make a difference?

2. R' Elchonon (kovetz hearos 36:1) points out that abba shaul and the rabbanan seem to be arguing about 2 things. First, acc. to rabbonon he can acquire her even if he has the wrong intentions - abba shaul argues and says that he would not be koneh her. Second, the rabbonon would say that even if he is not koneh her, there is also no issur of eishes ach, similar to a miuberes acc. to reish lakish (when she later miscarries), although he did not perform yibum and was not koneh her, there is no issur eishes ach - abba shaul disagrees and says there is an issur eishes ach.

3. The Poras Yosef points out that from the fact that the mishnah in bechoros is based on abba shaul, it implies that even though originally they had pure intent for mitzvah, and later they did not have pure intent for mitzvah but also had intent for beauty, abba shaul's ruling applies that there is a concern of issur eishes ach. This seems to contradict what we normally assume by mitzvos. Even acc. to the opinion that mitzvos require kavana, one can have an ulterior motive as well and that would not detract from the kavana of the mitzvah. Here by Yibum, abba shaul seems to require PURE kavana for mitzvah without any ulterior motive. Clearly, his requirement is not to have kavana for mitzvah, but rather NOT to have ulterior motives.

Yevamos 37b - Who Will Be Mine for a Day?

The Siderei Tahara (Y.D. 192:6) quotes an interesting question from the achronim. Perhaps in the days of Rav and Rav Nachman the chumrah of R' Zeirah to keep 7 clean days for even nidah, was not yet popular. Therefore, when Rav and R' Nachman called "who will be mine for a day", they were looking for women who were on their 7th day of nidah (deoraysa), so that even if they have blood from the chimud, they will still be able to go to the mikvah that night and be tahor (Any women who is not yet on her 7th day would be a problem since if she sees blood she will still need 7 days, but for someone on their 7th day of nidah there should not be a problem). So how can the gemara ask from the statement of Rava that Dam Chimud would require "7 clean days", that is only in the time of Rava which was after R' Zeirah that Chimud would require 7 clean days, but in the days of Rav and R' Nachman it would not require 7 clean days?

Yevamos 36a - 1. Oleh l'yibum o'leh l'chalitza. 2. Chalitzah after Bi'ah to Meuberes

2 points:

1. R' Elchonon (38:3) points out that normally the rule of kol ha'ola l'yibum.... means that if there is zikas yibum then there is chalitza, to the exclusion of a case where there is no zikas yibum. But here, the gemara can't possibly mean that rule, since there is zikas yibum even when she is pregnant (bec. even acc. to reish lakish there is no issur eishes ach to have biah with her when she is pregnant so long as the vlad turn out to be not shel kayama as we said yesterday - the reason why there is no issur eishes ach is bec. there is zikah). Rather, the gemara means that in a situation where yibum cannot be performed now bec. the bi'ah will not be effective to be koneh her and patur the tzarah, the chalitza will also not be effective. This is very meduyak in rashi on the top of the page vs. rashi 44a.

2. Yesterday I pointed out that acc. to reish lakish, rashi explains that the bi'ah while she is pregnant (in a case where she later miscarries), aside from not being an issur eishes ach, makes it impossible to free her with chalitzah. Rashi is medayek this from the mishna and gemara which says that the only solution is to do yibum after she miscarries, which implies that there is no other solution. However, the maharsha 36b explains that rashi 36b when he says that she needs a get but does not need chalitzah is going acc. to r' yochanan, but acc. to reish lakish he would need a get and chalitzah (see also tosfos yeshanim). From the maharsha we see that even after he had bi'ah there is a solution to free her by a get and chaltizah, the chalitzah would be deoraysa and the get would be derabonon as a penalty for entering a safek. This seems to contradict rashi 35b who understands that once bi'ah was done, chalitzah no longer works mideoraysa?

Yevamos 35b - Hagdara of Bi'as Miuberes Acc. To Reish Lakish

Acc. to Reish Lakish it is not clear what the hagdara of the bi'ah would be to a miuberes when the vlad is found to be not bar kayama (it is also not so clear whether there is a nafka minah between the version that learns if from sevara and the version that learns if from a pasuk). The gemara is clear that it would not work to acquire her like normal yibum, but it is not clear if there would be an issur of eishes ach. Tosafos points out from the fact that you are not chayev a korban that there would not be an issur of eishes ach. It seems that since it is a situation of Yibum there is no issur of eishes ach, but since at the moment the child could turn out to be bar kayama, the yibum does not take effect.

Rashi (d.h. d'lo sagi) understands from the gemara that if he would have bi'ah with her, and the child is found to be not bar kayama, he can no longer do chalitzah "since he did have bi'ah with her". It could be that rashi means to say that there would be an issur to do chalitzah since that would retroactively render the bi'ah to be an issur of eishes ach (but if he did chalitzah it would be effective). It seems more meduyak in rashi that the biah is considered to be the start of the mitzvah, just that it does not complete the mitzvah. Since the bi'ah starts the mitzvah, it strengthens her zikah to him so that chalitzah is no longer effective.

Yevamos 34b - Yibum before and after Matan Torah

There is a lot to speak about (Yossi - this is more your type of thing, not mine). I just want to make 1 point.

The gemara says that Onen did not have regular biah bec. he wanted to avoid having a child since "lo lo yihyeh hazerah" - meaning the child would not be his. What kind of rationale is this? From all perspectives of the halacha we consider the child to be his, so what was his concern? Rashi writes in chumash that Yehuda told Onen to do Yibum and call the child after Er. Ramban asks that the gemara already says that there is no requirement to call the child "al shem achiv hameis". The Re'eim answers that we are motzi the pasuk from peshuto based on a gezeira shava to nachala (yevamos 24a) which is only after matan torah, but before matan torah it was k'pshuto that the child was called after the dead brother. Based on this it seems that although after matan torah we understand the pasuk to be limited to inheritance (and actually refers to the yaveim not the child) and we don't consider the child to be that of the dead brother. Prior to matan torah we consider the child for all purposes to be the child of the dead brother - the father doesn't even have the right to name the child. Therefore, Onen did not want to have a child since the child would not carry his name at all.

Yevamos 34a - Issur Achilah and Issur Hana'ah

We find in rashi 3 different methods of creating an issur mosif. 1. the cheftzah shel issur becomes assur to more people. 2. the cheftza shel issur becomes more assur i.e. was assur to eat and now becomes assur b'hana'ah. 3. the cheftza shel issur becomes more limited in what you can do with it i.e. assur l'mizbeiach (rashi here considers this mosif, but in shavuos 24b considers this kollel). The commonality of them all is that the cheftzah shel issur becomes more severe in its issur.

2 points:

1. It seems that it is only considered issur mosif if on a practical level the 2nd issur increases severity such as when aishes ach is chal on top of achos isha, the women who is the cheftza of issur becomes assur to more people (all the husbands brothers). This would only apply if he actually has other brothers aside from the one who is married to his wife's sister. Based on this, when we say that nosar is an issur mosif bec. it becomes assur l'mizbeiach, is that only when there is a mizbeiach, but if the mikdash would be destroyed before it becomes nosar, it would not be an issur mosif?

2. Rashi explains that when the issur of hekdesh is chal on the issur of cheilev, it is an issur mosif since the piece of issur now becomes assur b'hana'ah. Why is this called an issur mosif, it is an entirely different type of issur - even if an issur achilas kodshim can't be chal on top of an issur to eat cheilev, if one would eat it he would be in violation of eating cheilev and also benefiting from kodshim (since eating is also a benefit). I found that R' Elchonon (33:7) asks a similar question, but not exactly on this Rashi. R' Elchonon suggests that every issur achila is really a limited issur hana'ah. Therefore, the original issur of cheilev is a limited form of issur hana'ah so that the issur hana'ah of kodshim can't be chal on it (if not for the fact that it is an issur mosif). However, R' Elchonon points out that based on this one can only be chayev for eating when there is a benefit, but if there is no han'ah in the eating he should not be chayev for achila.

נכסי דבר שטיא וגדר חזקת מרא קמא

reb avi allow me to go back for a momet, the blog was quiet so i figured why not, i didn't get a chance to look into your posts yet...
נשאלתי: בגמא לעיל הביאה ראיה שבספק גירושין שע"י תרי אומרים קרוב לו ותרי אומרים קרוב לה א"א לונר שהוי ספק דאורייתא וליכא למיסמך אחזקה דמותרת לשוק דהוי דומיא דנכסי דבר שטיא דהוי תרי אומרים שהיה שוטה ותרי אומרים דהיה חלים ואוקמי אראע בחזקת בר שטיא וא"כ מוכח דף בכי האי גוונא אזלינן בתר חזקה,
ובפשטות תמוה דמה ענין חזקת ממון דמרא קמא לחזקת איסור והיתר, דחזקת ממון הוי דין שאע"פ שאין בירור אוקמי ממונא בחזקת מרא קמא כעין שאמרינן המע"ה
ומצאתי דהבאר יצחק לר"א ספקטור יו"ד י"ח הביא ראיה מגמרא זו שחזקת מרא קמא הוי ממש כעין חזקה דמעיקרא כעין איסור והיתר ולא הוי דומה להמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה, ובאינצקךופדי תלמודית ערך חזקת מרא קמא מביא מ"ח אחרונים בגדרה של חזקת מרא קמא עכ"פ מגמרא זו לכאורה ראיה חזקה לרי"א ספקטור וסיעתו

Yevamos 33a - Is R' Chiya a Liar?

The gemara uses a very strange phrase. It seems that the assumption of the gemara is that when there is a machlokes that stems from a mesorah i.e. whether Rebbi said you are chayev 1 or 2, the rule is that both positions have to be justified. Meaning each opinion has to explain not only why he is correct but also pinpoint the mistake of his colleague bec. otherwise he would be claiming that his colleague is a liar by saying over a wrong mesorah (to the exclusion of an argument in sevara where each side presents its logic). Someone in my shiur asked if this is a standard rule that anytime 2 opinions argue about what they heard from their rebbi, does each one have to justify how his colleague could have made a mistake? We find many places where there is a machlokes about what someone said (like between r' avin and r' dimi) and the gemara never makes a big deal of how each one can claim the other is a liar?

Someone else suggested that it could be that only here where they supported their mesorah by taking an oath, does each have to justify the opinion of his friend.

Yevamos 33a - Issur Chal Al Issur

I was in Eretz Yisroel for 2 weeks for a wedding. I apologize and I hope to get back to the regular posting.

R' Elchonon (kovetz hearos 30:7) raises the question whether the concept of ein issur chal al issur, prevents the second issur from being chal at all so that there is no prohibition regarding the second issur, or is it just a din in punishment that one cannot be punished for the second issur.

He proves from Tosafos who explains that the issur zarus is chal simultaneously with the issur neveila (by a bird that melikah was done to), since the issur neveila cannot be chal on top of the issur meilah, and the issur meila is only removed with the sprinkling of the blood, so both the issur zarus and the issur neveila are chal together at the time of sprinkling the blood. R' Elchonon points out, if the issur of neveila is actually chal at the time of melika but only in respect to punishment do we say that you can't be chayev for neveila until after zerika (so in respect to punishment alone neveila is chal at zerika), how can the issur zarus which only begins at zerika be chal on top of the issur neveila which is chal at the time of melika. From the fact that tosafos assumes that both zarus and neveila occur simultaneously at the time of zerika, it is clear that 'ein issur chal al issur' prevents even the issur neveila from being chal on top of the issur meilah.

R' Elchonon proves the same point from the Nekudah Nifla'ah of the Rambam in Krisus.

גירות

בפשטות קריאת הגמרא היה נראה שבדיעיבד אם גר נתגייר כדי להינשא ליהודית וכדומה הוא גר גמור. אך מהרמב"ם נראה שזה ספק וחוששים לגירותו,
לאחר העיון כך נראה: דהמ"ח בגמרא הוא באופן שידוע שהיה קבלת מצוות אך הסיבה היתה בשביל אישות וכדו' דלחד מ"ד לא הוי גירות אך אנו פוסקים שבדיעבד הוי גירות כיון שהיה קבלת מצוות, אך יש חוץ מזה גם חשש שלא היה קבלת מצוות שלימה ולזה אומר הרמב"ם שמחכים ורואים איך יתנהגו ואזלנן לחומרא, אך אפילו אם יש וודאי קבלת מצוות עדיין לכתחילה ב"ד לא מקבלים ולחד מ"ד אפי' בדיעבד לא חל וע"ע בהגהות הגר"א בשו"ע

brain teaser 13b

I was asked this by a talmich chacham:
תוספות לעיל יג ב' מקשה מדוע צריך פסוק לאשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו והרי דרכיה דרכי נועם ותי' שם התוספות דצריך פסוק כשהאם מעוברת והו"א שהיבמה תחכה עד שתלד האם . והרע"א מקשה שם שאפילו האם מעוברת יהא מותר ליבמה להנשא לשוק אפילו בלי דין אשת אחיו שלא היה בעולמו דהרי מחצה נקיבות ומיעוטא מפילות ויש רוב שהילוד לא יהא זכר בן קיימא.
ואותו ת"ח ר"ל כך: שמדוע לא תירץ רע"א שצריך הדרשא באופן שיש שני נשים מעוברות שאז יש כבר רוב שאחד מהילדים יהיה זכר בן קיימא. דבשלמא עם הספק היה על האמהות אפשר לפסוק שיש רוב על כל מעוברת אך הספק הוא הרי על האב אם יהיה לו בן קיימא.

Yevamos 20b - 21a - Yibum Works Bidieved

The gemara suggests that yibum is considered "efshar lekayem shnayhem" by doing chalitzah, and then asks "im ba'alu kanu" - meaning that if there were no mitzvah of yibum when chalitzah can be done, yibum should not even work to be koneh bidieved. It seems that the gemara has 2 assumptions: 1. the kinyan of yibum is dependent on the fulfilling of the mitzvah. 2. the concept of efshar lekayem shnayhem does not only create an issur to to yibum but rather makes it that you have not fulfilled the mitzvah of yibum at all. Therefore the gemara asks, that since yibum is koneh bidieved, it must be that chalitzah is not called efshar lekayem shnayhem.

This seems plausible by the concept of efshar lekayem shneyhem, but this will not explain the gemaras question 21a by an aseh not pushing off a lo sa'aseh and aseh. The shita of the rivah is that the aseh does in fact push off the lo sa'aseh (i.e. no malkus), but it is assur to do it since the aseh of yibum does not push off the aseh. It seems clear that acc. to the rivah, if one were to do the mitzvah of yibum, although it is assur to do so, they did in fact fulfill the mitzvah, so why does the gemara say that if one would do yibum to an almanah min hanesuin, it does not exempt the tzarah, which implies that the mishnah was not fulfilled?

sorry for being brief - i am in jerusalem now and don't have that much computer time.

אסור לבטל מצוות יבמין

אסור לבטל מצוות יבמין is this specifically here or is this a general rule in shas that one may not cause a mitzva to be מתבטל?
I found the ברכ"א discusses this, he comes out that's its zika oriented as may -for example- be מפקיר his fruits to become פטור from תרו"מ

What is זיקה

the ברכת אברהם brings an argument if the concept of זיקה is מדרבנן or מדאורייתא. The proof that it is דאורייתא is from the fact that the יבם can be מפר the נדרים of his יבמה if one holds of זיקה.

He offers an explanation of sorts to this idea. The idea of being מקודשת makes a woman forbidden to the whole world and designated for one man. Yibum id similar in that she is forbidden to the world and designated for the brother. In the case of 2 brothers only one of the qualities of קידושין are there as she is forbidden to the world but not designated to a specific brother. This is why some hold that only by one brother there is זיקה. At the end, even if one holds of זיקה it is not a regular דין קידושין as one may marry the sister of his חלוצה and many other such examples.

Yevamos 16a - Exiting Through 3 Different Doors

The gemara tells that R' Elazar Ben azarya, R' Yehoshua and R' Akiva all exited through different doors. Tosafos explains that they did this in order to avoid Yonasan Ben Hurkinas who would prove the opinion of Beis Shamai to be correct and they would have to establish the halacha like B"S to do yibum to a tzaras ervah. The obvious question is, if they knew that Yonasan would prove his position that Beis Shamai was correct, how are they allowed to deliberately avoid him? R' Elchonon (divrei sofrim 5:15) explains that these 3 Rabbonim had a kabbalah from Chagai Hanvi that B"H position is correct. But, they realized that Yonasan would be smarter than them and present arguments and proofs that they would not be able to refute. Ain l'dayan ela mah sh'einav ro'os, so they would be forced to submit and pasken like B"S, even they knew that B"H was correct. Therefore, they avoided Yonasan so as not to hear his proofs so that they can continue holding like B"H. He continues to explain that in the machlokes B"S and B"H in general, we now pasken like B"H only bec. we can't grasp the true opinion of B"S who were much sharper, but in the world to come, when we will be enlightened to higher levels of understanding we will follow Beis Shamai.

This reminds me of a story from the sridei eish that he writes about the rogotchov - see comment #1.

I will be away for a little while starting sunday - R' Yossi and R' Aryeh please start posting!!

Yevamos 15a - Agudos and B"S following their opinion

There are many difficulties with this sugya.

1. The gemara 14a asks on the opinion that b"s practiced their opinion regarding the tzaras ervah, how can they do that, what about lo tisgodidu. What is the gemara suggesting that they do instead, can they allow a yevama leshuk just to avoid lo tisgodidu (perhaps chalitzah would have been a solution, but that should also be lo tisgodidu since b"h didn't require it)?

2. Also, why does the gemara ask only on b"s that if they practiced their opinion it would be an issur of making agudos, why not ask the same question on b"h - who says it was b"s that was causing the split, maybe it was b"h?

3. Tosafos 15a d.h. v'sicheich, proves from the gemara that acc. to the opinion that b"s followed the practice of b"h, that is even when b"h was lenient. How can b"s submit and follow b"h to be lenient since they held that it is assur?

4. The rashash points out that rashi 15b states explicitly as the gemara strongly implies, that the opinon who says that b"s did not practice their opinion, that is only to avoid making agudos agudos, but the gemara 14a says clearly that the rationale for not practicing their opinion is that they were sharper and/or don't care about the bas kol?

5. Since the gemara concludes that there is no issur of agudos between b"s and b"h bec. they are different batei dinim (either in 2 cities acc. to abaya and even in 1 city acc. to rava), how can rashi explain that the opinion who says that b"s did not practice what they held was bec. of agudos?

See comment for a mehalech.

Yevamos 14a - Lo Tisgodidu

Tosafos asks why there is no issue of Lo Tisgodidu by the fact that the cities and villages read on different days. Tosafos answers that it is impossible to suggest that the reading was done by the city person for the villagers, bec. on the day prior to the 14th the city person is not obligated in the mitzvah of reading and cannot read for others. Therefore, the villagers must of had a village person read for them. Thus, they had no need to come to the city to read, rather they read in their village, in which case it is like 2 batei dinim in 2 different cities so there is no problem of Lo Tisgodidu. Rashi in Maseches Megillah 2a writes clearly that the city person read for the villagers (rashi considers the city person to be a bar chiyuva even on the earlier day - see ritvah there). Rashi clearly holds that the villagers came to the city to hear the megillah, so the question of Tosafos is still applicable, since there are 2 customs being maintained within 1 city, it should be a problem of Lo Tisgodidu? It seems to me that Rashi himself 13b understands that the issue of Lo Tisgodidu was only considered a problem between the walled and non-walled cities since the walled city people cannot read on the 14th, and the non-walled city people cannot read on the 15th - that is 2 entirely separate customs. But, the villagers who ideally should read on the 14th as well and can actually read on the 14th, just that chazal were lenient on them and allowed them to read earlier, there is no issur of Lo Tisgodidu at all for them to read in the city prior to the 14th.

Yevamos 13a - Tzaras Tzara: Rav Ashi

The gemara is looking for a source for tzaras tzara (acc. to rashi - see tosafos 2a that we are looking for a source for tzaras tzaras tzara....). Rav Ashi says that just as the tzara is bemakom the ervah, so too the tzaras tzara is bemakom the ervah. Rashi on the mishna 2b (and also 8b d.h. im kein) seems to understand that since the ervah exempts her tzara, the tzara is herself an eishes ach not b'makom mitzvah, therefore she herself is an ervah of eishes ach which will assur the tzaras tzara. However, R' Elchonon (siman 3:15) explains that the pesukim teach us that b'makom mitzvah the tzarah herself becomes assur with the same issur as the ervah. If the ervah is a daughter, then the tzara of a daughter will be like a daugher in regard to the exemption from yibum. It is not the issur of eishas ach that exempts the tzaras tzara, but rather the original ervah of bito.
The approach of r' elchanan assumes that there would not be an issur eishes ach placed on the tzaras ervah since she fell b'yibum, and there would only be an issur of "bito". This would answer why we need a source for tzaras tzara (either a pasuk or sevara) and we don't simply say that a tzaras tzara is really just a tzaras ervah of eishes ach. We would have thought that the issur of bito becomes diluted and can't pass on to tzaras tzarah, and therefore we need either a pasuk or sevara to be mechadesh that it does.

Yevamos 13b - Is the Mitzvah Dependent on the Issur?

I assumed that the mitzvah of yibbum depended on the situation of eishas ach, but not on the issur of eishes ach. It just so happens that in the situation of eishas ach there is also an issur. However, Rashi explains that acc. to beis shamai who is matir the tzaras ervah in yibum bec. the issur of "aishes ach" isn't chal on the preexisting issur of a daughter. Since the issur of "aishes ach" is not chal on the ervah, the ervah doesn't fall b'yibum and it is as if she is not here at all so she does not exempt her tzarah from yibum. Clearly Rashi explains that the mitzvah of yibum isn't just dependent on the situation of being married to a brothers wife, but is dependent on there actually being an issur of aishes ach. This sheds new light on the concept of mitzvaso bekach as it applies to yibum. The torah specifically gave this mitzvah only in a situation of issur. Similarly we can explain by kelayim in bigdei kehuna - it is not just coincidental that the torah wanted the kohens clothing to be made from wool and linen which happen to be an issur of kelayim. Rather the mitzvah of bigdei kehuna is to wear clothes that are a violation of the issur kelyaim.

Yevamos 12b - 3 Women Who Can Have Relations with a Moch

R' Elchanon (kovetz hearos siman 23) discusses whether it is permitted for a person to put themselves into a situation where they will have to use pikuach nefesh to permit an issur. He proves from the Ba'al Hameor who forbids leaving on a ship within 3 days of Shabbos because it is likely that you will find yourself in a situation of pikuach nefesh and have to be mechalel shabbos, that it is only an issur derabonon but not deoraysa (if it would be an issur deoraysa it should not matter if it is within 3 days or more than 3 days). Once it is only an issur derabonon, we can be matir for shalom bayis. Therefore, one would be allowed to have relations with a women for whom it is dangerous to become pregnant, even though after relations she will use a 'moch' to prevent pregnancy (i am not sure about the statistical success rate associated with this form of birth control). This explanation would be necessary if we learn the gemara to be speaking about a moch after relations (tosafos in the name of rabbeinu tam) and would be an issur if not for pikuach nefesh. But, according to Tosafos who explains that these 3 women MUST use a moch, which implies that other also are allowed to bec. there is no issur for her to remove the shichvas zerah with a moch after tashmish, we don't need to come onto the heter of pikuach nefesh. Rav Elchonon second guesses his proof, that perhaps there is an issur deoraysa to put oneself into a situation where pikuach nefesh will have to push off the issur and no proof can be brought from the ba'al hameor bec. he may hold that shabbos specifically is "hutrah" for pikuach nefesh (but other issurim which are only "dechuya" there would be an issur deoraysa to lichatchila put oneself into a situation where they will have to rely on the license of pikuach nefesh).

At the end he cites a magen avrohom (o.c. 248) who questions whether one who intentionally put themselves into a situation of pikuach nefesh should rely on it to be docheh shabbos. R' Elchonon explains that by not relying on the heter it comes out retroactively that he did not do an issur by placing himself in that situation. R' moshe has a teshuva where he adamantly disagrees and says that one must use the heter of pikuach nefesh to be docheh shabbos and save their life.

Yevamos 8b - What is Matir the 2nd Biah

Tosafos points out that although we need a pasuk to be matir remarriage after divorcing a yevama, we don't need a pasuk to be matir the 2nd biah, yet when it comes to a chayvei lavin i.e. a divorced women who falls b'yibum to a kohen, the first biah is permitted but the 2nd is not. Why? Tosafos answer is not so clear, but the Tosafos Yeshanim seems to say that if we are "matir" the issur by the first biah, it remains mutar bec. it is not logical that the torah would create an issur by the 2nd biah. But, by chayvei lavin where we are relying on aseh docheh lo s'aseh for the first biah, since the 1st biah is not permitted, rather it is "pushed off", the 2nd biah will be assur.

Tosafos doesn't seem to be saying this exactly. I pointed out from Tosafos earlier that mitzvaso bekach is not necessarily synonomous with "hutra". Therefore, Tosafos could hold that even by the standard case of yibum, although it is mitzvaso bekach, it is only dechuya, not hutra. So the question comes back, Why does the mitzvah of yibum push off the issur of eishes ach even by the 2nd biah, but by a divorcee to a kohen it will only push it off by the 1st biah? What does Tosafos mean by his answer?

Yevamos 7b - Tamei entering Mikdash

The gemara says that a metzorah who is a tevul yom from keri should not be able to stand in machaneh leviya, and he should also not be able to stick his thumbs into machaneh shechina (since partial entering is called entering). The heter for the tevul yom to stand in machaneh leviya (sha'ar nikanor) is that the aseh of korban pesach pushes off the issur of tevul yom in machaneh leviya. But the heter to stick his thumbs into the azarah (machaneh shechina) for behonos is "ho'il v'ishtri" - meaning since we allow him to stick his hands in when he is a metzorah who is automatically mechusar kippurim (and not allowed in machaneh shechina), we also permit him to stick his hands in from the perspective of tevul yom.

Tosafos asks that once we allow him to stick his hands in and we hold that partial entering is a violation of entering, we might as well allow him to walk into the machaneh shechina. Tosafos answers: 1. The issur to go in partially is learned from a hekesh, so we are matir that issur. But the issur to walk in is mefurash in the pasuk, and we are not matir that issur. 2. He is required to reduce his "entry" as much as possible, so since he can accomplish what he needs by sticking his thumbs in, he is not allowed to walk in.

It seems that acc. to the first answer of Tosafos he can stick his entire arm in, since that will still only be a partial entering, but acc. to the 2nd answer he can only stick in the minimum that is necessary i.e. his thumbs but not even his hand and certainly not his arm.

Yevamos 6a - Listening to Parent to do an Aveira

The gemara seems to assume that when a father tells a son to do an aveira there is a mitzvah of kibud av, the only discussion is whether this mitzvah of kibud av is strong enough to push off a lo sa'aseh sheyesh bo kareis. Even Tosafos 6a d.h. nigmar, who says that once we are told that kibud av is not a special strong aseh, we assume it is a weaker aseh and does not even push off a regular lav, still assumes that there is a mitzvah to listen to a father when he tells you to do an aveira, just that it doesn't have the strength to push off an issur.
The Maharatz Chiyus asks based on the gemara in B.M. 62 that if a father is not "oseh ma'aseh amcha" i.e. a rasha, there is no mitzva of kibud av at all. Acc. to this opinion, anytime a father tells the son to do an aveirah he is automatically not oseh ma'aseh amcha, and there is no mitzvah of kibud av at all! How can the gemara assume that there is a mitzvah just that it doesn't override an issur?

Maharatz Chiyus quotes from the Shita Mikubetzes that if the aseh would push of a lo sa'aseh, the father would not be doing anything wrong by telling the son to violate shabbos or do an issur. It is only once we say that kibud av is not docheh the issur that it is considered something wrong. He concludes with a very strong question. Based on the conclusion that the fathers command to do an issur does not push off the issur, thereby making the father an oseh ma'aseh amcha, the reason the son should not listen is simply bec. there is no mitzvah of kibud av at all. So, how can the gemara think to learn from the lav of mechamer to all other places that aseh is not docheh lo sa'aseh, perhaps it is only by chibud av where there is no mitzvah at all to listen, but by other places we would learn from kelayim b'tzizis that aseh is docheh a lo sa'aseh.

יבמות ה' עשה דוחה תרי לאוין

הראה לי אחד המנ"ח ברנ"א שמקשה על רש"י, שרש"י לומד דאחר שנלמד מ'ראשו' של מצורע כבר צריך 'עליה' דאחות אשתו דהו"א העשה ידחה הלאו, ודברי רש"י תמוהין דעדיין לא ידעינן שעשה דוחה לאו שיש בו כרת. ומכח זה לומד המנ"ח דתרי לאוין חמירין כעין כרת, והכא יש תרי לאוין של מקיף ןניקף (!) ולכן למסקנה שעשה לא דוחה לאו שיש בו כרת ה"ה לא דוחה תרי לאוין, חוץ מאצל נזיר דקיל ושם מפורש בתוס' נזיר שכן דוחה אפי' תרי לאוין

יבמות ו ע"א

שיטת רש"י מפורשת שלמסקנה את שבתותי תשמורו שבמצות כיבוד אב ושם בא לאפוקי שחוט לי בשל לי, דהיינו שלמסקנה יש מקור שעשה דוחה ל"ת שיש בו כרת היכא שהוי הכשר מצווה ואין דרך אחרת לקיים העשה. לפ"ז מאד תמוה לי מה ההו"א בגמרא שאת שבתותי תשמורו שבמצות מורא מקדש בא ללמד באם אינו ענין שעשה דוחה לאו וכו' והרי איצטריך לגופיה למימרא שאף שלמדנו מכיבוד אב שעשה דוחה לאו בהכשר מצוה כאן לא דוחה, דהיינו דרק אפשר ללמוד שעשה דוחה וכו' אי לא איצטריך לגופיה (כמבואר תוס' ו ע"ב) והכא הרי איצטריך לגופיה
ואחד תירץ לי שכיון שהיסוד שנלמד מכיבוד אב הוא שאתם חייבים בכבודי ה"ה שכולל את מקדשי תיראו שכל דין המקדש הוא ליזהר בכבודי ולכן היינו יודעים אפילו בלי פסוק שלא ידחה, מה דעתכם

Yevamos 5a - Mitzvaso bekach

Tosafos on 3b explained that we can't learn aseh docheh lo sa'aseh from the standard case of yibum where we push off eishes ach, bec. that is "mitzvaso bekach". Simply speaking this means that since the mitzvah of yibum only exists in contrast to the issur, the issur could never have been given when up against the mitzvah of yibum. Meaning, mitzvaso bekach would indicate that it must be hutra rather than dechuya.

However, Tosafos 5b is clear that although kelaim in bigdei kehuna is "mitzvaso bekach" and therefore cannot be used as a source to learn from (as Tosafos says by the standard case of yibum), it is not b'geder hutra, rather it is dechuya. Tosafos says that bigdei kehuna is not a weakness in the prohibition of kelaim, bec. we are not matir the issur of kelaim (which would indicate its weakness), rather we push it off b'geder "dechiya" as we would in any aseh docheh lo sa'aseh. Clearly Tosafos holds that "mitzvaso bekach" does not force us to understand that it is hutra rather than dechuya. Even though kelaim bb'igdei kehuna is mitzvaso bekach, it follows the regular format of dechiya i.e. aseh of avodah is docheh the lo sa'aseh.

עשה דוחה ל"ת - מחשבה

to take a break from the head spinning sugya...
We touched on this once before, why is it that an עשה overrides a לאו and yet the punishment for transgressing a לאו is much stricter that one for not fulfilling an עשה?
I once heard from a Rebbi of mine like this: If one is used to bringing flowers to his wife every week and forgets once, he might be in trouble but has hope, if however he is caught cheating once he is in real trouble. Still if one would be married and not cheat ever but also not do anything positive to the marriage, he is in fact 'not married'.
another example, if a trucker is hired to truck a load cross country and the owner warns him not to go beyond speed limit and not to crash the car etc. if the trucker does everything perfectly but doesn't unload the goods at his destination but goes and comes back with the same load, what good does it do for us that he obeyed the speed limit.
meaning, that our job is to accomplish in this world and 'build the love', therefor this building overrides the transgressions, because the לאוין are only there to protect what has been build not to suffocate the building. There is a Gaon in Mishlei (6:36) that says 3 מלאכים greed a person after 120' 1 to count his עשה,s 1 the לאוין and one to see what he accomplished as far as his תפקיד and he says that last one is familiar, because he was the one to teach you תורה in the womb, meaning to teach you your true essence.

3a

when is the daughter of one's wife become אסור to him, is it after קידושין, נישואין or only after ביאה? Tosfos clearly says you do not need ביאה although the pasuk says ערוות אשה ובתה however the פתחי תשובה understands in tosfos that you need נישואין the Rambam holds that קידושין is enough to make her asur. (forgive me for not giving the מראה מקומות it's in the ברכת אברהם),
just a point, I think Tosfos might just mean that the pasuk is not literal and you need not wait till ביאה but perhaps he agrees with the rambam? in any case the achronim say not like me. let me know if you want the sources.

Yevamos 3b - Question of R' Akiva Eiger - Tzaras Ervah

One of the questions that is dealt with most extensively in the achronim and really opens up the perspective of the sugya of tzaras ervah is the question of R' Akiva Eiger. He asks why do we need a pasuk of "litzror" mentioned in the braisa, to tell you that tzaras tzarasa is also exempt from yibum. The mechanics of why a tzara is exempt is that since there is an ervah (Sarah), and this co-wife is a tzaras ervah (Esther), there is no zikah to yibum when her husband (reuven) dies, therefore she (Esther) becomes a regular issur eishach ach to the yavem (shimon). So, when the other brother (Levi) does yibum to the tzaras ervah (Esther), and then Levi dies, neither this women (Esther), nor Levi's other wife (Michal) have zikah of yibum to Shimon. The reason is that since the tzarah (Esther) becomes a regular issur of eishes ach to Shimon, that was created by Reuven, so the issur eishes ach on her preceded the relationship that is making her fall now to yibum from Levi, she (Esther) becomes in her marriage to Levi, like a regular issur ervah herself to Shimon, who exempts her tzarah (Michal). Based on this logic we should not need a pasuk to tell you that a tzaras ervah exempts tzaras tzarasa, bec. every tzaras ervah becomes an ervah herself and exempts her tzara as a tzaras ervah!

Yevamos 2a genius

The ברכת אברהם brings the following question from one of the עילויים of Europe - העילוי ממייציט:

If אשת אחיו מאמו is not in the Mitzva of יבום and is an איסור כרת then how come when there are 2 FULL brothers that share a father and mother isn't there a problem of doing יבום to an אשת אחיו מאמו, although she is also an אשת אחיו מאביו it should be forbidden because she is also an אשת אחיו מאמו.

The ברכ"א answers: the name of the איסור is אשת אחיו whether its a brother from a shared father or a shared mother, the "name" is still a "brothers wife", in a case when there is a חיוב of יבום it unlocks the איסור, so in a full brother since there is a חיוב the מצוה applies. simple. genius.

Chagiga 27b - Was the Shulchan Transportable?

Tosafos explains that we consider the shulchan not to be "asui l'nachas" bec. they picked it up to show for the olei regel, but the fact that it was transported through the midbar does not make it loose the status of "asui l'nachas" bec. "it was moved along with the other keilim". It is not so clear to me what Tosafos means. Why is the fact that other keilim are also moved make it not "asui l'nachas"? I don't have a clear peshat but it reminds me of the gemara shabbos 31b that since "al pi hashem yachanu" the taking down of the mishkan is considered destroying in order to build in its place. Meaning that the Mishkan was considered to always be in the same place. Since the Shulchan was moved along with the keilim of the mishkan, it still maintains the status of "asui l'nacha", if not for the fact that it was shown to the olei regel.

MAZAL TOV ON SEDER MOED!!!

WE SHOULD ALL BE ZOCHEH TO LEARN MANY MORE SEDARIM U'LSAIMUM.