Chagiga 25 - Eretz Ha'amim, Lifnei Iver, Migu

2 questions and 1 hearah:

1. Tosafos asks that if there is a retzuah seperating galil from jerusalem, how can one be oleh regel and still be tahor? Hagahos Ransburg says that he can get there by putting a board on an ox. Why can't we use that trick to get wine to jerusalem? He answers that it is similar to Eiruv in a cemetery where the maharsha explains that using this trick is not considered access to the eiruv since it is not a common way to travel. I don't understand the connection! By eiruv we don't consider this method as having "access" since it is not a common means of travel, but if someone shows up with wine in jerusalem that they brought from gallil on the back of an ox, why is that not acceptable for nisachim?

2. Rashi explains that if the 2 brothers split wheat and the chaver takes the tahor and give his brother the tameh, that is fine. But he cannot "sell" the tameh barley to his brother, to ensure that he receives the tahor wheat, since he is providing him with an issur and is violating lifnei iver. Why in the first case is it not lifnei iver? Had the chaver taken the tameh and thrown it out his brother would take the tahor and avoid any issur, so by the chaver taking the tahor he is causing (trei avri d'nahara) his brother to do an issur!? We see from here a big yesod. The issur of lifnei iver is to pass wine to a nazir since you are passing to him issur. But if there is one cup of wine and one of water in front of the nazir, one may take the water even though they will be causing the nazir to drink the wine. It is only lifnei iver to pass him the issur, but one may take the heter and thereby cause him to do his own issur.

3. The migu in our gemara is since we believe him for the kodesh in this barrel we automatically believe him for the terumah in it since they are 1 unit together in a barrel. Similarly, since we believe his body is tahor for pesach we beleive him for terumah since his body is 1 unit. Why does rashi have to explain the migu that to beleive him on the kodesh and not teruma is "degrading for the mizbeiach", just say that it is one unit that can't be split?

Chagiga 23b - To The Exclusion Of Tzedokim

The gemara explains that acc. to r' eliezer we use a straw for parah adumah that chazal were gozer should have status of tumas meis which would normally require h'erev shemesh, yet we use it as a tvul yom, and this it motzi m'liban shel tzdokim. The difficulty is that if you would ask the tzedokim they would also tell you that this straw can be used without he'erev shemesh, bec. the entire source of tumah is purely rabbinic (to treat the straw as tomei meis) which they certainly don't hold of. So, how is this motzi miliban shel tzdokim since the tzdokim themselves hold it can be used?

We learn from here that being motzi milban shel tzedokim does not mean that we show the tzedokim that we use something that they would not allow. Rather, we pay no attention to the actual opinion of the tzedokim. Our concern is that some perushim may give some credence to the tzedoki "chumras" so we use a straw that under perushim rules should require h'erev shemesh, to show that we disregard even the chumras of the tzedokim. Tosfaos d.h. metamin, points out that even acc. to R' Yehoshua where we are actually metamei the straw, we also use a type of tumah not recognized by the tzedokim. Tosafos clearly says that the motzi miliban is for US, not for THEM!

Chagiga 22a - Toveling One Vessel in Another

The gemara says that if the outer vessel does not have an opening of "shfoferes hanod" such as a wine bottle, one cannot be tovel smaller utensils inside the outer one bec. the water in the outer bottle is not considered to be attached to the mikvah. However, if the outer bottle itself is tameh, the Torah clearly allows one to immerse that bottle in the mikvah and by definition considers the water that is inside the bottle as attached to the mikvah for the need of the outer bottle. Therefore, when the outer bottle needs tevillah one can be tovel even the smaller utensils inside the bottle, bec. when the outer bottle is tameh, the water inside the bottle is considered attached to the mikvah (this is the peshat in "migu" here). But, this argument is only applicable if the outer bottle has the same level of requirement of tevillah as the inner utensils. However, if the outer bottle is only tameh midrabonon and the inner utensils are tameh midoraysa, we don't consider the water inside the bottle to be attached to the mikvah from a torah perspective and the utensils would remain tameh (assuming the bottle opening is less than shfoferes hanod).
Based on this, when we tovel brand new keilim, one cannot be tovel small metal utensils inside a glass bottle which does not have an opening of shfoferes hanod, bec. the glass bottle only needs tevillah midrabonon and the metal utensils need tevillah midioraysa, so migu does not apply.

הערות במקווה

א) קטפרס פירושו מים היורדים בהר, ויש מ"ח בתוספות לעיל אי הוי חיבור למקוה ולכ"ע לא הוי חיבור להשקה.
ב) הסיבה שקטפרס לא הוי חיבור הוא מפני שלא בטוח שהמים יגיעו למקוה. ולכאורה יש לזה ראיה מזה שטופח ע"מ להטפיח הוי חיבור ומה החילוק בין זה לקטפרס אלא שטופח ע"מ להטפיח אין ספק שהם ביחד כיוון שזה במקום חלק ולא במורד ההר
ג) מסקנה דתוספות הכא הוא שצריכים שיעור דשפורפרת הנוד באופן שהחיבור הוא באמצע הכתל אך אם אין כותל או שהחיבור הוא למעלה מהכותל רק צריך טופח ע"מ להטפיח וכקליפת השום - האם שניהם אותו דבר
reb avi am i right?

Chagiga 20b - Keilim Completed B'tahara

Tosafos explains that the mishna says the vessels are "completed" b'tahara rather than made b'tahara bec. it is not common to watch them until they are close to being finished since at the earlier stages they are not suseptible to tum'ah. The Turei Even understands from Tosafos that even if one would pay attention to watch the vessel from tum'ah from the very early stages of making it, it would still need tevilah for kodesh. The Turei Even argues and says that the primary concern is that saliva of an am ha'aretz landed on the kli while it was being made and was still there upon its completion. Therefore, if one watched it only at the completing of the vessel, this is a valid concern, but if it was watched from the very beginning then there is no concern at all and would not even need tevilah for kodesh. The Turei even would seem to hold that even if one did not watch the kli from teh very beginning, but some time before the actual completion from a time where saliva would have likely dried up, it would not need tevillah for kodesh. The chumra of tevillah for kodesh would only be if attention was first paid upon the actual completion of the kli and not before so there is a likely concern that the saliva that fell on prior to completion did not yet dry up.

Rashi d.h. keilim hanigmarim, comments that "nigmarim" does not mean while they are completed but rather means close to their completion. It seems to me that rashi understands that even if one keeps watch before they are completed, so it is very unlikely that the saliva was still moist on the kli at the time it was completed, we still require tevillah for kodesh. Perhaps Rashi would hold that if it was watched from the very beginning, then it would not need tevillah even for kodesh, but since we only start watching close to the time that it was completed (even if it is likely for the saliva to have already dried up) it would still need tevillah for kodesh.

Chagiga 19a - Being Machzik while still in the Mikvah

Continuing with R' Yossi's last point on the previous post:

It seems that the din of machzik is not like the din of mitzvos trichos kavana. One can be machzik so long as he has not completely left the mikva, even though he is no longer immersed in the mikvah. This is clear bec. when someone came up but his leg is still in the mikvah, although regarding the water we consider the water on his body attached to be mashlim the mikvah, and perhaps (if you say gud asik) the water in the mikvah to be attached to his head to allow tevila in his hair, we cannot consider him to be immersed in the mikvah (since there are definitely parts of his body that are dry), yet he can still be machzik since he has not completely left the mikva. The rationale must be (as R' Yossi pointed out) that he must accept a level of shemirah before he leaves the mikvah, but does not have to be tovel with kavana as he would have to do a mitzvah with kavana.

חגיגה י"ט כמה הערות בענין טבילה

א) גל שנתלש וכו' וא"ת מדוע מטהר והרי הוי זוחלין ומקוה מטהר רק באשבורן וי"ל די"א דכאן נתלש ממעין ועדיין יש לזה דין מעין כדמבואר בש"ך שהרש"ש מציין ולכן מטהר בזוחלין. ועי"ל שהתוי"ט שם מביא מברא"ש דקאי לרבי יוסי הסובר דמקווה מטהר בזוחלין. ועי"ל שכיוון שמטהר האדם והאדם עומד על הקרקע וכן הכלים מיטהרים כשהם בקרקע נמצא דגם הגל בשעה שנוגע בהם יש לו כבר דין מחובר לקרקע - כנ"ל שלמד רש"י ועין עוד ברש"י בחולין
ב) ברש"י ד"ה חרדלית מבאר דהו"א של הגמרא דגל לא יטהר או משום דין קטפרס או מדין זוחלין. ולכאורה הבנת שני הפירושים כך: דלפירוש זוחלין צ"ל שלמעשה במסקנה גל אינו "זוחל" אלא אשבורן וכמו שרציתי לומר ברש"י בהערה א' ולפירוש של קטפרס צ"ל שאין ביעה של זוחלין דאה"נ הכא הוי זוחל וקאי למ"ד שזוחלין מטהר במקוה
ג) תוספות מבאר דקטפרס לא הוי חיבור כיון שלא מוכח שהמים ירדו במורד וגיעו למקוה ובדומה ניצוק לא הוי חיבור כיון שאויר לא מקום ראוי למקוה ולכן א"א להתחבר למקוה באויר. ולכן תוספות מבאר שבדינו של רבי יהודה שודאי ירד מראשו למקוה עדיף מסתם קטפרס ולכן אומר תוספות שאף שדין קטפרס רק מהני להצטרף למקוה כשר ולא ליצור מקוה חדש ס"ל לגמרא שדינו של רבי יהודה עדיף ויכול ליצור אפילו מקוה חדש. וצריך ביאור
ד) הטו"א מקשה איך הגמרא יודעת דלרבי יהודה אפשר להחזיק לטהרה אחרת בעוד רגלו במים והרי רבי יהודה רק חידש דין גוד אחית. והגריש"א תירץ דאין הרי דין טבילה לשם מעשר ותרומה וכדו' אלא שצריך שידע למה טבל ובזה יחמיר בשמירתו. וא"כ רק מביאים ראיה מרבי יהודה שעדיין נחשב גמר טבילתו בעוד רגלו במים אף שלמעשה כבר ניטהר כשעלה ראשו מהמים ואם עדיין יש לו קצת דין של "טובל" א"כ ניחא שיוכל להחזיק לדבר חמור יותר כיוון שיש לו עוד זמן להתחיל שמירתו דהרי תחילת השמירה הוי אחר גמר הטבילה

Chagiga 18a - Melacha Chol Hamoed - Lifnei Iver

Re: Tosafos proof that melacha is assur m'dioraysa on chol hamoed from the gemara's question at the end of the first perek of avodah zara that renting a field to a kusi who will to melacha on chol hamoed is lifnei iver:
בסוף דבריהם הוכיחו התוס' דמלאכה בחוה"מ אסור מה"ת, מהא דסוף פ"ק דע"ז גבי המשכיר שדה לכותים דקפריך בגמ' שם תיפוק ליה משום לפני עור שבשכירתו מכשיל הכותי לעשות מלאכת בחוה"מ ועובר הישראל בלפני עור, דמשמע להו מזה שמלאכת חוה"מ אסור מדאורייתא. אלמא ס"ל להתוס' דאילו הוי רק מדרבנן לא שייך לפני עור. ויש ב' דרכים לפרש דבריהם. הרש"ש כתב משום דלפני עור רק שייך מה"ת גבי איסור תורה ולא באיסור דרבנן, לכך הוכיחו דע"כ מלאכת חוה"מ אסור מדאורייתא מדאוסר להשכיר משום לפני עור, אבל מה שדחו התוס' דבאמת הוא רק מדרבנן אלא שהצדוקין מודים בו ואין הכותים מודים בו )רש"ש( אינו מובן, דמה בכך שהצדוקים מודים בו מ"מ לא שייך לפני עור כיון דלפי ההלכה הוא רק אסור מדרבנן. וצ"ל דכל שהאיסור מפורש בתורה אף כשהוא באמת רק מדרבנן שייך בזה לפני עור וצ"ע. יש עוד דרך לפרש דבריהם כמש"כ המהרש"ם בהגהותיו על פי הנתהמש"פ (ס' רל"ד) דבאיסור דרבנן בשוגג ליכא איסורא וחידש המהרש"ם דכיון דלגבי הכותי ליכא אלא איסור דרבנן בשוגג ממילא אין איסור על הישראל להכשילו בזה [והוא חידוש גדול, דאף לפי הנתהמ"ש מסתברא שאסור להכשילו בשוגג]. ולזה תרצו שפיר דכיון שהצדוקין מודים בו וגם הכותים מודים ממילא הם מזידים בזה והוי איסור דרבנן במזיד ושפיר שייך לפני עור

Chagiga 17 - Yom Tavuach - Slaughter Day

Is the Yom Tavuach a halachic institution or is it just the first possible day for korbanos to be brought so that is when most people would bring their olas ri'iya and chagiga. Is one required to bring their korban on the yom tavuach when atzeres falls out on shabbos, or can they wait for a later day (if not for the concept of zrizin makdimin)?

It seems to me that the Yom Tavuach is a day recognized midioraysa for the main day for bringing korbanos. The gemara on 17b tries to prove that there is no tashlumin for atzeres from beis hillel who says that when atzeres falls on friday there is no yom tavuach, which the gemara assumes to mean that there is no yom tavuach at all - meaning no tashlumin. The Turei Even points out that in the hava amina the gemara could not have thought that there is no day at all for korbanos bec. the end of the mishna says that beis hillel agrees if atzeres falls on shabbos then sunday will be the yom tavuach. The gemara means that although sunday will be the yom tavuach, there will not be any other opportunity for tashlumin. Based on this the gemara is clearly holding that the concept of a yom tavuach will exist even if there is no "tashlumin". This implies that since the korban cannot be brought on shabbos, yet the torah requires it to be brought, it is as if the torah is saying that the main day to bring the korbanos is sunday.

Therefore, even though we hold that there is tashlumin, it still seems that the yom tavuach is midioraysa the day that korbanos must be brought (similar to the first day of yom tov that falls during the week), and the remaining days are only tashlumin if they were not brought on the yom tavuach.
What is the din if one is a chi'ger on atzeres which falls on shabbos and heals by the yom tavuach? Or if one is a chi'ger on the yom tavuach and heals afterward? Do we disregard the first day and consider all remaining days tashlumin for the yom tavuach?

Chagiga 16b - Time Bound Positive Mitzvos for Women

Tosafos in R"H 33a proves from this gemara that acc. to R' Yossi that Semicha for women is a "reshus", we see that there is a kiyum mitzvah for woman to perform time bound positive mitzvos. The difficulty is that R' Yossi himself is really just coming to say that it is "mutar" to the exclusion of the tana kama who says assur, but we don't find that R' Yossi holds that there is an actual kiyum mitzvah. Furthermore, he seems to say that it is only for the sake of "nachas ruach l'nashim", which indicates that there is not necessarily even a kiyum mitzvah, rather it is purely a d'var hareshus?

It seems to me that the proof is actually from the shakla v'taria of the gemara. The gemara originally wants to prove that semicha does not have to be done with all your strength, bec. if it would have to be done b'chol kocho, then we could not allow women to do it and violate avodah b'kodshim. The gemara is then madcheh that perhaps it does have to be done b'chol kocho, and we would instruct women to do it in a way where they are not really doing semicha at all. It seems from the dichuy that according to the approach that semicha does not need kol kocho, women would actually be accomplishing something with their semicha and they would at least be performing a mitzvah. This seems to be the proof of Tosafos that there is a kiyum mitzvah to which tosafos adds (there and here) that they can even make a beracha on it.

Chagiga 16a - Rabbeinu Chananel Regarding A Pregnant Virgin

The gemara acc. to our version asks a question whether a pregnant besulah (who either claims to be a besulah or is tested with the "barrel test") is permitted to a kohen gadol. But Rabbeinu Chananel explains (printed on 16 in vilna shas) the question based on the first pasuk in parshas Tazriah. The pasuk says the when a women is "mazriah" and gives birth to a male she is tameh for 7 days. R"C understands from this that she is only tameh if her pregnancy was through natural means of relations. The conclusion is that we assume she became pregnant in an ambati i.e. artificial insemination, and therefore does not have Tum'as leida. There is a tremendous nafkeh minah l'maseh from this. The halacha is that if a women does not have tumas leida then the baby is not given a milah on day 8. Meaning that if there is no tumas leida, then the bris does not push off shabbos. Therefore, any women who becomes pregnant through artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization (either from her husband or otherwise), the child would not receive his bris on the 8th day if it falls on shabbos. Obviously we do not pasken like R"C, but it is an interesting opinion.

אחר

Regarding Acher, Rav Dessler speaks about it in Vol.3 page 175, and 260. I will give some highlights.
בגילוי דמטטרון הוא הגילוי הגבוה של זכויות התורה והקשר שיש לעליונים מהתורה. הטעות של אחר היה שגמירי דבגבוה לא צריכים את התחתונים ומציאותו יתברך שלמה. שוב הגענו אם כן לנקודה הגבוהה ביותר לשורש כל הסתירות דאחדותו יתברך כנגד עולם הפירוד וידיעה ובחירה וכדומה. דהיינו דאה"נ מציאותו יתברך לא צריכה את העבודה אך עם כל זה יש מציאות נמוכה יותר שפועלת עם הברואים לזכותם. ואם כן מה שראה היה צריך לעורר אותו שאף בגבהי מרומים יש זכות לתורה ולומדיה. אף שלמעלה מזה יש עוד בחינת מציאותו יתברך שלא צריכה לעבודתינו כל עיקר ומבחינה זאת כל עבודתינו הוא דמיון בעלמא. זאת עומק הסתירה העמוקה שבמציאות גופא. הבחינה שמט"ט הוכה בפולסי דנורא הוא להראות לאחר שבאמת יש בחינה למעלה מזה כדאיתא ברבינו חננאל.
הבת קול שיצאה איתא מהבעש"ט שהיתה בת קול דטומאה שיצאה מעמקי הרהורי ליבו ובאמת היה אפשרות של תשובה. וכעת נשאר לבאר מה היה השרש שגרם לטעותו והתירוץ לזה מבואר שהיה תאווה ומינות. התאוות הכבוד שהתחיל מסעודת ברית המילה והמינות שעוד במעי אימו כשהריחה ע"ז ועוד ספרי המינות וכו' כל המבואר בגמרא ובתוס' ע"ש הם שגרמו לנגיעות שגרמו לראיה המוטעית. וידוע שכל המינות שרשה בתאווה כמו שמבואר ברש"י בחומש שישראל עבדו ע"ז כדי להתיר להם זנות. דהיינו הנגיעות גורמים לראיה מוטעית. והפחד פה הוא שאפילו בלימוד התורה צריך שיראתו תקדם לחכמתו דאל"כ ישרים דרכי ה' צדיקים ילכו בם ורשעים וכו' - כל זה מיוסד ברובו ממכתב אליהו ע"ש
והוא רחום יכפר עוון

מצות סירוס

רש"י ותוספות סוברים דהשאלה לבן זומא היתה דדילמא כלב לא אסור בסירוס כיוון דפסול לקרבן ואפילו מחיר כלב פסול לקרבן. ואגב רואים מרש"י שהסיבה לאיסור שייך לקרבנות ואף שסירוס אסור אפילו שלא לקרבן אך הפסוקים איירי בקרבנות וזה שייך לשרש האיסור

הראה לי צורבא מרבנן אחד שהמנ"ח במצווה רצ"א מסתפק אם סירוס מותר בדגים שבת"כ מובא בהמה חיה ועוף וכן אדם אך דגים לא מוזכר ע"ש שמסתפק שאולי הרמב"ם אוסר ובפרט ששרש המצווה זה שמשחית את הבריאה ואת כח ההולדה ומראה שהבריאה של הבורא לא נכונה

והמלבי"ם עה"פ ובכל ארצכם (באמור) שהגמרא הכא מביאה רוצה לומר ששאלו את בן זומא על כלב הים שמבואר במשנה בכלים מ"ח עם עורו מטמא כבהמה או טהור כשל דג והסיבה לספק כיוון שכלב הים עולה גם ביבשה וחי בשתי המקומות ולכן ר"ל שהריבוי של בכל ארצכם קאי על כלב הים בדווקא ולשיטתו שאר דגים יהיו מותרים בסירוס ודלא כנטיית המנ"ח לאוסרו

ועד שאנו דנים בזה יש לי תמיהה על הספרא ע"ש שיש דרשא לרבות איסור סירוס בחו"ל ומאד תמוה דהרי זה חובת הגוף ול"צ ריבוי לחו"ל והמלבי"ם בעצמו אומר שם שלא ממעטים חו"ל מבארצכם כיוון שזה חובת הגוף ומדוע לא מקשה על המשך הספרא שם שמביאים דרשא לרבות חו"ל. ואף שאין לי ישוב אך בעצם הספרא אולי אפשר לומר שאם יסוד האיסור הוא משום קרבנות כדאמרנו ברש"י ולא כחינוך שזה מדין השחתה של הבריאה שי צד להבין שבחו"ל יהא מותר וצע"ג אשמח לשמוע חוות חכמים

Chagiga 13a - Lifnei Iver: Two Sides of the River

Tosafos explains that if there would be another non-jew willing to teach torah to this non-jew then the jew would not be in violation of lifnei iver for teaching him since it is like "one side of the river" - meaning that the issur is accessible to the goy. 2 points:

1. Tosafos implies that there would not even be an issur derabonon of misaya'ah for the jew to teach the goy which there normally is even in cases of "one side of the river" as tosafos writes shabbos 3a. Tosafos would hold that the issur misaya'ah is related to tochacha or beis din metzuvin l'hafrisho, and would only restrict assisting another jew in an issur but would not apply to a goy.

2. The Mishneh L'melech (Hil. Malveh 4:2) is medayek from Tosafos that if a second jew would be willing to teach the goy torah, it would not make it "one side of the river" to allow the first to teach torah to they goy. His rationale is that since there is an issur lifnei iver for the first jew, the fact that the second jew is willing to violate lifnei iver and teach him, won't remove the issur of lifnei iver from the first. This does not mean to say that the goy must have a way of learning torah b'heter in order to remove lifnei iver from the first jew, bec. even if a goy would be willing to teach him that is not b'heter since a goy cannot even learn never mind teach. Rather the rationale is that if there is lifnei iver for one then there is lifne iver for all since it is not logical to say that the first jew removes the lifnei iver for the second, and the second removes it for the first.

לפני עוור

i heard this in the name of achronim.
Tosfos by us that is worried about בל תוסיף to teach Torah to a gentile seems a proof against the יד אברהם brought in y"d 62 by poskim there, that if one is not אסור in something he is not חייב for לפני עור on this act. Here it seems that we are worried of Bal Tosif although its alowed for us to learn Torah. The way to answer is, that the prohibition of learning Torah for them is explained in Sanhedrin either because of גזל or because of נערה המאורסה therefor these concepts do apply to us in a different format.

Chagiga 12a - Which Was Created First: Heavens or Earth?

Beis Hillel says that the earth was created first and only after was the heavens created. The Tzlach has an elaborate explanation as to why the earth which is seemingly less important, was created first. The Tzlach explains (second approach) that the heavens is always run according to the laws of nature and never has supernatural events that testify to the fact that there is a creator controlling the universe. But on earth there are miracles and supernatural events such as in mitzrayim where the earth deviates from the laws of nature to prove that there is G-d in control. Shamayim is run through midas hadin = "elokim". Therefore, the numerical value of "ha'teva" (nature) = Elokim (i was always troubled by this one since i don't think that we find in tanach the term tevah referring to laws of nature - i recall discussing this earlier on this blog!). But the earth is sometimes run using midas harachamim that allows for a break in the laws of nature. The superiority of the earth that gave it the privellage to be created first is the fact that it sometimes breaks from the laws of nature to prove the existence and involvement of G-d.

Based on this the Tzlach explains the pesukim by the plague of kinim (lice). The magicians of Pharoh could not produce lice and they admitted "etzbah elokim hi" - the finger of Elokim. Yet they immediately continue to reject Hashem. Why? Tzlach explains that the claim of "etzbah Elokim" is a denial of G-d. They were claiming that it was a natural occurrence rather than a miracle. That is why the response was to send the plague of arov (wild animals) which was to show "ki ani Hashem b'kerev ha'aretz". Hashem = A G-d in control of the universe.

Chagiga 11a - Michtav C'sivan

This post is from R' Aron Katz - it is somewhat connected to the previous post.

The gemarah asks that teharos are written, so why does the Mishna say that they are just "have what to rely on" It answers that the Mishna is referring to the drasha that Mikva needs 40 seah and it quotes a braisa that darshens from the pasuk that a Mikvah a) can't be mayim sheuvin and b) must be forty seah. The question is why doesn't the gemarah say that the Mishna is referring to the first drash of sheuvin instead (or as well as) the drasha of 40 seah?
The Turei Even asks that why are we calling these drashos "have what to rely on". If these drashos are only considered a semach, then every drasha can be called just a semach? He answers that the drasha of Mikva tells us that every person must use the same size Mikvah- even a midget-, even though the pasuk is only mashma that a mikvah must be large enough for the person going in it. Similarly by sheretz, every shertz uses the size of a infant snail, even though the other minim of sheretz are larger in infancy.
The orignal question is answered. The mishna is not calling the drasha that you can't use sheuvin a "semach", it is a 100% drasha, like it is written bfeirush. It is only calling the second drasha a "semach".
Aron Katz

Chagiga 11a - Shiur Mikvah

The Gemara determines the shiur mikvah to be "water that one fits his entire body into" which chazal determine to be 40 seah. Tosafos seems to be bothered with how one can fit his head into the mikvah since a height of 3 amos for the mikvah will not include the head. Tosafos answers that one can tilt their head to squeeze it in. Another solution found in Tosafos Yoma 31 d.h. amah is that the gemara is giving the shiur of water, but the actual pit is larger and the water level will rise as he enters so it will cover his head.

The Turei Even explains that we really have 2 sources in the torah. 1. We learn from "ub'a hashemesh v'taher" that just like the sun setting is all at once, so too tevillah can't be lechatzain (half and half), rather one's entire body at once. 2. We learn from the drasha of "mayim shekol gufo oleh bahen" that even a short person who can fit into less than 40 seah, needs a minimum of 40 seah. In other words, there is a practical din that one's entire body must be immersed, but the din taught in our gemara is not a practical din rather a din in shiur that a "mikvah" must have 40 seah. Based on this, perhaps the gemara understood that the "kol gufo oleh bahen" is his body without his head and therefore determines the height of a mikvah to be 3 amos which is the shiur of the mikvah (even though it will not cover his head), but there is another din (that is learned from the torah kohanim brought in Turei Even) that the entire person including the head must be immersed at once.

Chagiga 10a - When Thought Contradicts Verbal Declaration

גמ' לאפוקי מדשמואל דאמר שמואל גמר בלבו - בטו"א באבני שהם הקשה בפ"ג דתרומות והובא בפסחים סג. תנן המתכוון לומר תרומה ואמר מעשר וכו' עולה ואמר שלמים לא אמר כלום. משמע דכיון דבעינן פיו ולבו שוין לא הוי מעשר וגם לא הוי תרומה, וכן לא הוי שלמים וגם לא הוי עולה. ואמאי כיון דבקדשים וכן בתרומה מהני גמר בלבו אף שלא הוציא בשפתיו שהרי תרומה ניטלת במחשבה, דל מיניה דבורו ולהוי מיהת תרומה כדגמר בלבו. ותירץ הטו"א דכל שגמר בלבו שלא ניחא ליה במחשבה בעלמא אלא רצונו להוציאו בשפתיו אז לא מהני גמר בלבו, וא"כ ה"נ כיון שגמר בלבו להוציא בשפתים תרומה לא חל התרומה עד שהוציא משפתיו תרומה, וכיון שהוציא משפתיו מעשר לא אמר כלום ואין כאן לא תרומה ולא מעשר. אכן, בספר אור גדול ס' ל"ו חידש דגמר בלבו לא מהני רק כשלא הכחיש מחשבתו בדיבורו אבל כל שהכחיש מחשבתו בדיבור פיו לא מהני מחשבתו. נמצא דאף במקום דמהני גמר בלבו לחוד, זה רק כשאין דברי פיו מכחישין לגמרי שאפשר לקיים שניהם. ומפרש בזה דברי הרשב"א בגיטין לד דכששינה שם הבעל בגט הוי כאילו כתבו שלא לשמה ואינו גט, ואמאי הא כיון שמכוין למגרש העומד לפניו מה בכך ששינה בשמו הא כתב הגט לשם בעל המגרש. וביאר באור גדול דקודם שכתב הגט היה במחשבתו לכתוב לשם בעל המגרש אבל כשכתב הגט שינה בשמו וכתב שם אחר וכיון שמכחיש מחשבתו הראשונה שהוא לשם בעל המגרש במה שכתב הוי כמכחיש מחשבתו בפיו דתו לא מהני מחשבתו. ומתוך כך חידש חידוש עצום דבזמן הזה ששונין תחלה שמות האיש והאשה ואומר שכותב הגט לזה האיש שנקרא כך וכך ולזו האשה שנקראת כך וכך, אף אם באמת שקר הדברים שאינם נקראים כך, מ"מ הא אמר דכשיכתוב זה השם כוונתו לאיש זה ולאשה זו אף שהאמת אינו כן ושפיר הוי לשמו ולשמה ולשם גירושין.

Chagiga 9b - Reviewing 100 vs. 101

The gemara calls one who reviews their learning 101 times an "oved elokim", but one who only reviews 100 times is called a "lo avado". This may be obvious, but worthwhile to speak out. Based on the mashal that the gemara gives, the point is not just to encourage reviewing an extra time. The parable of the donkey is that a standard donkey for rent can travel 10 parsa and cost a zuz. If one wants a donkey to travel 11 parsa, although it is only 1 extra parsa a "standard" donkey can't make it, they need a "premium" type donkey, and therefore the cost will be 2 zuz. They are not just paying for the extra parsa they are paying for riding the entire 11 parsos on a premium donkey. The point of the gemara is to say that one who reviews the extra time, in contrast to one who reviewed one time less, is not just missing one review. Rather they are a totally different type of "donkey". The numbers of 100 and 101 are only examples that fit into the gematria, but the point applies to any number of times that one reviews. The clarity obtained from the extra time that one goes over the material makes him an entirely different type of person than one who reviewd one time less.

chagiga 8

question: if a person is obligated to bring the 1st animal from chulin and he is obligated to feed his family, then each one should need the 1st to be from chulin. in other words, i am confused as to the nature of the obligation to feed the family on the 1st day kurban chagiga, are we talking about young children? a wife? do the family have an independent chiyuv or are the an extension? if you understand my babble i would love to hear an explanation. thanks.

Chagiga 7b - Korban Simcha: Is the Mitzvah Just Eating?

R' Yossi already posted twice on this issue - see the first post on chagiga and see the hebrew post on 6b.

Tosafos 7b d.h. olos, explains in the name of Rabbeinu Elchanan and the R"i that although one can fulfill the obligation of simcha by eating the meat of nedarim and nedavos, that is only if the korban was brought with the intention of serving as a simcha offering. But, if it was brought to be only to fulfill a neder, it would not qualify for simcha. Clearly, Tosafos assumes that the mitzvah of Simcah is not just in the eating of the meat but also in the sacrificing of the animal to be a Shalmei Simcha.

Chagiga 6a - Chinuch For a Child Who Can't Walk

The gemara states that a child who is lame and will never heal is certainly exempt from chinuch since he will never have a mitzvah even as a gadol, the question is only for a child who will eventually heal, is there a mitzvah so long as he is lame? The gemara concludes that a child who is lame one does not have to be mechanech since a gadol in that state is exempt. Rashi seems to contradict himself bec. Rashi explains that a lame who "will heal" means he will heal prior to becoming a gadol, which implies that if he will heal when he is 15 that is considered "will never heal". So, why does Rashi explain that "will never heal" means even as a gadol he won't heal?

Rashi seems to understand that if he will heal when he is 12 then there is no rationale to be michanech him now 1. in his present state he is exempt even as a gadol, 2. there will be time to be michanech him in this mitzvah after he heals. But if he will only heal at 15, then although the first reason doesn't apply, we must still be michanech him now since he will eventually heal while he is a gadol and not know how to do the mitzvah. Therefore, Rashi understands that even acc. to the conclusion of the gemara we only exempt a child who will never heal or will heal when before he becomes a gadol, but if he will heal after he becomes a gadol we must be michanech him now (even in a state of chiger).

Chagiga 6a - Mitzvah of Chinuch

גמ' כל היכא דגדול מחייב מדאורייתא וכו'- לפי המסקנא יוצא דאפילו קטן שיהיה בריא כשיגדיל מ"מ אם היה לו איזה חולי שיהא פטור בגדלותו הרי הוא פטור אף בקטנותו. וכללו של דבר שלא מחייבינן בקטן יותר מבגדול בכה"ג. וקשה לפי"ז בין לב"ש בין לב"ה שהרי שניהם סברי דקטן חייב בחינוך קודם שיכול לעלות ברגליו בלי שום סיוע, דאפילו לב"ה מאחר שיכול לאחוז בידו של אביו הוא חייב אע"פ שבעצמו אינו יכול לילך, וא"כ כיון דגדול בכה"ג פטור כמש"כ רש"י ד. בד"ה דבר, משום שצריך משענת אחרת לבד מרגליו אמאי מחייבינן קטנים
הטו"א האריך מאוד בענין זה וכתב בד"ה פיסקא, יסוד גדול בסוגיא זו. כל שקטנותו גורם שלא יהא בר חיובא לא פטרינן ליה מחמת זה. ולכן אין הקטן שאינו יכול לעלות ברגליו פטור מחינוך אלא כשהחולי גורם אבל כשקטנותו גורם הרי הוא חייב אע"פ שגדול בכה"ג פטור. והביא ראיה לזה דאל"כ האיך שייך חינוך בקטן הרי קיי"ל דמצות צריכות כוונה, וקטן לאו בר כוונה הוא. א"ו כיון שחסרון זה הוא מחמת קטנותו הוי כמום עובר וחייב בחינוך בכה"ג. ובזה מיישב קושיית התוס' ב. בד"ה איזהו, דאף למ"ד כולן תשלומין דראשון וקטן אינו יכול להביא בראשון, היינו רק מחמת קטנותו ומש"ה שפיר מחייב לחנכו בשאר הימים. ומטעם זה הוסיף בשפ"א שאף קטן שאינו מדבר מחמת קטנותו כיון שיכול לאחוז בידו של אביו חייב בשמחה אע"פ שגדול שהוא אלם פטור. ונראה לפרש דטעמא דכלל זה דכל שגדול בכה"ג פטור לא מחנכינן ליה לקטן משום שכל התכלית של חינוך הוא "שיהא סרוך אחר מנהגו כשיגדיל", ואילו הוי מחנכינן ליה לקטן שהוא חולי ופטור בכה"ג כשיגדיל הוא נגד ענין של חינוך דהוי כאילו מלמדו שגדול בכה"ג מחייב שהוא ההיפוך מהאמת. לפיכך כל שקטנותו גורם ליכא למיחש למידי שהרי יבין הקטן לכשיגדיל דכיון שהיה מחמת קטנותו חייב אבל כשהוא מחמת חולי אחר פטור
אמנם אכתי קשה לי בשיטת רש"י, שכתב במשנה בד"ה שלש, וז"ל הראוי לעלות ברגליו חייב הכתוב וכיון דגדול פטור מה"ת קטן לאו בר חינוך הוא עכ"ל. הרי משמע מרש"י דסברת ב"ה לחלוק על ב"ש הוא דמדמינן קטן לגדול ממש וא"א לומר שחייב מכשיודע לרכוב על כתפיו, דכיון דגדול בכה"ג פטור ה"נ קטן, אלא דילפינן מרגלים דדוקא כשראוי לעלות ברגליו חייב דבכה"ג גדול נמי חייב. וזה תמוה שהרי אף כשיודע לאחוז בידו של אביו הא גדול בכה"ג פטור כמש"כ רש"י בעצמו ד. בד"ה דבר, כיון שהוא צריך משענת אחרת מלבד מרגליו, דהיינו ידו של אביו וצ"ע

חגיגה ו' ע"ב

בתד"ה יש בשמחה שאין בשתיהן כתב ובתוספתא גרסינן שהשמחה יש לה תשלומין כל שבעה ולא בשתיהן וכו' ושמעתתא שלנו וכו' סבירא ליה דגם באינך יש להן תשלומין. ותמהו האחרונים מה תשלומין שייך בשמחה דהרי חובת שמחה היא כל יום לאכול מבשר הקרבנות. ומכאן אחת ראיותיו של בעל האבי עזרי שיש שני דינים בחיוב שמחה אחת יש חיוב הקרבה דשלמי שמחה דומיא דשלמי חגיגה וחיוב זה שווה לנשים ואנשים וכן אינו בא מן החובה ויש עןד חיוב של שמחת יו"ט ע"י אכילת בשר קרבנות דבזה יוצא ובא מן החובה וכן בזה נשים לא מצוות אלא מכח החיוב של בעלה לשמח את אשתו. ואכמ"ל ע"ש וכבר הזכרנו שהחזו"א חולק בתוקף על דין מחודש זה ומין שלא מוזכר במשנה וברמב"ם אלא דרך רמז וכו' ומודפס בסוף האבי עזרי

where does G-d cry

The Gemara brings the Pasuk that G-d cries in the hideness. Then at the end the gemara says that he cries for the Bais Hamikdash in the inner and outer chambers. But there is a Machlokes in the Girsa between Rabeinu Chananel and Rashi as to where G_d cries for other things besides for the Bais Hamikdash.

Rashi Learns that he cries only in the inner chambers and not in the outer chambers. The reason Rashi says this is because the Pasuk that the Gemara starts off with seems to indicate that he cries in the inner chambers in hiding so this was simple to the gemara but the chidush of the gemara is that for the bais hamikdash he even cries in the outer chambers.

Philosophically this is very difficult, for we know that everything that happens is for good. So we understand that although things might look very bad on the outside in the inner core its all good as the Pasuk says "oz v'chedva b'mkomo". This is why Rabeni Chananel learns that usually the cry is only in the outer chamber. This I took from a discussion that goes more in depth into this with a mystical depth that is beyond me.

Chagiga 4b - Tochacha of Yosef

The gemara says that if the tochacha of yosef caused his brothers to be speechless, certainly the tochacha of hashem will do the same. Maharsha asks that we don't find that Yosef gave tochacha to his brothers? See Beis Haleivi on parshas vayigash that Yosef's comment "is my father still alive" is the greatest tochacha possible bec. it proved that their entire story was based on falsehood and lies. Similarly on the yom hadin even for things where we seem to have good excuses and a plausible story, Hashem will show the underlying contradictions in our actions - AYEIN SHAM.

Chagiga 4b - What do the dead know?

The gemara says that when Shmuel thought he was being summoned to din he brought Moshe Rabeinu along with him as a prop to indicate that he had not neglected to fulfill anything in Toras Moshe. Tosafos comment that Moshe could not testify to what Shmuel had done during his lifetime because he did not live at the same time as him.
This comment is difficult to understand in light of the sugya in Berachos 18b where the gemara discusses the idea that the dead are aware of what happens in this world. Maharitz Chayes notes this and suggests that the dead are shown what is happening down here but do not have insight into a person's innermost thoughts. Thus, Moshe could not authoritatively say that Shmuel observed the mitzvos that have to do with a person's beliefs and thoughts.
Although the gemara Menachos 29b says that Moshe got a glimpse into Rabi Akiva's classroom, there is no source in shas that I know of to suggest that Moshe saw all generations as Adam did in Sanhedrin 38b (dor dor v'dorshav).
Of note is Tosafos in Shabbos 12b where the gemara says that one who prays in lashon Arami does not have the malachei hashareis aid his tefillos because they don't understand lasho Arami. Tosafos comments that it is odd that the angels wouldn't know lashon arami considering that they even know a person's innermost thoughts. Apparently Tosafos assumes that angels know what we are thinking, but according to Maharitz Chayes (on our sugya) the same is not true of the dead. See also Rav Yakov Emden there who wonders where Tosafos gets this idea from, especially since the angels who came to visit Avraham inquired about Sarah's whereabouts implying that they didn't know where she was. (This is a strange comment considering Rashi on chumash based on the gemara tells us that they knew exactly where she was but were just trying to make her chaviv al ba'alah).

Mazel Tov on moed katan - Moed home stretch! Chagiga 2

(in lieu of Reb Avi who seems to be without an Internet connection during Chol Hamoed!)

in "the rosh yeshiva remembers" (Rav Bergmans book about Rav Schach tranalated by atscrol) page 266 he bring azoy:
Rav Schach in a periodical publication argues that there is a special mitzva to bring שלמי שמחה in addition to tothe mitzv of eating as part of simchas y"t. the chazon Ish argued with him sharply and held that if a Jew brings such an offering as a Mitzva he would transgress בל תוסיף. The chazon Ish held that there is a mitzah to eat meat of a kurban and if he has no other Kurban he would bring a שלמים. Later rav shach was showed that the אמרי ברוך also holds like him. The issue is the rambam in beg of Hilchos Chagiga.
Later Rav shach was asked from a Gemara Menachos 90b where the ברייתא lists the obligation that come with y"t as Olos R'iya and Shalmei Chagiga but does not mention Shalmei Simcha. Raz scach agreed that his was proof to the chazon ish (see more aci ezri hilchos chagga). The story in the book was brought with more details to show the humilty of Rav Schach, see there.

how to be menachem avel

the gemara at the end of the masechta is the source for not starting to talk before the avel, this can cause feelings of uncomfortableness especially with people that don't know the halacha.

rav elyashiv explains that the reason for this halacha is that you have to understand what exactly is most troubling to the avel so you can console him properly (a little psychology 101 from the great sage!). so being menachem an avel consists of 2 parts, being quiet and showing the avel this his loss is beyond words and description and you really have no way of consoling him (this is found rally in the prisha 393:3) the 2nd part is when you understand what really is troubling the avel you may try and talk to him about it.

here come the heter, since we don't console properly anyway, this 2nd part is a lost art (or for the most part anyway) and therefor he allows the following: one should come in and sit quietly for some time after which he is allowed to talk before the avel since this halacha is not stam an isur but a realistic way to be menachem and if you cannot achive this you may talk.

there is a story of rav pam coming to be menachem a family that lost a young girl and he was involved thru-out the ordeal, he came in and just sat there quietly and you saw the pain in his eyes, this was the family's greatest consolation. NOR OF SIMCHOS!

m"k 28a - dyung at 52 and the pesach connection

Finally a pesach connection! I will quote the Maharsha. The gemara says that dying @ 52 is a death like Shmuels.
the maharsha explains that a person lives for 70 years. these 70 years consist of 20 years before he is liable in heaven and then 50 mature years. those 50 years are parallel to the 5o years of the sefira and the yovel. where-as one must count for 49 to reach his goal on the 50th year (or 70th in a lifetime).
the 52 years of shmuel is when 2/3 of his adult years pass with out sinning; that is: the 50 adult years consist of 3 x 16 years (rounded) so 32 years into his adult years or 20 junior years + 32 adult years = 52 years. this is what the gemara says in yuma that chana said of her son that if most of his years will pass without sin he wont sin. so shmuel died after the age when he was proven that רובא דמוכח of his life passed with out sin (this is why shmuels death is NOT a כרת כך נלענ"ד).
In parallel, if Man was crated in nissan this means the 1st day of creation is 25th of adar. the 20 days of immaturity end on pesach till then the jews were not punished for their deeds in Mitzrayim, then comes the 50 days counting to Shvuos. the 32 day of the count - the day of 2/3 maturity parallel to the 52nd day of shmuel is ל"ג בעומר which we celebrate as a yom tov.
the word יובל itself is a רמז by having ל"ב on one side and י"ו of the count on the other.

מו"ק כ"ו ב' קריעה ותוספת קריעה -האם התוספת חלה על כל הקריעה או על מקצתה

in the מחלוקת of כל שבעה קורע or כל שלושים קורע the Gemara seems to say that the reason one can just add onto an existing ripping is because it is getting sewed up to some extent. meaning that adding onto an existing קריעה doesn't fulfil the din of קריעה only that since it was fixed either by being נשלל or מתאחה and therefor now a full קירעה can be performed.

the problem is that why then did the gemara say in the beginning of the amud that if one ripped for a father and a son the part that was for the father cannot be מתאחה but the part for the son can be fixed. for example, in the case of the intial rip made for the son and the extension of that קריעה for the father why is the initial rip for the son fixable since this same rip is now part of the 2nd קריעה for the father.

it seems that the second קריעה isn't actually using the 1st as part of it, rather only the additional rip is used to fulfil the din of קריעה its just that during שבעה or שלושים this rip is "in use" for another מת and therefor the extension of this same rip cannot be used for another מת. (this all is the meaning of a comment in the "הערות" - in my eyes) still this extension only has an importance of a rip since this garment already has a rip of a tefach והבן.

another wonder is both of the answers of the gemara in the latter part of the amud: ...התם משום כבוד אשה and התם משום כבוד אביו ואמו forgive me for not quoting the שקלא וטריא but the problem of the gemara was that by the case of the woman even during shiva she should be able to rip since she already fixed it and conversely by the father or mother one should not be able to rip even after 30 days since it isn't fixable - the question is understandable but what is the answer?

again it seems that this extra din of honor to a woman and conversely to father doesn't change the status of the actual קריעה and therefor a woman may not rip even during shiva for her rip is still "in use" for the 1st מת and conversely the rip for a father and mother is no longer in use after שלושים even if the din of honor doesn't let him fix it.

Moed Kattan 23b - Aveilus and Aninus

Tosafos discusses the difference between aveilus (post burial) and aninus (pre burial). During Aninus one is forbidden to eat meat and drink wine, and is prohibited in marital relations as apparent from the gemara. During Aveilus one must not wear shoes, and must perform atifas harosh, and turning over the beds (Re: Washing Clothes and cutting hair tosafos assumes that it is assur by both - What would Tosafos would say about bathing during aninus?)

What is the reason for the difference?

Tosafos explains that expression of "aveilus" which presumably mean methods of expressing sadness apply only during aveilus, but aninus is more along the lines of distracting one from showing the proper kavod to the meis and from performing the mitzvah of kevurah. One would think that aninus is more of a din in kavod for the meis, whereas aveilus is an true expression of sadness. However, Rashi in Succah 25a seems to assume that aveilus is also only for the purpose of showing kavod for the meis. Although they are both ways of showing kavod, the needs are different. During Aninus the kavod is to be involved actively, but during aveilus the kavod is to express sorrow.

Moed Kattan 21a - Mourner Tefilin

For a continued discussion about this see earlier post on 15a
http://hearos.blogspot.com/2007/03/moed-kattan-15a-mourner-wearing.html

Moed Kattan 20b - Difference between Aveilus: Wife vs. Other Relatives

The Gemara implies (and Tosafos confirms) that when one's wife is an Avel, they must be nohegaveilus with her out of respect for her. However, this only applies when she is an Avel for one of her parents, but if she is an Avel for her son or other relatives the husband does not have to keep Aveilus even in front of her. But when it comes to other relatives, the gemara is clear that even if one's son is an avel for his son, the grandfather must keep aveilus in front of his son (Tosafos is not sure whether this would apply to other relatives that the son is an avel for i.e. wife or only to descendents - see nimuke yosef that this may apply to all blood relatives such as one's father sitting shiva for his brother i.e. uncle). Why it there a difference between a wife and other relatives?

It seems that the aveilus that is done in front of a father or son while they are in shiva for their father or son, is actually a form of aveilus for one's grandfather and grandson directly (it is not just a din in kavod). But when one is noheg aveilus in front of their wife for her relatives, since there is no blood relation to the deceased, it is definitely not aveilus for the niftar. Rather, as the gemara says, it is a din in kavod ishto. It seems that the geder of this kavod is that one must express kavod ishto by participating in aveilus for those she is required to show kavod for i.e. parents. Meaning, it is not purely a kavod ishto din, but rather similar to the din kavod for a grandfather, son is bound to respect father and father is bound to respect his father, so son must respect grandfather. Similarly, one is required to respect his wife (see rambam in Ishus), and she is required to respect her parent, so the husband must respect his in laws both in life and in death. Based on this distinction, nowadays where we are not noheg this din at all, it is easily explained by a wife since kavod she can be mochel on, but when it comes to a grandfather and grandson it is not just a kavod din rather a hilchos aveilus din, so how can we not do it?

day starts when?

The rishonim say that an Avel get up from Shiva after נץ and the reason is from the Gemara in Megilla that לכתחילה one has to wait for נץ. Rav Elyashiv wonders that its not a proof for the laws of mourning which are of rabinic nature whereas there it was things that apply to torah law.
Perhaps this is a proof to the very big חידוש of Rav Moshe in יו"ד א' עמוד שנ"ו that argues on rashi and the minchas chinuch and says that נץ is the beginning of day מדאורריתא and עלות is day בדיעבד מדאורייתא, but still Rav moshe is saying a VERY big chidush - see there.

Moed Kattan 19a - Avel: Difference Between Yom Tov and Shabbos

The Mishna says that Shabbos counts towards shiva but does not stop it, whereas Regel stops it but does not count toward it. The simple understanding as pointed out by Nimukei Yosef is that Regel has simcha associated with it, which is more powerful than oneg of shabbos.

Perhaps the mishna can be explained based on another line of thinking. The mishna indicates that one day yom tovim such as shavuos, r"h and y"k may have a "shabbos" status rather than regel. The nimukei yosef explains the rationale is that regel should really be no better than shabbos, meaning it should count toward shiva but not stop it. But, since pesach and succos are 7 days, even if they count toward aveilus they will end up stopping it. Based on this logic, even the chachamim may hold that we don't want to distinguish between one regel and another so we allow even shavuos to stop the aveilus. According to this line of thinking shabbos and Regel are exactly the same (except for the private things such as relations and studying torah, that is assur on shabbos but is mutar on regel). If aveilus began before then shabbos and regel "count" but by regel (pesach and succos) that translates into stopping the shiva (and lo p'lug for shavuos). But, if the burial takes place only during the regel then the regel doesn't even count toward shiva and the same would be true by shabbos, just that there is never a burial on shabbos.

However, regarding regel stopping the sheloshim, the gemara implies that the logic is totally different. Really regel should count toward 30, but not stop it. But, since we allow grooming for kavod haregel on erev yom tov, "ho'il v'hutra hutra" - once we allow violation of sheloshim, we don't want to go back and assur it. That is why rav and rav huna insist that one must take advantage of the heter to shave in order to abolish the sheloshim, whereas r' sheishes/abah shaul would say that even if you didn't take advantage, since it was mutar we don't go back and assur it after the regel.

Moed Kattan 19a - Eating Matzah All 7 Days

There seems to be a strong proof from Tosafos to the opinion of the Gr"a that although there is no chiyuv to eat matzah every day of the 7 days, there is a mitzvah. Tosafos says that Chol Hamoed is considered an "os" and we do not put on Tefillin even acc. to the opinion that the issur melacha is only derabonon, bec. the mitzvah of matzah and succah make it an "os". Clearly Tosafos holds that there is at least a kiyum mitzvah to eat matzah and sit in the succah all 7 days. By Succos it is clear that it is a kiyum mitzvah bec. we even make a bracha, but the chiddush is that eating matzah on every day of the 7 days is also a kiyum mitzvah. See also B'al Hameor at the end of Pesachim who asks why we don't make a bracha on eating matzah all 7 days. His question is also a strong proof to the Gr"a.

Moed Kattan 17a - Using a Razor for a Moustache

Rabbeinu Chananel (brought in Nimukei Yosef Makos 4b b'dafei harif and Tur Y.D. 181) says that the 2 sides of the moustache are (2 out of 5 of the) areas that one is not allowed to shave with a razor. This is also brought in the Taz (181:3). L'ma'aseh we are choshesh for all the various shitos mentioned in Nimukei Yosef in Makos.

Rashi's peshat in our gemara is clearly against Rabbeinu Chananel. Rashi explains the story of the pair who came from 'chamsan', had they asked about shaving the moustache he would have been matir. Rashi explains that he would have been matir as far as the issur of "b'al Taschis p'as zikanecha". The Chasam Sofer is medayek from Rashi that he must hold like the Mordechai in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, that during aveilus it is only mutar with a shinuy (like tosafos), but he adds that this means specifically a knife rather than scissors (he seems to assume that a knife would not be a normal way to trim) and that is why there is a concern of hashchasa. The gemara says that the heter to cut the moustache is from corner to corner, which would certainly include the area mentioned by Rabbeinu Chananel. We see clearly that acc. to Rashi and other rishonim who would require the use of a knife rather than scissors, the ends of the moustache are not considered pe'os hazakan.

שמא יקדמנו אחר

בפשטות הגמרא קשה להבין, דקודם אמרינן דיש חשש שמא יקדמנו אחר ומהמעשה בגמרא משמע שרבא סבר דל"ש שיועיל בתפילה וכן בהמשך הגמרא מה' אשה לאיש משמע שבמזל תלוי ולא שייך לשנות בתפילה (עיין בעין יעקב). ובפשטות הביאור שהגמרא אומרת שצריך להיות תלוי במזל אך אם תפילה ושינוי מעשים שייך לשנות הזיווג (עיין שיטמ"ק ור"ן ותוס' הרא"ש ומהרש"א) ורק שאין זה עיצה טובה להרבות כ"כ בתפילה על פלונית מסויימת דדילמא היא לא ראויה לא וינשא לה כיוון דפעמים ה' שומע תפילתו אף לדבר שלא טוב בשבילו ולבסוף ישנאה. ואגב ביארו שמה שמבואר פה ברש"י בפשוטו זה וודאי טעות ואינו מפרש"י (ועיין רש"י ברי"ף). וכל זה שייך אף בזיווג ראשון ומתורץ קושית התוספות

אך מתוספות נראה שסובר שבזיווג ראשון ל"ש שישתנה כלל וידוע דהרבה סוברים דזיווג ראשון ושני אין הכוונה אשה הראשונה אלא שתלוי בדרגת הזכויות של האדם ומהאר"י אומרים שזיווג ראשון שייך רק בגלגול ראשון ורובם ככולם בגלגול שני ועוד שבד"כ אין הנשים מתגלגות אלא האנשים

ולגבי רמת ההשתלות המחוייבת בשידוכים היה נראה שאין נפ"מ בכל זה אלא תמים תהיה וצריך השתדלות כמו בכל דבר מצוה וכל א' כפי מדריגתו .

Moed Kattan 17b - Issur to Take Haircut during Regel

My post is a bit long and slightly involved so i am posting it in a comment. The issue is a discussion about the prohibition to shave during the regel when one was an avel before the regel, is it an issur bec. of regel or an issur aveilus bec. of sheloshim?

SEE COMMENT.

אילמלי אתה שאול והוא דוד

משיח בן דוד and משיח בן יוסף have different roots. Yosef was the one who resisted temptation where as Yehuda was the one who admitted his wrong doing. Dovid too sinned to teach תשובה as Rashi points out.

This is perhaps what the Gemara means, besides for the judgment on the actual sin there is a much greater judgment as to whether a person is doing his תפקיד in life. This concept is learned from a medrash that when a person goes to the heavenly court 3 מלאכים greed him 1 to judge his positive actions 1 to judge his negative ones and the 3rd to see "where he is holding". this 3rd מלאך is checking to see if he did his job (see גר"א משלי ו' ל"ג). Shaul's essence was not to sin - at all! so even few sins caused his demise, Dovid on the other hand is suppose to reveal T'shuva and as such "get's a brake

this has a little to do with the last discussion, for there is a story of a Yeshiva boy who was stomped with not knowing a simple Tosfos over lunch. He got so upset about it and left lunch with out bentching and went straight to the bais medrash and went on to become a great masmid and a gadol. The question is will he get punished for not bentching or do we say that since he fealt this surge of energy will get him going to complete his תפקיד he is a sort of an אונס and may bend the rules. i heard 2nd hand that one of the famous American poskim in erets yisroel justified this boy's actions. to me that is strange.

when do we bend the rules??

The age old question.
The 1st ט"ז in hilchos נידוי is a shocking one!
the rema there says that if one is חייב בנידוי we do so even if we suspect that he will be "יצא לתרבות רעה" the Gr"a there seems to agree and sites a Gemara in Kidushin 72b as a source. The Ta"z on the other hand disagrees sharply and brings a proof from the Gemara that we must redeem a jew who has been serving as a כומר לע"ז so surely he argues we should בשב ואל תעשה prevent him from going that way. I am not elobarting on the gemaros because you'lle can look it up.
My point being is that according to the Ta"z where does one draw the line, as some בחור asked me, would the Ta"z say the same by מלקות?.

Moed Kattan 16a - Rechilus

The Chofetz Chaim (10:5) proves from our gemara that rechilus is assur even if one is repeating to a gadol b'yisroel a degrading comment made by a "nobody". The gemara proves that the shliach beis din was allowed to report back to the beis din the degrading comments made by one being summoned about the beis din (Acc. to the girsa of Rosh that it was Rechilus, not loshon hora). This was a special dispensation given to a shliach beis din, which implies that otherwise it would be assur even in the situation of dasan and avirum degrading moshe Rabbeinu. It would seem clear then that R' Shimon who reported back to his father the comment made by bar kafra, was certainly loshon horah. Rashi defends R' Shimon by saying that it was "l'fi tumo".

Does Rashi mean to justify what R' Shimon did, or is Rashi simply stating that R' Shimon slipped by accidentally saying over rechilus?

Kefiyas Hamita

The gemara on 27a states that it is not sufficient for the avel to turn his bed over, but all of the beds in the house need to be turned over. The clear implication of the gemara is that kefiyas hamita is not a din in the avel, but in the beis ha'avel. The rishonim debate whether the beds of guests should be turned over (see Rosh #78). Furthermore, the Rosh holds that one who did not turn his bed over but did not sleep on it either (he slept on the floor) has violated this halacha, further implying that this is a din in the house and not in the avel himself. If he did kefiyas hamita and did not sleep on it , he has fulfilled his obligation. The Rosh continues to discuss why we don't do this anymore (see also Beis Yosef who suggests that we should at least turn over our blankets and pillows). This, of course, is not the only example of a din in the beis ha'avel rather than in the avel himself. There seems to be two dinim in talmud torah - an issur ont he avel to learn and an issur in the beis ha'avel (see שולחן ערוך סימן שמד שאין אומרים שמועה ואגדה בבית האבל וכן נקטינן דלא כרבי חנינא בן גמליאל - ועיין ברש"ש לקמן למה לא אמרינן הלכה כדברי המיקל באבל).
The Chasam Sofer famously suggested that our minhag to cover the mirrors is based in kefiyas hamita because the mirrors are where we find the expression of our tzelem elokim. Along similar lines, Rav Hershel Schachter shlit"a has suggested that photographs should also be covered in the beis ha'avel because they also represent the tzelem elokim. (I heard he did this during his recent shiva - when I visited on Shushan Purim his pictures were exposed)

Moed Kattan 15a - Mourner Wearing Tefillin

The gemara says that an avel does not wear tefillin. We pasken like R' Yehoshua on 21a that he only abstains from Tefillin on the first day. This is paskened in Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 388 and O.C. 38:5. It is not clear from the gemara and Shulchan Aruch if this exemption only applies when the day of burial is the day of death (which is d'oraysa aveilus acc. to behag and rif), or even if the burial is a day or 2 later we still exempt the avel from tefillin on the day of the burial. The Pischei Teshuva in Y.D. brings 2 opinions about this, and the M.B. is machria that we always exempt the avel on the day of burial from wearing tefillin even if it is not the day of death. This is clear from the Rosh. The Behag and the Rif are of the opinion that aveilus is d'oraysa on the first day, when the burial and death occur on the same day. Based on this it could be that the exemption of tefillin would only apply on the first day if it is "d'oraysa" meaning the yom hamisa and yom hakevura. However, the Rosh writes (end of siman 3) that the exemption from tefillin is even for aveilus d'rabonon. The Rabbonon felt that it was inappropriate to wear the crown of Tefillin while in a state of depression, therefore they uprooted the mitzvas aseh of tefillin on the day of the kevurah. It is for this reason that until the burial the avel does not put on tefillin (or do any positive mitzvah) bec. he is an onen, but even after the burial he does not put on tefillin later that day.

Moed Kattan 14a - Exemptions to Take Haircuts

The Mishna gives a list of people who couldn't take haircuts before regel and are therefore allowed to do in on regel. The reason for the issur on others to take haircuts is not bec. it is a melacha [Tosafos is mesupak if a full haircut is a melacha and the gemara may only be addressing a trim], but rather to prevent people from coming into the regel "menuval". So, What is the peshat in the heter for the people listed in the mishna: Was the issur only said as a prevention to coming into moed menuval, so one who could not take a haircut before is not included in the issur; or the issur was made across the board for concern of people coming into yom tov menuval, just that in a situation of o'nes there is a special leniency to allow them to take a haircut?

It seems to me that this is really the shaila of the gemara about one who lost an object. If the heter is just that a case where one could not do it before, is not included in the issur, then certainly one who looses an object would also qualify. But if the heter is an exemption for o'nes then chazal made a blanket issur and were only matir for a case that is clear to all that it is an o'nes, to the exclusion of one who lost an object. V'DOK.

Moed Kattan 12b - Setting Aside Work for Moed

Rashi and Tosafos seem to argue what the case of kivein milachto b'moed ye'avdu is. Rashi says it is talking where he left it for moed and already did it; ye'avdu means it is assur b'hana'ah. Tosafos (and Nimukei Yosef) seem to understand that it is speaking where you pushed it off for chol hamoed but did not yet do it so the mishna says he can't do it relying that it is now davar ha'aveid; yeavdu means you have to let the melacha go to waste and not do it. Obviously Rashi is more machmir then Tosafos by introducing an issur hana'ah.

The gemara's question about penalizing the son. Acc. to rashi, if the father did the work and the outcome is assur b'hana'ah, is it also assur b'hana'ah to the son. Tosafos learns that the father did not do the work and the question is whether the son can do it.

Tosafos would never hold that there is an issur hana'ah for the father or the son. But, we can still ask that even acc. to the conclusion of the gemara that there is no penalty of issur hana'ah for the son (acc. to rashi), if the melacha was not yet done would we allow the son to do it. Rashi may be more lenient than Tosafos acc. the maskanah whether we would let the son do a melacha left by the father, even though he is more machmir regarding the bidieved to create an issur hana'ah on the outcome of the melacha for the father.

Moed Kattan - Issur Melacha on Chol Hamoed

I was having a discussion last night with R' Menachem Spira regarding what types of melacha are assur on chol hamoed. We discussed 2 issues:

1. The Gemara on 10b gives a list of things such as digging, letting water in the field, cutting branches from a palm... and says that if done in a certain way that shows that you need if for yom tov it is mutar, but if not it is assur. R' Spira asked that even if done in a way where your intent is not for the melacha, it should still be assur bec. of psik reisha? At first I thought that the nature of issur melacha on chol hamoed which is tircha rather than melacha would not include psik reisha, but rather all davar she'eino miskavein, even a psik reisha would be mutar. However, Tosafos 4b says in the context of shevi'is that psik reisha would be assur even on shevi'is. But, we learn from tosafos that if it is done with a shinuy, meaning if it is done differently than the melacha is normally done, it is mutar. Therefore, the heter for these cases on chol hamoed is perhaps not davar sh'eino miskavein, but rather shinuy?

2. How do the 39 melachos of shabbos relate to chol hamoed? Do we assume they are all assur unless there is a special heter for tzorech yom tov, davar ha'aveid, ein lo ma yochal e.t.c. or do we assume that they are all mutar unless they involve either tircha and ma'aseh uman? Tosafos 12b seems to be misupak whether tircha that is not a melacha is assur (such as pragmatia which is not a real melacha), or must the tircha be associated with melacha to be assur. The gemara about building the amah 4b implies that chol hamoed it is an issur tircha even if not associated with a melacha (like choresh), it is only to explain why it is assur by shevi'is does the gemara have to make the comparison to choresh. It seems clear that tircha is assur on chol hamoed even if it is not a melacha, bec. it is like uvda d'chol (similarly, the rosh also points out from the fixers of the reish gelusa 12a, that even when the melacha is b'etzem mutar bec. it is not a real melacha, the receiving of payment creates an issur bec. it is uvda d'chol). But, I don't think that there is any place where we see melacha is assur even if not a tircha. We actually find the hagdara of the issur melacha is "tircha" as the gemara distinguishes between chol hamoed and shevi'is on 2b and also implies this on 13a.

Moed Kattan 12b - Adam Chashuv

The gemara uses the concept of adam chashuv a few times to say that even something which is mutar m'ikar hadin, should not be done by an adam chashuv. It is not clear if the reason is b'geder "ba'al nefesh yachmir" or if the reason is that even though it is totally mutar, people will be midameh it to something assur and come to be matir an issur. Rashi in Shabbos 51 explains that an adam chashuv should be more machmir bec. someone will see that he is lenient and come to be more lenient.
The sho'el in Igros Moshe O.C. 1:96 challenged R' Moshe about riding in a car to the Yeshiva after candle lighting bec. it was mar'as ayin. R' Moshe responds by explaining that mar'as ayin is when you do something that is mutar that people will confuse with something that is actually assur, but here the people are making a mistake in thinking that it is assur when it is mutar. That is called "am ha'ratzus" not "mar'as ayin" (That phrase is my own, not R' Moshe's!). Perhaps our gemara is a source that the sho'el is correct, in that an adam chashuv should not do something that is mutar if people will think that it is assur. Perhaps this is why R' Moshe refrained from driving to the Yeshiva from then on (as he writes about himself) and just argues the point that it is not an actual issur of ma'aris ayin. Also, if one reads the Teshuva carefully it seems that he rejects the notion that a few people who see would make a mistake and think that it is assur, would make it assur, since it is known to almost everyone that it is mutar. But in a case where many people may think that it is assur, even though it is mutar, an adam chashuv should refrain from doing it.

Moed Kattan 11b - Chol Hamoed vs. Aveilus

The gemara seems to assume that chol hamoed is an issur melacha d'oraysa as rashi implies (although tosafos chagiga 18a and the rosh at the beginning of the meseches learns the gemara to be lav davka) and aveilus is only d'rabonon (or at least melacha during aveilus is only d'rabonon as tosafos points out 14b). The machlokes in the gemara seems to be that R' Ashi holds that it is more mistaver to be machmir by chol hamoed which is d'oraysa (since we are meikil on chol hamoed certainly we are meikil for aveilus) than aveilus d'rabonon. R Shisha seems to hold that it is more mistaver to be machmir by aveilus which is d'rabonon than chol hamoed which is d'oraysa. This seems a bit strange. Are they arguing in general whether we are concerned to be mechazek drabonon's more than Torah laws?

Moed Kattan 10b - What is a Davar Ha'aveid?

The Rosh writes that although an opportunity to sell merchandise on chol hamoed for a high profit and after yom tov the profit will be minimal, is not considered davar ha'aveid. We see from the yerushalmi that a merchant who has an opportunity to buy merchandise on chol hamoed for a cheap price, and the opportunity will be lost after yom tov, [and certainly the opportunity to sell on chol hamoed for a high price which will be lost after yom tov] is considered davar ha'aveid and it is mutar. The language of the Rosh is "Loosing an opportunity to profit is considered a loss since it is not common". Shulchan Aruch paskens like this Rosh 639:5. The question is, why is this considered "davar ha'aveid"? Isn't davar ha'aveid only a loss of principal that you already have in your hands i.e. produce rotting?

I thought that perhaps we are speaking about the capital that one has invested in their business and is designated for buying and selling. That cash is not considered cash since its whole purpose it to invest in merchandise. The cash is considered a commodity like the merchandise who's value is determined by the amount of goods that it can be traded for. Therefore, just as one can offload merchandise on chol hamoed if it will loose its value by the time yom tov is over, one can also offload their "cash goods" on chol hamoed since it will loose its value in relation to the amount of merchandise that can be purchased with it by the time yom tov is over. Based on this, the heter of the Rosh would only apply to capital invested in the business, but would not necessarily allow for new cash to be invested in the merchandise.

But, someone in my shiur [Stan Sussman] pointed out that the simple understanding is that a lost opportunity to profit is deemed by halacha as a loss bec. the nature of business is to survive and prosper by taking advantage of these opportunities.