L'iluy Nishmas: Shifra Bas Horav Moshe
The Mishna L'melech (shechita 1:26) discusses a situation where a single witness testifies that a certain shochet did a pasul shechita. If there were 2 witnesses to this fact, the halacha states that we assume he is an invalid shochet and one cannot eat from any of the previous animals that he shechted. Although the single witness is not believed to ruin all the shechitos of this shochet, the question is whether we use the concept of shavya anafshei chaticha d'issura, to forbid this single witness from eating from not only this shechita (that he is passuling), but from every other shechita that this shochet has done. The Mishna L'melech wants to prove that this witness cannot eat from any shechita of this shochet, from our gemara. The gemara says that according to the opinion that when the buyer presents a later contract, it invalidates the earlier contract because it is the equivalent of saying that the earlier contract and the witnesses signed in it were liars. Rashi explains that he "invalidates the witnesses". Clearly, the buyer is not believed to invalidate the witnesses, so the Ran explains that Rashi simply means that he invalidates the witnesses for himself. Meaning that these witnesses cannot testify any other testimony for this buyer, since he was shavya anafshei to consider them pessulim (Tosafos indicates something similar, except that Tosafos sounds like it would not be a din of shavya anafshei, rather a din of being 'modeh' that for any of the contracts that this buyer has with these witnesses signed, he is admitting them to be passul. I think that would be a significant difference between the Ran and Tosafos whether these witnesses would be able to testify for this buyer in the future - acc. to tosafos yes, and acc. to ran no). Based on the Ran we see that shavya anafshei cannot only effect the issue that he is testifying about, but would have the full impact of 2 witnesses regarding all other past and future events that effect the individual witness.
3 comments:
your explanation of the ran and tosfos is eye-opening.
brings to mind the קצות ל"ד סק"ד where he debates if שוויא אנפשיה is מדין נדר or מדין נאמנות לנפשיה
accordingly, you will say the ran holds it is a נאמנות and tosfos will hold נדר.
perhaps.
ps. it was nice seeing you, hopefully only in simchos...
The Shaar Hamishpat (92:7) disagrees with the comparison: The Maharik rules that all meat slaughtered by this shochet will be permitted to eat by the witness because there is a double doubt; perhaps, he has slaughtered the animal properly and perhaps he repented. Just because he slaughtered improperly (according to the witness’ testimony) one time, it is not logical that we should prohibit his slaughtered meat forever. However, in respect to testimony, once the recipient has stated that these witnesses testified falsely, they will be disqualified to offer testimony for him forever. Even according to those that hold that we can apply the principle of a double doubt in regards to monetary judgments, here, it will not apply. What can be said? Perhaps the witnesses will testify truthfully and perhaps they repented. This logic is not applicable by testimony, for testimony functions as a proof, and if we are uncertain if the witnesses repented or not, they cannot be accepted as witnesses because we have no proof that they are testifying truthfully. Therefore, they will not be believed for all future testimonies regarding this recipient.
The Pri Chadash (Y.D. 1, 14) asks: Why don’t we apply the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura,” one who states that something is forbidden, even if he is not believed in respect to everyone else, renders the object forbidden to him (as is evident from the Gemora in Kesuvos 9a)? All the meat slaughtered by this shochet should be forbidden to this witness!?
The Pri Megadim (Sifsei Daas, ibid, 41) answers that the Maharik is referring to a case where the witness retracted and said that he had testified falsely. In such cases, the principle of “shavya a’nafshei chaticha d’issura” does not apply.
Rav Elyashiv answers: The reason why one can render the object forbidden with the principle of “shavya a’nafshei” is not because he is believed in respect to himself; rather, it is because it is regarded as an oath. The witness is taking a vow forbidding himself from this particular object. Accordingly, he explains that the witness who testified regarding the shochet it making a vow that he will not eat the meat from this animal, however, he will not be prohibited, on account of his vow, against eating from any other animal that this shochet slaughters.
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