I think that it is worthwhile pointing out an extremely important yesod in p'sak from Rashi. People often ask how R' Moshe would pasken differently in similar situations where the tzad kula and tzad chumrah were applicable to both. There are a few teshuvos in Igros Moshe that "contradict" one another. Many people are comfortable with assuming that he changed his mind which is a very shallow approach to answer very deep points. Furthermore, i have heard from many who were close to r' moshe that he seldom, if ever, changed his mind.
The answer lies in Rashi.
Rashi explains that the concept of "eilu v'eilu divrei eloki chaim" does not apply when 2 people argue about the opinion of a third. Clearly, one of them must be wrong, since that third person either held this way or that but not both. However, when there is a machlokes on a halacha whether something is mutar or assur, tahor or tamei..... we can apply "eilu v'eilu" since both perspectives and sevaros may be correct, just that sometimes based on the specific details of the situations it is more appropriate to apply the sevara l'hakel and sometimes more appropriate to apply the sevara l'hachmir "becaue the reason [that should be applied] can be reversed based on a slight change in circumstance". Anyone with even some experience in learning realizes the absolute truth of Rashi's statement and that is why the artscroll-type halacha books are very limited in ruling halacha l'maseh.
Rashi explains that the concept of "eilu v'eilu divrei eloki chaim" does not apply when 2 people argue about the opinion of a third. Clearly, one of them must be wrong, since that third person either held this way or that but not both. However, when there is a machlokes on a halacha whether something is mutar or assur, tahor or tamei..... we can apply "eilu v'eilu" since both perspectives and sevaros may be correct, just that sometimes based on the specific details of the situations it is more appropriate to apply the sevara l'hakel and sometimes more appropriate to apply the sevara l'hachmir "becaue the reason [that should be applied] can be reversed based on a slight change in circumstance". Anyone with even some experience in learning realizes the absolute truth of Rashi's statement and that is why the artscroll-type halacha books are very limited in ruling halacha l'maseh.
Specifically, this would explain why some talmidim of r' moshe claim that he would often be matir "kohanim" to marry divorced women claiming that they are not really kohanim, when others claim this is not a blanket heter (the first opinion is that of many of the younger talmidim who claim to have witnessed many cases where he was matir, whereas the second is the opinion of r' dovid feinstein and r' nota greenblatt who claim that there may be specific cases where he applied certain tzdadim to be meikel, but it was never used as a blanket heter).
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